UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JUAN CARLOS
BOHORQUEZ-VALENCIA,

Petitioner,

Case No. 3:25-cv-1383-MMH-LLL

v.

Garrett RIPA, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Miami, Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; Pamela BONDI, United States Attorney General, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; Scotty RHODEN, Sheriff of Baker County Detention Center.

Respondents.
_______________________________/

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

The Federal Respondents, and Scotty Rhoden,[1] as Sheriff of the Baker County Detention Facility, hereby respond to Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. As set forth below, the Court should deny habeas relief and dismiss the Petition because Petitioner's claim is not ripe for review pursuant

[1] United States Attorney's Office may appear on behalf of the Sheriff (in his official capacity) under the terms of a 2009 Inter-Governmental Service Agreement between ICE and Baker County (as service provider for detention and care of alien detainees).

to 8 U.SC. § 1231(a), Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies, and his assertions of Fifth Amendment due process violation is without merit.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Juan Carlos Bohorquez-Valencia, is a 59-year-old male who is a native and citizen of Columbia. *See* Doc. 1-2 (Notice to Appear ("NTA")). On January 10, 2019, Petitioner entered the United States with a business visa permitting him to remain in the United States for a temporary period not to exceed July 9, 2019. *Id.* Petitioner overstayed his visa. *Id.* On June 15, 2022, Petitioner was issued a Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") initial Prima Facie Determination letter. *See* Doc. 1-9 (VAWA Prima Facie Determinations). On July 4, 2025, Petitioner was detained by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). *See* Doc. 1-4 (Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien) and **Exhibit A** (Warrant for Arrest of Alien). On July 16, 2025, Petitioner was issued an NTA, therefore, placing him in removal proceedings and charging him under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") Section 237(a)(1)(B). *See* Doc. 1-2.

On July 30, 2025, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion for custody determination. *See* Doc. 1-3 (Motion for Bond). On August 4, 2025, the Immigration Judge ("IJ") denied bond based on flight risk, [redacted] or associated with an International Terrorist Group. *See* Doc. 1-5 (Order Denying Bond). Petitioner has appealed the bond order with the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). *See* Doc. 1-

8 (Bond Appeal Documents). Petitioner's next internet-hearing date is January 22, 2026. *See* **Exhibit B** (Orlando Notice of Internet-Based Hearing).

On November 13, 2025, Petitioner—who is currently confined at the Baker County Detention Center—filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. Petitioner contends that his detention is unlawful and constitutionally deficient, *see id.* at ¶ 1, seeking a court order requiring Petitioner's release or, in the alternative, a "new, constitutionally adequate" bond hearing within seven days. *Id.* at 16. Petitioner does not have a final order of removal but challenges his civil detention. *Id.* at ¶ 10.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires dismissal of claims where the Court "lack[s] jurisdiction over the subject matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A motion to dismiss may be brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) through a facial challenge or a factual challenge. *Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc.*, 998 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021). "A facial attack challenges whether a plaintiff "has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion." *Id.* By contrast, a factual attack "challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction irrespective of the pleadings, and extrinsic evidence may be considered." *Id.*

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. To survive a motion to dismiss under this Rule, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

III. MEMORANDUM

While this Court has jurisdiction to consider the challenge to Petitioner's continued detention, the Petition for Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) should be dismissed for three reasons. First, Petitioner's pre-final order detention is lawful because Petitioner's removal period has not begun, such that Petitioner's claim is unripe. Second, the relief Petition seeks has already been provided to him—in that Petitioner has already had his custody determination hearing and is currently appealing the IJ's decision to deny him bond—such that Petitioner has not yet exhausted his administrative remedies. Third, Petitioner's assertions that his confinement conditions violate due process is without merit, even despite his erroneous claim that prima facie determination confers legal status. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how his detention is unlawful, and his Petition should be denied.

A. Petitioner's Removal Period Has Not Begun.

Generally, this Court has jurisdiction to consider a challenge to a petitioner's continued detention in habeas corpus proceedings. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001). However, because Petitioner's removal period has not begun—as there exists no final order of removal to execute—the Petition should be dismissed.

The relevant detention provision governing Petitioner's detention is § 241(a) of the INA, as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which covers detention following entry of a final removal order. This provision generally affords the Attorney General a 90-day

period to accomplish removal. *See* 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(1)(A). The statute defines when the removal period begins. Pursuant to § 1231(a)(1)(B), the "removal period begins on the latest of the following:

(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if the court orders a stay of removal of the alien, the date of the court's final order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement."

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).

To the extent the Court construes Petitioner's challenge to his detention pursuant to § 1231(a), *see* Doc. 1. at ¶ 23, it is not ripe for review. Here, Petitioner concedes that his order of removal has not yet been issued. *See* Doc. 1 at ¶ 10. Because no final order of removal has been entered, the removal period has not begun and the 90-day removal period has not been triggered. Thus, Petitioner's detention is lawful.

B. Petitioner Has Not Exhausted His Administrative Remedies.

The United States Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") makes initial decisions about custody and bond—which an IJ may review. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(a). But to get a bond hearing, the alien (or his lawyer) must make an application to the IJ for bond redetermination. *Id.* § 1003.19(b)-(c). The IJ's bond redetermination is "separate and apart from" the removal proceedings. *Id.* § 1003.19(d). If the alien disagrees with the IJ's decision, he may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). *Id.* § 1003.1(b)(7).

Here, Petitioner sought a bond hearing—which the IJ held. *See* Docs. 1-3 (Motion for Bond) and 1-5 (Order Denying Bond). Indeed, the IJ denied bond, finding that Petitioner was a flight risk and [redacted] [redacted] or associated with an International Terrorist Group. *Id.* This moots Petitioner's assertions related to receiving a bond hearing. *See Juarez Alfredo v. Warden, Glades Cnty. Detention Ctr.*, No. 2:25-cv-00610-SPC-KCD (Doc. 5) (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2025). While the IJ ruled against him, Petitioner has since appealed to the BIA. *See* Doc. 1-8 (Bond Appeal Documents). As such, his administrative remedies are still potentially available and under consideration. Thus, Petitioner has yet to exhaust his administrative remedies. *Id.* Indeed, Petitioner is actively pursuing them before the BIA. *Id.* Accordingly, Petitioner's filing of a habeas petition is not the proper avenue to dispute the IJ's findings on a denial of bond and the Court should not engage in concurrent appellate review on the IJ's bond determination.

To the extent that Petitioner implies futility in finishing his BIA appeal, he is mistaken. *See McGee v. Warden, FDC Miami*, 487 F. App'x 516, 518 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding no jurisdiction on habeas petition where petitioner failed to exhaust remedies despite argument doing so would be futile). Futility is not a blank check to relieve petitioner's duty to exhaust his remedies. Under exceptional circumstances, courts may excuse an exhaustion requirement. *See Sanchez v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Low*, No. 5:23-CV-79-WFJ-PRL, 2023 WL 4489472, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 2023); *Faison v. Warden, FCC Coleman,* No. 5:23-CV-67-WFJ-PRL, 2023 WL 4489471 (M.D. Fla.

July 12, 2023); *Vasquez v. Warden, FCC Coleman Low*, No. 5:22-CV-517-WFJ-PRL, 2023 WL 4157364, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2023). Yet, there are no facts alleged here to support that relief in this case.

C. Petitioner's Assertion That Conditions of Confinement Violate Due Process Is Without Merit.

Petitioner asserts that his continuing detention violates the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and "has become excessive and punitive in relation to its purpose." Doc. 1 at ¶ 56. Specifically, Petitioner claims that while detained, his chronic hypertension diabetes and mental health disorders have worsened but that the facility has "not provided consistent care, creating a substantial risk of further harm." *Id.* at ¶ 5. In addition, Petitioner argues that his confinement violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause where the IJ failed to consider his VAWA prima face determination and pending VAWA special rule cancellation. *Id.* at ¶ 52.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the deprivation of a person's liberty without due process of law—freedom from imprisonment is at the heart of the liberties the Fifth Amendment is designed to protect. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing *Foucha v. Louisiana,* 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). Still, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that detention during the pendency of deportation proceedings is a "constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process." *See Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1711, 155 L. Ed. 2d 724 (2003); *see also Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896).

Under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, "a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). For conditions of confinement to constitute "punishment," a petitioner must show either "an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials," or an implied intent to punish through a condition or restriction that a "is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless[.]" *Id.* at 538-39. "Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to 'punishment.'" *Id.* at 539.

Here, Petitioner fails to show that his detention is not proportionately related to the government's non-punitive responsibilities and administrative purposes. While civil detainees retain greater liberty protections than individuals convicted of crimes, *see, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo*, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982), continued immigration detention pending a removal determination cannot be described as punitive or excessive in relation to the legitimate government purpose of protecting the public and ensuring attendance at removal proceedings. *See, e.g., Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523 ("[T]his Court has recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process."). "[I]t is a fallacy to think that Respondents do not have a legitimate government purpose in "preventing detained aliens from absconding and ensuring that they appear for removal.'" *Matos v. Lopez Vega*, No. 20-CIV-60784-RAR, 2020 WL 2298775, at *10 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2020). Petitioner's letter to the Court—wherein Petitioner mentions "unsuitable footwear," "lack of

adequate creams," and a "mattress [that] is completely inadequate"—does not change this analysis or weaken Respondents' legitimate interest in Petitioner's detention during the pendency of removal proceedings. *See* Doc. 1-7 (Petitioner's Letter to the Court dated November 7, 2025).

Petitioner has also failed to show a Fifth Amendment violation on account of deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause governs a deliberate indifference claim by an immigration detainee. *See, e.g.*, *Vaz v. Skinner*, 634 F. App'x 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015 (per curiam)). This Circuit has determined that the Fifth Amendment is violated when a jailer "is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate who suffers injury." *Swain v. Junior*, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020). To establish a deliberate indifference claim, a petitioner must make both an objective and a subjective showing. *Id.* "Under the objective component, the plaintiff must demonstrate 'a substantial risk of serious harm.'" *Id.* Under the subjective component, a petitioner must prove "'the defendants' deliberate indifference' to that risk of harm by making three subshowings: '(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.'" *Id.* "A prisoner bringing a deliberate-indifference claim has a steep hill to climb." *Keohane v. Fla. Dep't of Corr.*, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). An "official may escape liability for known risks if [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." *Swain*, 958 F.3d at 1089 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, Petitioner has failed to set forth a constitutional violation. As to the objective component, Petitioner has now shown the conditions of confinement are "extreme and present an unreasonable risk of serious damage to [the petitioner's] future health or safety. *Id.* at 1088. He has not alleged—much less demonstrated—that the Respondents have been non-responsive to his medical needs or, as to the subjective element, Petitioner has not shown that Respondents subjectively believe the measures they are taking are inadequate. Deliberate indifference requires a showing that Respondents disregarded a risk "by conduct that is more than gross negligence." *Keith v. DeKalb Cnty.*, Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034, 1047 (11th Cir. 2014). Even liberally construing the petition, Petitioner does not meet this standard. *See, e.g.*, *Swain*, 961 F.3d at 1089 ("Deliberate indifference requires the defendant to have a subjective state of mind more blameworthy than negligence, closer to criminal recklessness[.]"). Thus, Petitioner's Due Process Claims related to his health are without merit.

Even were Petitioner able to show a violation, "release from imprisonment is not an available remedy for a conditions-of-confinement claim." *Vaz*, 634 F. App'x at 781 (11th Cir. 2015); *see also St. Louis v. Martin*, No. 220CV349FTM60NPM, 2020 WL 3490179, at *7 (M.D. Fla. June 26, 2020). Indeed, in *Gomez v. United States*, the Eleventh Circuit stated that if conditions of confinement violate a prisoner's constitutional rights, "[t]he appropriate Eleventh Circuit relief . . . is to require the discontinuance of any improper practices, or to require correction of any condition causing cruel and unusual punishment." *Gomez v. United States*, 899 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (11th Cir. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit has further indicated that its holding from

Gomez applies to civil detainees in ICE custody. *See Vaz*, 634 F. App'x at 781-82 (noting that a detained alien could not obtain release based on his conditions of confinement claim). This district has further refused to permit any exception for civil detainees in ICE custody. As stated in *St. Louis v. Martin*, "release under § 2241 unavailing when the alleged constitutional violation is predicated upon the conditions of a petitioner's confinement." 2020 WL 3490179, at *7. Because Eleventh Circuit precedent precludes the Court from ordering release from custody, the Petition should be denied.

Petitioner's VAWA-related claims fare no better. Petitioner incorrectly assumes that because he has a prima facie determination, his detention is unlawful. *Id.* at ¶ 52. As Petitioner frames it, the prima facie determination would "legally preclude removal and eliminate any justification for detention as a flight risk." *Id.* This conclusion is incorrect because a prima facie determination on a VAWA petition confers no benefit and does not pose an impediment to the enforceability of a removal order should one issue in the court of his ongoing immigration proceedings.[2] It follows then that

[2] USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 3, Part D, Ch. 5, Violence Against Women Act – Adjudication, available at https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-3-part-d-chapter-5#footnotelink-2 at A.1 (last accessed December 19, 2025) (noting that a favorable prima facie determination does not confer immigration status or a benefit, nor does it mean that a petitioner will be granted the relief sought). At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court "may take judicial notice . . . of relevant public documents . . . [and] facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because they are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." *Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.*, 187 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201); *see also Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc.*, 133 F.4th 1032, 1036 n.3 (11th Cir. 2025) (taking judicial notice of information on defendant's website at motion to dismiss phase).

Petitioner's ongoing detention—notwithstanding Petitioner's prima facie VAWA determination—is not unlawful on that basis.

Nor is Petitioner's detention during the pendency of his VAWA petition adjudication a violation of his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. *See* Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 43, 52. Due process does not protect a "benefit . . . if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion." *Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzalez*, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005); *Kentucky Dep't. of Corrections v. Thompson*, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989); *see also Olim v. Wakinekona*, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983). And in this Circuit, an alien does not have "a constitutionally protected interest in receiving discretionary relief from removal." *Mohammed v. Ashcroft*, 261 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, to the extent that Petitioner asserts that he has a protected liberty interest in the favorable adjudication of his now-pending VAWA petition, precedent simply does not support this conclusion. Petitioner relies on *Mathews v. Eldridge* to support his claim that he has a protected liberty interest in relief from unlawful detention and that Respondents have not provided adequate process in light of his pending VAWA petition. Doc. 1 at ¶ 51. This also fails. In *Mathews*, the Court established a three-factor test to determine whether an individual's process is adequate. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The factors are (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) the value of additional procedure in avoiding error; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." *Id.*

Here, Petitioner's claims fail on the second and third factors. As to the second factor—the value of additional procedure in avoiding error—Petitioner simply states that "the facility has not provided consistent care, creating a substantial risk of further harm." Doc. 1 at ¶ 5. Petitioner fails to engage with the *Mathews* analysis into the second factor at all nor does he provide any precedent to support his conclusion. Contrast this with the analysis set forth in *Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson*, in which the Eleventh Circuit found sufficient evidence to conclude that the second *Mathews* factor was satisfied. 872 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1989). There, plaintiffs sought the opportunity to allow use of interpreters during interviews for their pending Special Agricultural Worker applications. *Id.* The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that preventing use of interpreters presented great risk that adjudicators would make an erroneous recommendation because an adjudicator's ability to assess credibility is hampered by their inability to understand an applicant's statements accurately. *Id.* The Court similarly found that precluding witness testimony increased the risk of reaching an erroneous determination, particularly where documentation was otherwise sparce. *Id.* Petitioner's blanket statement that "the facility has not provided consistent care, creating a substantial risk of further harm," *see* Doc. 1 at ¶ 5, without discussing what procedures are sought and how they will reduce error is simply insufficient to satisfy the second *Mathews* factor. Petitioner fails to offer any procedural adjustment shy of outright release and he fails to identify what error remains at risk absent accommodation. As discussed *supra* pp. 11-12, a *prima facie* VAWA determination does not halt or defer enforcement of a removal order should one be entered at the

conclusion of immigration proceedings, and detention during the pendency of removal proceedings is appropriate. *See also Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523. Therefore, it is difficult to find an error in Petitioner's continued detention notwithstanding the existence of a pending—but unadjudicated—VAWA petition.

As to the third *Mathews* factor, Petitioner is silent as to the government's interest, relying solely on the assertion that "Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from restraint." Doc. 1. at ¶ 55. This is not the analysis *Mathews* demands. Petitioner has not meaningfully discussed how and why the government's interests are impacted by the additional process he seeks nor has he provided precedential support of the position he takes, which suggests that there is none. *See Goldberg for Jay Peak, Inc. v. Raymond James Fin., Inc.*, No. 16-21831-CIV, 2017 WL 7791564, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2017); *see also Herman v. Mr. Cooper Grp. Inc.*, No. 2:23-CV-948-JES-KCD, 2024 WL 3277021, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 2, 2024) ("In our adversarial system, a claimant must present her case. It is not a court's job to conduct research to provide the proper support for [conclusory] arguments.").

To be clear, the government indeed has a legitimate interest in ensuring the safety of the community and the presence of an individual for removal proceedings, for which detention has been determined to be an appropriate measure. *See Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523, *Matos*, 2020 WL 2298775 at *10. Congress has established comprehensive laws concerning the detention of aliens during and after removal proceedings and those laws should be adhered to. *See Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) ("it must weigh heavily in the balance that control over matters of

immigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the executive and the legislature."). Here, Petitioner's detention determination was made consistent with Congress's statutory scheme. And under *any* provision of the detention statute, mandating release of an alien on account of a pending VAWA petition alone would compromise the government's interest in enforcement of immigration law consistent with the wishes of Congress. Petitioner has failed to satisfy the third *Mathews* factor, and his claims must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Petition (Doc. 1) must be dismissed. To the extent the Court construes Petitioner's challenge to his detention pursuant to § 1231(a), it is not ripe for review. Petitioner has already had his "constitutionally adequate" bond hearing, and, in light of his appeal, Petitioner's removal is not administratively final. To the extent that Petitioner challenges his confinement conditions as violating due process, his claims are meritless. Therefore, this action must be dismissed.

Dated: December 19, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on December 19, 2025, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send an electronic copy to the registered participants. I further certify that, upon filing, I will place, as expeditiously as possible, a copy of the foregoing document in email to the following:

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/s/ Mai Tran
MAI TRAN
Assistant United States Attorney

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY **Warrant for Arrest of Alien**

File No. [redacted] 636

Date: 07/04/2025

To: Any immigration officer authorized pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and part 287 of title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, to serve warrants of arrest for immigration violations

I have determined that there is probable cause to believe that See I-831 is removable from the United States. This determination is based upon:

☒ the execution of a charging document to initiate removal proceedings against the subject;

☐ the pendency of ongoing removal proceedings against the subject;

☐ the failure to establish admissibility subsequent to deferred inspection;

☐ biometric confirmation of the subject's identity and a records check of federal databases that affirmatively indicate, by themselves or in addition to other reliable information, that the subject either lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law; and/or

☐ statements made voluntarily by the subject to an immigration officer and/or other reliable evidence that affirmatively indicate the subject either lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to arrest and take into custody for removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the above-named alien.

(Signature of Authorized Immigration Officer)

M4125 SOLTIS - SDDO

(Printed Name and Title of Authorized Immigration Officer)

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that the Warrant for Arrest of Alien was served by me at Miami, Florida (Location)

on See I-831 (Name of Alien) on July 4, 2025 (Date of Service), and the contents of this notice were read to him or her in the SPANISH (Language) language.

JOHN ENRIQUEZ
Deportation Officer

Name and Signature of Officer

Name or Number of Interpreter (if applicable)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
Orlando IMMIGRATION COURT

LEAD FILE: [redacted]-636
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
DATE: Dec 17, 2025
EAD Clock:

TO: Caminero Law Firm
Peterson, Ryan
5728 Major Blvd Ste 750
Orlando, FL 32819

RE: [redacted] BOHORQUEZ VALENCIA, JUAN CARLOS

Notice of Internet-Based Hearing

Your case has been scheduled for a **INDIVIDUAL** hearing before the immigration court on:

Your hearing is not in person. You will access your hearing by using the web page below.
URL: https://eoir.webex.com/meet/IJ.Espinal

Date: **Jan 22, 2026**
Time: **08:30 A.M. ET**
Court Address: 1 SHERIFFS OFFICE DRIVE, MACCLENNY, FL 32063

Representation: You may be represented in these proceedings, at no expense to the Government, by an attorney or other representative of your choice who is authorized and qualified to represent persons before an immigration court. If you are represented, your attorney or representative must also appear at your hearing and be ready to proceed with your case. Enclosed and online at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/list-pro-bono-legal-service-providers is a list of free legal service providers who may be able to assist you.

Failure to Appear: If you fail to appear at your hearing and the Department of Homeland Security establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that written notice of your hearing was provided and that you are removable, you will be ordered removed from the United States. Exceptions to these rules are only for exceptional circumstances.

Change of Address: The court will send all correspondence, including hearing notices, to you based on the most recent contact information you have provided, and your immigration proceedings can go forward in your absence if you do not appear before the court. If your contact information is missing or is incorrect on the Notice to Appear, you must provide the immigration court with your updated contact information within five days of receipt of that notice so you do not miss important information. Each time your address, telephone number, or email address changes, you must inform the immigration court within five days. To update your contact information with the immigration court, you must complete a Form EOIR-33 either online at https://respondentaccess.eoir.justice.gov/en/ or by completing the enclosed paper form and mailing it to the immigration court listed above.

Internet-Based Hearings: If you are scheduled to have an internet-based hearing, you will appear by video or telephone. If you prefer to appear in person at the immigration court named above, you must file a motion for an in-person hearing with the immigration court at least fifteen days before the hearing date provided above. Additional information about internet-based hearings for each immigration court is available on EOIR's website at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing.

In-Person Hearings: If you are scheduled to have an in-person hearing, you will appear in person at the immigration court named above. If you prefer to appear remotely, you must file a motion for an internet-based hearing with the immigration court at least fifteen days before the hearing date provided above.

For information about your case, please call **1-800-898-7180** (toll-free) or **304-625-2050**.

The Certificate of Service on this document allows the immigration court to record delivery of this notice to you and to the Department of Homeland Security.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THIS DOCUMENT WAS SERVED BY:MAIL[M] PERSONAL SERVICE[P] ELECTRONIC SERVICE[E]
TO: [ ] Noncitizen | [ ] Noncitizen c/o Custodial Officer |
[E] Noncitizen ATT/REP | [E] DHS
DATE: 12/17/2025 BY: COURT STAFF KNIEVES
Attachments:[ ] EOIR-33 [ ] Appeal Packet [ ] Legal Services List [ ] Other NH

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ਨੋਟਿਸ ਨੂੰ ਔਨਲਾਈਨ ਪੜ੍ਹਨ ਲਈ ਇਸ ਪੰਨੇ 'ਤੇ ਕੋਡ ਨੂੰ ਸਕੈਨ ਕਰਨ ਲਈ ਸਮਾਰਟਫ਼ੋਨ ਦੇ ਕੈਮਰੇ ਦੀ ਵਰਤੋਂ ਕਰੋ।

অনলাইনে নোটিশ পড়ার জন্য এই পেজের কোডটি স্ক্যান করতে স্মার্টফোনের ক্যামেরা ব্যবহার করুন

सूचना अनलाइनमा पढ्न यस पृष्ठमा कोड स्क्यान गर्न स्मार्टफोनको क्यामेरा प्रयोग गर्नुहोस्।

Sèvi ak kamera yon telefòn entèlijan pou eskane kòd ki nan paj sa a pou li avi a sou entènèt.

استخدم كاميرا الهاتف الذكي لمسح الرمز الموجود في هذه الصفحة لقراءة الإشعار على الإنترنت

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