

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

STEVENSON JOSE MENDOZA CARVAL.

Petitioner,

Case No. 1:25-cv-1465

Hon. Robert J. Jonker  
U.S. District Court Judge

KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department  
of Homeland Security, et al.

Hon. Maarten Vermaat  
U.S. Magistrate Judge

Respondents.

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**ANSWER TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

Respondents, Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Robert Lynch<sup>1</sup>, Field Office Director, Detroit Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); and Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, by and through their attorneys, answer the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as follows:

**INTRODUCTION**

1. This petition arises from the U.S. government's new policy—which contradicts both the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and decades of agency practice—of erroneously interpreting the INA to mandate detention without the possibility of bond for noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection, even if they have been residing here for years.

<sup>1</sup> Robert Lynch is not the current ICE Detroit Field Office Director. The Acting Field Office Director is Kevin Raycraft, who should be automatically substituted for Mr. Lynch as a Respondent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph.**

2. This is one of hundreds of almost identical petitions filed around the country. To date, counsel's research has revealed only a handful of district court cases that have agreed with the government's novel and expansive legal interpretation of the INA. *See, Chavez v. Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-02325-CAB-SBC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192940 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 24, 2025); *Lopez v. Trump*, No. 8:25CV526, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192557 (D. Neb. Sep. 30, 2025); *Sandoval v. Acuna*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215357 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025); *Oliveira v. Patterson*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218128 (W.D. La. Nov. 4, 2025).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents also deny Petitioner's attempt to characterize district court decisions and defer to the text of the decisions themselves. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

3. Petitioner is a citizen of Colombia and resident of Chicago, Illinois who was arrested by ICE and is currently detained in Baldwin, Michigan at the privately owned GEO North Lake detention facility.

**ANSWER: Respondents admit that Petitioner is a citizen of Columbia, that federal authorities arrested him, and that he is being housed at the North Lake Processing Center, a GEO Group facility. Respondents lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remaining allegations of this paragraph.**

4. Petitioner is statutorily entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ) but will

not receive one or be released on bond because of a new policy and legal interpretation by ICE and the Department of Justice.

**ANSWER: Respondents deny that Petitioner is statutorily entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge. The remaining allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

5. The denial of bond is a new policy issued on July 8, 2025,<sup>2</sup> instructing all ICE employees to no longer apply 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to people charged with being inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who initially entered the United States without inspection. Instead, under the new policy, ICE employees are to subject people like Petitioners to mandatory detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A), no matter how long they have resided in the United States.

**ANSWER: Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to summarize an ICE Interim Guidance document and defer to the text of that document itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.**

6. The policy was joined by Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in their precedential decision, *Matter of YAJURE HURTADO*, 29 I & N Dec. 216, issued on September 5, 2025.<sup>3</sup>

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a BIA**

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<sup>2</sup> Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission> [<https://perma.cc/8SP7-TDDD>]

<sup>3</sup> Available at <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1413311/dl?inline>

**decision and defer to the text of the decision itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

7. BIA decisions are binding authority on Immigration Judges and holds that IJs no longer have jurisdiction to hold bond hearings for detained individuals like Petitioner.

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner's attempt to characterize a BIA decision and defer to the text of the decision itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

8. As a result, Petitioner will remain in mandatory detention. Absent relief from this Court, he face the prospect of months or years in immigration custody, separated from his family and community, all while being deprived an individualized hearing justifying his detention in violation of the INA and Due Process.

**ANSWER: Defendants admit only that Petitioner is in mandatory detention. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of this paragraph.**

9. Respondents' new legal interpretation, which has caused Respondent to be detained without bond, is plainly contrary to the statutory framework of the INA and contrary to both agency regulations and decades of consistent agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner. It also violates his right to due process by depriving him of his liberty without any consideration of whether such a deprivation is warranted.

**ANSWER: Denied.**

10. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be immediately released from custody unless Respondents provide him a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within 3 days.

**ANSWER: This paragraph contains a prayer for relief to which no response is required. To the extent this paragraph is deemed to allege facts to which a response is required, Respondents deny that Petitioner is entitled to the requested relief.**

### **JURISDICTION**

11. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny that the Court has jurisdiction over this case.**

12. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny that the Petitioner is entitled to the requested relief.**

### **VENUE**

13. Venue is proper in the Western District of Michigan under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Petitioner is detained at the direction, and is in the immediate custody, of Respondent Robert Lynch. *See Roman v. Ashcroft*, 340 F.3d 314, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2003).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Robert Lynch is no longer the ICE Detroit Field Office Director. The Acting Field Office Director is Kevin Raycraft, who should be automatically substituted for Mr. Lynch as a Respondent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). In further answer, Respondents do not contest venue in this case.**

14. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims and relevant facts occurred in this District.

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Robert Lynch is no longer the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and is not an employee of the United States. The Acting Field Office Director is Kevin Raycraft, who should be automatically substituted for Mr. Lynch as a Respondent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). In further answer, Respondents do not contest venue in this case.**

**REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243**

15. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to summarize a statute and defers to the text of the statute itself.**

16. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the Petitioner’s attempt to characterize court decisions and defer to the text of the decisions themselves.**

#### **PARTIES**

17. Petitioner is a citizen of Colombia and resident of Chicago, Illinois. He was arrested by ICE in Chicago on September 24, 2025.

**ANSWER: Respondents admit that Petitioner is a citizen of Columbia and that federal authorities arrested him on September 24, 2025. Respondents lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remaining allegations of this paragraph.**

18. Respondent Robert Lynch is the Acting Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Acting Director Lynch is Petitioner’s immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner’s detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

**ANSWER: Denied. Robert Lynch is no longer the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and is not an employee of the United States. The Acting Field Office Director is Kevin**

**Raycraft, who should be automatically substituted for Mr. Lynch as a Respondent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).**

19. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

**ANSWER: Respondents admit the first sentence of this paragraph. The remaining allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required.**

20. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and the immigration system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

**ANSWER: Respondents admit the first sentence of this paragraph. The remaining allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required.**

## FACTS

21. Petitioner has resided in the United States for almost two years. He is a resident of Chicago, Illinois where he lives with his long-term partner.

**ANSWER: Respondents lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this paragraph. Defendants admit only that U.S. Border Patrol encountered and apprehended Petitioner in Texas on December 1, 2023.**

22. On information and belief, ICE charged Petitioner, *inter alia*, being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without inspection.

**ANSWER: Admitted.**

23. Petitioner is not flight risk nor a danger to his community.

**ANSWER: Denied.**

### LEGAL FRAMEWORK

24. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a statute and defer to the text of the statute itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

25. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Under § 1226(a), individuals who are taken into immigration custody pending a decision on whether they are to be removed can be detained but are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d).<sup>4</sup> *See also Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (explaining that § 1226(a) applies to those who are “already in the country” and are detained “pending the outcome of removal proceedings”). Section 1226(a) is the statute

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<sup>4</sup> Section § 1226 contains an exception for noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes, who are subject to mandatory detention without bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That exception is not relevant here – Petitioner has no criminal record.

that, for decades, has been applied to people like Petitioner who have been living in the United States and are charged with inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize statutes, regulations, and court decisions and defer to the text of those sources. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

26. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of certain recently arrived noncitizens, namely those subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and other recent arrivals seeking admission under § 1225(b)(2). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287, 289 (explaining that § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry” to noncitizens “seeking admission into the United States.”). Section 1225(b)(2) is the statute that Respondents have suddenly decided is applicable to people like Petitioner.

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize statutes and court decisions and defer to the text of those sources. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

27. Third, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have already been ordered removed, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b). Section 1231 is not relevant here.

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize**

**statutes and defer to the text of the statutes themselves. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

28. This case concerns Respondents' policy as applied towards individuals like Petitioner – namely that he is subject to mandatory detention without bond under §1225(b)(2), rather than being bond-eligible under § 1226(a).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph contain Plaintiff's characterization of his Petition. Defendant admits only that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and is not bond eligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).**

29. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 302-03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-582 to 3009-583, 3009-585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner's attempt to characterize statutes and defer to the text of the statutes themselves. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

30. Following the 1996 enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). See Inspection

and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (explaining that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.”).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize statutes and regulations and defer to the text of those sources themselves. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

31. Thus, in the three decades that followed, people who entered without inspection and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings received bond hearings if ICE chose to detain them, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny the factual allegations of this paragraph and further deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize statutes and defer to the text of the statutes themselves. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

32. However, on July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, suddenly announced a new governmental policy that rejected the well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of agency practice.

**ANSWER: Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to summarize an ICE Interim Guidance document and defer to the text of that document itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.**

33. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,” claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection are subject to mandatory detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

**ANSWER: Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to summarize an ICE Interim Guidance document and defer to the text of that document itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.**

34. Further, in a September 5, 2025, decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a decision that holds that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are ineligible for bond hearings before an immigration judge. *See, Matter of YAJURE HURTADO*, 29 I & N Dec. 216.

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents**

**deny the allegations of this paragraph. Respondents also deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a BIA decision and defer to the text of the decision itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

35. In particular, the Respondents have determined that immigration judges no longer have jurisdiction to hold bond hearings for noncitizens like Petitioner. The BIA’s decision is binding on all immigration judges.

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a BIA decision and defer to the text of the decision itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

36. This novel interpretation has been roundly rejected by federal district courts almost unanimously. *See, inter alia, Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175767, at \*19-20 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (“...[T]he BIA’s decision to pivot from three decades of consistent statutory interpretation and call for [petitioner’s] detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is at odds with every District Court that has been confronted with the same question of statutory interpretation. At least a dozen federal courts concur generally with this Court’s interpretation of the statutory language as applied in this context.”) (internal citations omitted); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169423, at \*23, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (holding that “[t]here can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this country for over twenty-six years and was

already within the United States when apprehended and arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival at the border.”); *Sanchez v. Olson*, No. 25 CV 12453, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211062, at \*7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2025)(“almost every district court” has rejected DHS/DOJ interpretation); *Vazquez v. Bostock*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193611, 2025 WL 2782499, at \*1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (collecting cases); *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201967, 2025 WL 2886346, at \*3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025) (“As almost every district court to consider this issue has concluded, the statutory text, the statute's history, Congressional intent, and § 1226(a)'s application for the past three decades support finding that § 1226 applies to these circumstances.”)).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required, and Respondents deny the allegations in the first sentence of this paragraph. Respondents also deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize district court decisions and defer to the text of the decisions themselves. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

37. DHS’s and DOJ’s interpretation defies the INA. As the above courts explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

**ANSWER: Denied.**

38. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under § 1229a to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a statute and defer to the text of the statute itself. Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

39. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a statute and defer to the text of the statute itself. Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

40. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a statute and defer to the text of the statute itself. Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

41. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute’s entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are “seeking admission” to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 (explaining that this mandatory detention

scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible.”).

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a statute and court decision and defer to the text of those sources. Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

42. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to people, like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended by immigration authorities.

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a statute and defer to the text of the statute itself. Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

43. Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge where the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that he is a flight risk or danger to the community. *See, e.g., M.T.B. v. Byers*, Civil Action No. 2: 24-028-DCR, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148118, at \*11 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 20, 2024) (government should bear burden of proof at § 1226(a) bond hearing); *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188232, at \*35 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 21, 2025) (“vast majority”—an “overwhelming consensus”—of courts have placed the burden on the Government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee poses a danger or flight risk.).

**ANSWER: Denied.**

**CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

**COUNT I**  
**Violation of the INA**

44. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

**ANSWER: Respondents adopt by reference their responses to all of the prior paragraphs as though fully incorporated herein.**

45. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. Respondents deny Petitioner's attempt to characterize a statute and defer to the text of the statute itself. Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

46. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates their continued detention and violates the INA.

**ANSWER: Denied.**

**COUNT II**  
**Violation of Due Process**

47. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

**ANSWER: Respondents adopt by reference their responses to all of the prior paragraphs as though fully incorporated herein.**

48. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001).

**ANSWER: Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to summarize the Constitution and a Supreme Court decision and defers to the text of those sources. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.**

49. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

**ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize Supreme Court decisions or the Constitution. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.**

50. The government’s detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

**ANSWER: Denied.**

**The remainder of the Petition is a Prayer for Relief to which no response is required. To the extent that the Prayer for Relief is deemed to allege facts to which a response is**

**required, Respondents deny the allegations. Any allegation in the Petition that has not been expressly admitted is hereby denied.**

Respectfully submitted,

TIMOTHY VERHEY  
United States Attorney

Dated: December 8, 2025

/s/ Ryan D. Cobb

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