TIMOTHY COURCHAINE
United States Attorney
District of Arizona
BROCK HEATHCOTTE
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Arizona State Bar No.014466
Two Renaissance Square
40 North Central Avenue, Suite 1800
Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4449
Telephone: (602) 514-7500
Facsimile: (602) 514-7760
Email: Brock.Heathcotte@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for Respondents

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Aldo Sanchez Chavez, Petitioner, v. Unknown Individual #1, *et al.*, Respondent	No. CV-25-04116-SMB-ESW **RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (DOC. 7) AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. 1)**

Respondents, by and through undersigned counsel, respond in opposition to Petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction ("PI") (Doc. 7) and to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1).[1]

Petitioner Aldo Sanchez Chavez is a national of Mexico who entered the United States illegally by crossing the border without inspection by immigration officials. He was determined to be inadmissible when United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") encountered him for the first time on July 18, 2025. ICE kept him in custody pending his removal proceedings, and the immigration judge denied a bond hearing finding it lacked jurisdiction because Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention. In this habeas

[1] Petitioner's motion for a temporary restraining order was denied. Doc. 6.

petition and motion for injunctive relief, Petitioner seeks an order directing Respondents to immediately release him from immigration detention or to provide him with a bond hearing. Petitioner further seeks an injunction requiring Respondents to provide him and the Court five days advance notice of his removal, and various other declaratory and injunctive relief. The Government's position is that Petitioner is an "applicant for admission" who must therefore be detained pending removal proceedings. The plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") establishes that any noncitizen present in the United States without being admitted is indeed an "applicant for admission" and therefore subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018) ("Read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) thus mandate detention of applicants of admission until certain proceedings have concluded.").

I. BACKGROUND

Aldo Alberto Sanchez Chavez ("Petitioner") is a native and citizen of Mexico, born on [redacted] in Michoacan, Mexico. Exhibit A, Declaration of Jason A. Rheinfrank at ¶ 4. On July 18, 2025, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) encountered the Petitioner near Sasabe, Arizona, determined he unlawfully entered the United States, and took him into custody. *Id.* ¶ 5. The Petitioner admitted that on August 1, 2009, he entered the United States without being inspected or admitted near Sasabe Arizona. *Id.*

On August 19, 2025, the Petitioner was transferred to Eloy, Arizona. *Id.* ¶ 7. On August 25, 2025, the petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging him as removable under sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. *Id.* ¶ 8.

On October 6, 2025, the immigration court in Eloy, Arizona denied the Petitioner's Bond Redetermination Request because the court lacked jurisdiction. *Id.* ¶ 9. The Petitioner did not file an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals. *Id.*

III. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

A. Applicants for Admission.

"The phrase 'applicant for admission' is a term of art denoting a particular legal status." *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Section 1225(a)(1) states:

> (1) Aliens treated as applicants for admission.— An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival …) shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act an applicant for admission.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).[2] Section 1225(a)(1) was added to the INA as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-546. "The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

Before IIRIRA, "immigration law provided for two types of removal proceedings: deportation hearings and exclusion hearings." *Hose v. I.N.S.*, 180 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). A deportation hearing was a proceeding against a noncitizen already physically present in the United States, whereas an exclusion hearing was against a noncitizen outside of the United States seeking admission. *Id.* Whether an applicant was eligible for "admission" was determined only in exclusion proceedings, and exclusion proceedings were limited to "entering" noncitizens — those noncitizens "coming . . . into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession." *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 24 n.3 (1982) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1982)). "[N]on-citizens who had entered without inspection could take advantage of greater procedural and substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings, while non-citizens who presented themselves at a port of entry for inspection were subjected to more summary exclusion proceedings." *Hing Sum v. Holder*, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010); *see also Plasencia*, 459 U.S. at 25-26.

Prior to IIRIRA, noncitizens who attempted to lawfully enter the United States were in a worse position than noncitizens who crossed the border unlawfully. *See Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100; *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225-229 (1996). IIRIRA "replaced

[2] Admission is the "lawful entry of an alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13).

deportation and exclusion proceedings with a general removal proceeding." *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100. IIRIRA added Section 1225(a)(1) to "ensure[] that all immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted, regardless of their physical presence in the country, are placed on equal footing in removal proceedings under the INA." *Torres*, 976 F.3d at 928; *see also* H.R. Rep. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (explaining that § 1225(a)(1) replaced "certain aspects of the current 'entry doctrine,'" under which noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection gained equities and privileges in immigration proceedings unavailable to noncitizens who presented themselves for inspection at a port of entry). The provision "places some physically-but-not-lawfully present aliens into a fictive legal status for purposes of removal proceedings." *Torres*, 976 F.3d at 928.

B. Removal Proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a).

Removal proceedings under § 1229a are commonly referred to as "full removal proceedings" or "240 removal proceedings" due to the statutory section of the INA in which they appear. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; INA § 240. The proceedings take place before an IJ, an employee of the Department of Justice. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), (b)(1). Noncitizens in § 1229a proceedings have an opportunity to apply for relief from removal. *See, e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents); 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (adjustment of status). These are adversarial proceedings in which the noncitizen has the right to hire counsel, examine and present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4). Either party may appeal the IJ decision to the BIA. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(C); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 1240.15. If the BIA issues a final order of removal, the noncitizen may also seek judicial review at a U.S. Court of Appeals through a petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

C. Detention under the INA.

The INA authorizes civil detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings and "[d]etention is necessarily part of this deportation procedure." *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952); *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1231(a). "Where an alien falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as

well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention." *Prieto-Romero v. Clark*, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).

1. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

The INA mandates the detention of applicants for admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2); *see also Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (Applicants for admission "fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2)."). As explained above, arriving noncitizens and noncitizens present less than two years are subject to expedited removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). If a noncitizen "indicates an intention to apply for asylum," the noncitizen proceeds through the credible fear process and is subject to mandatory detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(B)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).

Section 1225(b)(2) is "broader" and "serves as a catchall provision." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. The Supreme Court recognized that 1225(b)(2) "applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1)." *Id.* Under § 1225(b)(2), a noncitizen "who is an applicant for admission" shall be detained for a removal proceeding "if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1225 does not provide for noncitizens to be released on bond, but DHS has discretion to release any applicant for admission on a "case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); *see Biden v. Texas*, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022).

2. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226.

Section 1226 provides that "an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under § 1226(a), the government may detain a noncitizen during his removal proceedings, release him on bond, or release him on conditional parole. By regulation, immigration officers can release a noncitizen if the noncitizen demonstrates that he "would not pose a danger to property or persons" and "is likely to appear for any future proceeding." 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8).

IV. THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION

Section 1225 applies to "applicants for admission," such as Petitioner, who are

defined as "alien[s] present in the United States who [have] not been admitted" or "who arrive[] in the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission "fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2)." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287.

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to arriving noncitizens and "certain other" noncitizens "initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid document." *Id.*; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii). These noncitizens are generally subject to expedited removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if the noncitizen "indicates an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution," immigration officers will refer the noncitizen for a credible fear interview. *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). A noncitizen "with a credible fear of persecution" is "detained for further consideration of the application for asylum." *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the noncitizen does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of persecution, or is "found not to have such a fear," they are detained until removed from the United States. *Id.* §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV).

Section 1225(b)(2) is "broader" and "serves as a catchall provision." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. It "applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1)." *Id.* Under § 1225(b)(2), a noncitizen "who is an applicant for admission" shall be detained for a removal proceeding "if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 68 (BIA 2025) ("for aliens arriving in and seeking admission into the United States who are placed directly in full removal proceedings, section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), mandates detention 'until removal proceedings have concluded.'") (quoting *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 299).

In *Jennings*, the Supreme Court evaluated the proper interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and stated that "[r]ead most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) [ ] mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded." 583 U.S. at 297. The Court noted that neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) "impose[] any limit on the length of detention" and "neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) say[] anything whatsoever about bond

hearings." *Id.* The Court added that the sole means of release for noncitizens detained pursuant to §§ 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2) prior to removal from the United States is temporary parole at the discretion of the Attorney General under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). *Id.* at 300. The Court observed that because noncitizens held under § 1225(b) may be paroled for "urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit," "[t]hat express exception to detention implies that there are no *other* circumstances under which aliens detained under § 1225(b) may be released." *Id.* (citations and internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in the original). Courts thus may not validly draw additional procedural limitations "out of thin air." *Id.* at 312. The Supreme Court concluded: "In sum, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention of aliens throughout the completion of applicable proceedings." *Id.* at. 302. As such, Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

The government acknowledges that the District Court in *Echevarria v. Bondi, et al.*, No. 2:25-cv-03252-PHX-DWL, 2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025), explicitly rejected its legal position that aliens who enter without admission, inspection or parole and are charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) are applicants for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), who are therefore subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(A), regardless of how long ago they entered. The government also acknowledges similar federal district court decisions that have rejected Respondent's legal position, including a Massachusetts federal district court decision which is now on appeal to the First Circuit. *Martinez v. Hyde*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. Jul. 24, 2025), *appeal pending*, No. 25-1902 (1st Cir.). There are, however, at least five federal courts that have joined what the government acknowledges is a minority position on whether § 1225 applies to persons in Petitioner's position rather than § 1226. *Mejia Olalde v. Noem*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221830, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025) (finding alien properly detained under § 1225(b)(2) because he was present in United States without having been admitted, and thus an applicant for admission under § 1225(a)); *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2780351, at *9 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025) (same); *Chavez v. Noem*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (same); *Pipa-Aquise v. Bondi*, No. 25-1094,

2025 WL 2490657, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2025) (same); *Pena v. Hyde*, No. 25-11983, 2025 WL 2108913, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025) (upholding detention under § 1225(b)(2) of alien "present in the country but [who] has not yet been lawfully granted admission"). Accordingly, the government maintains and preserves the legal position that Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

V. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PRE-DETENTION HEARING

ICE should not be—and is not—required to give Petitioner advance notice of its intention to re-detain, much less to prove that detention is warranted prior to its occurrence. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of basic processes of providing hearings post-detention. *See, e.g., Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 309 (1993) (rejecting a procedural due process claim that "the INS procedures are faulty because they do not provide for automatic review by an immigration judge of the initial deportability and custody determinations"); *Abel v. United States*, 362 U.S. 217, 233-34 (1960) (noting the "impressive historical evidence of acceptance of the validity of statutes providing for administrative deportation arrest from almost the beginning of the Nation"). Instead of a guarantee of pre-detention review by an Immigration Judge, aliens detained under § 1226(a) are provided with multiple avenues to seek review of their detention once they are in custody – a process which the Ninth Circuit has already held is constitutionally sufficient. *See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland,* 53 F.4th 1189, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2022). The Ninth Circuit held that that the "existing agency procedures" sufficiently protect liberty interest of aliens and "mitigate the risk of erroneous deprivation." *Id.* at 1209. "In short, the agency's decision to detain Rodriguez Diaz was subject to numerous levels of review, each offering Rodriguez Diaz the opportunity to be heard by a neutral decisionmaker. These procedures ensured that the risk of erroneous deprivation would be 'relatively small.'" *Id.* (quoting *Yagman v. Garcetti*, 852 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 2017)).

Other courts, including those in this judicial circuit, have rejected the premise that the Constitution requires an extra hearing before an alien can be arrested under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b). *See, e.g., United States v. Cisneros*, No. 19-CR-00280-RS-5, 2021 WL 5908407, at

*4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2021) ("[t]he law does not require a hearing before arrest" where a noncitizen released from ICE custody had been picked up by the San Francisco Police Department for assault). Other courts have also recognized that there is no "due process right to a pre-detention hearing where a noncitizen, subject to pending removal proceedings…is at risk of being re-detained after being at liberty for more than two years." *Reyes v. King*, No. 19 CIV. 8674 (KPF), 2021 WL 3727614, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2021).

Moreover, it is well established that "detention during deportation proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process." *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003); *see also Reno*, 507 U.S. at 306; *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) ("Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure."). In every case in which detention incident to removal proceedings has arisen, the Supreme Court has concluded that it is constitutional. *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) ("We think it clear that detention, or temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens would be valid. The procedural process provided to Petitioner, if he is re-arrested, is constitutionally adequate and no additional extra-statutory process should be required.

VI. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

A. Legal Standard

Petitioner asks this Court to issue a preliminary injunction granting him three forms of relief: immediate release from custody (or a hearing for release on bond), an injunction prohibiting Respondents from transferring him out of the District of Arizona, and prospective relief regarding ICE's ability to re-detain him in the future. Respondents argue that this motion should be denied because Petitioner has not demonstrated entitlement to any of the relief he requests.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, a petitioner must show "that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Injunctive

relief is "an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right." *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 9.

B. Petitioner is not likely to succeed on the merits.

Petitioner also requests that this Court order his immediate release. As argued in Section III above, Petitioner's habeas claim should not be granted. For these same reasons, Petitioner cannot show that he is "likely to succeed on the merits," as is required for injunctive relief. *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 20.

C. Petitioner cannot establish irreparable harm.

The Court should deny Petitioner's Motion, because Petitioner "must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief." *Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldridge*, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). The "possibility" of injury is "too remote and speculative to constitute an irreparable injury meriting preliminary injunctive relief." *Id.* "Subjective apprehensions and unsupported predictions . . . are not sufficient to satisfy a plaintiff's burden of demonstrating an immediate threat of irreparable harm." *Id.* at 675-76.

Petitioner cannot show that denying the PI would make "irreparable harm" the likely outcome. *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 22 ("[P]laintiffs . . . [must] demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.") (emphasis in original). "[A] preliminary injunction will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future injury." *Id.* "Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury." *Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court of State of Cal.*, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984). Petitioner cannot establish irreparable harm if he is not released from detention where he is lawfully and constitutionally detained pursuant to federal law.

D. The equities and public interest do not favor Petitioner.

The third and fourth factors, "harm to the opposing party" and the "public interest," "merge when the Government is the opposing party." *Nken*, 556 U.S. at 435. "In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction." *Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo*, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).

An adverse decision here would negatively impact the public interest by jeopardizing "the orderly and efficient administration of this country's immigration laws." *See Sasso v. Milhollan*, 735 F. Supp. 1045, 1049 (S.D. Fla. 1990); *see also Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson*, 122 F.3d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[I]t is clear that a state suffers irreparable injury whenever an enactment of its people or their representatives is enjoined."). The public has a legitimate interest in the government's enforcement of its laws. *See, e.g., Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky*, 586 F.3d 1109, 1140 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he district court should give due weight to the serious consideration of the public interest in this case that has already been undertaken by the responsible state officials in Washington, who unanimously passed the rules that are the subject of this appeal.").

While it is in the public interest to protect constitutional rights, if the petitioner has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of that claim—as Petitioner has not shown here—that presumptive public interest evaporates. *See Preminger v. Principi*, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005). And the public interest lies in the Executive's ability to enforce U.S. immigration laws. *El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Off. of Immigr. Rev.*, 959 F.2d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Control over immigration is a sovereign prerogative."). Petitioner admitted to entering the United States illegally, which renders him inadmissible, so the public and governmental interest in permitting his continued detention to effectuate removal is significant. Because Petitioner is an inadmissible alien subject to mandatory detention, the public interest favors his continued detention.

VI. CONCLUSION

Every habeas corpus petition necessarily alleges the same basic ground for relief, *i.e.,* that the petitioner is detained in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Only when it is clear on the face of a petition that exceptional circumstances require immediate review of a petitioner's claims will consideration of his petition be advanced at the expense of prior, pending petitions. Upon the current record, it is not plain that the merits of Petitioner's claims are so strong as to warrant expedited adjudication and Petitioner is not likely to succeed on the merits of his

claim. *See In re Roe,* 257 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2001) (declining to resolve issue of whether a district court has the authority to release a prisoner pending resolution of a habeas case, but holding that if such authority does exist, it can only be exercised in an "extraordinary case involving special circumstances"). For the reasons stated herein, both Petitioner's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED November 18, 2025.

TIMOTHY COURCHAINE
United States Attorney
District of Arizona

/s/ Brock Heathcotte
BROCK HEATHCOTTE
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Respondents