

**IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION**

MICAELA DE CORRAL)	
)	
Petitioner,)	
)	
vs.)	Case No. 4:25-cv-00145-BJB-HBB
)	
JASON WOOSELEY, Grayson County Jailer,)	
SAMUEL OLSON, Field Office Director,)	Hon. Benjamin Beaton
Chicago Field Office, Immigration and)	U.S. District Judge
Customs Enforcement,)	
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the)	Hon. H. Brent Brennenstuhl
United States Department of Homeland Security,)	U.S. Magistrate Judge
and PAMELA BONDI, U.S.)	
Attorney General,)	
)	
Respondents.)	

**PETITIONER’S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, MICAELA DE CORRAL, by and through undersigned counsel, files this emergency motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and/or a Preliminary Injunction. Petitioner seeks an immediate order compelling Respondents to release her from the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Petitioner is a citizen and native of Mexico who last entered the United States without inspection (EWI) in 1994, over three decades ago. She is a devoted wife and loving mother to her U.S. citizen daughter. As a cornerstone of her family, Petitioner's current detention by ICE has immediate and obvious consequences on her family. Because she is neither a flight nor safety risk, and she is not described in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2), Petitioner's detention by ICE without a bond hearing violates both the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution. The instant petition is being filed seeking this Court's urgent intervention in the form of an order enjoining ICE from continuing to unlawfully detain her. Indeed, Petitioner is separated from her family and has been deprived of the bond hearing the INA, the U.S. Constitution, and decades of agency practice, leave no doubt she is entitled to.

Petitioner, however, has not been and will not be provided with the bond hearing required by 8 U.S.C. § 1226 as DHS in conjunction with Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR)¹ (collectively “the Government”) recently announced they would be following a new interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Specifically, the Government’s new interpretation subjects every noncitizen who entered the U.S. without inspection to mandatory detention without the statutorily required bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge. As a result, Petitioner is currently being unlawfully detained by ICE.

In recent months, district courts across the country, including in both the Western District of Kentucky and the Eastern District of Kentucky, have been rejecting the Government’s new and erroneous interpretation of §1225(b)(2)(A), granting the habeas petitions of individuals similarly situated to Petitioner, and ordering ICE to either immediately release the petitioner or promptly provide a bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge.² Petitioner respectfully requests that

¹ The term EOIR or immigration courts are used interchangeably throughout this motion to refer to the agency vested with the responsibility of presiding over bond hearings, removal hearings, and appeals under the INA.

² See e.g., *Barrera v. Tindall*, No. 3:25-CV-541-RGJ, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); see also *Patel v. Tindall*, 2025 WL 2823607 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 3, 2025); *Orellana v. Noem*, No. 4:25-CV-112-RGJ, 2025 WL 3006763 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 27, 2025); *Martinez-Elvir v. Olson*, No. 3:25-CV-589-CHB, 2025 WL 3006772 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 27, 2025); *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025); *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, et al.*, No. CV H-25-3726, 2025 WL 2886346, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. CV 3:25-1093, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025); *Carmona-Lorenzo v. Trump*, No. 4:25CV3172, 2025 WL 2531521 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025); *Giron Reyes v. Lyons*, No. C25-4048-LTS-MAR, 2025 WL 2712427 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *Jimenez v. FCI Berlin*, No. 25-cv-326-LM-AJ (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025); *Choglio Chafra v. Scott*, 2025 WL 2688541 (D. Me. Sept. 21,

this Court join the overwhelming list of courts finding such detention unlawful and expeditiously ordering the government to remedy it.

**STATEMENT CONCERNING THE NEED FOR PROMPT REVIEW AND
ADJUDICATION**

This Motion is predicated on a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a remedy that Congress and the courts have long recognized demands swift judicial review. Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 2243 mandates an expedited show-cause response precisely because the petition's central claim is an ongoing, unlawful deprivation of liberty. It is axiomatic that the loss of liberty, even for a single day, constitutes profound and irreparable harm. Therefore, the failure to rule on the requested injunction within 14 days is not mere delay; it is a constructive denial of the motion itself. Each day of inaction inflicts the very irreparable injury the petition seeks to prevent, rendering the extraordinary remedy of habeas functionally meaningless and frustrating the "swift" relief that § 2243 requires.

The irreparable harm of Petitioner's unlawful detention is particularly unnecessary when one considers the fact that the government's attempt to mandate the detention of all noncitizens

2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Hasan v. Crawford*, No. 1:25-CV-1408 (LMB/IDD), 2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Rodriguez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025); *Cuevas Guzman v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-01015-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2617256 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025); *Caicedo Hinestroza v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-07559-JD, 2025 WL 2606983 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-CV-02180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025); *J.U. v. Maldonado*, 25-CV-04836, 2025 WL 2772765, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025); *Lopez v. Hardin*, No. 25-cv-830, 2025 WL 2732717, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2025)(agreeing on substantive claim but oddly not ordering any real relief in this decision); *Maldonado Vazquez v. Feeley*, 2:25-CV-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); *Rivera Zumba v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-14626, 2025 WL 2753496, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025); *S.D.B.B. v. Johnson et. al.*, No. 1:25-CV-882, 2025 WL 2845170, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2025); *Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos*, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025).

who entered without inspection (EWI) is a thinly veiled strategy to coerce individuals into abandoning claims for statutory relief, such as Cancellation of Removal, for which they are eligible. This policy disproportionately affects the very noncitizens who would typically qualify for a bond—those eligible for relief from removal (significantly lowering flight risk and often requiring the absence of any convictions that make them a danger or would mandate detention under § 1226(c)(1)(A)). By subjecting noncitizens to mandatory detention, the government forces these individuals to pursue their applications from within an ICE facility, fundamentally changing the decision-making process.

This new interpretation weaponizes detention as a coercive tool, forcing noncitizens into an untenable "cost-benefit" analysis. To even schedule an individual hearing for relief, a noncitizen must first demonstrate *prima facie* eligibility to the court. However, they are then forced to weigh the *possibility* of winning their case—which is never guaranteed—against the *certainty* of remaining in detention for months. Faced with the harsh realities of confinement (such as strip searches and a total loss of liberty) for what may be an uncertain chance of success, many individuals who are otherwise eligible for relief provided by Congress are pressured to “throw in the towel” and accept removal.

The situation is compounded by the current DHS practice of appealing *grants* of relief. A noncitizen must now consider that even if they win their case, DHS may appeal, forcing them to remain detained throughout the lengthy appeal process, which could stretch their total time in custody to eight months or more *after* an immigration judge has already ruled in their favor. This strategy effectively deters noncitizens from pursuing the very relief Congress intended to make available, using procedural detention not as a tool for public safety but as a means to force capitulation.

Delays in the adjudication of this habeas petition and those brought by noncitizens like Petitioner facilitates exactly what the government is trying to achieve. Accordingly, the failure to promptly address Petitioner's motion (in no more than 14 days) effectively acts as a constructive denial of it.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mrs. De Corral is a 62-year-old female who entered the United States without inspection in 1994 and has resided here ever since. Mrs. De Corral has a daughter, a brother, and eighteen (18) nieces and nephews who are U.S. citizens. She has no criminal record. DHS-ICE detained Petitioner pursuant to an Administrative Warrant in the Chicagoland area of Illinois. While Petitioner's Warrant and her Notice to Appear ("NTA") were seemingly prepared post arrest, the warrant cites to the Respondents' detention authority under Section 236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). *See* DN. 1-1. Petitioner's NTA was issued on November 2, 2025, and classifies her as being present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled. *See* DN 1-2.

Mrs. De Corral's immigration proceedings are currently pending before the Cleveland Immigration Court, which has administrative control over the female Annex of Grayson County Jail. She is scheduled for an individual hearing before the Cleveland Immigration Court on March 23, 2026. While Mrs. De Corral is unlawfully subjected to mandatory detention, she is additionally prejudiced with having to defend her removal proceedings in an expedited manner and far away from her family in Illinois.

Because Petitioner is being detained in ICE custody without being afforded the bond hearing required under the law, she seeks this Court's urgent intervention.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until the court makes a final decision on injunctive relief. *Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. Of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Loc. No. 70 of Alameda Cnty.*, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). To obtain a TRO, an applicant must establish four elements: (1) substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) substantial threat of irreparable harm; (3) the threatened injury outweighs any harm the order might cause the defendant; and (4) the injunction will not disserve the public interest. *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

I. Petitioner Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of his Claims.

A. Petitioner Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Her Claim that Her Detention Without a Bond Hearing Based on Nothing More than Being EWI is Unlawful and Unconstitutional.

Petitioner is substantially likely to succeed on the merits of her claims because her detention is unlawful under both the INA and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Respondents' new, erroneous interpretation of the INA—which subjects all noncitizens who entered without inspection (“EWI”) to mandatory detention—reverses nearly three decades of consistent agency practice, defies multiple canons of statutory construction, and violates the Constitution. This novel theory, recently rubber-stamped by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in *Matter of Hurtado*, 29 I & N Dec. 216 (BIA Sept. 5, 2025), is a thinly veiled attempt to achieve through executive fiat what Congress has not authorized: the categorical denial of bond hearings to a class of noncitizens long understood to be eligible for them. As numerous federal district courts have already concluded, this position is legally indefensible. The multitude of detailed legal reasons with citations to supporting authority demonstrating a strong likelihood of

success are included in the Petition and Memorandum in support thereof previously filed. *See* DN 1, DN 12 at pp. 4-23.

i. Petitioner's Detention Violates Due Process.

Noncitizens are entitled to due process of the law under the Fifth Amendment. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee's due process rights, courts apply the three-part test set forth in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Pursuant to *Mathews*, courts weight the following factors:

- (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
- (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
- (3) the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Petitioner addresses the *Mathews* factors in turn.

Private interest. It is undisputed Petitioner has a significant private interest in being free from detention. "The interest in being free from physical detention" is "the most elemental of liberty interests." *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). Moreover, when assessing the private interest, courts consider the detainee's conditions of confinement, namely, "whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration." *Günaydin v. Trump*, No. 25-cv-01151 (JMB/DLM), 2025 WL 1459154, at *7 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (citing *Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons*, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021); *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)).

Petitioner has not only been held in ICE detention without a bond hearing or the possibility of obtaining one for over two months, she was also moved across different states in ICE's custody.

As in *Günaydin*, “[s]he is experiencing all the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” *Id.* The first *Matthews* factor supports Petitioner’s claim of a Fifth Amendment violation.

Risk of erroneous deprivation. Under this factor, courts must “assess whether the challenged procedure creates a risk of erroneous deprivation of individuals’ private rights and the degree to which alternative procedures could ameliorate these risks.” *Id.* at *8. The Government’s new position claiming any noncitizen present in the U.S. without having been inspected by an immigration officer (colloquially referred to as “EWI”) is subject to mandatory detention without a bond hearing is the sole reason she has been and continues to be unlawfully detained. Notably, the Government’s new position contradicts nearly three decades of consistent agency action holding bond hearings and setting bond for noncitizens who are EWI. Significantly, a bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), like the ones that took place for decades prior to July 2025, is exactly the place for any claimed interest the Government has in detaining Petitioner (e.g. assuring appearance at hearings and public safety) to be heard and ultimately ruled on by a neutral adjudicator. This *Matthews* factor weighs in favor of Petitioner, too.

Respondents’ competing interests. Under this factor, the court weighs the private interests at stake and the risk of erroneous deprivation of those interests against Respondents’ interests. *Matthews*, 424 U.S. at 335. Petitioner does not dispute that the Government and the public have a strong interest in the enforcement of the immigration laws. Ironically, it is Petitioner who is asking the Court to enforce such laws as the currently exist; meanwhile, the Government is asking everyone to ignore multiple provisions of the INA. Petitioner is not a flight risk nor a danger to

the community. Nor is Petitioner described in any of the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 which would subject her to mandatory detention without the right to a bond hearing before an immigration judge. Accordingly, the Government's interest in upholding the Constitution and immigration laws is fulfilled through the relief sought by Petitioner's habeas petition.

Because all three *Matthews* factors favor Petitioner's position, this Court should determine that Petitioner is likely to succeed in demonstrating that her detention without a bond hearing based on nothing more than being EWI contravenes his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.

ii. Petitioner's Detention Violates the Relevant Statutes.

The government's detention of Petitioner without a bond hearing, based on its new interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(A), is contrary to the INA's plain text, its clear structural divisions, and its recent legislative amendments. Indeed, as several district courts have already pointed out:

the government's "interpretation of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and practice.

Lepe v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025). Furthermore, the statutory scheme, read as a coherent whole, demonstrates that Petitioner's detention is governed by the discretionary framework of 8 U.S.C. §1226, which mandates the very bond hearing she has been denied.

First, the plain language of 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens like Petitioner who were apprehended in the interior of the United States years after their entry. As a growing number of courts have found, the statute mandates detention only for an individual who is (1) an "applicant for admission," (2) is "*seeking admission*," and (3) is determined by an

examining officer to be “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see also* *Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *2 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (affirming these “several conditions must be met” for a noncitizen to be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)). The government’s new interpretation, formalized and perceived as binding on immigration judges by the BIA’s decision in *Matter of Hurtado* issued on September 5, 2025, conveniently ignores the second, critical element: that the person must be actively “seeking admission.” A noncitizen who entered years ago and has since resided in the United States is not, by any plain sense meaning of the term, “seeking admission” when apprehended by interior enforcement officers. The statute’s use of the present progressive tense—“seeking”—unambiguously limits its application to the context of an arrival at a port of entry or the border, not to an arrest occurring long after the act of entry is complete. *See Martinez v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing the use of present and present progressive tense to support conclusion that INA § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to individuals apprehended in the interior); *accord Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025). *See also United States v. Wilson*, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (“Congress’ use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes.”); *Al Otro Lado v. McAleenan*, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (construing “is arriving” in 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1225 (1)(A)(i) and observing that “[t]he use of the present progressive, like use of the present participle, denotes an ongoing process”).

By reading the phrase “seeking admission” out of the statute, the government violates the foundational interpretive canon against surplusage, which requires that courts “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” *Corley v. United States*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009). This textual distinction reflects the INA’s broader structure, which carefully distinguishes between

two different contexts of enforcement. Section 1225, titled “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearings,” governs the process of inspection and admission at the border. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (recognizing that “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens *seeking admission into the country* under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) ... [and] to detain certain aliens *already in the country* pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c)”) (emphasis added). In contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, titled “Apprehension and detention of aliens,” governs the arrest and detention of noncitizens already present within the United States. *Id.* Petitioner, having been arrested in the interior decades after her entry, falls squarely within the purview of 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and therefore, his detention is subject to the discretionary bond provisions of this statute.

Second, as numerous courts have repeatedly recognized in recent months, the government’s new interpretation of the detention provisions renders the recently enacted Laken Riley Act (“LRA”) entirely superfluous and devoid of any meaning whatsoever. *See e.g., Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *6–7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (“The BIA also argued that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not render superfluous the Laken Riley Act. . . But. . . considering both §§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(c)(1)(E) mandate detention for inadmissible citizens, whether one includes additional conditions for such detention does not alter the redundant impact.”). In January 2025, Congress passed the LRA for the purpose of making noncitizens who are present in the U.S. without being admitted or inspected by an immigration officer. Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). The LRA specifically targets for mandatory detention a narrow class of noncitizens who meet two distinct criteria: (1) a *status* requirement (being inadmissible as EWI, and thus an “applicant for admission”), and (2) a *conduct* requirement (having been charged with,

arrested for, or convicted of specific offenses like burglary or theft). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). The very structure of this amendment is dispositive. By creating a new category of mandatory detention for EWI noncitizens *with* certain criminal histories, Congress legislated against the clear backdrop of the existing legal landscape—a landscape where EWI status *alone* was insufficient to trigger mandatory detention.

If the government’s new theory were correct, and all EWI noncitizens were already subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), then the LRA would accomplish nothing. It would be a meaningless legislative act. The canon against surplusage forbids such a conclusion. The LRA is powerful evidence that Congress understood and implicitly ratified the decades-long practice of affording bond hearings to EWI noncitizens who lacked the disqualifying criminal histories enumerated in 1226(c) or were among those described in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) such as arriving aliens (a discrete subset of “applicants for admission”).

The Executive Branch’s subsequent policy reversal is not merely a novel interpretation; it is an attempt to rewrite the statute and override a recent, specific legislative judgment, raising profound separation of powers concerns. Moreover, the BIA’s new interpretation, is contradicted by the Executive Branch which touted the LRA as a necessary piece of legislation that would “save countless innocent American lives” when signed into law.³ After all, the LRA would do absolutely nothing because, as DHS and EOIR suddenly claim, every noncitizen covered by the LRA’s amendments was already subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Third, the INA’s implementing regulations and broader statutory framework confirm that Immigration Judges (“IJs”) retain jurisdiction to grant bond to noncitizens in Petitioner’s circumstances. *Vazquez v. Feeley*, No. 2:25-CV-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *3–6 (D.

³ <https://www.npr.org/2025/01/29/g-s1-45275/trump-laken-riley-act>

Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (“The EOIR’s regulations drafted following the enactment of the IIRIRA explained this distinction.”) (citing *Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens*, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (“Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection). Among other things, the regulations create a specific jurisdictional bar preventing IJs from conducting bond hearings for “arriving aliens” under 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B). An “arriving alien” is defined as an “applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry.” 8 C.F.R. § 1.2. By explicitly carving out this specific subset of “applicants for admission,” the regulations create a powerful negative inference: IJs *do* have jurisdiction over “applicants for admission” who are not “arriving aliens,” a category that includes Petitioner. Again, if all “applicants for admission” were already subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), this carefully drawn regulatory distinction would be entirely pointless.

Furthermore, the INA’s distinct grants of arrest authority reinforce this conclusion. Sections 1225 and 1357(a)(2) authorize warrantless arrests at or near the border for those “entering or attempting to enter” the U.S. In contrast, both § 1226(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) provide the authority for warrant-based arrests for interior enforcement and arrests of noncitizens already present in the U.S.

Here, Petitioner was arrested in the interior far from the land border and years after her entry. Accordingly, her arrest is governed by the authority provided in §1226(a). Likewise, her continued detention is governed by the same statute that authorized his arrest: § 1226 which entitles her to a bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge. Accordingly, Respondents refusal to provide this statutorily required bond hearing based on its new and erroneous interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates the INA and is unlawful.

Consequently, Petitioner is likely to succeed on her claim that her detention without a bond hearing violates the INA for all the reasons discussed above. The likelihood of success tips even further in her favor given that it is her position—not the government’s—that numerous district courts have agreed with when granting habeas petitions in recent months on this exact issue—as noted above.

II. Petitioner Faces Immediate and Irreparable Harm.

A movant “must show a real and immediate threat of future or continuing injury apart from any past injury.” *Aransas Project v. Shaw*, 775 F.3d 641, 648 (5th Cir. 2014). Continued unlawful detention is, by its very nature, an irreparable injury. The Supreme Court has affirmed that “[f]reedom from imprisonment . . . lies at the heart of the liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Each day Petitioner remains in custody, she is irreparably harmed by the loss of his fundamental liberty and separation from her daughter and husband.

The harm is not merely abstract. Petitioner has already been subjected to the being transported across the country in ICE custody—and all the humiliating and degrading things that go along with being transported while in custody (cuffs, chains, and repeated strip searches) Absent relief from this Court, Petitioner will remain detained and potentially moved again, in what is becoming an increasingly long removal proceeding process, and as a result, denied her liberty, removed from her livelihood and freedom, and removed from what had previously been a community where she belongs.

III. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Weighs in Petitioner' Favor.

The final two factors for a preliminary injunction—the balance of hardships and public interest—“merge when the Government is the opposing party.” *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Here, the balance of hardships weighs overwhelmingly in Petitioner ’s favor. The injury to

Petitioner —unconstitutional detention and risk to her well-being—is severe and immediate. Moreover, it is always in the public interest to prevent violations of the U.S. Constitution and ensure the rule of law. *Id.* at 436 (describing public interest in preventing noncitizens “from being wrongfully removed, particularly to countries where they are likely to face substantial harm”).

Conversely, the harm to Respondents is nonexistent. Petitioner is not among those Congress mandated were eligible to be considered for release. Nor is Petitioner a danger to the community or a flight risk. Moreover, to the extent the Government disagrees with any of these statements, it has the same recourse it has had for decades: making those arguments to a neutral adjudicator during a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a). Surely, Respondents cannot claim any, much less substantial, harm would be caused by affording Petitioner a bond hearing, just as it has to similarly situated noncitizens for decades in accordance with the INA’s statutory scheme. *See Martinez*, 2025 WL 2598379, at *5. Furthermore, the public interest is served by preserving “life, liberty, and happiness” and by preventing the waste of taxpayer resources on unlawful and unnecessary detention.

IV. Petitioner Seeks the Same Injunctive Relief Being Granted to Nearly Every Similarly Situated Habeas Petitioner.

Petitioner seeks injunctive relief to maintain the status quo by requiring ICE to either immediately release her or promptly provide her with a bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge. As stated above, the list of district courts that have recently concluded the government’s new position is plainly incorrect is a long one that is growing by the day.

While courts have been fairly unanimous in this finding and granting relief, the specific remedy has varied slightly. *See Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025) (discussing the various forms of relief ordered by courts granting habeas relief in similar cases). For example, “[s]ome courts have determined that the appropriate

relief for an immigration detainee held in violation of due process is the petitioner's immediate release from custody.” *Id.* (citing *M.S.L. v. Bostock*, No. 6:25-CV-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *15 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025)). Alternatively, “[m]any courts in recent days order[ed] a bond hearing, at which the Government bears the burden of justifying the immigration habeas petitioner's continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.” *Id.* (citing *Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos*, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729, at *9 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); *Morgan v. Oddo*, No. 24-cv-221, 2025 WL 2653707, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2025); *J.M.P. v. Arteta*, No. 25-cv-4987, 2025 WL 2614688, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2025); *Espinoza*, 2025 WL 2581185, at *14; and *Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar*, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2280357, at *12 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2025)). These remedies preserve rather than alter the status quo. *Nguyen v. Scott*, 2025 WL 2419288, at *10 (W.D. Wa. Aug. 21, 2025) (citing *Phong Phan v. Moises Beccerra*, No. 2:25-cv-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993735, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); *Pinchi v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-05632-RMI-RML, 2025 WL 1853763, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2024) (finding the “moment prior to the Petitioner’s likely illegal detention” was the status quo). The status quo ante litem is “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” For nearly thirty years, bond hearings before a neutral immigration judge were the status quo for noncitizens who were EWI and not described in § 1226(c) or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h). This was the status quo, of course, because it is precisely what is required by the INA’s statutory scheme. Injunctive relief is, therefore, appropriate in Petitioner’s case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court immediately grant her petition and this motion and issue a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction ordering her immediate release from ICE custody, or in the alternative a prompt bond

hearing at which the government bears the burden of demonstrating flight or safety risk by clear and convincing evidence.

Dated: Aurora, Illinois
January 30, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 30, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky by using the CM/ECF system. All parties to this case are registered CM/ECF users and will be served through the CM/ECF system.

Dated: January 30, 2026
Aurora, Illinois

Respectfully submitted,

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