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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
EL PASO DIVISION**

**ANTONIO ALVARADO LUNA,** )

Petitioner, )

v. )

Case no. 3:25-cv-00565

WARDEN, *in their official capacity* as )  
Warden of the ERO Camp East Montana )  
Detention Facility; )

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS  
CORPUS**

MARY DE ANDA YBARRA, *in her* )  
*official capacity* as Field Office Director of )  
the ICE El Paso Field Office of )  
Enforcement and Removal Operations, )  
U.S. Immigrations and Customs )  
Enforcement; U.S. Department of )  
Homeland Security; )

TODD M. LYONS, *in his official capacity* )  
as Acting Director, Immigration and )  
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of )  
Homeland Security; )

KRISTI NOEM, *in her official capacity* as )  
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland )  
Security; and )

PAMELA JO BONDI, *in her official* )  
*capacity* as Attorney General of the United )  
States; )

Respondents. )

### INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who has resided in the U.S. for approximately twenty-six years. Petitioner is currently detained at the Camp East Montana Detention Facility at 6920 Digital Road, El Paso, Texas 79936. *See Exh A- ICE Detainee Locator Results.*
2. On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued a precedential decision that unlawfully reinterpreted the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). *See Exhibit B- Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).* Prior to this decision, non-citizens like Petitioner who had lived in the U.S. for many years and were apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the interior of the country were detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and eligible to seek bond hearings before Immigration Judges (IJs). Instead, in conflict with nearly thirty years of legal precedent, Petitioner is now considered subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and has no opportunity for release on bond while his removal proceedings are pending.
3. Petitioner’s detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates the plain language of the INA and its implementing regulations. Petitioner, who has resided in the U.S. for more than twenty-six years and who was apprehended in the interior of the U.S., should not be considered an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission.” Rather, he should be detained pursuant 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for release on conditional parole or bond.
4. Petitioner seeks declaratory relief that he is subject to detention under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations and asks that this Court either order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody or provide him with a bond hearing.

**CUSTODY**

5. Petitioner is currently in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at DHS Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Camp East Montana Detention Facility in El Paso, Texas. *See Exh A - ICE Detainee Locator Results*. He is therefore in “‘custody’ of [DHS] within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute.” *Jones v. Cunningham*, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).

**JURISDICTION**

6. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause), and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et. seq.*
7. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 *et. seq.*, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et. seq.*, the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).
8. Federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by non-citizens challenging both the lawfulness and the constitutionality of their detention. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

**REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243**

9. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Respondents “forthwith,” unless Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an OSC is issued, the Court must require Respondents to file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

10. Petitioner is “in custody” for the purpose of § 2241 because Petitioner was arrested and detained by Respondents.

**VENUE**

11. Venue is properly before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees or officers of the United States acting in their official capacity and because Petitioner is currently detained in El Paso, Texas, at the Camp East Montana Detention Center.

**EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES**

12. Administrative exhaustion is unnecessary as it would be futile. *See, e.g., Aguilar v. Lewis*, 50 F. Supp. 2d 539, 542–43 (E.D. Va. 1999). It would be futile for Petitioner to seek a custody redetermination hearing before an IJ because of the BIA recent decision holding that anyone who has entered the U.S. without inspection is now considered an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” and therefore subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025); *see also Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2591530, at \*7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (noting that BIA’s decision in *Yajure Hurtado* renders exhaustion futile).

13. Additionally, the agency does not have jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claim of unlawful custody in violation of his due process rights, and it would therefore be futile for him to pursue administrative remedies. *Reno v. Amer.-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (finding exhaustion to be a “futile exercise because the agency does not have jurisdiction to review” constitutional claims).

**PARTIES**

14. Petitioner is from Mexico and has resided in the U.S. since 1999. He is currently detained in the Camp East Montana Detention Facility in El Paso, Texas.
15. Respondent “Warden” is sued in his or her official capacity as Warden of the Camp East Montana Detention Center. In this official capacity, Respondent “Warden” is Petitioner’s immediate custodian.
16. Respondent Mary de Anda Ybarra is sued in her official capacity as Field Office Director, El Paso Field Office, Enforcement and Removal Operations, ICE. In her official capacity, Respondent de Anda Ybarra is the legal custodian of Petitioner.
17. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is sued in his official capacity as Acting Director of ICE. As the Acting Director of ICE, Respondent Lyons is a legal custodian of Petitioner.
18. Respondent Kristi Noem is sued in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security. As the head of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the agency tasked with enforcing immigration laws, Secretary Noem is Petitioner’s ultimate legal custodian.
19. Respondent Pamela Jo Bondi is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States. As Attorney General, she has authority over the Department of Justice and is charged with faithfully administering the immigration laws of the United States.

**LEGAL BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT**

20. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for noncitizens in removal proceedings.
21. First, individuals detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are generally entitled to a bond hearing, unless they have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes and

are subject to mandatory detention. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1226(c) (listing grounds for mandatory detention); *see also* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a) (immigration judges may review custody determinations made by DHS), 1236.1(d) (same).

22. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) as well as other recent arrivals deemed to be “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2).
23. Third, the INA authorizes detention of noncitizens who have received a final order of removal, including those in withholding-only proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).
24. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 302-03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 300-582 to 3009-583, 3009-585. Section 1226 was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).
25. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (“Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination”).
26. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were

thereafter detained and placed in standard removal proceedings were considered for release on bond and also received bond hearings before an Immigration Judge (IJ), unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who had entered the United States, even if without inspection, were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. In contrast, those who were stopped at the border were only entitled to release on parole. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 220 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

27. For decades, long-term residents of the U.S. who entered without inspection and were subsequently apprehended by ICE in the interior of the country have been detained pursuant to § 1226 and entitled to bond hearings before an IJ, unless barred from doing so due to their criminal history.
28. In July 2025, however, ICE began asserting that all individuals who entered without inspection should be considered “seeking admission” and therefore subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
29. On September 5, 2025, the BIA issued a precedential decision adopting this interpretation, departing from the INA’s text, federal precedent, and existing regulations. **Exhibit B- *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).**
30. Defendants’ new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and its implementing regulations. Indeed, for decades, Defendants had applied § 1226(a) to people like the Petitioner. Defendants’ new policies are thus not only contrary to law, but are arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).

They were also adopted without complying with the procedural requirements of the APA.

31. Numerous federal courts have rejected this interpretation and instead have consistently found that § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2), authorizes detention of noncitizens who entered without inspection and were later apprehended in the interior of the country. *See e.g., Sampiao v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025) (noting court's disagreement with BIA's analysis in *Yajure Hurtado*); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Jimenez v. FCI Berlin, Warden*, No. 25-cv-326-LM-AJ (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Cuevas Guzman v. Andrews*, 2025 WL 2617256, at \*3 n.4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also Lepe v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-cv-01163-KES-SKO (HC) (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025), *Lopez v. Hardin*, No. 2:25-cv-830-KCD-NPM (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2025), and *Chafila v. Scott*, No. 2:25-cv-00437-SDN (D. Maine Sept. 21, 2025).
32. Under the Supreme Court's recent decision in *Loper Bright v. Raimondo*, this Court should independently interpret the statute and give the BIA's expansive interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) no weight, as it conflicts with the statute, regulations, and precedent. 603 U.S. 369 (2024).
33. The statutory context and structure also make clear that § 1226 applies to individuals who have not been admitted and entered without inspection. In 2025, Congress added new mandatory detention grounds to § 1226(c) that apply only to noncitizens who have not been admitted. *See The Laken Riley Act*, Pub. L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3 (2025) (8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)).
34. By specifically referencing inadmissibility for entry without inspection under 8 U.S.C. §

1182(6)(A), Congress made clear that such individuals are otherwise covered by § 1226(a). Thus, § 1226 plainly applies to noncitizens charged as inadmissible, including those present without admission or parole.

35. The Supreme Court has explained that § 1225(b) is concerned “primarily [with those] seeking entry,” and is generally imposed “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether [a noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 297, 2987 (2018). In contrast, Section 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens *already in the country* pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 289 (emphases added).
36. Furthermore, § 1225(b)(2) specifically applies only to those “seeking admission,” and the implementing regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 address non-citizens who are “coming or attempting to come into the United States.” The use of the present progressive tense would exclude noncitizens like Petitioner who are apprehended in the interior years after they entered, as they are no longer “seeking admission” or “coming [...] into the United States.” See *Martinez v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 2084238 at \*6 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing the use of present and present progressive tense to support conclusion that INA § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to individuals apprehended in the interior); see also *Al Otro Lado v. McAleenan*, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (construing “is arriving” in 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and observing that “[t]he use of the present progressive, like use of the present participle, denotes an ongoing process”).
37. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to Petitioner, who had entered the U.S. approximately twenty-six years ago.
38. Furthermore, Respondents’ detention of the Petitioner violates his right to Due Process

under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Petitioner has been detained after residing for twenty six years in the United States. In that time, he has accrued considerable ties to the U.S. and considers the U.S. his home. The Respondents' current policy of denying him the opportunity to request release on bond is a flagrant denial of his Due Process rights. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Constitution generally requires a hearing before the government deprives a person of liberty or property. *Zimmerman v. Burch*, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990).

39. Under the *Mathews v. Eldridge* framework, the balance of interests strongly favors Petitioner's release. *See Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
40. Petitioner's private interest in freedom from detention is profound. The interest in being free from physical detention is "the most elemental of liberty interests." *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); *see also Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) ("Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.").
41. The risk of erroneous deprivation is exceptionally high. Petitioner has no criminal history and has deep ties to his community.
42. The government's interest in detaining Petitioner without due process is minimal. Immigration detention is civil, not punitive, and may only be used to prevent danger to the community or ensure appearance at immigration proceedings. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

43. Furthermore, the “fiscal and administrative burdens” of providing Petitioner with a bond hearing are minimal, particularly when weighed against the significant liberty interests at stake. *See Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
44. Considering these factors, Petitioner contends that the balance of the *Mathews* factors weighs heavily in his favor and as such supports his plea for relief as presented in this Petition.

**STATEMENT OF FACTS**

45. Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico.
46. Upon information and belief, Petitioner has resided in the U.S. since 1999.
47. Upon information and belief, Petitioner has never been arrested or charged with any crime.
48. He is now detained at the Camp East Montana Detention Facility. *See Exhibit A- ICE Detainee Locator Results.*
49. Petitioner now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1225
50. Without relief from this Court, he faces continued detention without a bond hearing.

**COUNT I**  
**Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)**  
**Unlawful Denial of Release on Bond**

51. Petitioner restates and realleges all paragraphs as if fully set forth here.
52. Petitioner may be detained, if at all, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
53. Under § 1226(a) and its associated regulations, Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. *See 8 C.F.R. 236.1(d) & 1003.19(a)-(f).*

54. Pursuant to the Respondents current policy, Petitioner has not been, and will not be, provided with a bond hearing as required by law.

55. Petitioner's continuing detention is therefore unlawful.

**COUNT II**

**Violation of the Bond Regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1 and 1003.19 Unlawful Denial of Release on Bond**

56. Petitioner restates and realleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

57. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of "Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens]," the agencies explained that "[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination." 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323. The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

58. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

**COUNT III**

**Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)  
Unlawful Detention Under This Provision**

59. Petitioner restates and realleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

60. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) is concerned primarily with those seeking entry to the United States and is generally imposed at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a noncitizen seeking to enter the country is admissible.
61. Upon information and belief, Petitioner has resided in the U.S. since 1999. He is therefore neither an arriving alien nor an alien who is now seeking admission to the United States.
62. Because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) does not apply to Petitioner, Respondents' detention of him under this provision is unlawful.

**COUNT IV**

**Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process**

63. Petitioner restates and realleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
64. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits the federal government from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. V.
65. For the reasons stated above, the balance of the Mathews factors weigh heavily in the Petitioner's favor, and as such Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court order his immediate release from custody or, in the alternative, order the Respondents to provide him with a custody redetermination hearing before a neutral arbiter within seven seven days of this Court's order in which the government bears the burden of proving that the Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community. See *Lopez-Arevelo*, 2025 WL 2691828, at \*12 (citing *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 855 n.14 (citations omitted)). "Allocating the burden in this manner reflects the concern that '[b]ecause the alien's

potential loss of liberty is so severe ... he should not have to share the risk of error equally.” (citing *German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 214). “And the consensus appears to be holding, with many courts in recent days ordering a bond hearing, at which the Government bears the burden of justifying the immigration habeas petitioner's continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.” *Id.* ; *Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos*, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729, at \*9 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); *Morgan v. Oddo*, No. 24-cv-221, 2025 WL 2653707, at \*1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2025); *J.M.P. v. Arteta*, No. 25-cv-4987, 2025 WL 2614688, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2025); *Espinoza*, 2025 WL 2581185, at \*14; *Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar*, 2025 WL 2280357, at \*12 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2025).

**PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court will:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Order that Petitioner not be transferred outside of this District;
- (3) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why his Petition should not be granted within three days;
- (4) Declare that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful;
- (5) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to release him from custody or provide him with a custody determination hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before a neutral arbiter, in which the Respondents must bear the burden of showing that the Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community.
- (6) Grant him any further relief this Court deems just and proper.

Date: November 18, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Mark Kinzler

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Attorney for Petitioner

**VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242**

I represent the Petitioner, Antonio Alvarado Luna, and submit this verification on his behalf. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2242 or under the U.S. Constitution are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 18th day of November, 2025.

/s/Mark Kinzler

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Alvarado Luna v. Thompson

3:25-cv-00565

I hereby certify that on November 19, 2025, I have mailed by United States Postal Service the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by certified mail to the following:

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U.S. Attorney General Pamela Bondi  
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Washington, DC 20530

The above respondents were also named in the CM/ECF habeas corpus filing with the Western District of Texas court

/s/ Mark Kinzler