

District Judge Tiffany M. Cartwright

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

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JUAN ADRIAN GALVAN,

Case No. 2:25-cv-02349-TMC

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Petitioner,

FEDERAL RESPONDENTS'  
RETURN MEMORANDUM

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v.

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LAURA HERMOSILLO, *et al.*,

Noted for Consideration:  
December 4, 2025

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Respondents.

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Petitioner Juan Adrian Galvan seeks habeas relief from his mandatory immigration

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detention. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detains him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

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1225(b). Federal Respondents acknowledge that this Court granted summary judgment and

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found that detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) of the defined class in *Rodriguez*

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*Vazquez v. Bostock* is unlawful. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025

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WL 2782499 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025). That decision is presently on appeal. *Rodriguez*

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*Vazquez v. Bostock*, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, Dkt. 71.

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A. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)

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While acknowledging the Court's decision in *Rodriguez Vazquez*, Federal Respondents

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continue to believe Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

1 See *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025)  
2 (holding petitioner detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)); *Sixtos Chavez v. Noem*, --- F. Supp.  
3 3d ---, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (same). Noncitizens who are apprehended  
4 shortly after illegally crossing the border and who are determined to be inadmissible due to  
5 lacking a visa or valid entry documentation, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A), may be removed  
6 pursuant to an expedited removal order unless they express an intention to apply for asylum or a  
7 fear of persecution in their home country. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(II). “The purpose  
8 of these provisions is to expedite the removal from the United States of aliens who indisputably  
9 have no authorization to be admitted to the United States, while providing an opportunity for  
10 such an alien who claims asylum to have the merits of his or her claim promptly assessed by  
11 officers with full professional training in adjudicating asylum claims.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 828,  
12 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 209 (1996).

13 Applicants for admission fall into one of two categories. Section 1225(b)(1) covers  
14 noncitizens initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of  
15 valid documentation, and certain other noncitizens designated by the Attorney General in her  
16 discretion. Separately, Section 1225(b)(2) serves as a catchall provision that applies to all  
17 applicants for admission not covered by Section 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not  
18 relevant here). See *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

19 Congress has determined that all noncitizens subject to Section 1225(b) are subject to  
20 mandatory detention. Regardless of whether a noncitizen falls under Section 1225(b)(1) or  
21 (b)(2), the sole means of release is “temporary parole from § 1225(b) detention ‘for urgent  
22 humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,’ § 1182(d)(5)(A).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 283.

23 Further, several provisions at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 preclude review. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)  
24 bars review of Petitioner’s claims because they arise from the government’s decision to

1 commence removal proceedings. Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) bars the Court from hearing  
2 Petitioner's claims because his claims challenge the decision and action to detain him, which  
3 arises from the government's decision to commence removal proceedings, thus an "action taken  
4 . . . to remove an alien from the United States." Third and lastly, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3) applies  
5 and limits "[j]udicial review of determinations under section 1225(b) of this title and its  
6 implementation." The plain language of the statute precludes judicial review for noncitizens  
7 determined to be detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2) and applies to a "determination under  
8 section 1225(b)" and to its implementation.

9 **B. Petitioner Galvan**

10 As a threshold matter, there has been no bond determination in Petitioner's case. ICE has  
11 advised that Petitioner has not had a bond hearing before the Immigration Judge and the  
12 Immigration Judge has yet to make any findings regarding bond eligibility in this case.  
13 Accordingly, this petition is not ripe for this Court's consideration. *Deakins v. Monaghan*, 484  
14 U.S. 193, 199, (1988) ("Ripeness is an Article III doctrine designed to ensure that courts  
15 adjudicate live cases or controversies and do not 'issue advisory opinions [or] declare rights in  
16 hypothetical cases.'"); *Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty.*, 863 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017)  
17 (alteration in original) (quoting *Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n*, 220 F.3d 1134,  
18 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)) ("For a case to be ripe, it must present issues that are definite  
19 and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract."). Even if the Court were to consider the case,  
20 Petitioner has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him, and the petition  
21 should therefore be dismissed. *Leonardo v. Crawford*, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)  
22 ("When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should  
23 either dismiss the [habeas] petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner  
24 has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is excused."); *see also Rodriguez Mendoza, et al., v.*

1 *Raycraft*, et al., 2025 WL 3157796, at \*11 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2025) (finding that  
2 administrative exhaustion requirement not waived as futile when petitioner's appeal challenging  
3 the Immigration Judge's bond denial based on finding mandatory detention under Section 1225  
4 remained pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals, post-issuance of *Matter of Yajure*  
5 *Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)).

6 Alternatively, while Federal Respondents do not agree with the *Rodriguez Vazquez*  
7 decision and are still weighing their options on how to proceed, they do not oppose this  
8 Petitioner being considered a member of the Bond Denial Class<sup>1</sup> for purposes of this litigation.  
9 If the Court were to grant the habeas petition with respect to this Petitioner, the appropriate  
10 relief is not release. Instead, this Court should order the Immigration Judge to provide Petitioner  
11 a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1226(a), consistent with the Court's judgement in  
12 *Rodriguez*, 2025 WL 2782499, at \*27.

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23 <sup>1</sup> "Bond Denial Class": All noncitizens without lawful status detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center who  
24 (1) have entered or will enter the United States without inspection, (2) are not apprehended upon arrival, (3) are not  
or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the noncitizen is  
scheduled for or requests a bond hearing." *Rodriguez*, 2025 WL 2782499, at \*6.

1 DATED this 2nd day of December, 2025

2 Respectfully submitted,

3 CHARLES NEIL FLOYD  
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5 *s/ Katherine G. Collins*

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16 *I certify that this memorandum contains 926*  
17 *words, in compliance with the Local Civil Rules*