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6
7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 Southern District of California

9
10 JESUS HERRERA SANCHEZ,
11 Petitioner,

v.

12
13 CHRISTOPHER J. LaROSE ; *et al.*,
14 Respondents.

) Case Number: 25-cv-3035-JO-SBC
)
) **PETITIONER’S TRAVERSE AND**
) **MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF**
) **PETITION**

1 Petitioner submits this Traverse and Memorandum to comply with the Court’s order and the
2 habeas corpus procedure and to expedite the process.

3 As a threshold matter, petitioner should remark that none of the material facts are in dispute.
4 Still, petitioner does need to clarify a few facts, as per the court’s order re supplementing the
5 petition. First, petitioner actually has four United States citizen children. Second, there were two
6 removal cases in 2023. In the first case, petitioner was released after posting a \$3,000 bond. But
7 then the DHS terminated that case. The DHS started a new case a few days later but did not detain
8 petitioner at all. So, it appears that for the last case petitioner was actually either free on his own
9 recognizance or was still subject to the \$3,000 bond on the terminated removal case. The Return
10 also omits the details surrounding petitioner’s re-detention by DHS, although respondent is
11 supposed to supplement the record.

12 So, there do not appear to be any material issues of fact in dispute. Therefore, what is left is
13 to simply apply the legal principles to these undisputed facts and decide the petition. The court
14 should immediately grant the petition because none of the arguments in the Return have any merit.

15 Respondent’s Return urges the court to deny the petition and refuse any relief for three
16 reasons. First, it says the court has no jurisdiction to ever consider the petition. Second, it says that
17 petitioner should be compelled to exhaust the administrative remedies. Third, it says that the DHS
18 may lawfully re-detain petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 for any or no reason. None of these
19 arguments have any merit. Let us briefly examine each one of them.

20 **Jurisdiction**

21 Respondents first argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) prohibits this court from even considering
22 whether petitioner’s detention because it lacks jurisdiction. This argument is belied by both the
23 statute and case law.

24 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) divests the court of jurisdiction to review actions that the Attorney
25 General may take to *commence* proceedings, *adjudicate* cases, or *execute* removal orders. (emphasis
26 added). Here, petitioner is not asking the court to review any actions related to the *commencement*
27 of proceedings, the *adjudication* of cases, or the *execution* of a removal order. Petitioner challenges
28 the purely legal question of whether he is subject to mandatory re-detention without any change in

1 circumstances or explanation after the DHS released him on his own recognizance. So, the statute
2 does not apply to this habeas corpus petition by its own words.

3 Moreover, the case law reached the same conclusion. Section 1252(g) should be ready
4 narrowly to apply “only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision
5 or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’ ” *Reno v. Am.-*
6 *Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); *see also Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583
7 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (holding that constitutional challenge to prolonged detention without bond-
8 hearing requirement is not barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)). “It is implausible that the mention of three
9 discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising
10 from deportation proceedings.” *Reno*, 525 U.S. at 482. Thus, Section 1252(g) does not “sweep in
11 any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney
12 General.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294. *See Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem*, 790 F. Supp. 3d 850, 884-85
13 (C.D. Cal. 2025). Therefore, § 1252(g) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction. *See, e.g., Navarro*
14 *Sanchez v. Larose et al.*, 25-cv-2396 JES (MMP), 2025 WL 2770629, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
15 2025) (finding the Court had jurisdiction in a similar matter); *Noori v. Larose et al.*, 25-cv-1824
16 GPC (MSB), 2025 WL 2800149, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (same).

17 **Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies**

18 Second, respondents argue that we must ensure that petitioner has exhausted the
19 administrative remedies. Petitioner did, to the extent necessary. The exhaustion requirement for
20 habeas claims under Section 2241 is prudential, rather than jurisdictional. *Singh v. Holder*, 638 F.3d
21 1196, 1203 n.3 (citing *Arango Marquez v. I.N.S.*, 346 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2003)). Petitioner
22 requested a bond re-determination hearing with the immigration judge. The judge denied the request
23 concluding he had no jurisdiction based on the BIA’s recent decision in *Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I & N
24 Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). It is futile to appeal this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
25 The decision came from the BIA. The BIA would obviously reach the same (wrong) conclusion that
26 the immigration judge has no jurisdiction to consider a bond. Or, Respondents and the BIA would
27 argue that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pending removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C.
28 § 1225(a)(1), 1225(b)(2)(A), The immigration judge and BIA will also not consider the primary

1 basis of this habeas corpus petition: that petitioner was unlawfully re-detained and is not subject to
2 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. So, petitioner had exhausted the administrative
3 remedies to the extent needed for a decision on the petition.

4 **Re-Detention**

5 Third, respondent's argue that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §
6 1225 and the re-detention after the original release from detention was lawful. Once again,
7 respondents are wrong. The mandatory re-detention issue actually has two facets: (1) was the re-
8 detention without a change in circumstances or any explanation lawful; and (2) is petitioner
9 detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226? Given the somewhat new and drastic change in
10 DHS policy, this is developing case law. However, multiple district courts have now been able to
11 grapple with and decide these legal issues.

12 First, multiple district courts have concluded that the DHS cannot just arbitrarily re-detain
13 an individual without any explanation or change in circumstances. For instance, in *Pinchi v. Noem*,
14 No. 5:25-CV-05632-PCP, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025),
15 the court reached this conclusion relying on the Due Process Clause:

16 ... **even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal**
17 **proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest**
18 **in remaining out of custody.** *See Romero v. Kaiser*, No. 22-cv-02508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2
19 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022) (“[T]his Court joins other courts of this district facing facts similar to the
20 present case and finds Petitioner raised serious questions going to the merits of his claim that due
21 process requires a hearing before an IJ prior to re-detention.”); *Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson*, No. 21-cv-
22 01434, 2021 WL 783561, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021); *Ortiz Vargas v. Jennings*, No. 20-cv-
23 5785, 2020 WL 5074312, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020); *Ortega*, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (“Just as
24 people on preparole, parole, and probation status have a liberty interest, so too does [a noncitizen
25 released from immigration detention] have a liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”).
26 *Id.* (emphasis added). Other courts, including this Court, have held similarly. *Doe v. Becerra*, No.
27 2:25-CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025); *see also Padilla v.*
28 *U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t*, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The Supreme

1 Court has consistently held that non-punitive detention violates the Constitution unless it is strictly
2 limited, and, typically, accompanied by a prompt individualized hearing before a neutral
3 decisionmaker to ensure that the imprisonment serves the government's legitimate goals.”).

4 The DHS initially detained petitioner in June 2023 but released him after he posted a \$3,000
5 bond as ordered by the immigration judge. The DHS later terminated that case but started a new one
6 a few days later in September 2023. The DHS did not detain petitioner when it started the
7 September 2023 removal case, so it effectively released him on his own recognizance. Petitioner's
8 OR release was a conclusion that he was not a danger to the community or flight risk. Petitioner
9 hired an attorney and attended many court hearings. He applied for cancellation of removal and
10 withholding of removal. During this time petitioner had no problems with the law and otherwise
11 complied with the terms of his release from detention. Petitioner was stunned when the DHS
12 officers detained him on the freeway without any explanation and sent him to the immigration jail.
13 He was given no warning or reason for the re-detention. Petitioner was simply driving down the
14 freeway and never returned home.

15 Notably, the respondent's Return also provides no explanation or justification for the re-
16 detention after his OR release. This is because there is none. There was no change in circumstances
17 or law to justify the re-detention. This occurred based upon the whim of the respondents, apparently
18 in a strenuous effort to boost the President's deportation numbers. The re-detention was an unlawful
19 violation of both the APA and Due Process.

20 Finally, Respondents argue that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pending
21 removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), 1225(b)(2)(A). Respondents rely on the BIA's
22 recent decision in *Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I & N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), affirming the government's new
23 interpretation of § 1225. Multiple Courts, including this one, have rejected this argument.

24 As a threshold matter, the BIA decision *Yajure Hurtado* is entitled to little or no deference
25 by the District Court. *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024) (observing that
26 while “agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities,” “[c]ourts do”).

27 Multiple District Courts across the entire United States have recently concluded that the
28 government's proposed interpretation of the statute (a) disregards the plain meaning of section

1 1225(b)(2)(A); (b) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (c) would render a
2 recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (d) is inconsistent with decades of prior
3 statutory interpretation and practice. The following quote is a representative example:

4 “The Court follows other decisions in this Circuit finding that “seeking admission
5 requires an affirmative act such as entering the United States or applying for status,
6 and that it does not apply to individuals who, like [Petitioner], have been residing in
7 the United States and did not apply for admission or a change of status.” *Mosqueda*
8 *v. Noem*, No. 25-CV-2304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8,
9 2025); *see, e.g., Vazquez v. Feeley*, No. 2:25-CV-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL
10 2676082, at *11–16 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); *Rodriguez*, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1
11 (“Every district court to address this question has concluded that the government’s
12 position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory interpretation,
13 legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”); *Guzman v. Andrews*, No. 25-
14 CV-1015-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2617256, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025)
15 (finding that petitioner who was released on bond and rearrested was entitled to a
16 bond hearing under § 1226); *Garcia*, 2025 WL 2549431, at *8 (providing petitioner
17 with an individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a)); *Valdovinos v. Noem*, No. 25-
18 CV-2439 TWR (KSC), slip op. at 9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2025) (same).”
19 *Esquivel-Pina v. LaRose*, No. 25-CV-2672, 2025 WL 2998361 at 8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24,
20 2025).

21 **Attorney Fees**

22 Petitioner has requested costs and attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to the Equal Access
23 to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The EAJA provides in part:

24 A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final
25 judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses
26 which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award
27 under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement from
28 any attorney ... representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time

1 expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed. The party
2 shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified.
3 Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be
4 determined on the basis of the record ... which is made in the civil action for which
5 fees and other expenses are sought.

6 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).

7 In this case, it appears the unlawful re-detention of petitioner was arbitrary and unjustifiable,
8 if not intended to be punitive and malicious. A cynical or jaded mentality could conclude that the
9 recent mass re-detentions are a calculated plan to break the hope and spirit of persons in removal
10 proceedings leading them to give up the fight and abandon their cases in despair—thus leading to
11 more bodies deported from the United States. More importantly, it seems that these issues have
12 already been decided multiple times in the Southern District of California but respondents continue
13 to detain people and oppose habeas corpus petitions. Respondents actions are not justified.

14 **Conclusion**

15 So, to summarize: the court has jurisdiction to decide the petition and the administrative
16 remedies have been exhausted enough to ripen the case. Respondent's violated the APA and Due
17 Process by the summary and unexplained re-detention after his release. Petitioner was entitled to a
18 pre-deprivation of liberty hearing and an explanation as to why he is being sent to the immigration
19 jail. The court should order the following: (1) petitioner's immediate release from the jail; (2) that
20 he is not subject to re-detention without a hearing where respondents must prove by clear and
21 convincing evidence that he is a danger or flight risk; and (3) respondents to pay petitioner's
22 attorney fees.

23 DATED: 13 November 2025

24 Respectfully submitted,

25 */s/ William Baker*
26 William Baker (157 906)
27 MORENO & ASSOCIATES
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