

FILED

**JAMES J. VILT JR., CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
W/D OF KENTUCKY**

Date: Nov 20, 2025

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION**

RANBEER SINGH)

Alien #: )

Petitioner,)

v.)

Case No. **4:25CV-153-DJH**

Mike Lewis, HOPKINS COUNTY JAILER; Samuel
Olson, IMMIGRATION and CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE
DIRECTOR; Todd M. Lyons, ACTING
DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION and CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT; Kristi Noem,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; Pam Bondi,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES)

VERIFIED PETITION

Respondents.)

EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT of HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, RANBEER SINGH, by and through his own and proper person, and through his attorney, SAADIA SIDDIQUE, of SIDDIQUE LAW GROUP, LLC, petitions this Honorable Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is challenging his unlawful arrest and detention and inability to request bond contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which under certain conditions, allows for release on bond during the pendency of immigration court proceedings.

Singh is a citizen of India who entered the United States without inspection on or about September 20, 2013. He was not apprehended at the border and has remained in the United States since this date. He has resided in California for approximately 12 years and has two children who are U.S. Citizens, ages four and one. He is the primary support for his family

members and was travelling to Plainfield, Indiana for a scheduled routine appointment with safety inspectors from the U.S. Department of Transportation.

At approximately 8:00 A.M. on November 17, 2025, while at his appointment duties in Plainfield, Indiana, he was detained and apprehended by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers and taken to an ICE facility in either Broadview, Illinois or Indianapolis, Indiana, with docket control by the Chicago ICE office. It is believed that shortly that same day he was then transferred to Clay County Jail in Brazil, Indiana and then at some point on November 18, 2025, to Hopkins County Jail in Madisonville, Kentucky. He remains at this facility and as of the date of filing this Petition it is believed Respondents have not transferred him outside the jurisdiction of this court.

Respondents have unlawfully arrested and detained numerous individuals throughout the United States and within Indiana and Illinois, jailing them without any possibility of release and without any due process protections based upon an erroneous misclassification of detention provisions as being subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which does not allow for release on bond. Singh falls into this category of individuals and is subject to continued detention during the pendency of his immigration court hearings, which are pending.

Introduction

It is believed that Singh remains detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Hopkins County Jail in Madisonville, Kentucky. Prior to his apprehension, Petitioner was scheduled for an individual hearing before an Immigration Judge in San Francisco, California on March 23, 2029, on his application for asylum and cancellation of removal for certain non-

permanent residents. As a result, he has not had a meaningful opportunity to present his claims for relief before the Immigration Court and he has no final order of removal.

Petitioner is entitled to his removal hearing before an Immigration Judge, who will determine his ultimate removability and his applications for relief. However, until approximately the last three months, Respondents have abruptly and unlawfully reversed decades of settled immigration practice and procedure where individuals in Petitioner's situation would otherwise be entitled to release upon posting an immigration bond while removal proceedings remain pending. Respondents' continued detention of Petitioner without a hearing on an immigration bond is in violation of law. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a *cf.* *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (under section 1225 proceedings individuals are subject to detention without a bond hearing when encountered at "borders and ports of entry").

Numerous individuals in Petitioner's position have challenged the Respondents' new interpretation that individuals detained in the United States and not at the border are subject to mandatory detention without a bond hearing and its application to all civil immigration detainees and in all Immigration Courts, including people arrested and detained in immigration proceedings in Illinois and Indiana and then sent to ICE contracted facilities around the country. *See Singh v. Lewis*, 2025 WL 2699219 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); *Jimenez v. FCI Berlin, Warden*, 2025 WL 2639390 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025); *Choglo Chafila v. Scott*, 2025 WL 2688541 (D. Me. Sept. 2, 2025); *Ayala Casun v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 280679 (D.R.I. Oct. 2, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Hasan v. Crawford*, 2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); *Beltran Barrera v. Tindall*, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9,

2025); *B.D.V.S. v. Forestal*, 2025 WL 2855743 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2025); and *Zaragoza Mosqueda et al. v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025).

Jurisdiction

The action arises under the Constitution of the United States, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. section 1101 *et seq.*, and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. section 701 *et seq.* This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241, and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the “Suspension Clause”), as Petitioner is presently subject to immediate detention and custody under color of authority of the United States government, and said custody is in violation of the Constitution, law or treaties of the United States.

This action is brought to compel the Respondents’ officers of the United States, to accord Petitioner the due process of law to which he is entitled under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Specifically, “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); *Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“Aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law”).

This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 USC § 2241, the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 USC § 2201 *et seq.*, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), and the All Writs Act, 28 USC §1651.

Venue

Venue lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). The Petitioner is detained by ICE, under the jurisdiction of the Chicago Field Office, at Hopkins County Jail in Madisonville, Kentucky, a facility located in the Western District of Kentucky. He is subject to being moved to another undisclosed ICE facility. Undersigned counsel is not aware if he will be moved again and thus requests he remain in the jurisdiction of this court.

Parties¹

Petitioner is citizen and national of India and presently in the custody of ICE. He is a resident of the State of California and maintains residence in California.

Respondent MIKE LEWIS is being sued in his official capacity only, as the Jailer of Hopkins County Jail, he is the custodian of the jail and all individuals detained therein, where Petitioner is presently being detained. He is, therefore, Petitioner's immediate custodian.

Respondent SAM OLSON is being sued in his official capacity only, as the Field Office Director of the Chicago Field Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. As such, he is charged with the detention and removal of aliens which fall under the jurisdiction of the Chicago Field Office. The Chicago Field Office has direct control over Petitioner's detention and removal.

Respondent TODD M. LYONS is being sued in his official capacity only, as the Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. As such, he is charged with the detention and removal of all aliens.

¹ The proper respondent to this petition is the warden or sheriff of the detention center where Petitioner is detained. *Kholavskiy v. Achim*, 443 F.3d 946, 949-53 (7th Cir. 2006).

Respondent KRISTI NOEM is being sued in her official capacity only, as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).

Respondent PAMELA BONDI is being sued in her official capacity only, as the Attorney General of the United States and administers the Department of Justice, including EOIR, the BIA, and the Immigration Courts.

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner, RANBEER SINGH, is present in the United States without inspection and based on information and belief, has not been previously apprehended when he crossed the U.S border at or near McAllen, Texas on or about September 20, 2013. He filed an affirmative application for asylum (Form I-589) on August 4, 2014, with the USCIS asylum office. (Pet. Ex. A: I-589 Receipt Notice). On or about July 12, 2016, USCIS asylum office referred his case to the Immigration Court on the basis that he did not demonstrate he filed his application for asylum within one year of entry date. (Pet. Ex. B: Referral Notice). This finding appears to be in error since Petitioner claims he entered the United States in September 2013, and his I-589 was received by USCIS on August 4, 2014. Nevertheless, USCIS issued him a Notice to Appear (NTA) which placed him in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and charges him with being present in the United States without admission and therefore removable pursuant to *inter alia* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). (Pet. Ex. C: NTA).

Petitioner has no criminal record and his removal proceedings remain pending before an Immigration Court in San Francisco, California. His next court hearing is scheduled for March 23, 2029. (Pet. Ex. D: Case Information).² Having been present in the U.S. for over 10 years and with two U.S. Citizen children under 21 years of age, Petitioner also filed for cancellation of

² Undersigned counsel is not representing Petitioner in his removal proceedings.

removal; adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) which allows the Attorney General to “cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien-

(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than

10 years immediately preceding the date of such application;

(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period;

(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), or 237(a)(3),

subject to paragraph (5); and

(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to

the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien

lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

Petitioner has filed this application before the immigration court and it also remains pending.

(Pet. Ex. E: I-485 Receipt Notice).

Petitioner owns a trucking company registered in the State of Indiana. He also holds a valid commercial driver’s license (CDL). He is the sole financial support to his two U.S. Citizen children and wife who is not employed. He owns a home in Stockton, California and has been paying US Income taxes since obtaining work authorization and his social security number. On or about November 17, 2025, Petitioner appeared for a required safety investigation appointment with an officer from the US Dept. of Transportation located at 6321 Bales Drive, Plainfield, Indiana. When he appeared for the meeting at 8 A.M., he was surrounded by ICE agents and forcibly detained. No warrant was shown or evidence provided he fell under a class of aliens not entitled to continued release pending resolution of his removal proceedings.

Respondents have not provided Petitioner with a new immigration court date and he anticipates being held, without bond, at an ICE facility. As a person arrested inside the United States and held in civil immigration detention for his pending removal proceedings, he is subject to detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. *See cases cited on page 3.* As a person detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Petitioner must, upon his request, receive a bond hearing and Petitioner requests such a bond hearing consistent with established precedent. Under *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the responsible administrative agency has predetermined Petitioner will be denied a bond hearing, and the government is holding Petitioner under the purported authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), under which he will not receive a bond hearing.

Since *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* has been decided dozens of individual habeas corpus petitions challenging its misclassification of bond-eligible detainees have been filed in District Courts. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for most noncitizens in removal proceedings conducted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes detention for individuals in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. These individuals are generally entitled to a bond hearing unless they have been convicted or arrested of certain crimes which are subject to mandatory detention. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention for those subject to expedited removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and other noncitizen applicants for admission at the border who are deemed not clearly entitled to be admitted. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Final, the INA provides for detention of noncitizens who have been *ordered* removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a),(b) (emphasis added).

This case concerns the detention provisions at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2), which were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration and Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

(IIRIRA) of 1996 and most recently section 1226(a) was amended in early 2025 by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). Following the enactment of IIRIRA in 1996, EOIR drafted regulations indicating that individuals present in the country without inspection, were not considered detained under § 1225 but rather detained under § 1226(a) and thus entitled to a bond hearing. *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

Thus, as in Petitioner's case, absent ineligibility due to a criminal history, individuals in § 1229a removal proceedings are entitled to a bond hearing consistent with almost 30 years of practice where individuals arrested inside the United States, even after initially entering without inspection, fall within § 1226 detention proceedings and entitled to request and receive bond. *See Singh v. Lewis*, 2025 WL 2699219, at *5 (W.D. KY Sept. 22, 2025) (Petitioner who was "present in the United States for more than 12 years is not seeking admission into the United States.") (internal quotations omitted); and *Martinez v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 2084238, at *4 n. 9 (D. Mass. July 25, 2025) (citing the United States Solicitor General's representation to the Supreme Court at oral argument that "DHS's long-standing interpretation has been that 1226(a) applies to those who have crossed the border between ports of entry and are shortly thereafter apprehended").

On July 8, 2025, ICE, "in coordination with" the Department of Justice, announced a new policy that rejected the well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice. A series of Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decisions under authority of the EOIR, sought to apply § 1225 (b) bond ineligibility to individuals apprehended inside the United States. Petitioner acknowledges that the Supreme Court has held that noncitizens "seeking *initial* admission to the United States" have limited access to constitutional protections.

Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). This provision does not apply to Petitioner's situation.

Causes of Action

Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

1. FIRST, the mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to Petitioner as he has been placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and thus entitled to a bond hearing. Section 1225(b) does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been present and residing in the United States. Petitioner has been present and residing in the United States now for 12 years.
2. The application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner's continued detention without a bond hearing violates 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which governs his case.
3. SECOND, under the Administrative Procedure Act, a court must "hold unlawful and set aside agency action" that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law" ... or that is "in excess of statutory jurisdiction authority, or limitations or short of statutory right." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) – (C).
4. Petitioner's continued detention is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and without statutory authority in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).³
5. THIRD, Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint. Respondent's denial of a bond hearing is a violation of his due process rights which "lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas*, at 690 (2001).

³ Petitioner-Plaintiff also asserts that his arrest is in violation of a separate Court order in *Castanon Nava, et. al. v. DHS, et. al.*, 1:18-cv-03757 (NDIL)(Judge Cummings) as he was arrested and stopped pursuant to what is believed to be a warrantless arrest.

Respondents interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is in error and is a violation of his due process rights.

6. FOURTH, if necessary by way of separate petition, Petitioner requests a temporary restraining order enjoining Respondents from relocating him outside the jurisdiction of this court pending final resolution of his case. He is likely to succeed on the merits, there is a threat of irreparable harm absent an injunction, the balance between threatened harm to him versus the Government weighs in his favor and Respondents will not suffer by granting him a bond hearing, and public interest dictates that those detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 be given a bond hearing as Congress intended.
7. FIFTH, If Petitioner prevails, he requests attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, as amended 28 U.S.C. § 2412.

Relief Requested:

WHEREFORE, Petitioner RANBEER SINGH, respectfully request this Honorable Court:

- A. Accept jurisdiction over this action;
- B. Order Respondents not to remove Petitioner outside the jurisdiction of this Court;
- C. Grant the writ of habeas corpus;
- D. Order the Department of Homeland Security to conduct an individualized bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;
- E. Make a finding that Respondents have acted contrary to law and have abused Petitioner's due process rights, and

F. Grant any other relief that is equitable and just.

Respectfully Submitted,
RANBEER SINGH

By: s/ Saadia Siddique
Attorney for the Petitioner

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VERIFICATION

I, Saadia Siddique, declare as follows:

I am an attorney admitted to practice law in the State of Illinois.

Because many of the allegations of this Petition require a legal knowledge not possessed by Petitioner, I am making this verification on his behalf.

I have read the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and know the contents thereof to be true to my knowledge, information, or belief.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on November 19, 2025.

s/Saadia Siddique

SAADIA SIDDIQUE

Siddique Law Group LLC

Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 19, 2025, I served a copy of this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by MAIL or EMAIL to the following individuals:

Jailer Mike Lewis
2250 Laffoon Trail
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I ALSO HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing documents will be served on counsel for all parties through the Court's CM/ECF system.

s/Saadia Siddique
SAADIA SIDDIQUE
Siddique Law Group LLC
Attorney for Petitioner
Date: November 19, 2025