

1 ADAM GORDON  
United States Attorney  
2 LISA M. HEMANN  
Arizona State Bar No. 024703  
3 ERIN M. DIMBLEBY  
California State Bar No. 323359  
4 Assistant U.S. Attorneys  
Office of the U.S. Attorney  
5 880 Front Street, Room 6293  
San Diego, CA 92101-8893  
6 Telephone: (619) 546-6964/6987  
Facsimile: (619) 546-7751  
7 Email: Lisa.Hemann@usdoj.gov  
E-mail: Erin.Dimbleby@usdoj.gov

8 Attorneys for Respondents

9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 KAMALJEET SINGH,  
12 Petitioner,  
13 v.  
14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior  
15 Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, San  
16 Diego, California, *et al.*,  
17 Respondents.

Case No.: 25-cv-03239-JO-AHG  
**RETURN IN OPPOSITION TO  
HABEAS PETITION**

18 **I. Introduction and Summary of Argument**

19 Petitioner has filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is  
20 currently in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and is charged with  
21 inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the United  
22 States who has not been admitted or paroled. Exhibit 1 (Notice to Appear); ECF No. 1,  
23 ¶ 12. He was previously released on an Order of Recognizance. ECF No. 1, ¶ 10.  
24 Accordingly, Petitioner is mandatorily detained in Immigration and Customs  
25 Enforcement (ICE) custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

26 On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled on this  
27 issue in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). After detailed  
28 analysis, the BIA determined that based on the plain language of section 235(b)(2)(A)

1 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), Immigration Judges  
2 lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to noncitizens who are present in  
3 the United States without admission. Other district courts have followed the BIA’s  
4 approach. *See, e.g., Valencia v. Chesnut*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3205133 (E.D.  
5 Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); *Alonzo v. Noem*, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3208284 (E.D. Cal.  
6 Nov. 17, 2025); *Cabanas v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-cv-04830 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025);  
7 *Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3199872 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12,  
8 2025); *Mejia Olalde v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-00168-JMD (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); *Silva*  
9 *Oliveira v. Patterson*, No. 6:25-cv-01463, 2025 WL 3095972 (W.D. La. Nov. 4, 2025);  
10 *Barrios Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-cv-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31,  
11 2025); *Cirrus Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-1437-bhl, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct.  
12 30, 2025); *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb.  
13 Sept. 30, 2025); *Chavez v. Noem*, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal.  
14 Sept. 24, 2025); *Pena v. Hyde*, No. 25-11983-NMG, 2025 WL 2108913 (D. Mass. July  
15 28, 2025).

16 Based on the arguments below, the Court should deny any requests for relief and  
17 dismiss the petition.

## 18 II. Statutory Background

### 19 A. Individuals Seeking Admission to the United States

20 For over a century, this country’s immigration laws have authorized immigration  
21 officials to charge noncitizens as removable from the country, arrest those subject to  
22 removal, and detain them during removal proceedings. *See Abel v. United States*, 362  
23 U.S. 217, 232–37 (1960). “The rule has been clear for decades: ‘[d]etention during  
24 deportation proceedings [i]s ... constitutionally valid.’” *Banyee v. Garland*, 115 F.4th  
25 928 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003)), *rehearing by*  
26 *panel and en banc denied*, *Banyee v. Bondi*, No. 22-2252, 2025 WL 837914 (8th Cir.  
27 Mar. 18, 2025); *see Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“Detention is  
28 necessarily a part of this deportation procedure.”); *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523 n.7 (“In fact,

1 prior to 1907 there was no provision permitting bail for *any* aliens during the pendency  
2 of their deportation proceedings.”) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court even  
3 recognized that removal proceedings ““would be [in] vain if those accused could not be  
4 held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character.”” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at  
5 523 (quoting *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896)). Over the century,  
6 Congress has enacted a multi-layered statutory scheme for the civil detention of aliens  
7 pending a decision on removal, during the administrative and judicial review of removal  
8 orders, and in preparation for removal. *See generally* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226, 1231. It  
9 is the interplay between these statutes that is at issue here.

10 **B. Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225**

11 “To implement its immigration policy, the Government must be able to decide  
12 (1) who may enter the country and (2) who may stay here after entering.” *Jennings v.*  
13 *Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 286 (2018). Section 1225 governs inspection, the initial step  
14 in this process, *id.*, stating that all “applicants for admission . . . shall be inspected by  
15 immigration officers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). The statute—in a provision entitled  
16 “ALIENS TREATED AS APPLICANTS FOR ADMISSION”—dictates who “shall be  
17 deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission,” defining that term to  
18 encompass *both* an alien “present in the United States who has not been admitted *or*  
19 [one] who arrives in the United States . . . .” *Id.* § 1225(a)(1) (emphasis added). Section  
20 1225(b) governs the inspection procedures applicable to all applicants for admission.  
21 They “fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered  
22 by § 1225(b)(2).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287.

23 Section 1225(b)(1) applies to arriving aliens and “certain other” aliens “initially  
24 determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid  
25 documentation.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii). These  
26 aliens are generally subject to expedited removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. §  
27 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if the alien “indicates an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a  
28 fear of persecution,” immigration officers will refer the alien for a credible fear

1 interview. *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). An alien “with a credible fear of persecution” is  
2 “detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” *Id.*  
3 § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the alien does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express  
4 a fear of persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” they are detained until  
5 removed from the United States. *Id.* §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV).

6 Section 1225(b)(2) is “broader” and “serves as a catchall provision.” *Jennings*,  
7 583 U.S. at 287. It “applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).”  
8 *Id.* Under § 1225(b)(2), an alien “who is an applicant for admission” shall be detained  
9 for a removal proceeding “if the examining immigration officer determines that [the]  
10 alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”  
11 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); see *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 220 (BIA  
12 2025) (“[A]liens who are present in the United States without admission are applicants  
13 for admission as defined under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.  
14 § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings.”);  
15 *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66, 68 (BIA 2025) (“for aliens arriving in and seeking  
16 admission into the United States who are placed directly in full removal proceedings,  
17 section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), mandates detention ‘until  
18 removal proceedings have concluded.’”) (citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 299). However,  
19 DHS has the sole discretionary authority to temporarily release on parole “any alien  
20 applying for admission to the United States” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent  
21 humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” *Id.* § 1182(d)(5)(A); see *Biden v.*  
22 *Texas*, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022).

23 **C. Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)**

24 Section 1226 provides for arrest and detention “pending a decision on whether  
25 the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under § 1226(a),  
26 the government may detain an alien during his removal proceedings, release him on  
27 bond, or release him on conditional parole. By regulation, immigration officers can  
28 release an alien who demonstrates that he “would not pose a danger to property or

1 persons” and “is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). An  
2 alien can also request a custody redetermination (i.e., a bond hearing) by an IJ at any  
3 time before a final order of removal is issued. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. §§  
4 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1), 1003.19.

5 At a custody redetermination, the IJ may continue detention or release the alien  
6 on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1). IJs have  
7 broad discretion in deciding whether to release an alien on bond. *In re Guerra*, 24 I&N  
8 Dec. 37, 39-40 (BIA 2006) (listing nine factors for IJs to consider). But regardless of  
9 the factors IJs consider, an alien “who presents a danger to persons or property should  
10 not be released during the pendency of removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 38.

11 Section 1226(a) does not grant “any *right* to release on bond.” *Matter of D-J-*, 23  
12 I&N Dec. at 575 (citing *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952) (emphasis in  
13 original). Nor does it address the applicable burden of proof or particular factors that  
14 must be considered. *See generally* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Rather, it grants DHS and the  
15 Attorney General broad discretionary authority to determine, after arrest, whether to  
16 detain or release an alien during his or her removal proceedings. *See id.* If, after the bond  
17 hearing, either party disagrees with the decision of the IJ, that party may appeal the  
18 decision to the BIA. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(3), 1003.19(f), 1003.38, 1236.1(d)(3).

19 Included within the Attorney General and DHS’s discretionary authority are  
20 limits on the delegation to the immigration court. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B),  
21 the IJ does not have authority to redetermine the conditions of custody imposed by DHS  
22 for any arriving alien. The regulations also include a provision that allows DHS to  
23 invoke an automatic stay of any decision by an IJ to release an individual on bond when  
24 DHS files an appeal of the custody redetermination. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) (“The  
25 decision whether or not to file [an automatic stay] is subject to the discretion of the  
26 Secretary.”).

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1 **D. Review Before the Board of Immigration Appeals**

2 The BIA is an appellate body within the Executive Office for Immigration  
3 Review (EOIR) and possesses delegated authority from the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R.  
4 §§ 1003.1(a)(1), (d)(1). The BIA is “charged with the review of those administrative  
5 adjudications under the [INA] that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to  
6 it,” including IJ custody determinations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1), 236.1, 1236.1. The  
7 BIA not only resolves particular disputes before it, but is also directed to, “through  
8 precedent decisions, [] provide clear and uniform guidance to DHS, the immigration  
9 judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the  
10 [INA] and its implementing regulations.” *Id.* § 1003.1(d)(1). Decisions rendered by the  
11 BIA are final, except for those reviewed by the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. §  
12 1003.1(d)(7).

13 If an automatic stay of a custody decision is invoked by DHS, regulations require  
14 the BIA to track the progress of the custody appeal “to avoid unnecessary delays in  
15 completing the record for decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(3). The stay lapses in 90 days,  
16 unless the detainee seeks an extension of time to brief the custody appeal, 8 C.F.R.  
17 § 1003.6(c)(4), or unless DHS seeks, and the BIA grants, a discretionary stay. 8 C.F.R.  
18 § 1003.6(c)(5).

19 If the BIA denies DHS’s custody appeal, the automatic stay remains in effect for  
20 five business days. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(d). DHS may, during that five-day period, refer  
21 the case to the Attorney General under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) for consideration. *Id.*  
22 Upon referral to the Attorney General, the release is stayed for 15 business days while  
23 the case is considered. The Attorney General may extend the stay of release upon  
24 motion by DHS. *Id.*

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1 **III. Argument**

2 **A. Claims and Requested Relief Jurisdictionally Barred**

3 Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that this Court has subject matter  
4 jurisdiction over asserted claims. *See Ass’n of Am. Med. Coll. v. United States*, 217 F.3d  
5 770, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2000); *Finley v. United States*, 490 U.S. 545, 547-48 (1989).

6 In general, courts lack jurisdiction to review a decision to commence or  
7 adjudicate removal proceedings or execute removal orders. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)  
8 (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any  
9 alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence  
10 proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.”); *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-*  
11 *Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (“There was good reason for  
12 Congress to focus special attention upon, and make special provision for, judicial  
13 review of the Attorney General’s discrete acts of ‘commenc[ing] proceedings,  
14 adjudicat[ing] cases, [and] execut[ing] removal orders’—which represent the initiation  
15 or prosecution of various stages in the deportation process.”); *Limpin v. United States*,  
16 828 Fed. App’x 429 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding district court properly dismissed under 8  
17 U.S.C. § 1252(g) “because claims stemming from the decision to arrest and detain an  
18 alien at the commencement of removal proceedings are not within any court’s  
19 jurisdiction”). In other words, § 1252(g) removes district court jurisdiction over “three  
20 discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to  
21 ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” *Reno*, 525 U.S.  
22 at 482 (emphasis removed). Congress has explicitly foreclosed district court jurisdiction  
23 over claims that necessarily arise “from the decision or action by the Attorney General  
24 to commence proceedings [and] adjudicate cases . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

25 Section 1252(g) also bars district courts from hearing challenges to the method  
26 by which the government chooses to commence removal proceedings, including the  
27 decision to detain an alien pending removal. *See Alvarez v. ICE*, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203  
28 (11th Cir. 2016) (“By its plain terms, [§ 1252(g)] bars us from questioning ICE’s

1 discretionary decisions to commence removal” and bars review of “ICE’s decision to  
2 take [plaintiff] into custody and to detain him during his removal proceedings”).

3 Other courts have held, “[f]or the purposes of § 1252, the Attorney General  
4 commences proceedings against an alien when the alien is issued a Notice to Appear  
5 before an immigration court.” *Herrera-Correra v. United States*, No. 08-2941 DSF  
6 (JCx), 2008 WL 11336833, at \*3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008). “The Attorney General  
7 may arrest the alien against whom proceedings are commenced and detain that  
8 individual until the conclusion of those proceedings.” *Id.* at \*3. “Thus, an alien’s  
9 detention throughout this process arises from the Attorney General’s decision to  
10 commence proceedings” and review of claims arising from such detention is barred  
11 under § 1252(g). *Id.* (citing *Sissoko v. Rocha*, 509 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2007)); *Wang*,  
12 2010 WL 11463156, at \*6; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

13 Moreover, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), “[j]udicial review of all questions of law  
14 and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien  
15 from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review  
16 of a final order under this section.” (emphasis added). Further, judicial review of a final  
17 order is available only through “a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of  
18 appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The Supreme Court has made clear that § 1252(b)(9)  
19 is “the unmistakable ‘zipper’ clause,” channeling “judicial review of all” “decisions and  
20 actions leading up to or consequent upon final orders of deportation,” including “non-  
21 final order[s],” into proceedings before a court of appeals. *Reno*, 525 U.S. at 483, 485;  
22 see *J.E.F.M. v. Lynch*, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting § 1252(b)(9) is  
23 “breathtaking in scope and vise-like in grip and therefore swallows up virtually all  
24 claims that are tied to removal proceedings”). “Taken together, § 1252(a)(5) and  
25 § 1252(b)(9) mean that *any* issue—whether legal or factual—arising from *any* removal-  
26 related activity can be reviewed *only* through the [petition for review] PFR process.”  
27 *J.E.F.M.*, 837 F.3d at 1031 (emphasis in original) (“[W]hile these sections limit *how*  
28 immigrants can challenge their removal proceedings, they are not jurisdiction-stripping

1 statutes that, by their terms, foreclose *all* judicial review of agency actions. Instead, the  
2 provisions channel judicial review over final orders of removal to the courts of appeal.”)  
3 (emphasis in original); *see id.* at 1035 (“§§ 1252(a)(5) and [(b)(9)] channel review of  
4 all claims, including policies-and-practices challenges . . . whenever they ‘arise from’  
5 removal proceedings”).

6 Critically, “1252(b)(9) is a judicial channeling provision, not a claim-barring  
7 one.” *Aguilar v. ICE*, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007). Indeed, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)  
8 provides that “[n]othing . . . in any other provision of this chapter . . . shall be construed  
9 as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition  
10 for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”  
11 *See also Ajlani v. Chertoff*, 545 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[J]urisdiction to review  
12 such claims is vested exclusively in the courts of appeals[.]”). The petition-for-review  
13 process before the court of appeals ensures that noncitizens have a proper forum for  
14 claims arising from their immigration proceedings and “receive their day in court.”  
15 *J.E.F.M.*, 837 F.3d at 1031–32 (internal quotations omitted); *see also Rosario v. Holder*,  
16 627 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the [INA] to  
17 obviate . . . Suspension Clause concerns” by permitting judicial review of  
18 “nondiscretionary” BIA determinations and “all constitutional claims or questions of  
19 law.”). These provisions divest district courts of jurisdiction to review both direct and  
20 indirect challenges to removal orders, including decisions to detain for purposes of  
21 removal or for proceedings. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294–95 (section 1252(b)(9)  
22 includes challenges to the “decision to detain [an alien] in the first place or to seek  
23 removal”).

24 In evaluating the reach of subsections (a)(5) and (b)(9), the Second Circuit has  
25 explained that jurisdiction turns on the substance of the relief sought. *Delgado v.*  
26 *Quarantillo*, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011). Those provisions divest district courts of  
27 jurisdiction to review both direct and indirect challenges to removal orders, including  
28 decisions to detain for purposes of removal or for proceedings. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S.

1 at 294–95 (section 1252(b)(9) includes challenges to the “decision to detain [an alien]  
2 in the first place or to seek removal[.]”). Here, Petitioner challenges the government’s  
3 decision and action to detain, which arises from DHS’s decision to commence removal  
4 proceedings, and is thus an “action taken . . . to remove [him/her] from the United  
5 States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); see also, e.g., *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294–95; *Velasco*  
6 *Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) did  
7 not bar review in that case because the petitioner did not challenge “his initial  
8 detention”); *Saadulloev v. Garland*, No. 3:23-CV-00106, 2024 WL 1076106, at \*3  
9 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2024) (recognizing that there is no judicial review of the threshold  
10 detention decision, which flows from the government’s decision to “commence  
11 proceedings”).

12 Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this petition under 8 U.S.C.  
13 § 1252.<sup>1</sup> See *Acxel S.Q.D.C. v. Bondi*, No. 25-3348 (PAM/DLM), 2025 U.S. Dist.  
14 LEXIS 175957 (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 2025).

15 **B. Petitioner is Lawfully Detained**

16 Petitioner’s claims for alleged statutory and constitutional violations fail because  
17 Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

18 Based on the plain language of the statute, Petitioner’s detention is governed by  
19 § 1225. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires mandatory detention of ““an alien who is *an*  
20 *applicant for admission*, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien  
21 seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” *Chavez*

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22  
23 <sup>1</sup> On an alternative basis, the Court should ensure Petitioner properly exhausts  
24 administrative remedies. The Ninth Circuit requires that “habeas petitioners exhaust  
25 available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.”  
26 *Castro–Cortez v. INS*, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001). “When a petitioner does  
27 not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the  
28 petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted  
remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.” *Leonardo v. Crawford*, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160  
(9th Cir. 2011); see also *Alvarado v. Holder*, 759 F.3d 1121, 1127 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014)  
(issue exhaustion is a jurisdictional requirement); *Tijani v. Holder*, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080  
(9th Cir. 2010) (no jurisdiction to review legal claims not presented in the petitioner’s  
administrative proceedings before the BIA).

1 v. *Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-02325, 2025 WL 2730228, at \*4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025)  
2 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)) (emphasis in original). Section 1225(a)(1)  
3 “expressly defines that ‘[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been  
4 admitted ... shall be deemed for purposes of this Act *an applicant for admission.*” *Id.*  
5 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)) (emphasis in original). Here, Petitioner is an “alien  
6 present in the United States who has not been admitted.” Thus, as found by the district  
7 court in *Chavez v. Noem* and as mandated by the plain language of the statute, Petitioner  
8 is an “applicant for admission” and subject to the mandatory detention provisions of  
9 § 1225(b)(2).

10 When the plain text of a statute is clear, “that meaning is controlling” and courts  
11 “need not examine legislative history.” *Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp.*, 659 F.3d  
12 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2011). But to the extent legislative history is relevant here, nothing  
13 “refutes the plain language” of § 1225. *Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 671 F.3d  
14 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2011). Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and  
15 Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) to correct “an anomaly whereby  
16 immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the United States were in a worse  
17 position than persons who had crossed the border unlawfully.” *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d  
18 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), *declined to extend by, United States v. Gambino-*  
19 *Ruiz*, 91 F.4th 981 (9th Cir. 2024); *see Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 223-  
20 34 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996)). It “intended to replace certain  
21 aspects of the [then] current ‘entry doctrine,’ under which illegal aliens who have  
22 entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration  
23 proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a  
24 port of entry.” *Id.* (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225).

25 “The entry fiction doctrine flows from the principle that the ‘power to admit or  
26 exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative,’ and ‘the Constitution gives the political  
27 department of the government plenary authority to decide which aliens to admit.”  
28 *Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3199872, at \*7 (C.D. Cal.

1 Nov. 12, 2025) (quoting *Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 139  
2 (2020) (quotations omitted)). Such plenary power includes the “power to set procedures  
3 to be followed in determining whether an alien should be admitted.” *Thuraissigiam*, 591  
4 U.S. at 139. “The entry fiction doctrine protects that sovereign prerogative, which  
5 ‘would be meaningless if it became inoperative as soon as an arriving alien set foot on  
6 U.S. soil.’” *Altamirano Ramos*, 2025 WL 3199872, at \*7 (quoting *Thuraissigiam*, 591  
7 U.S. at 139). Within this context, the Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen an alien  
8 arrives at a port of entry—for example, an international airport—the alien is on U.S. soil,  
9 but the alien is not considered to have entered the country.” *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at  
10 139. Such is true even in situations where an alien is “paroled elsewhere in the country  
11 for years pending removal.” *Id.* (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has recognized  
12 that those individuals are treated “as if stopped at the border.” *Id.* “The same must be  
13 true” of an “applicant for admission” who enters into the United States unlawfully. *Id.*  
14 at 140.

15 A contrary interpretation would put aliens who “crossed the border unlawfully”  
16 in a better position than those “who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry.”  
17 *Id.* Aliens who presented at a port of entry would be subject to mandatory detention  
18 under § 1225, but those who crossed illegally would be eligible for a bond under §  
19 1226(a). See *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 225 (“The House Judiciary  
20 Committee Report makes clear that Congress intended to eliminate the prior statutory  
21 scheme that provided aliens who entered the United States without inspection more  
22 procedural and substantive rights than those who presented themselves to authorities  
23 for inspection.”). The Court should “‘refuse to interpret the INA in a way that would in  
24 effect repeal that statutory fix’ intended by Congress in enacting the IIRIRA.” *Chavez*,  
25 2025 WL 2730228, at \*4 (quoting *Gambino-Ruiz*, 91 F.4th at 990).

26 The plain language of § 1225(b)(2) does not contradict nor render § 1226(a)  
27 superfluous. Section 1226(a) provides the detention authority for the significant group  
28 of aliens who are *not* “applicants for admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)—

1 specifically, aliens who have been admitted to the United States but are now removable.  
2 *RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank*, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (“the  
3 specific governs the general”). For example, the detention of any of the millions of  
4 aliens who have overstayed their visas are governed by § 1226(a), because those aliens  
5 (unlike Petitioner) *were* lawfully admitted to the United States.

6 Moreover, in *Chavez v. Noem*, the district court noted that § 1226(a) “‘generally  
7 governs the process of arresting and detaining’ certain aliens, namely ‘aliens who were  
8 inadmissible at the time of entry *or who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses*  
9 *since admission.*” *Chavez*, 2025 WL 2730228, at \*5 (quoting *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at  
10 288) (emphasis in original). In turn, individuals who have not been charged with  
11 specific crimes listed in § 1226(c) are still subject to the discretionary detention  
12 provisions of § 1226(a) *as determined by the Attorney General*. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)  
13 (“*On a warrant issued by the Attorney General*, an alien may be arrested and detained  
14 pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”)  
15 (emphasis added). Therefore, heeding the plain language of § 1225(b)(2) has no effect  
16 on § 1226(a). Similarly, the application of § 1225’s explicit definition of “applicants for  
17 admission” does not render the addition of § 1226(c) by the Riley Laken Act  
18 superfluous. Once again correctly determined by the district court in *Chavez v. Noem*,  
19 the addition of § 1226(c) simply removed the Attorney General’s detention discretion  
20 for aliens charged with specific crimes. 2025 WL 2730228, at \*5.

21 One of the most basic interpretative canons instructs that a “statute should be  
22 construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” See *Corley v. United States*, 556  
23 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (cleaned up). If Congress did not want § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply  
24 to “applicants for admission,” then it would not have included the phrase “applicants  
25 for admission” in the subsection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see also Corley*, 556  
26 U.S. at 314.

27 Finally, the phrase “alien seeking admission” does not limit the scope of  
28 § 1225(b)(2)(A). The BIA has long recognized that “many people who are not *actually*

1 requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless  
2 deemed to be ‘seeking admission’ under the immigration laws.” *Matter of Lemus-Losa*,  
3 25 I&N Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012) (emphasis in original). Statutory language “is known  
4 by the company it keeps.” *Marquez-Reyes v. Garland*, 36 F.4th 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.  
5 2022) (quoting *McDonnell v. United States*, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016)). The phrase  
6 “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A) must be read in the context of the definition of  
7 “applicant for admission” in § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission are both those  
8 individuals present without admission and those who arrive in the United States. *See*  
9 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Both are understood to be “seeking admission” under § 1225(a)(1).  
10 *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 221; *Lemus-Losa*, 25 I&N Dec. at 743.  
11 Congress made that clear in § 1225(a)(3), which requires all aliens “who are applicants  
12 for admission or otherwise seeking admission” to be inspected by immigration officers.  
13 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). The word “or” here “introduce[s] an appositive—a word or  
14 phrase that is synonymous with what precedes it (‘Vienna or Wien,’ ‘Batman or the  
15 Caped Crusader’).” *United States v. Woods*, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013). Further,  
16 § 1225(a)(5) provides that “[a]n applicant for admission may be required to state under  
17 oath any information sought by an immigration officer regarding the purposes and  
18 intentions of the applicant in seeking admission to the United States.” The reasonable  
19 import of this particular phrasing is that one who is an applicant for admission is  
20 considered to be “seeking admission” under the statute.

21 Because Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225, Petitioner cannot show  
22 entitlement to relief.

23 Respondents acknowledge that courts in this district have recently rejected  
24 similar arguments in other similar habeas matters. Respondents maintain that Petitioner  
25 is properly subject to mandatory detention under § 1225 and dismissal is proper. To the  
26 extent the Court finds this Petitioner subject to detention authority under 8 U.S.C.  
27 § 1226(a), Respondents’ position is that the proper remedy would be directing a bond  
28 hearing under § 1226(a), to be held within fourteen (14) days. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)

1 (“No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this  
2 section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or  
3 parole.”); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018) (“As we have previously  
4 explained, § 1226(e) precludes an alien from ‘challeng[ing] a “discretionary judgment”  
5 by the Attorney General or a “decision” that the Attorney General has made regarding  
6 his detention or release.’ But § 1226(e) does not preclude ‘challenges [to] the statutory  
7 framework that permits [the alien’s] detention without bail.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b)  
8 (“The Attorney General at any time may revoke a bond or parole authorized under  
9 subsection (a), rearrest the alien under the original warrant, and detain the alien.”).

10 **C. Petitioner’s Conditional Parole was Lawfully Revoked.**

11 The INA governs the detention and release of noncitizens during and following  
12 their removal proceedings. *See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. 523, 527 (2021).  
13 Under the INA, ICE may choose to release a person on parole. The decision is  
14 discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis. An immigrant who has been detained  
15 at the border, may be paroled for humanitarian reasons or due to it providing a  
16 significant public benefit (8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A))) or she may be conditionally  
17 released (8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). These are distinct procedures. A person on conditional  
18 parole is usually released on their own recognizance subject to certain conditions such  
19 as reporting requirements. To be released on conditional parole, there must be a finding  
20 by ICE that the immigrant does not pose a risk of flight or danger to the community.  
21 *See Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzalez*, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007).

22 ICE has statutory and regulatory authority to revoke its parole decisions and  
23 initiate removal proceedings. No immigration court or hearing is required for revocation  
24 under that authority. Parole decisions may be made for broad and practical reasons  
25 related to public benefit, as well as for humanitarian reasons—i.e., while ICE’s decision  
26 incorporates flight risk and danger assessment, it is not limited to those criteria. ICE’s  
27 discretionary decisions concerning detention and release are, in this respect, distinct  
28 from an immigration court bond hearing.

1 By statute, the authority to grant and revoke this parole is vested in the Secretary  
2 of Homeland Security, who may delegate it. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“No court may set  
3 aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the  
4 detention or any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.”); *Jennings v.*  
5 *Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018) (“As we have previously explained, § 1226(e)  
6 precludes an alien from ‘challeng[ing] a “discretionary judgment” by the Attorney  
7 General or a “decision” that the Attorney General has made regarding his detention or  
8 release.’ But § 1226(e) does not preclude ‘challenges [to] the statutory framework that  
9 permits [the alien’s] detention without bail.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) (“The Attorney  
10 General at any time may revoke a bond or parole authorized under subsection (a),  
11 rearrest the alien under the original warrant, and detain the alien.”).

12 Regulations for such revocation exist, but they grant broad authority to make the  
13 decision to revoke release decisions. “While the regulation provides the detainee some  
14 opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation, it provides no other procedural and  
15 no meaningful substantive limit on this exercise of discretion as it allows revocation  
16 ‘when, in the opinion of the revoking official ... [t]he purposes of release have been  
17 served ... [or] [t]he conduct of the alien, or *any other circumstance*, indicates that release  
18 would no longer be appropriate.” *Rodriguez v. Hayes*, 578 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir.  
19 2009), *opinion amended and superseded*, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010), citing §§  
20 241.4(l)(2)(i), (iv) (emphasis in original).

21 The statute does not provide that ICE is prohibited from revoking parole once  
22 granted. And while some courts have recognized due process limitations on the  
23 authority of the government to revoke parole depending on the facts of the case, to imply  
24 into existence a broad bar on any release revocation by ICE—assigning that authority  
25 instead strictly to immigration courts—is inconsistent with the statutory scheme.  
26 Finally, countermanding ICE’s discretionary parole authority by requiring mandatory  
27 immigration court proceedings would strip ICE of the ability to make such parole  
28 decisions for broader reasons. Such an implied negation of ICE’s discretionary authority

1 would impair ICE’s ability to grant conditional parole in the first place, which damages  
2 the immigration law system.

3 **IV. CONCLUSION**

4 For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that the  
5 Court dismiss this action.

6 DATED: November 28, 2025

7 Respectfully submitted,

8 ADAM GORDON  
9 United States Attorney

10 s/ Lisa M. Hemann  
11 LISA M. HEMANN  
12 Assistant United States Attorney  
13 Attorney for Respondents  
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