

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

HENDERSON GUEVERA AREVALO,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT LYNCH, Acting Field Director for
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Detroit
Field Office, in his official capacity; KRISTI NOEM,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
and PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General,

Respondents.

Case No. 1:25-cv-1365

Hon. Robert J. Jonker
U.S. District Court Judge

Hon. Maarten Vermaat
U.S. Magistrate Judge

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Respondents, Robert Lynch¹, Field Office Director, Detroit Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, by and through their attorneys, answer the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Petitioner Henderson Guevera Arevalo as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. This petition arises from the U.S. government's new policy—which contradicts both the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and decades of agency practice—of erroneously interpreting the INA to mandate detention without the possibility of bond for noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection, even if they have been residing here for years.

¹ Petitioner named Robert Lynch as a Respondent, as Field Office Director for the Detroit ICE Field Office. Mr. Lynch no longer occupies that position and the current Acting Field Office Director, Kevin Raycraft, should automatically be substituted as the Field Office Director Respondent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. The mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) already applied to aliens, like Petitioner, who arrive and apply for admission at a U.S. port of entry without valid immigration and travel documents. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response to Habeas Petition (“Response”), filed concurrently with this Answer.

2. Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela and resident of Chicago, Illinois who was arrested by ICE and is currently detained in Baldwin, Michigan at the privately owned GEO North Lake detention facility.

ANSWER: Admitted.

3. Petitioner is statutorily entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ) but will not receive one or be released on bond because of a new policy and legal interpretation by ICE and the Department of Justice.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Immigration judges already lacked jurisdiction to provide bond to arriving aliens in removal proceedings, like Petitioner. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B). Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

4. The denial of bond is a new policy issued on July 8, 2025,² instructing all ICE employees to no longer apply 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to people charged with being inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who initially entered the United States without inspection. Instead, under

² Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission> [<https://perma.cc/8SP7-TDDD>].

the new policy, ICE employees are to subject people like Petitioners to mandatory detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A), no matter how long they have resided in the United States.

ANSWER: Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Immigration judges already lacked jurisdiction to provide bond to arriving aliens in removal proceedings, like Petitioner. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B). Additionally, Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to summarize an ICE Interim Guidance document and defer to the text of that document itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.

5. The policy was joined by Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in their precedential decision, *Matter of YAJURE HURTADO*, 29 I & N Dec. 216, issued on September 5, 2025.³

ANSWER: The Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to summarize a BIA decision and defers to the text of the decision itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.

6. BIA decisions are binding authority on Immigration Judges and holds that IJs no longer have jurisdiction to hold bond hearings for detained individuals like Petitioner.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny that Petitioner is in the class of persons defined by *Yajure Hurtado*, e.g., aliens who are present in the United States without admission or inspection. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 228. Because Petitioner is an arriving alien who applied for admission at a port of entry, *Yajure Hurtado* does not apply to him. Moreover, immigration judges already lacked jurisdiction to provide bond to arriving aliens in removal proceedings, like Petitioner. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B).

7. As a result, Petitioner will remain in mandatory detention. Absent relief from this

³ Available at <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1413311/dl?inline>

Court, he face the prospect of months or years in immigration custody, separated from his family and community, all while being deprived an individualized hearing justifying his detention in violation of the INA and Due Process.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph.

8. Respondents' new legal interpretation, which has caused Respondent to be detained without bond, is plainly contrary to the statutory framework of the INA and contrary to both agency regulations and decades of consistent agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner. It also violates his right to due process by depriving him of his liberty without any consideration of whether such a deprivation is warranted.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. The mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) already applied to aliens, like Petitioner, who arrive and apply for admission at a U.S. port of entry without valid immigration and travel documents. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.

9. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be immediately released from custody unless Respondents provide him a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within 3 days.

ANSWER: This paragraph contains a prayer for relief to which no response is required. To the extent this paragraph is deemed to allege facts to which a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations as untrue.

JURISDICTION

10. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny that the Court has jurisdiction over this case. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.

11. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents do not contest that the Court has authority to grant relief in this case.

VENUE

12. Venue is proper in the Western District of Michigan under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Petitioner is detained at the direction, and is in the immediate custody, of Respondent Robert Lynch. *See Roman v. Ashcroft*, 340 F.3d 314, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2003).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents do not contest venue in this case. Respondents deny the remaining allegations of this paragraph. Petitioner is in the immediate custody of Kevin Raycraft, the Acting Director of the ICE Detroit Field Office. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.

13. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because

Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims and relevant facts occurred in this District.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents do not contest venue in this case.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

14. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a federal statute and defer to the text of the statute itself.

15. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to summarize a federal appeals court decision and a Supreme Court decision and defer to the text of the decisions themselves.

PARTIES

16. Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela and resident of Chicago, Illinois. He was arrested

by ICE on September 13, 2025, and is currently detained in Baldwin, Michigan at the privately owned GEO North Lake detention facility.

ANSWER: Admitted.

17. Respondent Robert Lynch is the Acting Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Acting Director Lynch is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

ANSWER: Respondents deny that Robert Lynch is the Acting Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. The Acting Field Office Director is Kevin Raycraft. The second sentence of this paragraph states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents admit that the Field Office Director is charged with the detention and removal of aliens which fall under the jurisdiction of the Detroit Field Office. Respondents lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the third sentence of this paragraph.

18. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

ANSWER: Respondents admit that Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Respondents lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of whether Petitioner sues the Secretary in her official capacity. The remainder of this paragraph states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the remaining allegations in this paragraph.

19. Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency

responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny that Petitioner named DHS as a respondent to this action.

20. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and the immigration system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

ANSWER: Respondents admit that Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. Respondents lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the third sentence of this paragraph. The remainder of this paragraph states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the remaining allegations in this paragraph.

21. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny that Petitioner named the Executive Office for Immigration Review as a respondent to this action.

FACTS

22. Petitioner Henderson Guevera Arevalo is a citizen of Venezuela and resident of Chicago, Illinois. He was arrested in Chicago by ICE on September 13, 2025. Petitioner has no criminal record. He came to the United States to seek asylum. His wife and child are in Colombia and

hope to join Petitioner when he is granted asylum.

ANSWER: Respondents admit that Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico and was arrested in Chicago, Illinois on September 13, 2025. Respondents lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph.

23. Petitioner has an aunt in Chicago and regularly attends church.

ANSWER: Respondents lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph.

24. On information and belief, ICE charged Petitioner, *inter alia*, being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without inspection.

ANSWER: Admitted.

25. Petitioner is not flight risk nor a danger to his community.

ANSWER: Denied.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

26. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny Petitioner's attempt to characterize a federal statute and defer to the text of the statute itself.

27. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Under § 1226(a), individuals who are taken into immigration custody pending a decision on whether they are to be removed can be detained but are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d).⁴ *See also Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (explaining that § 1226(a) applies

⁴ Section § 1226 contains an exception for noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes, who are subject to mandatory detention without bond. 8 U.S.C. §

to those who are “already in the country” and are detained “pending the outcome of removal proceedings”). Section 1226(a) is the statute that, for decades, has been applied to people like Petitioner who have been living in the United States and are charged with inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a federal statute and a Supreme Court decision and defer to the text of the statute and decision themselves. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.

28. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of certain recently arrived noncitizens, namely those subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and other recent arrivals seeking admission under § 1225(b)(2). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287, 289 (explaining that § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry” to noncitizens “seeking admission into the United States.”). Section 1225(b)(2) is the statute that Respondents have suddenly decided is applicable to people like Petitioner.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents admit that § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme applies to at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who seek admission into the United States. Respondents deny the remaining allegations of this paragraph. Section 1225(b)(2) always has applied to arriving aliens like Petitioner. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.

29. Third, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have already been

1226(c). That exception is not relevant here – Petitioner has no criminal record.

ordered removed, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b). Section 1231 is not relevant here.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a federal statute and defer to the text of the statute itself.

30. This case concerns Respondents’ policy as applied towards individuals like Petitioner – namely that he is subject to mandatory detention without bond under §1225(b)(2), rather than being bond-eligible under § 1226(a).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

31. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a federal statute and defer to the text of the statute itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

32. Following the 1996 enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures,

62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (explaining that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.”).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Respondents also deny Petitioner’s attempt to summarize a federal regulation and defer to the text of the regulations itself.

33. Thus, in the three decades that followed, people who entered without inspection and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings received bond hearings if ICE chose to detain them, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Respondents also deny Petitioner’s attempt to summarize a federal statute and the Congressional record and defer to the text of the statute and record themselves. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.

34. However, on July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, suddenly announced a new governmental policy that rejected the well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of agency practice.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is

required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Respondents also deny Petitioner's attempt to summarize ICE policy and defer to the text of that policy itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.

35. The new policy, entitled "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission," claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection are subject to mandatory detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny Petitioner's attempt to summarize an ICE Interim Guidance document and defer to the text of that document itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response, filed concurrently with this Answer.

36. Further, in a September 5, 2025, decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a decision that holds that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are ineligible for bond hearings before an immigration judge. *See, Matter of YAJURE HURTADO*, 29 I & N Dec. 216.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny Petitioner's attempt to characterize a BIA decision and defer to the text of the decision itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

37. In particular, the Respondents have determined that immigration judges no longer have jurisdiction to hold bond hearings for noncitizens like Petitioner. The BIA's decision is binding on all immigration judges.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Immigration judges already lacked jurisdiction to provide bond hearings to arriving aliens in removal proceedings, like Petitioner. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B). Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

38. This novel interpretation has been roundly rejected by federal district courts almost unanimously. *See, inter alia, Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175767, at *19-20 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (“...[T]he BIA’s decision to pivot from three decades of consistent statutory interpretation and call for [petitioner’s] detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is at odds with every District Court that has been confronted with the same question of statutory interpretation. At least a dozen federal courts concur generally with this Court’s interpretation of the statutory language as applied in this context.”) (internal citations omitted); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169423, at *23, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (holding that “[t]here can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this country for over twenty-six years and was already within the United States when apprehended and arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival at the border.”); *Sanchez v. Olson*, No. 25 CV 12453, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211062, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2025) (“almost every district court” has rejected DHS/DOJ interpretation); *Vazquez v. Bostock*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193611, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (collecting cases); *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201967, 2025 WL 2886346, at *3 (S.D. Tex.

Oct. 7, 2025) (“As almost every district court to consider this issue has concluded, the statutory text, the statute's history, Congressional intent, and § 1226(a)'s application for the past three decades support finding that § 1226 applies to these circumstances.”)).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. The mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) already applied to aliens, like Petitioner, who arrive and apply for admission at a U.S. port of entry without valid immigration and travel documents. Additionally, Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize district court decisions and defer to the text of the decisions themselves. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

39. DHS’s and DOJ’s interpretation defies the INA. As the above courts explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Section 1225(b)(2) always has applied to arriving aliens like Petitioner. Respondents also deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize district court decisions and defer to the text of the decisions themselves. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

40. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under § 1229a to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is

required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Respondents also deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a federal statute and defer to the text of the statute itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

41. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Respondents also deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a federal statute and defer to the text of the statute itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

42. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Respondents also deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a federal statute and defer to the text of the statute itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

43. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute’s entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are “seeking admission” to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 (explaining that this mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and

ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible.”).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents admit that § 1225(b) applies to people, like Petitioner, who arrive at U.S. ports of entry. Respondents deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a federal statute and a Supreme Court decision and defer to the text of the statute and decision themselves. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

44. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to people, like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended by immigration authorities.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Because Petitioner applied for admission as a port of entry, he was charged as an arriving alien, and he remained an arriving alien while paroled under INA § 212(d)(5). Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Violation of the INA

45. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

ANSWER: Respondents adopt by reference their responses to all of the prior paragraphs as though fully incorporated herein.

46. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Respondents also deny Petitioner’s attempt to characterize a federal statute and defer to the text of the statute itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

47. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates their continued detention and violates the INA.

ANSWER: Denied.

**COUNT II
Violation of Due Process**

48. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

ANSWER: Respondents adopt by reference their responses to all of the prior paragraphs as though fully incorporated herein.

49. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001).

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny Petitioner's attempt to characterize the Constitution and defer to the text of the Constitution itself. Respondents also deny Petitioner's attempt to characterize a Supreme Court decision and defer to the text of the decision itself. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

50. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

ANSWER: The allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations of this paragraph. Further answering, Respondents refer the Court to, and incorporate herein, their Response filed concurrently with this Answer.

51. The government's detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

ANSWER: Respondents admit that Petitioner has been detained but deny that he does not have the opportunity to seek a request for bond redetermination. The remaining allegations of this paragraph state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the remaining allegations of this paragraph.

The remainder of the Petition is a Prayer for Relief to which no response is required. To the extent that the Prayer for Relief is deemed to allege facts to which a response is required, Respondents deny the allegations.

Any allegation in the Petition that has not been expressly admitted is hereby denied.

Respectfully submitted,

TIMOTHY VERHEY
United States Attorney

Dated: November 25, 2025

/s/ Kalen Pruss

KALEN PRUSS

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