

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY**

SARA VALERIA VELASQUEZ-GOMEZ,

Petitioner,

- against -


LUIS SOTO, in his official capacity as Facility Director, Delaney Hall Detention Center; ALEXANDER CABEZAS, in his official capacity as Director for the Newark Field Office for Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; PAMELA JO BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States of America,

Respondents.

No.

**VERIFIED PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner SARA VALERIA VELASQUEZ-GOMEZ brings this challenge following her unlawful search, seizure and eventual detention by Respondents on October 29, 2025. Ms. Velazquez-Gomez is an 18-year-old asylum-seeker and recent graduate of  in Staten Island, New York. She excelled in high school and plans to go to college, but after her mother was injured at her job and could no longer work, Ms. Velazquez-Gomez began working at a warehouse in Woodbridge, New Jersey to support her family.

2. On October 29, 2025, dozens of officers of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), supported by helicopters and numerous vehicles, surrounded and

entered Ms. Velasquez-Gomez's workplace. Ms. Velasquez-Gomez presented a valid employment authorization document to the officer who questioned her. Nonetheless, Ms. Velasquez-Gomez was arrested and subsequently transported Ms. Velasquez-Gomez to Delaney Hall Detention Center, where she is presently detained.

3. Ms. Velasquez-Gomez has resided in New York since age 15, when she entered by crossing the U.S.-Mexico border on November 10, 2022 along with her mother, two siblings, and her mother's former partner. After crossing between ports of entry near Calexico, CA, the family presented themselves to Customs and Border Protection officials, who detained them for two days and then released the family under its discretionary authorities.

4. On November 3, 2023, Ms. Velasquez-Gomez was included as a derivative on a timely I-589, Application for Asylum filed by her mother remains pending before United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. Based on her pending asylum application, she subsequently applied for, and received, employment authorization. She thereafter received a Social Security Number.

5. Under Respondents' recent unlawful reinterpretation of the immigration statutes, Ms. Velasquez-Gomez is ostensibly subject to indefinite mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), notwithstanding her presence in the U.S. for more than two years.

6. Petitioner’s confinement is unlawful—as confirmed by a cascade of decisions, including within this District, that have rejected Respondents’ interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2). Accordingly, she brings this petition seeking immediate and unconditional release. She also asks this Court to enjoin her transfer outside this District. *Local 1814, Intern. Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Ass’n, Inc.*, 965 F.2d 1224, 1237 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Once the district court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of, and the parties to, the litigation, the All Writs Act [28 U.S.C. § 1651] authorizes a federal court to protect that jurisdiction” (cleaned up)); *Khalil v. Joyce*, No. 2:25-cv-1963 (MEF) (D.N.J.) Mar. 19, 2025), ECF No. 81 (enjoining transfer and removal of an immigration habeas petitioner under the All Writs Act). Alternatively, Petitioner respectfully asks the Court to issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 on the expedited basis set forth in the statute, during which the Court should (1) find that Petitioner’s detention violates federal law and (2) order her release.

PARTIES

7. Petitioner is resident of Carteret, New Jersey who has lived in the U.S. continuously since 2022. ICE arrested her on October 29, 2025. She is currently detained at Delaney Hall Detention Center located in Newark, New Jersey (“Delaney Hall”).

8. Respondent Luis Soto is named in his official capacity as Facility Director, Delaney Hall Detention Center. His address at the facility is 451 Doremus Avenue, Newark, NJ 07105.

9. Respondent Alexander Cabezas is named in his official capacity as the Director for the Newark Field Office for ICE within the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Mr. Cabezas is a Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer with DHS, ICE, Enforcement and Removal Operations, Newark Field Office whose duties include oversight of detention operations at the Delaney Hall Detention Facility in Newark, New Jersey. In his official capacity, he is responsible for the administration of immigration laws and the execution of detention and removal determinations, and is an immediate custodian of Petitioner. Respondent Cabezas’ address is U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 970 Broad Street, 11th Floor, Newark, New Jersey 07102.

10. Respondent Kristi Noem is named in her official capacity as the Secretary of Homeland Security in the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). In her official capacity, Ms. Noem is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a); routinely transacts business in the District of New Jersey; is legally responsible for pursuing any effort to remove Petitioner, and is a legal custodian of Petitioner. Respondent

Noem’s address is U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the General Counsel, 2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20528-0485.

11. Respondent Pamela Jo Bondi is named in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States. In her official capacity, Ms. Bondi is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws as exercised by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g). She routinely transacts business in the District of New Jersey and is legally responsible for administering Petitioner’s removal and custody proceedings and for the standards used in those proceedings. As such, she is a legal custodian of Petitioner. Respondent Bondi’s office is located at the United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530.

JURISDICTION

12. Federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of their detention by ICE. *See, e.g., Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); *Lomeu v. Soto*, No. 25-CV-16589, 2025 WL 2981296, *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025) (Padin, J.) (citing *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 517) (“The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a person in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”); *Contreras Maldonado v. Cabezas*, No. 25-CV-13004, 2025 WL 2985256, *2 (D.N.J.

Oct. 23, 2025) (Semper, J.) (similar); *Soto v. Soto*, No. 25-CV-16200, 2025 WL 2976572, *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025) (O’Hearn, J.) (similar); *Rivera Zumba v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-14626, 2025 WL 2753496, *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025) (Hayden, J.) (similar).

13. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution. This Court has authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2202. The Court has additional remedial authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

14. While Respondents have taken the position in similar matters that administrative exhaustion is required before jurisdiction will attach, Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent establishes otherwise. Due process claims, like those brought here, are “generally exempt from the exhaustion requirement because the [Board of Immigration Appeals] does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues.” *Mudric v. Att’y Gen. of the United States*, 469 F.3d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 2006); see *Carr v. Saul*, 593 U.S. 83, 92, 93, 96 (2021) (noting that “agency adjudications are generally ill suited to address structural constitutional challenges,” that “[i]t makes little sense to require litigants to present claims to adjudicators who

are powerless to grant the relief requested,” and holding that it was legal error to impose an administrative exhaustion requirement on constitutional claims).

15. Further, because Petitioner challenges her detention under Section 1225(b)(2), any attempt to exhaust administrative remedies would be futile. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 218 (BIA 2025) (holding that “an Immigration Judge lacks authority to hear a bond request” filed by a noncitizen held in mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)); *see also, e.g., Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 25-CV-2304, 2025 WL 2591530, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (administrative challenge futile in light of *Yajure Hurtado*). Accordingly, the Court can exercise jurisdiction regardless of whether Petitioner has exhausted administrative remedies.

VENUE


16. Venue is proper in this Court because Petitioner is physically confined within the District of New Jersey. *See Spencer v. Kemna*, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (finding that venue is determined at the time a habeas petition is filed).

SPECIFIC FACTS ABOUT PETITIONER

17. Ms. Velasquez-Gomez has resided in the U.S. continuously since 2022. After crossing the U.S.-Mexico border with her mother and other relatives at age 15 and presenting to a Border Patrol officer to request asylum, Ms. Velasquez-Gomez was detained with her family for two days. During that time, DHS did not take any steps to initiate the "expedited removal" process, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225, did

not perform a Credible Fear Interview, and did not classify the family as subject to mandatory detention. On November 12, 2022, the family was released pursuant to DHS's discretionary authority. Ms. Velasquez-Gomez's mother received an Order of Release on Recognizance which stated, "In accordance with section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the applicable provisions of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, you are being released on your own recognizance[.]" Ms. Velasquez-Gomez, her mother, and others in her family also received parole notices.

18. Ms. Velasquez-Gomez's mother timely filed for asylum on November 3, 2024, listing Ms. Velasquez-Gomez as a derivative asylee. Thereafter, Ms. Velasquez-Gomez duly attended her biometrics appointment as part of the background checks performed during the asylum process. When she became eligible, she applied for employment authorization based on her pending asylum application, and received an employment authorization document valid from May 1, 2024 to April 30, 2029. The mother's request for asylum—and hence Ms. Velasquez-Gomez's—remains pending before United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"). They have been awaiting adjudication of their asylum claim for over two years.

19. Prior to her unlawful detention on October 29, 2025, she had lived with her mother. In 2025, she graduated from  on

Staten Island, with honors. She put her goal of further education on hold, however, in order to support her family. Due to a work injury, Ms. Velasquez-Gomez's mother was disabled in 2025 and no longer able to work. As a result, Ms. Velasquez-Gomez took a job in a warehouse in New Jersey to help her family make ends meet.

20. On information and belief, Ms. Velasquez-Gomez has no criminal arrests or convictions.

21. Ms. Velasquez-Gomez's employer is an international shipping and logistics company. She works at a warehouse located in Woodbridge, New Jersey.

22. On October 29, 2025, early in the morning, dozens of DHS agents surrounded and then dozens more entered the Woodbridge, New Jersey warehouse, armed and wearing face masks. A subset of agents went through the warehouse, directing everyone to come to the first floor. Agents blocked all entrances and exits; those who attempted to leave or hide were immediately detained. On information and belief, agents were not looking for anyone in particular, and did not have any idea that Ms. Velasquez-Gomez was on the premises, nor what her status was.

23. Once in the main area, workers, including Ms. Velasquez-Gomez, were surrounded by more than 40 agents.

24. DHS agents divided employees, including Ms. Velasquez-Gomez, into two lines: one for citizens and lawful permanent residents with documentation of their status, and a second line for everyone else. Ms. Velasquez-Gomez was in the second line. At this point, Ms. Velasquez-Gomez was already effectively detained. When it was Ms. Velasquez-Gomez's turn to speak to an agent, she presented her valid employment authorization document and informed the DHS agent that she was a derivative on her mother's asylum application. Nonetheless, Respondents drew up a purported administrative arrest warrant that was then used as a post-hoc justification for detaining Ms. Velasquez-Gomez. She was arrested, zip-tied, taken to a van outside, and transported to Delaney Hall. After her detention, she was also served with a Notice to Appear, commencing the process of removal proceedings before an immigration judge. The box on the Notice to Appear that would indicate DHS ever subjected Ms. Velasquez-Gomez to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or expedited removal, prior to the initiation of removal proceedings, has not been checked.

25. Petitioner remains detained in immigration custody at Delaney Hall in Newark, New Jersey.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

I. The Government’s Statutory Authority to Detain Noncitizens

26. The two primary provisions of the United States Code that govern the detention of noncitizens prior to an order of removal are 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 U.S.C § 1225(b).¹

27. Section 1226(a) governs the detention of most noncitizens who are already in the United States and subject to formal removal proceedings before an immigration court under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); *see also Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (“[U.S. immigration law] authorizes the Government to detain certain [noncitizens] *already in the country* pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”) (emphasis added).

28. As the Supreme Court has made clear, “Section 1226(a) sets out the default rule: The Attorney General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of an [noncitizen] ‘pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.’” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287-89.

29. Detention under Section 1226(a) is discretionary, not mandatory; the government “may release the [noncitizen] on—(A) a bond of at least \$1,500 with

¹ Section 1226(c) concerns mandatory detention for noncitizens who have been convicted, or in some circumstances arrested, for certain criminal offenses, and is irrelevant to the instant petition, as none of Petitioner’s arrest fit the relevant offenses under Section 1226(c). Moreover, Respondents are not relying on Section 1226(c) to justify Petitioner’s detention.

security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or (B) conditional parole[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B).²

30. Under the Section 1226 framework, release is appropriate where a noncitizen “demonstrate[s] to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the [noncitizen] is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). *See Velesaca v. Decker*, 458 F. Supp. 3d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations require ICE officials to make an individualized custody determination”); *see also Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25-CV-5937, 2025 WL 2371588, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025).

31. If, after an individualized consideration, ICE chooses to detain the noncitizen pursuant to Section 1226(a) pending removal proceedings, the individual may ask for a bond redetermination hearing before the immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19.

² Whether release is under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)’s discretionary authority, or pursuant to parole under 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5), Respondents necessarily determined that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (allowing parole, including of noncitizens subject to 235(b) detention, “provided the [noncitizen] present neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding”); 8 C.F.R. 236.1(c)(7) (allowing discretionary release of noncitizens subject to § 236(a) detention, “provided that the [noncitizen] must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the [noncitizen] is likely to appear for any future proceeding”).

32. In contrast with Section 1226, which applies to “certain [noncitizens] *already in the country*,” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added), Section 1225(b) governs detention of noncitizens seeking entry into the United States (*i.e.*, “applicants for admission”). In other words, Section 1225(b) mandates detention for those noncitizens subject to it, and they are not eligible to be considered for release.

33. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to a narrower subset of applicants for admission. It provides that, “if the examining officer determines that a[] [noncitizen] *seeking admission* is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the [noncitizen] *shall be detained* for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

34. As courts in this District and countless others have almost uniformly held, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who are detained while living in the United States. *Castillo*, 2025 WL 2940990, at *1; *Lomeu*, 2025 WL 2981296, at *8 (holding that the detention of a noncitizen who has resided in the United States for years under Section 1225(b) “is incompatible with the overall statutory scheme” and “completely ignore[s] the plain and longstanding distinction in U.S. immigration law between those noncitizens who are entering the country and those who remain after entering.”) (citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 286); *Contreras Maldonado*, 2025 WL 2985256, at *3–6 (similar and collecting cases); *Soto*, 2025 WL 2976572, at *6–7 (similar); *Zumba*, 2025 WL 2753496, at *6–10.

35. Many courts have ultimately decided that when Section 1225(b)(2) is applied unlawfully, release is the most appropriate remedy. *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588 at *15 (concluding that detention while waiting for a bond hearing is “inadequate to address the denial of due process that Mr. Lopez Benitez was entitled to in the first instance”); *Chipantiza-Sisalema v. Francis*, No. 25-CV-5528, 2025 WL 1927931, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2025) (finding that a custody redetermination hearing does not cure any constitutional violations and that such a remedy “rings hollow”); *Hyppolite v. Noem*, No. 25-CV-4304 (NRM), 2025 WL 2829511, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (ordering release where petitioner was detained without individualized determination, and barring re-detention absent pre-deprivation bond hearing); *Artiga v. Genalo*, No. 25-CV-5208 (OEM), 2025 WL 2829434, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025); *J.U. v. Maldonado*, 25-CV-04836, 2025 WL 2772765, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025) (noting that “there was no ‘initial decision’ as ICE’s detention of Petitioner did not comport with the implementing regulations and § 1226(a); thus, a bond hearing for a post-deprivation review is wholly inadequate to remedy that unlawful detention”); *Lepe v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-01163, 2025 WL 2716910, at 10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); *Hasan v. Crawford*, No. 1:25-CV-1408, 2025 WL 2682255, at *12–13 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025).

II. Noncitizens' Procedural Due Process Rights

36. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment entitles noncitizens to due process of law. *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). As clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court, the protection of the Due Process Clause applies to noncitizens in the United States “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citations omitted).

37. Stated simply, “while [DHS] might want to enforce this country’s immigration laws efficiently, it cannot do that at the expense of fairness and due process.” *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, No. 25-CV-267, 2025 WL 1284720, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. May 2, 2025) (citing *United States ex. rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 266–68 (1954)).

38. Further, noncitizens are entitled to procedural due process protections, even in the face of policy shifts between administrations. While a “new administration can change the rules . . . it cannot change them and make up new rules as it goes along when the new rules abridge constitutional rights.” *Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer*, No. 25-CV-493, 2025 WL 1953796, at *14 (W.D.N.Y. Jul. 16, 2025).

39. In the context of immigration detention due process claims, the Third Circuit has applied the three-factor balancing test set forth in *Mathews v. Eldridge* to determine what due process requires. *Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr.*

Inst., 12 F.4th 321, 331–32 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); *see also Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison*, 905 F.3d 208, 225 (3d Cir. 2018), *abrogated on statutory grounds by Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. 573 (2022) (applying a *Mathews* test “to identify “the specific dictates of due process” for an immigration habeas petitioner).

40. These factors are: (i) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (ii) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (iii) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” *Id.*

41. In light of a noncitizen’s due process rights and the procedural rights conferred by Section 1226(a) and the implementing regulations, a decision to detain a noncitizen ***requires an individualized determination*** as to the noncitizen’s risk of flight and danger to the community. *See, e.g., Contreras Maldonado*, 2025 WL 2985256, at *6 (“Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when she was detained without an individualized determination under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations”); *K.A. v. Green*, No. 18-3436, 2018 WL 4676049, at *2–3 (D.N.J. Sep. 28, 2018) (Linares, J.) (holding that the immigration judge granted petitioner an “‘individualized determination’ of his dangerousness and flight risk

taking into account *inter alia* petitioner’s “extensive record,” “history of incarceration,” and “risk were he released once more,” as required by the Government “to prove that [petitioner’s] continued detention was necessary to further the ends of § 1226(c)”; *Hyppolite v. Noem*, No. 25-CV-4304 (NRM), 2025 WL 2829511, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025); *Velesaca v. Decker*, No. 20-CV-1803, 458 F. Supp. 3d 224, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *10; *Kelly v. Almodovar*, No. 25-CV-6448, 2025 WL 2381591, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. 25-CV-02157, 2025 WL 2337099, at *13 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Pinchi v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-05632, 2025 WL 2084921, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025).

42. Under the *Mathews* rubric, freedom from imprisonment, physical restraint, or other forms of government custody is “the most elemental of liberty interests.” *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *9 (“[Petitioner] invokes the most significant liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment”) (quoting *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)) (citing *Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 529); *Ortega v. Bonnar*, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (noncitizens in immigration custody had an arguably even greater liberty interest in remaining out of detention than criminal parolees who required due process protection).

43. With respect to the second *Mathews* factor, given the strong liberty interest at stake, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process requires at least some notice and an opportunity to be heard before a person can be placed in immigration detention. *Trump v. J.G.G.*, 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025). Further, due process requires that “notice must be afforded within a reasonable time and in such manner as will allow [noncitizens] to actually seek . . . relief[.]” *Id.*

44. For the third *Mathews* factor, “the Attorney General’s discretion to detain individuals under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is valid where it advances a legitimate government purpose.” *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 854. The recognized government interests in immigration detention are “ensuring the appearance of [noncitizens] at future immigration proceedings” and “preventing danger to the community.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. Absent evidence in the record that a noncitizen is dangerous, and in situations when the noncitizen has appeared for immigration proceedings, district courts have held that the government cannot demonstrate a significant interest in their detention. *See Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *13; *Valdez*, No. 25-CV-4627, 2025 WL 1707737, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 18, 2025).

45. Recent decisions by federal courts in various jurisdictions confirm that due process requires the government to make individualized determinations to detain noncitizens and give them notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard when challenging their detention. *See Contreras Maldonado*, 2025 WL 2985256, *5–6;

Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *13 (“Respondents’ ongoing detention of [Mr. Lopez Benitez] with no process at all, much less prior notice, no showing of changed circumstances, or opportunity to respond, violates his due process rights.”) (citations omitted).

46. Further, if a noncitizen does not receive individualized consideration pre-deprivation, his due process rights are irrevocably violated, and no amount of procedure provided post-detention can remedy that violation. *See, e.g., Contreras Maldonado*, 2025 WL 2985256, at *5–6 (“Respondents’ post-hoc reasoning at the August 14, 2025 bond hearing does not rectify the lack of individualized determination at the time of arrest” and “The court therefore finds that Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when she was detained without an individualized determination under § 1226. . . . The Court grants the writ of habeas corpus . . . and orders Respondents to release Petitioner”); *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *14 (“Given the nature of the constitutional violation Mr. Lopez Benitez sustained here—i.e., Respondents’ failure to conduct any kind of individualized assessment before detaining him—any post-deprivation review by an immigration judge would be inadequate.”); *see also Chipantiza-Sisalema*, 2025 WL 1927931, at *3 (finding bond “hearing is no substitute for the requirement that ICE engage in a deliberative process prior to, or contemporaneous with, the initial decision to strip a person of

the freedom that lies at the heart of the Due Process Clause.”) (citation modified); *Kelly*, 2025 WL 2381591, at *3 (same).

47. As a result, courts have ordered a noncitizen’s immediate release where their pre-detention due process rights have been violated. *See, e.g., Contreras Maldonado*, 2025 WL 2985256, at *7; *Rivera Zumba*, 2025 WL 2753496, at *11; *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *15; *Lomeu*, 2025 WL 2981296, at *9; *Soto*, 2025 WL 2976572, at *9; *see also Maklad v. Murray*, No. 1:25-CV-946, 2025 WL 2299376, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug 8, 2025); *Pinchi*, 2025 WL 2084921, at *7; *Velasquez*, 2025 WL 1953796, at *18; *Singh v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-00801, 2025 WL 1918679, at *10 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025); *Kelly*, 2025 WL 2381591, at *8; *Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at *19; *Valdez*, 2025 WL 1707737, at *5.

48. Here, immediate release is appropriate because Respondents have not—and cannot—show that they conducted an individualized determination regarding Petitioner before her summary arrest. Respondents’ apparent reliance on Section 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention provision establishes their decision to forego any evaluation of whether Petitioner’s circumstances would otherwise warrant detention under Section 1226, which provides the sole lawful authority for detaining individuals residing in the U.S. Indeed, in what is becoming a routine litigation strategy, Respondents will likely advance a two-part argument to perpetuate their unlawful detention scheme: first, they will claim Petitioner’s

detention is lawful under Section 1225(b)(2), and then, as a fallback, acknowledge that Section 1226 applies but that Petitioner should seek an administrative bond hearing. All the while, Petitioner will likely remain in detention awaiting such a hearing and for any administrative appellate process to run its course. Immediate release is the only remedy that would end this game of bait-and-switch.

49. In the alternative, Petitioner seeks at a minimum a bond hearing at which Respondents bear the burden of justifying her continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. *See German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility*, 965 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2020) (ordering government to bear the burden by clear and convincing evidence at an immigration bond hearing, relying on *Mathews*); *Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison*, 905 F.3d 208, 224 (3d Cir. 2018), abrogated on other grounds by *Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. 573 (2022). Although she submits this is insufficient to vindicate the immense due-process violation inherent in this race-based detention, a bond hearing is a mechanism to mitigate her continued unlawful confinement.

III. TIMELINE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2243

50. Courts considering petitions for writs of habeas corpus are directed to either issue a writ “forthwith,” or to direct the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted within three days, or, with good cause, within twenty days. 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

51. Once the government has responded, the statute directs the Court to schedule a hearing on the petition “not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.” *Id.*

52. Because Petitioner’s liberty remains heavily burdened during his continued detention, we ask the Court to adhere to the clear schedule set forth in § 2243 and order the Government to Show Cause within three days as to why the Petition should not be granted.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (Failure to Conduct an Individualized Pre-Detention Assessment)

53. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

54. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the government from depriving any person of liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. *See generally Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).

55. Accordingly, Petitioner was entitled to due process of law *in advance* of any detention. *Cf. Contreras Maldonado*, 2025 WL 2985256, at *5.

56. The Third Circuit applies the *Mathews v. Eldridge* factors to determine what due process requires in the context of immigration detention, balancing: (i) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (ii) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (iii) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” *Gayle*, 12 F.4th at 331 (citation modified) (quoting *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335)

57. Petitioner’s private interests here are strong: she has been deprived of his liberty. Indeed, detention is the “carefully limited exception” and implicates the “most significant liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment.” *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 851.

58. Further, Respondents detained Petitioner without notice, without an opportunity to respond, and without any meaningful evaluation as to her particular circumstances, including whether she poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.

59. With respect to the government’s interest, Respondents have not offered any individualized purpose for Petitioner’s detention. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690–91.

60. Necessarily, therefore, based on ICE’s view that Petitioner’s detention was mandatory, an individualized assessment of the factors in her case—including her strong ties to the U.S., her success in high school, her years-long residence in this country, her lack of any indication of dangerousness including no arrests, her compliance with all DHS requirements including timely filing for asylum, attending biometrics, and attending ICE check-ins—was not made prior to her detention. *See Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *11 (“The problem is that Respondents have not offered any explanation for Mr. Lopez Benitez’s detention other than their initial assertion that it is mandatory—that is, that it is *non-discretionary*. Such an assertion is precisely the *opposite* of an exercise of discretion, which entails some sort of judgment”) (emphasis in original).

61. For the foregoing reasons, Respondents’ detention of Petitioner violates the rights guaranteed to her by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As multiple courts have held, no amount of post-deprivation process can cure the foregoing violation, and Petitioner should be released.

COUNT TWO

VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (Substantive Due Process)

62. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

63. The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. At its core, a person’s protected liberty interest mandates freedom from arbitrary imprisonment and applies with equal force to individuals in immigration detention. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Doherty v. Thornburgh*, 943 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1991). Because “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception,” the government may imprison people as a preventive measure only within strict limits. *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992) (quoting *U.S. v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).

64. In the immigration context, detention is nonpunitive and therefore held to different standards than criminal detention. *See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). Specifically, Courts have recognized only two legitimate purposes for immigration detention: mitigating flight risk and preventing danger to the community. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 853–54; *Faure v. Decker*, No. 15-CV-5128, 2015 WL

6143801, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2025). Detention is nevertheless the “carefully limited exception” and implicates the “most significant liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment.” *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 851.

65. Throughout the years that she has been in the United States, Petitioner has proven that she is not a flight risk or a danger to the community at large. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690–91 (noting that immigration detention aims to ensure the detainee’s appearance at immigration proceedings and protect the community from dangerous individuals). Because Respondents’ detention of Petitioner detention bears no “reasonable relation” to the government’s interests in preventing flight and danger, *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), hers detention is devoid of any reasoned justification.

66. For the foregoing reasons, Respondents’ arbitrary and abrupt detention of Petitioner violated his substantive due process rights.

COUNT THREE

VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION (Freedom from Unlawful Stop and Seizure)

67. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

68. The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures” and establishes that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing . . . the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

69. Except at the border and its functional equivalents, the Fourth Amendment prohibits Respondents from conducting a detentive stop to question a person without reasonable suspicion that a person is a noncitizen unlawfully in the United States. *See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). The Government bears the burden of providing “specific and articulable facts” to support reasonable suspicion. *See Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The race of an individual cannot itself create reasonable suspicion, even for a temporary stop. *United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975); *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo*, No. 25A169, --- S.Ct. ----, 2025 WL 2585637, at *3 (Sep. 8, 2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Officers lacked reasonable suspicion to even approach Ms. Velasquez-Gomez, and certainly lacked probable cause to arrest her.

70. “[T]o establish reasonable suspicion, an officer cannot rely solely on generalizations that, if accepted, would cast suspicion on large segments of the law-abiding population.” *United States v. Manzo-Jurado*, 457 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2006); *see also Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo*, 606 U.S. __ (2025), 2025 WL 2585637,

at *3 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“To be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion[.]”).

71. Petitioner’s detention had no basis apart from her race. Rather, it was part of a coordinated, indiscriminate sweep on October 29, 2025 of individuals who appeared to be of Hispanic descent at their workplace. Petitioner was stopped and detained while immigration agents requested her identification. Despite her pending asylum claim and lawful employment status, she was zip-tied, put in a van, and transported to Delaney Detention Hall, where she remains. Moreover, the warrant generated in the field in the middle of this brief and conclusory exchange to justify a detention that was already underway is not a properly created warrant as the regulations do not authorize DHS to generate a warrant in this fashion.

72. As a result, Petitioner’s detention violates the Fourth Amendment because she was arrested without probable cause or a proper warrant. *See, e.g., Gamez Lira v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-00855, 2025 WL 2581710, at *3–4 (D.N.M. Sept. 5, 2025) (finding habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim likely to succeed in showing arrest and continued detention unconstitutional when Respondents failed to make a probable cause determination before re-arresting and detaining noncitizen in removal proceedings).

73. The appropriate remedy for this violation is release from detention. *See, e.g., Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at *18, *report and recommendation adopted*,

2025 WL 2349133 (ordering habeas petitioner’s “release from detention . . . granted because her Fourth Amendment rights were violated.”).

COUNT FOUR

**VIOLATION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT,
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and Implementing Regulations**

74. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

75. Upon information and belief, Respondents are currently detaining Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), its mandatory detention authority.

76. However, Petitioner was, at the time of her arrest and detention by Respondents, not seeking admission to the United States. She was already residing in the United States for more than two years.

77. Section 1226 governs the detention of individuals residing within the United States, like Petitioner, and implements a discretionary detention regime with the opportunity for release.

78. Because Petitioner detention should be governed by Section 1226, the application of the mandatory detention statute, 8 U.S.C. §1225(b), to Petitioner is unlawful under the Immigration and Nationality Act .

COUNT FIVE

**VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)**

79. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

80. The Administrative Procedure Act prohibits agency action which is arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

81. An action is an abuse of discretion if the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” *Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (quoting *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). An agency must articulate “a satisfactory explanation” for its action, “including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” *Dep’t of Com. v. New York*, 588 U.S. 752, 773 (2019) (citation omitted).

82. Respondents’ decision to detain Petitioner and suddenly subject her to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2) as a result of their indiscriminate Savino Del Bene warehouse operation, irrespective of Petitioner’s individual circumstances, is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

- a. Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;
- b. Declare that Respondents' actions violate the Fourth Amendment;
- c. Declare that Respondents' actions violate the Administrative Procedure Act;
- d. Grant a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to immediately and unconditionally release Petitioner from custody;
- e. Alternatively, order that a bond hearing be held before a neutral adjudicator where the Government bears the burden of proof of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community;
- f. In the alternative, issue an order to show cause directing the government to respond to this Amended Petition within three (3) days, and hold a hearing within eight (8) days, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243;
- g. Order a stay of removal to retain the Court's jurisdiction while these proceedings are pending;
- h. Award reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and
- i. Grant such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

November 10, 2025

s/Anwen Hughes

Anwen Hughes

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DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY –

Attorneys for Petitioner

SARA VALERIA VELASQUEZ-GOMEZ

**VERIFICATION BY SOMEONE ACTING ON THE PETITIONER'S
BEHALF PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241**

I am submitting this verification on behalf of Petitioner because I am an attorney for Petitioner. I have discussed with the Petitioner the events described in this Petition. Based on those discussions, I hereby verify that the statements made in the attached Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. This verification is being made by counsel with permission of the Petitioner rather than by Petitioner herself due to counsel's inability to meet with the Petitioner in a timely fashion.

Furthermore, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 11.2, I verify that, to the best of my knowledge, the matters in controversy in this action are not the subject of any other pending action before any court, arbitrator, or administrative body.

Dated: November 9, 2025
New York, New York

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Nathan Yaffe

Nathan Yaffe