

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

YOHANDER JOSE LEON LOPEZ,

Case No. 1:25-cv-1379

Petitioner,

Hon. Paul L. Maloney
U.S. District Court Judge

v.

ROBERT LYNCH, Detroit Field Office
Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, in his official capacity; TODD
LYONS, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, in his official
capacity; and KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in her
official capacity,

Respondents.

**RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND COMPLAINT FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

Petitioner Yohander Jose Leon Lopez is a noncitizen who was not lawfully admitted to the United States and has no lawful immigration status. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), detained Petitioner while it pursues administrative removal proceedings against him. He challenges the agency's decision to detain him under a statutory provision that does not entitle him to a bond hearing until the conclusion of his administrative immigration proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

Respondents acknowledge that the Court recently concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A), “governs noncitizens . . . who have resided in the United States for many years and who were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested.” *Hernandez Garcia v. Kevin Raycraft*, No. 1:25-cv-1281, 2025 WL 3122800, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2025);

see also Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025); *Rodriguez Carmona, v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025). However, Respondents respectfully disagree with the Court's analysis and maintain that aliens like Petitioner properly are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Respondents further maintain that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's claims, Petitioner's detention does not violate the Due Process Clause or the *Castañon Nava* settlement, and Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the Court should decline to issue a writ of habeas corpus to Petitioner. Furthermore, the Court should dismiss the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the Director of ICE as respondents to this action because the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper respondent in this habeas suit.¹

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela who unlawfully entered the United States in 2023. (Pet., ECF No. 1, ¶ 32; Ex. A, Ellis Decl. ¶¶ 4-7.) On October 18, 2025, an ICE agent arrested Petitioner for being illegally present in the United States pursuant to a previously issued I-200 warrant. (Ex. A, Ellis Decl. ¶ 8.) Upon his detention, DHS determined that Petitioner was an applicant for admission seeking admission, and not clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. (*Id.* ¶ 11.) DHS has detained Petitioner at the North Lake Processing Center in Baldwin, Michigan. (*Id.*)

¹ Petitioner named Robert Lynch as a Respondent, as Field Office Director for the Detroit ICE Field Office. Mr. Lynch no longer occupies that position and the current Acting Field Office Director, Kevin Raycraft, should automatically be substituted as the Field Office Director Respondent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

Petitioner currently is in removal proceedings on the detained docket before the Detroit immigration court. (Ex. B, Hearing Notice.) He is scheduled to appear for a master calendar hearing on January 14, 2026. (*Id.*) He has not filed a motion for bond. (*Id.*)

On November 5, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition in federal court seeking a writ of habeas corpus asking the Court to direct Respondents to release Petitioner or promptly provide him with a bond hearing. Additionally, he asks the Court to issue a declaration that his detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Finally, he asks the Court to prohibit the Respondents from transferring him from the Western District of Michigan without the court's approval.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

I. The Pre-IIRIRA Framework Gave Preferential Treatment to Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, contains a comprehensive framework governing the regulation of aliens, including the creation of proceedings for the removal of aliens unlawfully in the United States and requirements for when the government is obligated to detain aliens pending removal.

Prior to 1996, the INA treated aliens differently based on whether the alien had physically “entered” the United States. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 222-223 (BIA 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a), 1251 (1994)); see *Hing Sum v. Holder*, 602 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). “Entry” referred to “any coming of an alien into the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994), and whether an alien had physically entered the United States (or not) “dictated what type of [removal] proceeding applied” and whether the alien would be detained pending those proceedings, *Hing Sum v. Holder*, 602 F.3d at 1099.

At the time, the INA “provided for two types of removal proceedings: deportation hearing and exclusion hearings.” *Hose v. I.N.S.*, 180 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). An alien who arrived at a port of entry would be placed in “exclusion proceedings and subject to mandatory detention, with potential release solely by means of a grant of parole.” *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223; see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)-(b) (1995); *id.* § 1226(a) (1995). In contrast, an alien who physically entered the United States unlawfully would be placed in deportation proceedings. *Id.*; *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100. Aliens in deportation proceedings, unlike those in exclusion proceedings, “were entitled to request release on bond.” *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994)).

The INA’s prior framework distinguishing between aliens based on physical “entry” had

the ‘unintended and undesirable consequence’ of having created a statutory scheme where aliens who entered without inspection ‘could take advantage of the greater procedural and substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings,’ *including the right to request release on bond*, while aliens who had ‘actually presented themselves to authorities for inspection . . . were subject to mandatory custody.

Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223 (emphasis added) (quoting *Martinez v. Att’y General of U.S.*, 693 F.3d 408, 413 n.5 (2012)); see also *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100 (similar); H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996) (“House Rep.”) (“illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection”).

II. IIRARA Eliminated the Preferential Treatment of Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and Mandated Detention of all “Applicants for Admission.”

Congress discarded the prior regime through enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996). Among other things, the statute had the goal of “ensur[ing] that all immigrants who have not been

lawfully admitted, regardless of their legal presence in the country, are placed on equal footing in removal proceedings under the INA.” *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

To that end, IIRIRA replaced the prior focus on physical “entry” and instead made lawful “admission” the governing touchstone. IIRIRA defined “admission” to mean “the *lawful* entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). In other words, the immigration laws would no longer distinguish aliens based on whether they had managed to evade detection and enter the country without permission. Instead, the “pivotal factor in determining an alien’s status” would be “whether or not the alien has been *lawfully* admitted.” House Rep., *supra*, at 226 (emphasis added); *Hing Sum v. Holder*, 602 F.3d at 1100 (similar). IIRIRA also eliminated the exclusion-deportation dichotomy and consolidated both sets of proceedings into “removal proceedings.” *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223.

IIRIRA effected these changes through several provisions codified 8 U.S.C. § 1225:

Section 1225(a): Section 1225(a) codifies Congress’s decision to make lawful “admission,” rather than physical entry, the touchstone. That provision states that an alien “present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States” “shall be deemed . . . an applicant for admission”:

An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (emphasis added). “All aliens . . . who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States” are required to “be inspected by [an] immigration officer.” *Id.* § 1225(a)(3). The inspection by the immigration

officer is designed to determine whether the alien may be lawfully “admitted” to the country or, instead, must be referred to removal proceedings.

Section 1225(b): IIRIRA also divided removal proceedings into two tracks—expedited removal and non-expedited “Section 240” proceedings—and mandated that applicants for admission be detained pending those proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)-(2).

Section 1225(b)(1) provides for so-called “expedited removal proceedings.” *DHS v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 109-113 (2020). Expedited removal proceedings potentially can be applied to a subset of aliens—those who (1) are “arriving in the United States,” or who (2) have “not been admitted or paroled into the United States” and have “not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). As to these aliens, the immigration officer shall “order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution.” *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). In that event, the alien “shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear or persecution and, if found not to have such fear, until removed.” *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.5(b)(4)(ii). An alien processed for expedited removal who does not indicate an intent to apply for a form of relief from removal is likewise detained until removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV); *see* 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii).

Section 1225(b)(2) is a “catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by” subsection (b)(1). *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). It requires that those aliens be detained pending § 240 removal proceedings:

Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien

seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien *shall be detained* for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title [Section 240].

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). *See* 8 C.F.R. § 253.3(b)(1)(ii) (mirroring § 1225(b)(2) detention mandate); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 302 (holding that § 1225(b)(2) “mandate[s] detention of aliens throughout the completion of applicable proceedings and not just at the moment those proceedings begin”).

While § 1225(b)(2) does not allow for aliens to be released on bond, the INA grants DHS discretion to exercise its parole authority to temporarily release an applicant for admission, but “only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Parole, however, “shall not be regarded as admission of the alien.” *Id.*; *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288 (discussing parole authority). Moreover, when the Secretary determines that “the purposes of such parole . . . been served,” the “alien shall . . . be returned to the custody from which he was paroled” and be “dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).

Section 1226: IIRIRA also created a separate authority addressing the arrest, detention, and release of aliens generally (versus applicants for admission specifically). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226. This is the only provision that governs the detention of aliens who, for example, lawfully enter the country but overstay or otherwise violate the terms of their visas, or are later determined to have been improperly admitted. The statute provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” *Id.* § 1226(a). Detention under this provision is generally discretionary: The Attorney General “may” either “continue to detain the arrested alien” or release the alien on bond or conditional parole. *Id.* § 1226(a)(1)-(2).

That “default rule,” however, does not apply to certain criminal aliens who are being released from detention by another law enforcement agency. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288; *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Section 1226(c) provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody” certain classes of criminal aliens—those who are inadmissible or deportable because the alien (1) “committed” certain offenses delineated in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 and 1227; or (2) engaged in terrorism-related activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). The government must detain these aliens “when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned against for the same offense.” *Id.*

Congress recently amended § 1226(c) through the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3, (2025), which requires detention of (and prohibits parole for) aliens who (1) are inadmissible because they are physically present in the United States without admission or parole, have committed a material misrepresentation or fraud, or lack required documentation; and (2) are “charged with, arrested for, [] convicted of, admit[] having committed, or admit[] committing acts which constitute the essential elements of” certain listed offenses. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).

For many years after Congress enacted IIRIRA, immigration judges treated aliens who entered the United States without admission and were later detained away from the border as being subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). *See Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 225 n.6.

However, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a published decision in *Hurtado*. The Board concluded that § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention regime applies to *all* aliens who entered the United States without inspection and admission:

Aliens . . . who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an

immigration officer. Remaining in the United State for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not constitute an “admission.”

29 I. & N. Dec. at 228; *see also id.* at 225 (“Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens . . . who are present in the United States without admission”).

ARGUMENT

The Court should deny Petitioner’s request for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims, and Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Even if that failure is excused, he is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2) because the text, structure, and history of the statute demonstrate that it applies to him. His detention also comports with the Constitution because he has been provided the due process required by law. If the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s habeas proceedings, it need not restrict his transfer out of this district. And because the petition may only be directed to the ICE Field Office Director, the Court should dismiss Secretary Noem and Director Lyons as respondents to this action.

I. Petitioner’s Claims Should be Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

A. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3) bars review of Petitioner’s claims.

Section 1252(e)(3) deprives this Court of jurisdiction, including habeas corpus jurisdiction, over Petitioner’s challenge to detention of noncitizens under § 1225(b)(2). Section 1252(e)(3) limits judicial review of “determinations under section 1225(b) of this title and its implementation” to the District Court for the District of Columbia. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3). Paragraph (e)(3) further confines judicial review to (1) whether § 1225(b) or an implementing regulation is constitutional or (2) whether a regulation or other written policy directive, guideline, or procedure implementing the section violates the law. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(i)-(ii); *see also M.M.V. v. Garland*, 1 F.4th 1100, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Unlike other provisions within 1252(e), § 1252(e)(3) applies

broadly to judicial review of § 1225(b), not just determinations under § 1225(b)(1). *Compare* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(A), (e)(2), *with* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A). *See also Russello v. United States*, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (presuming Congress acted intentionally where it “includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act”).

Petitioner challenges the determination, set forth in writing by DHS, that aliens who entered the United States without inspection are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner therefore seeks judicial review of a written policy or guideline implementing § 1225(b) that, under § 1252(e)(3)(A)(ii), only the District Court for the District of Columbia can provide.

B. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) bars review of Petitioner’s claims.

Section 1252(g) categorically bars jurisdiction over “*any* cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien *arising from* the decision or action by the [Secretary of Homeland Security] to *commence proceedings*, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added). The Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision to commence removal proceedings, including the decision to detain an alien pending such removal proceedings, squarely falls within this jurisdictional bar.

The decision to commence removal proceedings against an alien includes the detention of that alien pending the removal determination. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Consequently, the decision to detain is a “specification of the decision to ‘commence proceedings’ which . . . § 1252(g) covers.” *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (“AADC”)*, 525 U.S. 471, 474, 485 n.9 (1999); *see also Herrera-Correra v. United States*, No. 08-cv-2941, 2008 WL 11336833, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008) (“For the purposes of § 1252, the Attorney General commences proceedings against an alien when the alien is issued a Notice to Appear before an immigration

court.”). At that point, the “Attorney General may arrest the alien against whom proceedings are commenced and detain that individual until the conclusion of those proceedings.” *Herrera-Correra*, 2008 WL 11336833, at *3. “Thus, an alien’s detention throughout this process arises from the Attorney General’s decision to commence proceedings,” and review of claims arising from that choice is barred under § 1252(g). *Id.*

Here, Petitioner contends that his detention pending removal proceedings is unlawful. In so doing, he admits that his detention is part and parcel of the commencement of proceedings against him. Petitioner’s detention therefore “aris[es] from” the decision to commence removal proceedings against an alien. *See Alvarez v. ICE*, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016) (“By its plain terms, [§ 1252(g)] bars us from questioning ICE’s discretionary decisions to commence removal” and also to review “ICE’s decision to take [plaintiff] into custody and to detain him during his removal proceedings”); *Tazu v. Att’y Gen. U.S.*, 975 F.3d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding that the text of § 1252(g) strips courts of jurisdiction to review execution of a removal order, including the detention necessary to effectuate a complete removal). As such, judicial review of the Petitioner’s claims should be barred by § 1252(g).

Respondents acknowledge that language from some Sixth Circuit cases has been interpreted to allow habeas petitions challenging ongoing detention despite § 1252(g). *See Hamama v. Adducci*, 912 F.3d 869, 877 (6th Cir. 2018) (“the district court’s jurisdiction over the detention-based claims is independent of its jurisdiction over the removal-based claims”); *Elgharib v. Napolitano*, 600 F.3d 597, 605-06 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that if the petition’s challenge did not address merits of removal, the district court may have jurisdiction over the habeas claims); *Moussa v. Jenifer*, 389 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that “there are instances where § 1252(g) does not suspend habeas review,” such as challenges to indefinite detention following execution of a

removal order); *Mustata v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 179 F.3d 1017, 1020 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that 1252(g) only applies to the discrete actions of commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, or executing removal orders). But these Sixth Circuit decisions did not involve § 1225 detention for commencement of proceedings or a Petitioner who directly challenged the decision to detain him in the first instance. In *Hamama*, the petitioners were not “seeking habeas relief in the first instance,” 912 F.3d at 875; they had already been ordered removed or had reopened orders of removal but were being detained due to criminal history or terrorist activities, *id.* at 873; the parties did not contest the court’s jurisdiction over detention-based claims and the primary focus was on whether the court could issue class-wide injunctive relief, *id.* at 877; and the Sixth Circuit determined that the district court lacked jurisdiction relating to challenges to the removal order and well as class action detention relief, *id.* at 877, 880. *Moussa* involved a request for a stay of deportation, not a detention claim, and concluded that the agency’s discretionary decision on whether to stay deportation was not subject to judicial review and was not separate from the decision to execute the deportation order. 389 F.3d at 552, 554. *Elgharib* concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction where the petitioner filed a petition for writ of prohibition after failing to appeal a motion to reopen her removal proceedings. 600 F.3d at 599, 606. And *Mustata* involved an ineffective assistance of counsel claim relating to withdrawal of an asylum claim and the petitioners were not detained. 178 F.3d at 1019. In contrast, here ICE detained petitioner to commence removal proceedings and Petitioner claims that very act was unlawful. Therefore, prior Sixth Circuit opinions do not favor jurisdiction here. *But see Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch*, — F. Supp.3d —, 2025 WL 3012033, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025) (concluding that habeas petition seeking a bond hearing was not in the scope of § 1252(g)). Even if they did, Respondents disagree

with such a reading of § 1252(g) for reasons expressed in other Circuits, as indicated above, and are preserving this argument for appeal.

C. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) bars review of Petitioner’s claims.

Under § 1252(b)(9), “judicial review of all questions of law . . . including interpretation and application of statutory provisions . . . arising from any action taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States” is only proper before the appropriate court of appeals in the form of a petition for review of a final removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). Section 1252(b)(9) is an “unmistakable ‘zipper’ clause” that “channels judicial review of all” claims arising from deportation proceedings to a court of appeals in the first instance. *Id.*; *Hamdi v. Napolitano*, 620 F.3d 615, 626 (6th Cir. 2010); *see also Nasrallah v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 573, 579-80 (2020) (“a noncitizen’s various challenges arising from the removal proceeding must be ‘consolidated in a petition for review and considered by the courts of appeals’”).

Section 1252(b)(9) divests district courts of jurisdiction to review both direct and indirect challenges to removals, including decisions to detain for purposes of removal or for removal proceedings. While this jurisdictional bar is a “judicial channeling provision” that may still allow foreign nationals to challenge the conditions of their confinement during those removal proceedings, *Hamdi*, 620 F.3d at 626, the statutes do not permit the use of habeas to challenge “the decision to *detain them* in the first place or to seek removal,” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294 (emphasis added). Yet that is precisely what Petitioner is requesting here, as adjudicating whether bond should be given to a foreign national in removal proceedings is part and parcel of “adjudicat[ing a] case” before each immigration judge. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

Section 1252(b)(9) provides that “[j]udicial review of *all* questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any

action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (emphasis added.) Thus, while § 1252(b)(9) may not bar claims challenging the conditions or scope of detention of foreign nationals in removal proceedings, it *does* bar claims “challenging the decision to detain them in the first place.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294. As Justice Thomas reasoned in his concurrence in *Jennings*:

Section 1252(b)(9) is a “general jurisdictional limitation” that applies to “all claims arising from deportation proceedings and the many decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process.” *AADC*, 525 U.S. at 482. Detaining an alien falls within this definition—indeed, this Court has described detention during removal proceedings as an “aspect of the deportation process.” *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) The phrase “any action taken to remove an alien from the United States” must at least cover congressionally authorized portions of the deportation process that necessarily serve the purpose of ensuring an alien’s removal. Claims challenging detention during removal proceedings thus fall within the heartland of § 1252(b)(9).

Id. at 317-18 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Because Petitioner’s habeas claims require a court to answer “legal questions” that arise from “an action taken to remove an alien,” they “fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 295 n.3.

The Court should dismiss the Petitioner’s claims for lack of jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9). The Petitioner must instead present his claims before the appropriate court of appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

II. Petitioner Has Not Exhausted His Administrative Remedies.

Petitioner has yet to request a bond hearing. Should he request and the immigration court decline to grant his bond, he would have the right to appeal any unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). *Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 1:25CV01621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025); *Rabi v. Sessions*, No. 19-3249, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19661, at *1-2 (6th Cir. July 16, 2018) (unpublished order).

Accordingly, Petitioner has yet to exhaust his administrative remedies within the immigration courts before seeking a writ of habeas corpus from this Court.

“When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the [habeas] petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.” *Leonardo v. Crawford*, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). In *Leonardo*, the petitioner pursued habeas review of an immigration judge’s (IJ) adverse bond determination before he appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. *Id.* The Ninth Circuit determined that filing a habeas petition in federal district court was “improper” because the petitioner “should have exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district court to review the IJ’s decision.” *Id.* (citing *Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft*, 339 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Sixth Circuit has endorsed this procedure for challenging bond determinations. *See Rabi v. Sessions*, No. 19-3249, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19661, at *1-2 (6th Cir. July 16, 2018) (citing *Leonardo*, 646 F.3d at 1160) (unpublished order). Additionally, some lower courts in this circuit have applied a three-factor test for determining whether prudential exhaustion applies. *See, e.g., Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 1:25CV01621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025). The test considers whether:

- (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision;
- (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and
- (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.

Id. (quoting *Puga v. Chertoff*, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)).

Respondents acknowledge that the Court previously declined to require prudential exhaustion for aliens contesting detention under § 1225(b)(2). *See, e.g., Hernandez Garcia*, 2025

WL 3122800, at *5; *Sanchez Alvarez*, 2025 WL 2942648, at *3; *Rodriguez Carmona*, 2025 WL 2992222, at *4. Here, however, the three-factor test weighs in favor of requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. First, although Petitioner alleges that Respondents violated the INA and the Due Process Clause, the latter claim likewise hinges on the INA and Respondents' allegedly wrongful interpretation of the statute. "In other words, any determination regarding detention here turns on interpretation and application of the governing removal regime," a review that in the first instance "should proceed before the Board of Immigration Appeals to 'apply its experience and expertise without judicial interference.'" *Monroy Villalta v. Greene*, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2472886, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2025) (quoting *Khalili v. Holder*, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009) (abrogated on other grounds)); see also *Hernandez*, 2025 WL 2444114, at *10 (applying *Monroy Villalta* to find that the first factor weighs in favor of requiring exhaustion of claims premised on the statutory interpretation of the INA); *Ba v. Dir. of Detroit Field Office, U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf't*, No. 4:25-CV-02208, 2025 WL 2977712, at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2025) ("Because of the expertise the Board of Immigration Appeals and the immigration courts more generally have in the statutory and administrative regimes governing the admission and removal of foreigners, many of the purposes for requiring exhaustion may be served by permitting agency review in the first instance." (quotation omitted)).

Second, "relaxing the exhaustion requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme in favor of what may be perceived as a potentially more favorable and/or timely reviewing body, i.e., federal court." *Hernandez*, 2025 WL 2444114, at *10. Petitioner has not even begun the process of seeking relief through the administrative process provided by the immigration courts and already seeks the Court's "interference in agency affairs." *Id.* Waiving administrative exhaustion in this context would undermine the authority of the agency and the

“important purposes served by exhaustion” in the immigration context, *id.*, including “protecting the authority of administrative agencies” and “developing the factual record to make judicial review more efficient,” *Ba*, 2025 WL 2977712, at *3 (quoting *Beharry v. Ashcroft*, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003)).

Third, allowing the immigration court and, if necessary, the BIA to evaluate Petitioner’s bond motion “would permit the agency to correct its own mistakes, if any, and preclude the need for judicial review if Petitioner is successful.” *Id.* at *10. If Petitioner applies for and the immigration court grants him bond, there will be no need for judicial review of his claims. Likewise, if the immigration court denies his motion, Petitioner may appeal the decision to the BIA, where he may seek a new bond hearing and request release.

Thus, as in *Leonardo*, 646 F.3d at 1160, “prudential principles of exhaustion counsel that Petitioner pursue his administrative remedies before seeking a writ of habeas corpus,” *Monroy Villalta*, 2025 WL 2472886, at *2 (requiring administrative exhaustion where habeas petitioner challenged his bond determination based on the statutory interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a)); *see also Ba*, 2025 WL 2977712, at *3 (same). Petitioner should continue pursuing his claims before the immigration court and, if necessary, the Board of Immigration Appeals before seeking relief from this Court.

III. Petitioner Properly is Detained Under § 1225(b)(2).

Petitioner unambiguously meets every element for detention under § 1225(b)(2). Moreover, even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were ambiguous, its structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation of the statute.

A. Section 1225(b)(2) mandates detention of aliens like Petitioner who are present in the United States without having been lawfully admitted.

Under the plain language of Section 1225(b)(2), DHS is required to detain all aliens, like Petitioner, who are present in the United States without admission and are subject to removal proceedings—regardless of how long the alien has been in the United States or how far from the border they ventured. *See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania*, 591 U.S. 657, 676 (2020) (“Our analysis begins and ends with the text.”).

1. Applicant for admission.

Section 1225(a) defines “applicant for admission” to encompass an alien who either “arrives in the United States” or who is “present in the United States who has not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). And “admission” under the INA means not physical entry, but lawful entry after inspection by immigration authorities. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Thus, an alien who enters the country without permission is and remains an applicant for admission, regardless of the duration of the alien’s presence in the United States or the alien’s distance from the border. *See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (“For these purposes, ‘[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .)’ is deemed ‘an applicant for admission.’” (quoting § 1225(a)(1))); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (“an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as ‘an applicant for admission’” (quoting § 1225(a)(1))). “An alien can have physically entered the country many years before and still be an applicant for lawful entry, seeking legal ‘admission.’” *Mejia Olalde v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025) (citing *Matter of Lemus*, 25 I&N Dec. 734, 743 n.6 (BIA 2012)).

Section 1225(b)(2) in turn provides that “an alien who is an applicant for admission” “shall be detained” pending removal proceedings if the “alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1125(b)(2)(A). The statute’s use of the term “shall” makes clear that detention is mandatory, and the statute makes no exception for the duration of the alien’s presence in the country or where in the country he is located. *See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach*, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998). Therefore, the statute’s plain text mandates that DHS detain all “applicants for admission” who do not fall within one of its exceptions.

Petitioner falls squarely within the statutory definition. He was “present in the United States,” and there is no dispute that he has “not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a). He did not present himself at a port of entry, and he was not admitted after inspection by an immigration officer. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.1. Moreover, Petitioner cannot—and did not—establish that he is “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Therefore, Petitioner “shall be detained for a proceeding under” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

2. *Seeking admission.*

Section 1225(b)(2) further requires the detention of an “applicant for admission, if the examining officer determines that [the] alien *seeking admission* is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The statutory text and context show that being an “applicant for admission” is a means of “seeking admission”—no additional affirmative step is necessary. In other words, every “applicant for admission” is inherently and necessarily “seeking admission,” at least absent a choice to pursue voluntary withdrawal or voluntary departure.

Section 1225(a) provides that “[a]ll aliens . . . who are applicants for admission *or otherwise* seeking admission or readmission . . . shall be inspected.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis added). The word “[o]therwise” means “in a different way or manner.” *Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.*, 576 U.S. 519, 535 (2015) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1598 (1971)); *see also Att’y Gen. of United States v. Wynn*, 104 F.4th 348, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (same); *Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 839 F.3d 958, 963-64 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“or otherwise” means “the first action is a subset of the second action”); *Kleber v. CareFusion Corp.*, 914 F.3d 480, 482-83 (7th Cir. 2019). Being an “applicant for admission” thus is a particular “way or manner” of seeking admission, such that an alien who is an “applicant for admission” *is* “seeking admission” for purposes of Section 1252(b)(2)(A). No separate affirmative act is necessary. *See Matter of Lemus-Losa*, 25 I & N. Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012) (“[M]any people who are not *actually* requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless deemed to be ‘seeking admission’ under the immigration laws”).

This reading is consistent with the everyday meaning of the statutory terms. One may “seek” something without “applying” for it—for example, one who is “seeking” happiness is not “applying” for it. But one *applying* for something is necessarily *seeking* it. Compare Webster’s New World College Dictionary 69 (4th ed.) (“apply” means “To make a formal request (*to* someone *for* something)”), *with id.* at 1299 (“seek” means “to request, ask for”). For example, a person who is “applying” for admission to a college or club is “seeking” admission to the college or club. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 63 (1980) (“American Heritage Dictionary”) (“apply” means “[t]o request or *seek* employment, acceptance, or *admission*”) (emphasis added). Likewise, an alien who is “applying” for admission to the United States (*i.e.*, an “applicant for admission”) is “seeking admission” to the United States.

Moreover, Congress’s use of the present participle—“seeking”—in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) should not be ignored. *United States v. Wilson*, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (“Congress’ use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes.”). By using the present participle “seeking,” § 1225(b)(2)(A) “signal[s] present and continuing action.” *Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co.*, 48 F.4th 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2022). The phrase “seeking admission” “does not include something in the past that has ended or something yet to come.” *Shell v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co.*, 941 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2019); *see also Pena v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11983-NMG, 2025 WL 2108913, at *1-2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025) (finding that, in the absence of the receipt of lawful immigration status, an alien who was unlawfully present in the U.S. for 20 years and had an approved U-130 Petition for Alien Relative “remains an applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)).

Of course, “seeking admission” also has meaning beyond being an “applicant for admission.” As § 1225(a)(3) shows, being an “applicant for admission” is only *one* “way or

manner” of “seeking admission”—not the exclusive way. For example, lawful permanent residents returning to the United States are not “applicants for admission” because they are already admitted, but they still may be “seeking admission.” *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1103(A)(13)(C). But for purposes of § 1225(b)(2) and its regulation of “applicants for admission,” the statute unambiguously provides that an alien who is an “applicant for admission” is “seeking admission,” even if the alien is not engaged in some separate, affirmative act to obtain lawful admission. *See Mejia Olalde*, 2025 WL 3131942, at *1 (“it makes no sense to describe an active applicant for admission as somebody who is not ‘seeking’ admission”); *Pena v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11983-NMG, 2025 WL 2108913, at *1-2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025) (because alien did not have lawful status, he remained an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)); *Barrios Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-CV-01467, 2025 WL 3048926, at *5 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025) (holding that “the plain statutory language of § 1225(a)(1) that defines ‘applicants for admission’ . . . also applies to those who are ‘present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1))).

Here, Petitioner is “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2) because he is an applicant for admission who is present without admission and is seeking to remain in the United States. He has not agreed to depart, so logically he must be seeking to remain—a legal action that requires “admission,” i.e., a lawful entry. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(13), 1182(a)(6), and 1225(a)(3). Nor has he conceded his removability and allowed his removal in his administrative immigration proceedings. Noncitizens present in the United States who have not been lawfully admitted and who do not agree to immediately depart must be referred for removal proceedings under § 1229a. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). In removal proceedings, if an unlawfully admitted noncitizen does not accept removal, he can seek a lawful admission. *See, e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.

For instance, if Petitioner does not concede removability and allow his immediate removal at his upcoming hearing in immigration court, he may apply to cancel his removal and adjust his status under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. *See Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland*, 124 F.4th 416, 419 (6th Cir. 2024); *Lopez-Soto v. Garland*, 857 F. App'x 848, 854 (6th Cir. 2021). If his application is successful, he will be granted lawful status and the agency “shall record the alien’s lawful admission for permanent residence as of the date of the . . . cancellation of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(3).

Petitioner is seeking admission to the United States within the meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A).

B. Section 1226(c) does not support Petitioner’s interpretation of the statute.

Petitioner also argues that Respondent’s interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) would render superfluous § 1226, which is a separate mandatory detention provision for certain inadmissible and criminal aliens. That, too, is wrong. Although § 1226(c) and § 1225(b)(2) overlap for some aliens, § 1226(c) has substantial independent effect beyond aliens that entered without admission, and mere overlap is no basis for re-writing clear statutory text.

To begin, there is no colorable argument that Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) renders § 1226(a)’s discretionary detention authority superfluous. Section 1226(a) authorizes the government to “arrest[] and detain[]” any “alien” pending removal proceedings but provides that the government also “may release the alien” on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) provides the detention authority for the significant group of aliens who are *not* “applicants for admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)—specifically, aliens who have been admitted to the United States but are now removable. *RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank*, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (“the specific governs the general”). For example, the detention of any of the millions of aliens who have overstayed their visas will be governed by § 1226(a), because those aliens (unlike Petitioner) *were* lawfully admitted to the United States.

Likewise, Respondents' reading of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not render § 1226(c) superfluous. As described above, § 1226(c) is the exception to § 1226(a)'s discretionary detention regime. It requires the government detain "any alien" who is deportable or inadmissible for having committed specified offenses or engaged in terrorism-related actions. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(E). Like § 1226(a), subsection (c) applies to significant groups of aliens *not* encompassed by § 1225(b)(2), such as visa overstayers.

Most obvious, § 1226(c)(1) requires the government to detain aliens who *have been admitted* to the United States and are now "deportable." *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B)-(C). By contrast, § 1225(b)(2) has no application to admitted aliens. Moreover, § 1226(c)(1) requires detention of aliens who are "inadmissible" on certain grounds. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A), (D), (E). Those provisions, too, sweep more broadly than § 1225(b)(2), because they cover aliens who are inadmissible but were erroneously admitted. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a), (a)(1)(A) (providing for the removal of "[a]ny alien . . . in *and admitted to* the United States," including "[a]ny alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of status was within one or more of the classes of aliens *inadmissible* by the law existing at the time" (emphasis added)). In this respect, § 1226(c)(1) applies to admitted aliens, who are not covered by § 1225(b)(2).

Finally, § 1225(b)(2)(A) does "not apply to an alien . . . who is a crewman," "a stowaway," or "is arriving on land . . . from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States." 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(B)-(C). Section 1226(c) would apply to those aliens, too, if they were inadmissible or deportable on one of the specified grounds.

Section 1225(b)(2) also does not render superfluous Congress's recent amendment of § 1226(c) through the Laken Riley Act. That law requires mandatory detention of criminal aliens who are "inadmissible" under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), (a)(6)(C), or (a)(7). *See* 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c)(E)(i)-(ii). As with the other grounds of “inadmissibility” listed in § 1226(c), both (a)(6)(C) and (a)(7) apply to inadmissible aliens who were admitted in error, as well as those never admitted. That means there is no surplusage, as § 1225(b)(2) has no application to aliens who were admitted in error.

To be sure, the Laken Riley Act’s application to aliens who are inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)—for being “present . . . without being admitted or paroled”—overlaps with § 1225(b)(2)(A). Both statutes mandate detention of “applicants for admission” who fall within the specified grounds of inadmissibility. However, “[r]edundancies are common in statutory drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure, sometimes because of congressional inadvertence or lack of foresight, or sometimes simply because of the shortcomings of human communication.” *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 223 (2020). That is particularly true here, where this portion of the Laken Riley Act overlaps with § 1225(b)(2)(A) even under Petitioner’s reading, which recognizes that applicants for admission who are “seeking admission” must be detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See *Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship*, 564 U.S. 91, 106 (2011) (“[T]he canon against superfluity assists only where a competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statute”).

Besides, § 1226(c) does independent work, despite the overlap, by narrowing the circumstances under which aliens may be *released* from mandatory detention. Again, for aliens subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), IIRIRA allows the government to “temporarily” parole them “on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(5). Section 1226(c)(1) takes that option off the table for aliens who have also committed the offenses or engaged in the conduct specified in § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(E). As to those aliens, § 1226(c) *prohibits* their parole and authorizes their release only if “necessary

to provide protection to” a witness or similar person “and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(4). So even as to aliens who are already subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), § 1226(c) is not superfluous: It significantly narrows the government’s parole power with respect to those individuals.

C. Congress intended for the detention of aliens like *Petitioner* under § 1225(b)(2).

Petitioner’s reading of the statute not only is textually baseless; it also subverts IIRIRA’s express goal of eliminating preferential treatment for aliens who enter the country unlawfully. *See King v. Burwell*, 576 U.S. 473, 492 (2015) (rejecting interpretation that would lead to result “that Congress designed the Act to avoid”); *New York State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino*, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973) (“We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated purposes.”). His interpretation would reward him for knowingly violating the law, entitling him to more favorable treatment than a noncitizen who lawfully presented himself at a port of entry. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 228 (BIA Sept. 5, 2025). Nowhere does the INA state that, “after some undefined period of time residing in the interior of the United States without lawful status, . . . an applicant for admission is no longer ‘seeking admission,’ and has somehow converted to a status that renders him or her eligible for” consideration under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). *Id.* at 221.

To the contrary, as noted above, one of IIRIRA’s express objectives was to dispense with the pre-1996 regime under which aliens who entered the United States unlawfully were given “equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that [were] not available to aliens who present[ed] themselves for inspection” at the border, including the right to secure release on bond. House Rep., *supra*, at 225. Petitioner’s interpretation would restore the regime Congress sought to discard: It would require detention for those who present themselves for inspection at the border

in compliance with law, yet grant bond hearings to aliens like Petitioner who evade immigration authorities, enter the United States unlawfully, and remain here unlawfully for years or even decades until an involuntary encounter with immigration authorities. That is *exactly* the preferential treatment for illegal entrants that IIRIRA sought to eradicate. The Court should reject any interpretation that is so transparently subversive of Congress’s stated objective. *King*, 576 U.S. at 492.

Respondents’ interpretation, by contrast, not only adheres to the statute’s text and congressional intent, but it also brings the statute in line with the longstanding “entry fiction” that courts have employed for well over a century to avoid giving favorable treatment to aliens who have not been lawfully admitted. Under that doctrine, all “aliens who arrive at a port of entry . . . are treated for due process purposes as if stopped at the border,” and that also includes aliens “paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal” who have developed significant ties to the country. *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 139 (quoting *Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953)). For example, *Kaplan v. Tod*, 267 U.S. 228 (1925), held that an alien who was paroled for nine years into the United States was still “regarded as stopped at the boundary line” and “had gained no foothold in the United States.” *Id.* at 230; *see also Mezei*, 345 U.S. at 214-15. The “entry fiction” thus prevents favorable treatment of aliens who have not been admitted—including those who have “entered the country clandestinely.” *The Yamataya v. Fisher*, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903). IIRIRA sought to implement that same principle with respect to detention. Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) is true to that purpose.

In sum, the text, structure, and history of § 1225(b)(2) demonstrate that DHS properly has detained Petitioner under the statute. Nevertheless, Respondents concede that the Court and other district courts have declined to find that § 1225(b)(2) applies to noncitizens who have already

entered the United States unlawfully. *Hernandez Garcia* 2025 WL 3122800, at *5 n.2; *Sanchez Alvarez*, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 n.1; *Rodriguez Carmona*, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6. However, not all decisions have been resolved against the government on the issue of properly interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). See, e.g., *Mejia Olalde v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025) (finding petitioner, as an applicant for admission, “is governed by § 1225(b)(2) and is ineligible to receive a bond hearing” under the “plain language” of the statute); *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2780351, at *10 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025) (holding that “the plain language of § 1225(b)(2) and the ‘all applicants for admission’ language of *Jennings*” permit DHS to detain similarly-situated aliens § 1225(b)(2)); *Barrios Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-CV-01467, 2025 WL 3048926, at *5 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025) (same); *Chavez v. Noem*, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025); *Pena v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11983-NMG, 2025 WL 2108913, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025) (“Because petitioner remains an applicant for admission, his detention is authorized so long as he is ‘not clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted’ to the United States.” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A))). Moreover, no circuit court, including the Sixth Circuit, has considered whether DHS properly is construing § 1225(b)(2) to apply to aliens like Petitioner. Consequently, this Court is left to apply “all relevant interpretive tools” to conclude which interpretation of the statute is best. *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024). The best interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) permits Petitioner’s detention under the statute, for the reasons stated above.

IV. Petitioner's Detention Comports with Due Process.

The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property "without due process of law." U.S. const. amend. V. That includes freedom from government detention unless "adequate procedural protections" are applied. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 690, 701 (2001).

In the immigration context, the Supreme Court has held that the process due under the constitution is coextensive with the removal procedures provided by Congress. *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 138-40. *See also United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process[.]"). It has confirmed that statutory provisions denying bond during administrative removal proceedings do not violate the due process clause. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) ("Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process."). And it has held that even after a noncitizen is ordered removed, detention for up to six months is presumptively valid under the due process clause. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701.

As noted above, Supreme Court precedents indicate that foreign nationals who entered illegally by evading detection while crossing the border should be treated the same as those who were stopped at the border in the first place. *See Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 138-40. While foreign nationals who have been *admitted* may claim due-process protections beyond what Congress has provided even when their legal status changes (such as a foreign national who overstays a visa, or is later determined to have been admitted in error), *see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath*, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950), the Supreme Court has never held that foreign nationals who have "entered the country clandestinely" are entitled to such additional rights, *see Yamataya v. Fisher*, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903). Congress instead codified this distinction by treating all foreign nationals who have

not been admitted—including unlawful entrants who have evaded detection for years—as “applicant[s] for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

In light of this precedent, Petitioner does not present a plausible due process claim. Petitioner has received notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, is scheduled to attend hearings with an immigration judge, may request bond, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for less than 5 weeks. (*See* Ex. A, Ellis Decl. ¶ 8.) No further due process is due to him at this time. *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 138-40.

Because Petitioner has received the due process to which he is entitled, he cannot assert a viable claim under the Due Process Clause.

V. Petitioner’s Detention Comports With the *Castanon Nava* Settlement Agreement.

The 2022 settlement agreement in *Castañon-Nava v. Department of Homeland Security*, resolved a class action challenging ICE’s practice of conducting warrantless civil immigration arrests within the Chicago Field Office Area of Responsibility. The *Castañon-Nava* settlement imposes documentation and disclosure requirements when ICE carries out a warrantless arrest and permits a warrantless arrest only when an officer has probable cause that an individual is unlawfully present and likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. ICE’s disclosure requirements expanded after an October 7, 2025 ruling in response to a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, in which the court rejected ICE’s authority to issue Form I-200 Warrant for Arrest of Alien to non-targets in the field without the concurrent or prior issuance of notices to appear. *Castañon-Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, — F. Supp. 3d. —, 2025 WL 2842146, at *22-24 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2025). As a result, the *Castañon-Nava* settlement now requires disclosure of Forms I-213 Records of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien for arrests in the Northern District of Illinois that are either (1) warrantless, or (2) made pursuant to administrative warrants (I-200s)

issued to non-targets in the field pre-arrest but not preceded by, or in issued conjunction with, notices to appear.

Here, DHS fulfilled its disclosure obligations by documenting the facts and circumstances of Petitioner's arrest in his I-213 form. (Ex. A, Ellis Decl. ¶ 8.) And contrary to Petitioner's claims, his arrest was not warrantless. (*Id.*) As explained in his I-213, Petitioner was a targeted arrest "effectuated pursuant to a Warrant for Arrest, Form I-200." (*Id.*) Because Petitioner was a targeted, not collateral, arrest with a properly executed I-200 warrant, there is no *Castanon Nava* violation.

Petitioner's detention does not violate the *Castañon-Nava* settlement.

VI. A Prohibition on Petitioner's Transfer is Unnecessary.

Petitioner asks the Court to restrict his transfer out of the Western District of Michigan. A restriction is unnecessary, however, because the Court will maintain jurisdiction regardless of where DHS holds him in custody.

Petitioner named his immediate custodian, the ICE Field Office Director, as a respondent to this action. *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 440 (2004); *Roman v. Ashcroft*, 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003). It is well established that "when the Government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner's release." *Padilla*, 542 U.S. at 440. Accordingly, the Court need not restrict Petitioner's movement to maintain jurisdiction over his petition. *Id.*; see also *Rodriguez Carmona*, 2025 WL 2992222, at *8-9 (declining to grant alien's request for an order that he remain within the district where he filed his habeas petition); *Zhu v. Genalo*, No. 1:25-CV-06523 (JLR),

2025 WL 2452352, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2025) (retaining jurisdiction over alien’s habeas proceedings after he had been moved to another district).

The Court already will retain jurisdiction over Petitioner during the pendency of his habeas proceedings and should deny his request for an unnecessary order.

VII. The Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the Only Proper Respondent.

A writ of habeas corpus may only be issued “to the person having custody of the person detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Except in extraordinary circumstances, the only proper respondent in a habeas corpus case is the detainee’s immediate custodian. *See Roman v. Ashcroft*, 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003). *Cf. Hernandez Garcia*, 2025 WL 3122800, at *7-8 (applying an exception to decline to dismiss the Secretary of Homeland Security as a respondent to a habeas action). In the immigration context, that is the ICE Field Office Director. *Id.*

Here, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security is not a proper respondent to this habeas action. Petitioner acknowledges that he named the Secretary because she “is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the [INA].” (Pet., ECF No.1, ¶ 35.) Similarly, he named Director Lyons because he heads the agency “responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA.” (*Id.* at ¶ 34.) That is not a proper reason for naming the Secretary as a respondent to this action. *See Roman*, 340 F.3d at 322 (reasoning that “adopting a broader definition of ‘custodian’” that encompasses any official with control over an alien’s detention and release “would complicate and extend the duration of habeas corpus proceedings”); *See also, Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft*, No. 1:25-CV-1232, 2025 WL 3039255, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025)(dismissing the Attorney General as an improper respondent to a habeas petition). Therefore, Secretary Noem and Director Lyons should be dismissed from this litigation, leaving the Detroit ICE Field Office Director as the proper respondent. *Id.*

CONCLUSION

The government respondents respectfully request that the Court deny Yohander Jose Leon Lopez's petition for a writ of habeas corpus because he is not detained in violation of federal law or the Constitution.

Respectfully submitted,

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