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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

SANTOS MORENTE CAHUEC

Petitioner,

v.

Samuel J. Olson, Field Office Director
of Enforcement and Removal
Operations, St. Paul Field Office,
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Kristi NOEM, in her
official capacity as Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Todd Lyons, in his official
capacity as acting director of U.S.
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Pam Bondi, in her
official capacity as Attorney General
of the United States; Ryan Shea,
Freeborn County Jail Sheriff.

Respondents.

Case No.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1
2 1. Petitioner, Santos Morente Cahuec, is in the physical custody of
3 Respondents at the Freeborn County Jail. He now faces unlawful detention
4 because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive
5 Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) have concluded Petitioner is subject to
6 mandatory detention.
7

8 2. On August 3, 2023, Petitioner was charged with, *inter alia*,
9 having entered the United States without inspection. 8 U.S.C. §
10 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

11 3. On August 10, 2023, Petitioner was released on bond by order of
12 Immigration Judge (IJ) Carr after a custody redetermination hearing
13 pursuant to his discretionary detention.
14

15 4. On August 21, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
16 vacated IJ Carr's order.

17 5. On September 26, 2025, Petitioner was arrested and taken into
18 Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") custody upon appearing for a
19 bond demand.

20 6. On October 14, 2025, DHS amended the charges to allege
21 Petitioner was removable for being an immigrant who, at time of application
22 for admission, was not in possession of a valid entry document. 8 U.S.C.
23
24

1 §1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I). DHS cited no new facts in support of this amended
2 charge.

3 7. Based on this allegation in Petitioner’s removal proceeding, DHS
4 denied Petitioner release from immigration custody, consistent with a new
5 DHS policy formalized by the BIA decision *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, under
6 which all ICE employees are to consider anyone inadmissible under §
7 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without
8 inspection—to be an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
9 and therefore subject to mandatory detention.
10

11 8. Petitioner sought a bond redetermination hearing before IJ
12 Ivany, but on October 15, 2025, the IJ denied bond, having determined that
13 pursuant to, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, the Petitioner was subject to
14 mandatory detention under INA § 235(b)(2)(A) and thus the IJ lacked
15 jurisdiction to assess if he could be released on bond.
16

17 9. Petitioner’s detention on this basis violates the plain language of
18 the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to
19 individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in
20 the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute,
21 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That
22 statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as
23 inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.
24

1 for the District of Minnesota, the judicial district in which Petitioner
2 currently is detained.

3 16. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
4 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the
5 United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions
6 giving rise to the claims occurred in the District of Minnesota.
7

8 **REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243 To Show Cause**

9 17. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or
10 order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not
11 entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the
12 Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause
13 additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*
14

15 18. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the
16 constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in
17 all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400
18 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention
19 and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and
20 receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.”
21 *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
22

23 **PARTIES**

1 19. Petitioner Santos Morente Cahuec is a citizen of Guatemala who
2 has been in immigration detention since September 26, 2025. After arresting
3 Petitioner in Fort Snelling in Saint Paul, Minnesota, ICE did not set bond
4 and Petitioner requested review of his custody by an IJ. On October 15, 2025,
5 Petitioner was denied bond by an IJ at the Fort Snelling Immigration Court,
6 finding he lacked jurisdiction under INA § 235(b)(2). The IJ determined that
7 the Petitioner was detained under INA § 235 pursuant to the BIA holding in
8 *Yajure Hurtado* and he lacked jurisdiction to determine if the Petitioner
9 merited release on bond.
10

11 20. Respondent Samuel J. Olson is the Director of the MSP Field
12 Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such,
13 Samuel Olson is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for
14 Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.
15

16 21. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of
17 Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and
18 enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE,
19 which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate
20 custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.
21

22 22. Respondent Todd Lyons is the acting director of U.S.
23 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). He is responsible for
24 overseeing the federal agency responsible for Petitioner's detention. Mr.

1 26. Due Process requires that there be “adequate procedural
2 protections” to ensure that the government’s asserted justification for a
3 noncitizen’s physical confinement “outweighs the ‘individual’s
4 constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” *Id.* at 690
5 (quoting *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)). In the immigration
6 context, the Supreme Court only recognizes two purposes for civil detention:
7 preventing flight and mitigating the risks of danger to the community.
8 *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 528. A noncitizen may only
9 be detained based on these two justifications if they are otherwise statutorily
10 eligible for bond. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

12 27. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
13 be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” *Mathews v.*
14 *Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). To determine what process Petitioner is
15 due, this Court should consider (1) the private interest affected by the
16 government action; (2) the risk that current procedures will cause an
17 erroneous deprivation of that private interest, and the extent to which that
18 risk could be reduced by additional safeguards; and (3) the government’s
19 interest in maintaining the current procedures, including the governmental
20 function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
21 substitute procedural requirement would entail. *Id.* at 335.
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1 28. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast
2 majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

3 29. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in
4 standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals
5 in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of
6 their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who
7 have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to
8 mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

10 30. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens
11 subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent
12 arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

13 31. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have
14 been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings,
15 *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

17 32. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and
18 1225(b)(2).

19 33. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were
20 enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
21 Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 302–03,
22 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was
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24

1 most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L.
2 No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

3 34. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new
4 regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country
5 without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they
6 were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited
7 Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal
8 Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

9
10 35. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered
11 without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received
12 bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That
13 practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which
14 noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody
15 hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994);
16 *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a)
17 simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).
18

19 36. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a
20 new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory
21 framework and reversed decades of practice.
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1 37. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention
2 Authority for Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered
3 the United States without inspection shall now be deemed “applicants for
4 admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and therefore are subject to mandatory
5 detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of
6 when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the
7 United States for months, years, and even decades.

9 38. On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
10 adopted this same position in the case of *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N
11 Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). That decision holds that all noncitizens who entered the
12 United States without admission or parole are considered applicants for
13 admission and are ineligible for immigration judge bond hearings.

14 39. ICE and EOIR have adopted this position even though federal
15 courts have rejected this exact conclusion. For example, after IJs in the
16 Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for
17 persons who entered the United States without inspection and who have
18 since resided here, the U.S. District Court in the Western District of
19 Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that
20 § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon
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23 _____
24 ¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

1 arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239
2 (W.D. Wash. 2025); *see also* *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025
3 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) (granting habeas petition based on
4 same conclusion).

5
6 40. “The idea that a different detention scheme would apply to non-
7 citizens ‘already in the country,’ as compared to those ‘seeking admission into
8 the country,’ is consonant with the core logic of our immigration system.”
9 *Martinez v. Hyde*, CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24,
10 2025) (citing *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)).

11 41. DHS’s and DOJ’s interpretation defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez*
12 *Vazquez* court explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions
13 demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

14
15 42. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a
16 decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United
17 States.” These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to “decid[e] the
18 inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

19 43. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as
20 being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8
21 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s reference to such people makes
22 clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under
23 subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress
24

1 creates “specific exceptions” to a statute’s applicability, it “proves” that
2 absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies. *Rodriguez v. Bostock*,
3 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1257 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citing *Shady Grove*
4 *Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)).

5
6 44. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people
7 who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those
8 who are present without admission or parole.

9 45. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of
10 entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute’s entire
11 framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are
12 “seeking admission” to the United States. 8 U.S.C.

13 § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this
14 mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of
15 entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen]
16 seeking to enter the country is admissible.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S.
17 281, 287 (2018).

18
19 46. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)
20 does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were
21 residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended.

22 FACTS

1 47. Petitioner has resided in the United States since 2009, and lived
2 in Wadena, Minnesota, prior to his detention.

3 48. On August 3, 2023, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's
4 Form I-213, from the day of the arrest, recorded that Petitioner was arrested
5 for being "an alien present in the United States without being admitted or
6 paroled."

7
8 49. On October 14, 2025, without providing any facts to support
9 amending the charge, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Form I-261
10 was amended to allege the Petitioner was "as an immigrant who, at the time
11 of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired...entry
12 document required by the Act." The Petitioner is now detained at the
13 Freeborn County Jail.

14
15 50. Petitioner's criminal history involves no offenses subjecting him
16 to mandatory detention. Petitioner's record includes a past DWI in January
17 2015 and a disorderly conduct conviction in 2024. Petitioner has consistently
18 abstained from alcohol for over a month prior to his detention.

19 51. Petitioner is currently in removal proceedings before the Fort
20 Snelling Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.

21 52. Petitioner has four United States Citizen minor children.

22 53. Petitioner is married to a United States Citizen who is the
23 mother of his children.
24

1 54. Petitioner is a successful business owner of a restaurant that
2 relies on his presence and management.

3 55. Petitioner has relief available to him. He has a prima facie case
4 for 42(b) Cancellation of Removal for Non-Legal Permanent Residents.

5 56. Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.

6 57. Following Petitioner's arrest and transfer to Freeborn County
7 Jail, Petitioner subsequently requested a bond redetermination hearing
8 before an IJ.

9 58. On October 15, 2025, an IJ affirmed she lacked jurisdiction under
10 the *Yajure Hurtado* decision.

11 59. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from
12 this court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration
13 custody, separated from his family, business and community.

14 60. Any appeal to the BIA, while available, is futile for his release.
15 The recent BIA decision in *Yajure Hurtado* would subject the Petitioner to
16 detention without discretionary bond, likely in contravention of federal law.
17 Moreover, in the *Rodriguez Vazquez* litigation, where EOIR and the Attorney
18 General were defendants, DOJ affirmed its position that individuals like
19 Petitioner are applicants for admission and subject to detention under §
20 1225(b)(2)(A). See Mot. to Dismiss, *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, No. 3:25-
21 CV-05240-TMC (W.D. Wash. June 6, 2025), Dkt. 49 at 27–31.
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2 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

3 **COUNT I**

4 **Violation of the INA**

5 61. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set
6 forth in the preceding paragraphs.
7

8 62. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does
9 not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to
10 the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those
11 who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United
12 States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by
13 Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are
14 subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.
15

16 63. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates
17 his continued detention and violates the INA.
18

19 **COUNT II**

20 **Violation of Due Process**

21
22 64. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each
23 and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
24

1 65. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or
 2 property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from
 3 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
 4 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.”
 5 *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653
 6 (2001).
 7

8 66. The government’s detention of Petitioner is unjustified.
 9 Respondents deprived the Petitioner of the opportunity to demonstrate
 10 heneed not be detained. See *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (finding immigration
 11 detention must further the twin goals of (1) ensuring the noncitizen’s
 12 appearance during removal proceedings and (2) preventing danger to the
 13 community). Petitioner cannot present facts demonstrating that he can be
 14 safely released back to his community when the Respondents illegally
 15 deprive any IJ of jurisdiction to hear his case.
 16

17 67. Respondents’ continued immigration detention of the Petitioner
 18 is disconnected from a “reasonable relationship” to any legitimate
 19 nonpunitive purpose. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has a
 20 fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.
 21

22 68. The government’s detention of Petitioner without a bond
 23 redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to
 24 others violates his right to due process. The court should issue a writ of

1 habeas corpus directing Respondents to release Petitioner to safeguard his
2 Fifth Amendment liberties.

3
4 **COUNT III**

5 **Respondents' Custody Determination is Contrary to Law**

6 69. Petitioner incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs.

7 70. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that courts
8 “shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary,
9 capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
10 law” or is “unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A),
11 (E).

12
13 71. Under *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369
14 (2024), the Supreme Court held that “[c]ourts must exercise their
15 independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within
16 its statutory authority, as the APA requires.” *Loper Bright Enters. v.*
17 *Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 410 (2024).

18 72. In *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the
19 BIA held that all noncitizens who entered the United States without
20 admission or parole are now considered applicants for admission under
21 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and thus are ineligible for immigration judge bond
22 hearings. This precedential decision applies to those in Petitioner’s
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1 circumstances and was decided after the IJ ordered him to be released
2 on bond. As such, it will be applied to the currently pending appeal
3 with the BIA.

4 73. Because the BIA's precedential decision *Matter of Yajure*
5 *Hurtado*, categorizes Petitioner as detained under § 1225(b), *a statute*
6 *which does not apply to him*, the BIA decision is arbitrary, capricious,
7 and unlawful and should be set aside. Instead, Petitioner should be
8 categorized as detained under § 1226(a), which allows for release on
9 conditional parole or bond for individuals who entered the United
10 States without inspection.

11
12 74. For this reason, this Court should enter a declaratory judgment
13 finding that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and order
14 him released on the bond issued by the IJ.
15

16 **COUNT IV**
17 ***Matter of Yajure Hurtado* Violates Procedural Due Process as**
18 **Applied**

19
20 75. Petitioner incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs.

21 76. When the government interferes with a liberty interest, "the
22 procedures attendant upon that deprivation [must be] constitutionally
23 sufficient." *Ky. Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson*, 490 U.S. at 460. The
24

1 constitutional sufficiency of procedures is determined by weighing
2 three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official
3 action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the
4 available procedures, and (3) the government's interest, including the
5 function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
6 additional or substitute procedures would entail. *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at
7 335.
8

9 77. Petitioner has a weighty liberty interest as his freedom "from
10 government . . . detention . . . lies at the heart of the liberty that [the
11 Fifth Amendment] protects." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 693.
12

13 78. The risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner's liberty is
14 extremely high, given that the government, pursuant to *Matter of*
15 *Yajure Hurtado*, is detaining Petitioner under a statute that does not
16 apply to him and denying him his statutory right to a bond hearing on
17 the erroneous assertion that he is subject to mandatory detention.
18

19 79. Finally, the government's interest in preserving its unilateral
20 authority to prevent the release of noncitizens who have already shown
21 they are neither a flight risk nor a danger is minimal. Providing
22 additional procedural protections here introduces no additional
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24

1 administrative burdens as Petitioner is statutorily entitled to a bond
2 hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

3 80. Because Respondents have custody of Petitioner in violation of
4 his Fifth Amendment rights, the Court should issue a writ of habeas
5 corpus directing Respondents to release Petitioner to safeguard his
6 constitutional liberties. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Numerous courts throughout
7 the country have found that the use of the mandatory detention
8 provision, as affirmed in *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado*, violates an
9 individual's right to meaningful procedural due process. *See, e.g.,*
10 *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828, at *12
11 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025); *Lopez Santos v. Noem*, No. 3:25-CV-01193,
12 2025 WL 2642278, at *5 (W.D. La. Sept. 11, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*,
13 No. CV 3:25-1093, 2025 WL 2472136, at *3 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025). As
14 such, this Court should likewise find that Petitioner's detention
15 represents a violation of his right to procedural due process and order
16 him released according to the bond conditions set by the IJ.
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21 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

22 WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

23 a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
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- b. Issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner or provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 14 days;
- c. Issue an Order to Show Cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, directing Respondents to show cause why the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 should not be granted within three days;
- d. Award Petitioner attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law;
- e. Order a bond redetermination hearing be held; and
- f. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 7th day of November 2025.

/s/Gloria Contreras Edin
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Attorney for Petitioner

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