



PARAMO BIESTRA, JUAN JOSÉ  
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1. Final Bond Memorandum
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Mr. Paramo is native and citizen of Mexico who was admitted to the U.S. as a visitor in November 2022. Mr. Paramo has been involved in extensive litigation against Mexican business interests, the litigation having gone as far as review by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The U.S. Government presented the Immigration Judge with documents purporting to be Mexican arrest warrants. The documents appear to be civil summonses, and the Mexican government has made no effort to extradite Mr. Paramo.

Based on those summonses, Mr. Paramo is being detained by ICE and has been refused a bond. While the bond denial is on appeal to the BIA, it appears the BIA is delaying adjudication in contravention of its procedures, and Mr. Paramo looks to this Court with the instant petition.

Defendant Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, responsible for the operations of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as well as the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). CBP and ICE are responsible for the apprehension and detention of non citizens..

Defendant Pam Bondi is Attorney General of the United States, and this action is brought against her in her official capacity. Ms. Bondi is generally charged with enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and is further authorized to delegate such powers and authority to subordinate employees of the Department of Justice. 8 USC § 1103(a).

More specifically, the Attorney General is responsible for the conduct of ICE in the execution of judicial and administrative orders pertaining to noncitizens present in the United States.

Defendant Bret Bradford is the Houston Field Office Director of ICE. Mr. Bradford is directly responsible for the conduct of Houston ICE agents in the execution of judicial and administrative orders pertaining to noncitizens present in the Houston, Texas area.

Defendant Randall Tate is the warden of the Montgomery Processing Center, where Mr. Espinal is being held at the request and under the control of ICE.

## II. JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction in this case is proper pursuant to Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution, 28 USC § 2241(c) (the codification of the Great Writ), 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act) and 28 USC § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction).

Mr. Paramo asks this Court to review his continued detention, which is within the jurisdiction of this Court. *Cardoso v. Reno*, 216 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 2000). *INS v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 291–96 (2018).

Authority to grant the requested injunctive relief in cases otherwise within the Court's jurisdiction is conferred by 28 USC § 2201(a). As noted above,

authority to grant the requested injunctive relief in cases otherwise within the Court's jurisdiction is conferred by 28 USC § 2201(a).

### III. VENUE

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 USC 1391(e), in that this is an action against officers and agencies of the United States in their official capacities, brought in the District where a Defendant is detained.

### IV. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which stripped the Immigration Judge's jurisdiction to grant bond to persons who, like Ms. Melgar, entered the U.S. without exception. Ms. Melgar would show that not only does *Yajure Hurtado* renders further administrative appeal futile, it in fact makes it futile to request a bond from the Immigration Judge. No further administrative review is available.

### V. CAUSE OF ACTION

#### A. *Order to maintain jurisdiction of the Court*

Mr. Paramo is detained in Conroe, Texas. He respectfully asks the Court to order that he not be moved outside the jurisdiction of this court while these proceedings are pending.

#### B. *Order to release from custody*

For several years, Mr. Paramo has been involved in civil litigation with various Mexican financial institution. The litigation involves millions of dollars,

and goes back to December 2021. Negotiations are on-going, but have so far shown themselves unable to resolve the disputes.

Two summonses were issued by two different courts in Mexico. DHS and the Immigration Judge characterize these summonses as criminal warrants. Mr. Paramo maintains, and the facts show, that they are more like civil summonses than they are like criminal warrants.

Based on the summonses, Mr. Paramo was detained by ICE and an NTA was issued.

Mr. Paramo has applied for asylum, and the application remains pending.

Mr. Paramo requested bond in the amount of \$3,500.

A bond hearing was held on July 9, 2025. At this bond hearing, a lawyer for one of the Mexican banks involved in litigation with Mr. Paramo lied his way into the hearing. The lawyer misrepresented himself to the Court as a disinterested observer wishing to observe and learn about proceedings, and Mr. Paramo's attorney did not object to his presence. Only later did the attorney learn of the lawyer's true intent.

A Bond was denied on July 14, 2025. On July 18, 2025, a "Final Bond Memorandum" was issued explaining the Court's reasoning in denying bond.

The Immigration Judge found that because of two Mexican summonses/arrest warrants, Mr. Paramo is a flight risk and therefore a bond was denied. The Immigration Judge even seemed to imply that these instruments were the reason Mr. Paramo came to the U.S., even though one of the instruments was

issued two days after Mr. Paramo's arrival and the second was not issued for several months. No claim has been made that Mr. Paramo is able to see the future.

To be sure, Mr. Paramo is challenging the proceedings against him as permitted by law. Mr. Paramo has in place stays ("amparos") preventing the execution of the summonses, and he is applying for asylum in the U.S. seeking protection from the Mexican government. Both of these are legal avenues of response to a feared persecution by Mexico.

The litigation in Mexico is complex. At page two of his Bond Memorandum, the Immigration Judge quotes the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as describing it this way: "Depending on who tells the story, Defendant-Appellant Juan José Paramo is either an honest Mexican business man caught up in a loan dispute or a fugitive from justice who fled to the United States hoping to evade the consequences of a large-scale fraud he perpetrated in Mexico."

But the fact that the Fifth Circuit has anything at all to say in this matter is telling because it shows that Mr. Paramo continues to engage with the Mexican government and the lending institutions. Far from being a fugitive, Mr. Paramo continues to file legal responses, appeal decisions and make settlement offers and communicate with opposing counsel by email. Mr. Paramo is not evading the Mexican proceedings, but continues to seek a resolution even as he fears persecution.

Equally telling is the fact that the Mexican government has never sought to extradite Mr. Paramo. Mr. Paramo is in contact with the U.S. Attorney and is

willing to turn himself in should the Mexican government require it, but no effort to arrest Mr. Paramo has been made. The position of the Immigration Judge *vis a vis* the lack of any extradition proceeding is confusing. The Court seems to be saying that the lack of extradition efforts “means there is no presumption against bail,” but at the same time “there is no presumption bail *should* be granted.” *Id* at pages 4, 5, emphasis in the original. In other words, the fact that no extradition proceedings have been initiated seems to be of no meaning.

In this, the Immigration Court is wrong. In the context of the on-going communications between Mr. Paramo, the Mexican government, and the parties involved in the litigation, the fact that the Mexican government has not found it necessary to seek extradition speaks volumes. Obviously the Mexican government does not consider Mr. Paramo a fugitive, at least in the sense that he is evading proceedings against him.

The Immigration Judge himself concedes that Mr. Paramo’s settlement offers are “large and in good faith.” He also concedes that Mr. Paramo “had the right to enter the U.S., and that he did so lawfully as a visitor for pleasure, and that he filed an I-589 application to try and remain in the U.S...” *Id.* at p. 2. Still, the Immigration Court was fixated on two warrants that may in fact not be warrants at all but merely civil summonses, summonses which Mr. Paramo is not ignoring, but is rather actively engaging.

The Immigration Judge claims Mr. Paramo “has...the history” to indicate a flight risk. *Id.* at p. 3. No history of unlawful flight has been presented, while

there is a long history of attempts at resolution and of compliance with lawful requests.

Appeal from the bond denial was timely filed. The parties submitted their briefs on August 20, 2025. The BIA has delayed adjudication of the bond appeal for over three months now, causing irreparable harm to Mr. Paramo.

Mr. Paramo's wife has made substantial investment in real estate in the United States, and has applied for Lawful Permanent Residence as an investor. This major investment is of great benefit to the United States. Mr. Paramo is a derivative beneficiary of that application, which is pending. Mr. Paramo also has a fourteen year old U.S. Citizen son that he and his wife care for. Mr. Paramo's continuing detention is causing extreme disruption and hardship to Mr. Paramo and his wife.

## VI. CONCLUSION

Mr. Paramo therefore comes before the Court as a last resort to seek release from custody under such reasonable conditions as the Court in its discretion may impose.

## VII. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff respectfully prays:

- 1) That the Court order Defendants to appear within three days to answer why Mr. Paramo should not be released;
- 2) That, upon due consideration, the Court enjoin Defendants from moving Mr. Paramo outside the jurisdiction of this Court pending further order of this Court;

- 3) That the Court order ICE to release Ms. Melgar from custody under such reasonable conditions as the Court in its discretion might impose.
- 4) Mr. Paramo prays for such other relief as the Court in equity might grant.

Respectfully submitted,



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VERIFICATION

COMES NOW, Salvador Colón, before me the undersigned authority, known to me to be the person stated, and under oath does state the following:

"My name is Salvador Colón. I swear that I am Counsel of Record for the Petitioner in the instant case, who is presently detained in Conroe, Texas. I hereby affirm that I have read the foregoing petition, and that everything contained therein is true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge and/or information and belief after reasonable inquiry, and that the requested injunctive relief is warranted to prevent irreparable injury to Plaintiff."

  
SALVADOR COLON

SWORN TO and subscribed before me this 5<sup>th</sup> day of November,  
2025.



  
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for  
the STATE OF TEXAS


# EXHIBIT 1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW  
CONROE IMMIGRATION COURT  
CONROE, TEXAS

Matter of: )  
)  
**JUAN JOSE PARAMO RIESTRA,** )  
)  
*Respondent* )  
)  
In Bond Proceedings )  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Case No.   
IJ: Hon. Chris A. Brisack  
Date: July 18, 2025

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT



ON BEHALF OF DHS

Christopher Simons, Assistant Chief Counsel  
806 Hilbig, Room 2-200  
Conroe, Texas 77301

FINAL BOND MEMORANDUM

Respondent filed a first request on May 22, 2025 and this Court issued a prior memorandum indicating its thoughts on bond as of that time, and offering Respondent the opportunity to withdraw that bond hearing request, which Respondent did. A second bond hearing request was filed on June 30, 2025 and the hearing on the current bond request was held on July 10, 2025. No decision was made on that date but on July 14, 2025 the Court denied bond and a second bond memorandum was filed in conjunction with the Court's summary ruling. The Court noted that additional analysis might be provided later if either side appealed. Respondent appealed so the Court is now providing a final bond memorandum, which generally adopts and repeats the prior analysis and fact finding made in the second bond memo.

A noncitizen bears the burden of showing he/she poses no danger to the community and is not a flight risk in order to be released on bond. See 8 CFR §236.1( c)(8). The Court considers whether the Respondent is likely to appear for future proceedings. *Matter of Adeniji*, 22 I&N Dec. 1102, 1112 (BIA 1999); see also *Matter of D-J-*, 23 I&N Dec. 572, 582 (BIA 2003). The Court "has extremely broad discretion in deciding whether or not to release a respondent on bond." *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 39 (BIA 2006). The BIA has provided an extensive, but not exhaustive, list of factors that the court may consider when determining whether a respondent should be released on bond. *Id.* at 39-40; see also 8 CFR §1003.19(d). The Court may attribute greater weight to one or more particular factors as long as the court's ultimate determination is reasonable. See *Guerra, supra* at 40.

Respondent requests a bond of \$3,500. DHS opposes bond and, *inter alia*, presented two documents purporting to show the existence of two arrest warrants in Mexico for Respondent. One is a Federal Mexico warrant from Aguascalientes, Mexico prepared at the request of the Federal Public Prosecutors Office and issued by Orlando Iniguez Delgadillo, a District Judge Specialized

in the Adversarial Criminal Justice System, assigned to the Federal Criminal Justice Center in the State of Aguascalientes, serving as a Due Process Judge. The second is a document confirming to Israel Nava Rodriguez, an investigating agent of the Public Prosecutors Office, a Nuevo Leon, Mexico arrest warrant. Both documents indicate that that particular Mexican Government entity has determined there is sufficient reason to believe that a crime was committed to warrant the arrest.

Although Respondent previously claimed there are no pending arrest warrants in effect regarding Respondent, a proposition this Court previously found insufficiently corroborated, see the first bond memorandum, it now is currently and apparently undisputed that Respondent has two arrest warrants. ("It is uncontroverted at this point that Mr. Paramo Riestra has arrest warrants in Mexico." Respondent's Pre-Hearing Statement, p. 4 of 6.) Respondent's new and current argument is that those warrants are of minimal significance, particularly given that "for each of these warrants there are 'amparos,' which in essence guarantee that Mr. Paramo Riestra will not be held in custody upon his appearance before the different Mexican jurisdictions which have summoned him." This Court finds the issuance of warrants to be particularly significant and the existence of amparos to be of less significance.

The 5<sup>th</sup> Circuit characterized the interactions of the parties in the context of a motion to quash §1782 discovery (a particular issue not directly relevant to this Court) this way: "Depending on who tells the story, Defendant-Appellant Juan Jose Paramo is either an honest Mexican businessman caught up in a loan dispute or a fugitive from justice who fled to the United States hoping to evade the consequences of a large-scale fraud he perpetrated in Mexico." Respondent is subject to at least two disputes over which characterization is correct-- on the one hand, there are one or more civil "disputes" between Respondent and at least two Mexican banks which have spilled over into the U.S. in the form of the §1782 action, and on the other hand, there are criminal proceedings between Respondent and various parts of the Mexican government which generated the aforementioned arrest warrants. The amount in dispute is large. One of the warrants says losses are \$5,660,606.11 but probably even more illustrative is Respondent's offered Stand Still and Offer of Acceptance Agreement on May 15, 2023 whereby all parties would "settle the multiple judicial processes" by Respondent's payment of \$110,000,000. This apparently was not accepted.

Respondent left Mexico and arrived in the U.S. on November 27, 2022, two days before the Nuevo Leon warrant issued on November 29, 2022 and a bit less than three months before the federal warrant issued. It also appears to be certain and undisputed that Respondent has remained outside of the jurisdiction of Mexico since November 27, 2022. This Court recognizes that Respondent had the right to enter the U.S., and that he did so lawfully as a visitor for pleasure, and that he filed an I-589 application to try and remain in the U.S. but this lawful flight to the U.S. does not negate concerns that he will flee and not willingly put himself in a position to be returned to Mexico and face criminal prosecution.

Respondent points to various facts as suggesting or showing that he is not a flight risk. This includes a claim that Respondent has been trying to reach a settlement with the banks involved and has made significant good faith offers that involve large sums of money. That the offers are large and in good faith may be true but this is difficult to determine given that the total amount in

dispute in the civil and criminal cases is not known to this Court – the offer may represent a small percent of the amount allegedly misappropriated or it may represent much more. Regardless, though, even the existence of a good faith settlement offer to the banks in the civil dispute does not inherently demonstrate or significantly evidence Respondent’s danger of fleeing from federal officials pursuing criminal charges. Respondent has the means and the history and, particularly given the amounts and possible criminal punishment involved, a possible incentive to avoid returning to Mexico. Although his recent history of not returning may (in whole or in part) be explained and/or even understandable even if he has a valid fear of persecution, such fears would continue if his I-589 application is denied. Compare *In re Extradition of Garcia*, 761 F. Supp.2d 468 (S.D. Tex. 2010)(fugitive failed to show that he was not flight risk or danger to community where he lacked incentive to appear at hearing since among other factors he feared he would experience death or significant period of incarceration by Mexican authorities)

Undisputed (DHS presented no evidence to refute Respondent’s evidence) is that Mexico has an “amparo” system. However, the Court fails to see sufficient significance in this to overcome the risk of flight. For example, at one point an expert presented by Respondent indicated that the “amparo” has nothing to do with the main trial. At another point he stated that even if an amparo is granted, the remedy is to remand to the authorities in order to get them to comply with an injunction – not (for example) an outright dismissal of the warrant or the criminal case. Thus, apparently the warrant often remains in effect and the criminal case is not directly affected, particularly absent a specific and favorable ruling, which is not shown to have occurred in the past or to be particularly likely in the future for this Respondent.

Respondent may be arguing that the existence of the amparo system and his ability to invoke it demonstrates that the Mexican legal system would not subject Respondent to a bond or incarceration, so that neither should this Court. This argument has no impact, particularly given the many amparo actions in Mexico Respondent has filed so far are without success and given that it is unclear that the bond factors in the different countries are the same. To the extent Respondent’s claim is that the existence of Mexican warrants can/should be ignored because there is a legal option to preliminarily challenge the Constitutionality of the procedural steps used to obtain the warrant, this leap is too much. The expert’s testimony is that there are amparo proceedings in place but they have not yet been resolved or resulted in rulings in Respondent’s favor. Moreover, even if Respondent were to prevail, the expert testified that the effect of granting an amparo “depends on [the facts in] each case.”

Respondent instead may be arguing that the foreign arrest warrant cannot suffice to show that Respondent is currently charged with an offense and/or that the entity which issued the warrant still has the power to enforce it. Compare *Skaftouros v. U.S.*, 667 F.3d 144, 160 (2d Cir. 2011). However, the expert testified that while several (perhaps four) amparos are pending, all are in process and do not yet effectuate any limitations. Although the expert’s testimony can be said to demonstrate that a warrant might ultimately be found in an amparo proceeding to have violated certain fundamental or Constitutional requirements, and in that event there might be consequences, presumably including an effect on the warrant, there is no claim or evidence that fundamental violations have been found to have occurred and no claim or evidence that the warrants are not in effect. C.f. *Grin v. Shine*, 187 U.S. 181, 190-91, 23 S.Ct. 98 (1902)(refusing to consider a

challenge to the validity of a foreign arrest warrant). In short, the likelihood of success is speculative.

Yet another possibility is that Respondent instead may be urging that the existence of the amparo system means Respondent has less reason to fear returning to Mexico since his basic Constitutional interests will be protected – which in turn might be important in this bond proceeding because it shows Respondent has little to no reason to fear returning to face the Mexico legal system so that he has little to no reason to flee even if things go poorly for him in the U.S. This point (if made) also is not helpful to Respondent because it is not the legal system Respondent claims to fear but the banks and particular individuals associated with the banks, and the amparo system does not appear to be a mechanism to protect Respondent from harm originating from the banks/bankers.

In summary regarding the amparo system, this Court does not see how its existence minimizes, much less sufficiently significantly minimizes, the existence of the warrants and Respondent's risk of flight. Indeed, the opposite may be true. The Court is aware some legal processes in other countries are different than those in the U.S. and that not all documents generated by those systems therefore should be given automatic effect in the U.S. For example, Interpol Red Notices are sometimes given effect but often there are concerns and reasons to question whether the process that generated those notices were legitimate and the impact they should be given. However, the existence of the amparo system demonstrates the Mexican legal system has steps in place to address or minimize concerns over basic and Constitutional rights, and to the extent such rights of Respondent are threatened, including by the persecutors identified in his I-589 application, he has not only the normal court process but also the amparo process. This may make it more difficult for Respondent to show that the Government is unable or unwilling to take action, and/or to show Government acquiescence. In other words, to the extent the existence of the amparo system lowers Respondent's odds of prevailing on his application for relief, it may increase rather than decrease his risk of flight.

The Court also will address some of the other points raised.

Respondent argues that Respondent is subject to something more akin to a “summons” than a “warrant,” apparently particularly given the existence of amparo, and that Respondent is not currently the subject of an extradition request. With regard to the former point, the Court notes that the documents submitted are translated as warrants, not summons. Regardless the distinction does not seem particularly significant -- the fact remains that authorities in Mexico want and may be demanding that Respondent appear to face serious claims and/or charges. With regard to the latter point, the Court recognizes that the distinction is not without some potential significance -- bail is not ordinarily available in extradition cases due to the foreign relations interest of the United States in successfully returning persons subject to criminal prosecution to the requesting country. *In re Extradition of Russell*, 805 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1986)(holding that there is a presumption against bail in extradition cases). In both regards, however, the fact that an enhanced request mechanism exists and a greater presumption is possible does not substitute for evidence demonstrating lack of flight risk. See, e.g. *Villalobos Suru v. Garland*, 8 F.4<sup>th</sup> 1161 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2021)(in context of determining if there is serious nonpolitical crime, arrest warrant with Red Notice is sufficient). As such, the Court recognized the fact that extradition proceedings are not

invoked means there is no presumption against bail, which would have put Respondent in an even more difficult posture. However, there also is no presumption bail *should* be granted because extradition has not been requested. This Court has considered the propriety of bail without any presumptions applied.

The Court will not determine at this time whether Respondent is a danger to the community but is inclined to think he is not. What constitutes “the community” is not clear. It may be that the only “danger” this Court may consider is limited to persons or communities within the geographic location within the Court’s jurisdiction, which in this case would be to persons in the United States. This limitation could be significant given that in this case the claimed losses appear to be wholly to assets in Mexico owned by Mexican banks and businesses. However, there also is some authority suggesting that such a geographic limitation is not required, at least in the Bail Reform Act context. *E.g.*, *U.S. v. Hir*, 517 F.3d 1081 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008)(term “community” as used in Bail Reform Act considering whether defendant is danger to any other person or the community is not necessarily limited to geographic location within the United States, at least in case in which defendant is charged with a crime under United States law whose effects are felt abroad). It appears probable that *Hir* is distinguishable in that Respondent is not charged with a crime in the U.S. but the Court need not resolve this issue at this time. See also *U.S. v. Peterson*, 557 F. Supp.2d 1124, 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2008)(“The district judge may determine the threat a defendant poses to a community, whether in the United States or abroad.”); *U.S. v. Ramirez-Ortega*, 2023 WL 2783012 (D. Az. April 5, 2023)(not reported)(in sentencing context finding “danger to community” is not limited to a geographic location in the United States where the offense of conviction has effects abroad).

The Court does not rely to any significant degree on Respondent’s ownership (or at least control over) a Leer Jet. While in some sense ownership of the jet seemingly by definition might affect this Court’s “flight risk” calculation, the Court does not see any evidence that this additional or alternative means of transportation changes or impacts Respondent’s flight risk.

Respondent seems to disagree with the Court’s mention and purported consideration of the I-213 statement that Respondent “came to the U.S. to resolve pending ongoing legal issues in Mexico City with multiple finical (sic) institutions. [He] claims Banorte and Santander Financial in Mexico are the two main institution (sic) who currently have legal actions against him. [He] has an active warrant out of Mexico for Financial Fraud.” The Court does not think these facts are in dispute; indeed, the Court has been received documents from Respondent confirming negotiations. The Court does not, as Respondent worries, think the I-213 implies that Respondent has not been diligently working in Mexico and continuing to work in the United States to resolve his issues. That said, it is not clear how his diligence (or lack thereof) in resolving the dispute would impact the Court’s assessment of his flight risk; the salient fact is that even assuming years of good faith and significant negotiations, the matter remains unresolved and the subject of potential criminal action.


Respondent similarly may also disagree with any characterization of Respondent coming to the U.S. as creating potential “leverage.” However, this Court does not consider this a particularly significant, much less weighty, or an inherently negative factor, even if true. It appears Respondent was entitled to enter the U.S. by lawful means as a visitor, which he did, and this is

not prohibited. Even if doing so provided him other benefits such as a better negotiating position, this is not in and of itself prohibited or a negative factor. Many people come to the U.S. for the purpose of enhancing their financial posture and leverage (for example, against gangs). Likewise, the fact that Respondent indicates he came to the U.S. also in part for medical treatment and because he has family and a home here is relevant and not really disputed by any evidence. However, these factors are not as significant as the warrants.

As noted in this Court's prior memos, the factors and circumstances in this case are both unusual and familiar. Respondent is accused of committing acts involving one or more crimes resulting in financial losses, a not uncommon claim. However, the amounts involved are uncommon and for almost all people would be life-changing. Also unusual is the existence of a parallel U.S. federal court case involving discovery related to the funds at issue. Also unusual is Respondent's apparent financial ability to flee.

Although this Court has not discussed the other *Guerra* factors in detail, some are discussed above and the Court recognizes that the majority (if going by sheer numbers) generally support Respondent's request for bond. For example, he has not been accused of having committed crimes in the U.S. He has a fixed address and family ties in the U.S. He is seeking medical treatment in the U.S. He has participated in U.S. court proceedings. However, this Court finds that the most important factor is the existence of criminal arrest warrants in Mexico and that this outweighs the other factors. The crimes alleged involve significant criminal punishment and civil proceedings, all of which Respondent is resisting. Respondent has the right to resist, of course, but he also has the burden of proving entitlement to bond, and in the opinion of this Court at this time, the lack of sufficient evidence to overcome the flight risk created by the arrest warrants means he has not met his burden.

The Court therefore denies bond.

  
CHRIS A. BRISACK  
Immigration Judge

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THIS DOCUMENT WAS SERVED BY: MAIL  PERSONAL SERVICE  ELECTRONIC SERVICE

TO:  ALIEN  ALIEN c/o Custodial Officer  ALIEN'S ATT/REP  DHS

DATE: 07/18/2025 BY: EC

Attachments:  EOIR-33  EOIR-28  Legal Service List  Other:

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# EXHIBIT 2




**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW  
CONROE IMMIGRATION COURT**

Respondent Name:

PARAMO Riestra, Juan Jose

To:



A-Number:



Riders:

In Custody Redetermination Proceedings

Date:

07/14/2025

**ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE**

The respondent requested a custody redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236. After full consideration of the evidence presented, the respondent's request for a change in custody status is hereby ordered:

- Denied, because  
See bond memorandum issued concurrently.
  
- Granted. It is ordered that Respondent be:
  - released from custody on his own recognizance.
  - released from custody under bond of \$
  - other:
  
- Other:



Immigration Judge: BRISACK, CHRIS 07/14/2025

Appeal: Department of Homeland Security:  waived  reserved  
Respondent:  waived  reserved

Appeal Due:

**Certificate of Service**

This document was served:

Via: [ M ] Mail | [ P ] Personal Service | [ E ] Electronic Service | [ U ] Address Unavailable

To: [ ] Noncitizen | [ ] Noncitizen c/o custodial officer | [ E ] Noncitizen's atty/rep. | [ E ] DHS

Respondent Name : PARAMO RIESTRA, JUAN JOSE | A-Number :



Riders:

Date: 07/14/2025 By: Concepcion, Jennifer, Court Staff