IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Pablo AGUILAR,

Petitioner,

v. C.A. No. _____

Kevin RAYCRAFT,
Acting Director of Immigration
Customs Enforcement and Removal
Operations, Detroit Field Office;
Kristi NOEM, Secretary of the
Department Of Homeland Security;
and Pamela BONDI, United States
Attorney General,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

NOW COMES the Petitioner Pablo AGUILAR Herrera, by and through his attorneys TAPIA-RUANA & GUNN P.C., pleading for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC §2241, which seeks a prompt individual bond hearing under 8 USC §1226(a) or, alternatively, his release from custody. Further to 28 USC §2243, Petitioner also requests that this Court issue an order requiring Respondents to show cause why his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should not be granted.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Petitioner was born in Mexico in 1975.

2. Petitioner entered the United States ("U.S.") without inspection near Douglas, Arizona, in August 1999.
3. Petitioner has resided in Illinois for over 26 years and currently resides with his US citizen father and US legal permanent mother in Aurora, Illinois.
4. Petitioner's father has filed a Relative Visa Petition (Form I-130), which has been approved by USCIS, and which allows the Petitioner to apply for legal permanent residency.
5. Aside from a few traffic citations, Petitioner has never been arrested or convicted of any crime.
6. On September 29, 2025, while at his place of employment at Hanson Landscape in Wheeling, Illinois, Petitioner was arrested by armed, masked officers of Immigration Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), who entered the premises without invitation or warrant. After Petitioner was detained, he was issued a warrant for his arrest. He was then transferred to the ICE processing facility in Broadview, Illinois.
7. On or about September 29, 2025, the Acting Director for the Detroit Field Office of the Immigration Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ICE/ERO") transferred Petitioner to the North Lake Correctional Facility in Baldwin, Michigan, where he presently languishes.

8. The Acting Director of the ICE/EOR Detroit Field Office is responsible for decisions regarding the custody of the Petitioner, including the initial decision to transfer and detain him at the North Lake Correctional Facility in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.

9. On September 29, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") service Petitioner with a Notice to Appear ("NTA") before an Immigration Judge ("IJ") in Detroit, Michigan, to show cause why he should not be removed from the U.S (hereafter, "removal proceedings").

10. On October 20, 2025, a hearing before an IJ was held in Detroit, Michigan, on Petitioner's NTA, during which Petitioner moved for leave to file an application for Cancellation of Removal as a defense to the charge of removability. The IJ ordered that all documents regarding same be filed with the immigration court ("EOIR") by November 21, 2025, for a hearing. The IJ also stated that he had no jurisdiction to entertain a hearing for bond, given the BIA's recent decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025).

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

11. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 USC §1101, *et seq.*

12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 USC §2241 (habeas corpus), 28 USC §1331 (federal question), and where applicable, Article I § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause).

13. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 USC §2241, and the All Writs Act, 28 USC §1651.

14. This Court has jurisdiction to address a habeas petition "challen[ing] the statutory framework that permits [a petitioner's] detention without bail." *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003) (holding that 8 USC §1226(e) does not bar a challenge to a statute's meaning or constitutionality).

PARTIES—IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION

15. Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who entered the U.S. without inspection in August 1999. Since that time, he has continuously and peacefully resided in Illinois. Presently, he is in the immediate custody of the Director of the ICE/EOR Detroit Field Office and is being detained at the North Lake Correctional Facility in Baldwin, Michigan.

16. Kevin Raycraft is the Acting Director of the ICE/EOR Detroit Field Office, located at 985 Michigan Ave, Suite 207, Detroit, Wayne County, Michigan. whose area of responsibility and oversight includes civil immigration detention in facilities located in Michigan. See www.ice.gov/detention-facilities. He is a proper respondent because he is subject to service of process issued by this Court

and because he is responsible for decisions regarding the custody of the Petitioner, including the initial decision to transfer and detain him at the North Lake Correctional Facility in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.

17. Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). She is a proper respondent because she is subject to service of process issued by this Court, because her office has authority over the Field Offices of ICE/ERO.

18. Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is a proper respondent because she is subject to service of process issued by this Court, because her office has authority over the Executive Office of Immigration Review ("EOIR") (see www.justice.gov/agencies/chart-map) which consists of IJs and the Board of Immigration Review ("BIA") (see https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-organization-chart), and because her office controls policy that direct whether persons like Petitioner are permitted a bond hearing before an IJ.

VENUE

19. Venue for a habeas corpus petition brought by an alien detainee is properly in the district where his "immediate custodian," the "[ICE/EOR] District Director," resides in his/her official capacity. *Roman v. Ashcroft,* 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003).

20. Proper venue lies in this Court because the Petitioner's "immediate custodian" is Kevin Raycraft, the Director of the ICE/ERO Detroit Field Office, operating in Detroit, Wayne County, Michigan, who oversees and directs the Baldwin correctional facility in either detaining, releasing, or transferring the Petitioner. *See Roman,* F.3d at 320-21; *see also Gonzalez v. Raycraft,* No. 25-cv-13094 (E.D. Mich. 10/27/25) (where ICE conceded that Raycraft was the immediate custodian to a petitioner detained in Baldwin, Michigan, and thus the proper respondent in a habeas corpus petition).

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

21. In a precedential decision, the BIA has recently held that IJs no longer have the authority to hear or grant bond requests for noncitizens who (like Petitioner) entered the U.S. without being "admitted" by an immigration officer (*i.e.*, "without inspection"), even if such persons have been in the U.S. for many years, have no criminal record, and have established ties to the community. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025).

22. Neither the habeas statute, 8 USC §2241, nor the relevant sections of the INS require petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing petitions for habeas corpus. *Laing v. Ashcroft*, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2004).

23. A court may require prudential exhaustion if: "(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision;

(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review." *Puga v. Chertoff*, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts may waive prudential exhaustion, however, if "administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void." *Laing*, 370 F.3d at 1000.

24. Given the BIA's precedential holding in *Yajure Hurtado*, which Petitioner alleges is based on a misinterpretation or misapplication of the law, awaiting the IJ's anticipated written order denying a bond hearing and the BIA's affirmation of the same is a futile exercise, the outcome of which has already been predetermined. *See Gonzalez v. Raycraft,* No. 25-cv-13094 (E.D. Mich. 10/27/25) (finding that awaiting BIA review of an anticipated IJ order denying a bond hearing prior to proceeding on a habeas petition seeking such hearing is unnecessary and futile in light of *Yahure Hurtado*).

APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK[1]

[1] The following paragraphs 25 through 44 are taken nearly verbatim from the concise and thorough review of the applicable law prepared by Richard F. Boulware, II, U.S. District Court Judge for the District of Nevada, as set forth in his order dated September 17, 2025, in the case of *Miguel Angel Maldonado Vazquez v. Thomas E. Feeley*, No. 2:25-cv-01542.

Writ of Habeas Corpus

25. The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is "available to every individual detained within the United States." *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).

26. A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, "the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest." *I.N.S. v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).

27. A district court's habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration-related detention. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); *see also Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).

Types of Civil Detention

28. The INA generally provides for three forms of civil detention for noncitizens in removal proceedings. First, 8 USC §1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens arrested "on a warrant" pending the resolution of standard removal proceedings before an IJ. See 8 USC §1229(a). Unless they have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain enumerated crimes, which would subject them to mandatory detention until their removal proceedings are concluded, see 8 USC §1226(c), an individual detained under §1226(a) can be released by ICE on bond

or conditional parole. See 8 USC §1226(a)(1); 8 CFR §236.1(c)(8). If release is denied by ICE, the detainee can seek a custody redetermination before an IJ (i.e., bond hearing) at the outset of their detention, see 8 CFR §§1003.19(a), 1236.1(d). At the hearing, the noncitizen may present evidence to show they are not a flight risk or danger to the community and should therefore be released on bond. *See, generally, Matter of Guerra,* 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 50 (BIA 2006).

29. Second, the INA imposes mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 USC §1225(b)(1) and of an "applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted" under §1225(b)(2). Individuals detained under §1225(b) receive no bond hearing, see 8 USC §1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii)(IV), (b)(2)(A), and can only be released under humanitarian parole at the arresting agency's (i.e., ICE) discretion. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018); 8 USC §1192(d)(5). Lastly, the INA provides for detention of noncitizens who have been issued a final order of removal. See 8 USC §1231(a)-(b).

§1226(a) vs. §1225(b)(2)

30. This case concerns the mandatory versus discretionary detention provisions under §1226(a) and §1225(b)(2), which were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub.

L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 02–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226 was most recently amended this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

31. Based on a novel reading of §1225(b)(2), it is the current policy of the government to require mandatory detention for any individual who entered the U.S. without inspection despite having not been apprehended upon arrival or shortly thereafter.

32. Prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA, noncitizens arrested in the interior and charged with entering the U.S. without inspection were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer, while those stopped at the border were only entitled to release on parole. See 8 USC §1252(a) (1994) (authorizing detention of noncitizens "arriving at ports of the United States"). Congress clarified that the IIRIRA amendment of §1226(a) simply "restate[d]" the detention authority previously found at §1252(a) "to arrest, detain, and release on bond a[] [noncitizen] who is not lawfully in the United States." See H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 210 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). Congress separately maintained the existing mandatory detention scheme for noncitizens arriving in the U.S. without a clear right to admission and expanded the scope of that detention scheme to include certain recently arrived noncitizens. Compare 8 USC §1225(b) (1994 ed.), with 8 USC §1225(b)(1)-(2).

These amendments were designed to address the perceived problem of noncitizens arriving in the U.S. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, p. 1, at 157-58, 228-29.

33. In distinguishing between noncitizens arriving versus noncitizens residing in the U.S., Congress reflected its understanding of longstanding due process precedent that recognizes the more substantial due process rights of noncitizens already residing in the U.S. with those of noncitizens recently arriving. *Id.* at pt. 1, at 163-66 (recognizing the "constitutional liberty interest[s]" of noncitizens present in the U.S., versus the assumed minimal due process rights of arriving noncitizens) (citing *Knauff v. Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S 537 (1950)).

34. Until DHS and DOJ adopted the policy described below, the longstanding practice of the agencies charged with interpreting and enforcing the INA applied § 1226(a) to noncitizens like Petitioner, who entered the U.S. without inspection and were apprehended while residing in the U.S. The EOIR's regulations drafted following the enactment of the IIRIRA explained this distinction. See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) ("Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination . . . The effect of this change is that inadmissible aliens, except for arriving aliens, have available

to them bond redetermination hearings before an immigration judge, while arriving aliens do not. This procedure maintains the status quo . . .”). Accordingly in the decades since IIRIRA was enacted, DHS and the EOIR have applied § 1226(a) to the detention of individuals apprehended within the continental U.S. who entered without inspection and provided them access to release on bond.

35. The Laken Riley Act created additional exceptions to §1226 and authorized mandatory detention for certain categories of noncitizens under §1226(c). *See* Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Specifically, §1226(c)(1)(E) (enacted by the Laken Riley Act) requires mandatory detention for people who were charged as being (1) inadmissible under §1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (the inadmissibility ground for entry without inspection) or (a)(7) (the inadmissibility ground for lacking valid documentation to enter the U.S.) ***and*** who (2) have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. 8 USC §1226(c)(1)(E) (emphasis added).

36. On July 8, 2025, DHS instituted a notice titled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission” to all ICE Employees.[2] The Notice indicated that DHS, in coordination with the DOJ, “revisited its legal position” on the INA and determined that §1225(b)(2), rather than §1226, is the

[2] See https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission.

applicable immigration authority for any alien present in the U.S. "who has not been admitted. . . whether or not at a designated port of arrival." Accordingly, "it is the position of DHS that such aliens are subject to [mandatory] detention under INA §235(b) and may not be released from ICE custody except by INA §212(d)(5) parole." The Notice further provides "[t]hese aliens are also ineligible for a custody redetermination hearing (bond hearing) before an immigration judge and may not be released for the duration of their removal proceedings absent a parole by DHS. For custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same manner that 'arriving aliens' have historically been treated."

Due Process

37. "'It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law' in the context of removal proceedings . . ." *Trump v. J.G.G.*, 604 U.S., 145 S.Ct. 1003, 1006 (2025) (*per curiam*) (quoting *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)).

38. Noncitizen detainees charged with being in the U.S. illegally are entitled to procedural due process, meaning "notice and opportunity to be heard 'appropriate to the nature of the case.'" *J.G.G.*, 145 S.Ct. at 1006.

39. Substantive due process protects individuals from government action that interferes with fundamental rights. *See Regino v. Staley*, 133 F.4th 951, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2025). Governmental action that infringes a fundamental right is

constitutional only if "the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." *Reno v, Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restrain—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis,* 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Substantive due process thus protects noncitizens from arbitrary Government confinement, which violates a noncitizen's substantive due process rights except in certain "special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances where a special justification . . . outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." *Id.* at 690 (internal quotations omitted).

40. "[T]he government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by a lesser bond or alternative conditions." *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017)

41. Since the July 8, 2025 DHS Guidance Memo, nearly all U.S. District Courts ruling on habeas petitions brought by longtime noncitizen residents apprehended by ICE far from any international border or port of entry, who, after being taken into ICE custody, were denied bond or a bond hearing, have rejected BIA/DHS/ICE's interpretation of §1225(b) and have granted relief, variously requiring the release of petitioners or ordering that petitioners being provided

with a bond hearing, as provided under §1226(a) or both. *See, e.g., Jimenez Garcia v. Raybon*, 2:25-cv-13086, *8-9 (E.D. Mich., 10/21/25) (collecting cases).

APA

42. 5 USC §701, *et seq.*, the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), creates a cause of action for persons who suffer a legal wrong or who are adversely affected because of agency action.

43. Under 5 USC §706(2), "The reviewing court shall … hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."

44. Where an agency like the BIA has policymaking authority but makes its decision based on statutory analysis rather than considering the competing interests at stake, its decision is generally deemed to be arbitrary and capricious. *See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder*, 555 U.S. 511, 524 (2009) (where the Supreme Court invalidated the BIA's interpretation of §1158(b)(2)(A)(i) and §1231(b)(3)(B)(i), provisions that disqualify individuals from obtaining refugee status if they have "assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution" of others, finding that the BIA's interpretation was based on a mistaken assumption that statutory interpretation resolved the issue, and thus the Board did not "evaluate the evidence" and "bring its expertise to bear upon the matter.")

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Count One

Violation of 8 USC §1226(a)--Unlawful Denial of a Bond Hearing

45. Petitioner alleges and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.

46. Petitioner was born in Mexico in 1975, and entered the US without inspection near Douglas, Arizona, in August 1999.

47. Petitioner has resided in Illinois for over 26 years and currently resides with his US citizen father and US legal permanent resident mother in Aurora, Illinois.

48. Petitioner's father has filed a Relative Visa Petition (Form I-130), which has been approved by USCIS, which allows the Petitioner to apply for legal permanent residency.

49. Aside from a few traffic citations, Petitioner has never been arrested or convicted of any crime.

50. Until July 2025, the longstanding practice of the agencies charged with interpreting and enforcing the INA applied §1226(a) to noncitizens like Petitioner, who entered the U.S. without inspection and were apprehended while residing in the U.S. *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) ("Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled [formerly

referred to as aliens who entered without inspection] will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination . . . The effect of this change is that inadmissible aliens, except for arriving aliens, have available to them bond redetermination hearings before an immigration judge, while arriving aliens do not. This procedure maintains the status quo . . .").

51. Accordingly, DHS and the EOIR have for decades applied §1226(a) to the detention of individuals apprehended within the continental US who entered without inspection and provided them access to release on bond.

52. A recent BIA decision, *In Matter of Yahure Hurtado,* novelly and incorrectly interprets the law to apply §1225(b) and its mandatory detention provision to persons like Petitioner, who have resided far from the border for decades without engaging in criminal activity.

53. Therefore, this Court should find that §1226(a) applies to Petitioner's removal proceedings and should order that he be promptly provided with a bond hearing before an IJ.

Count Two

Violation of the APA—Unlawful Denial of a Bond Hearing

54. Petitioner incorporates by reference the above paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.

55. The BIA is part of an administrative agency charged with making immigration policy.

56. The BIA's decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* has caused Petitioner harm, to wit, it has deprived him of an opportunity previously granted persons similarly situated to be heard on a motion for release on bond.

57. The BIA's decision in *Yahure Hurtado* is based on its own statutory analysis rather than considering the competing interests at stake.

58. As such, the BIA's decision in *Yahure Hurtado* is arbitrary and capricious and, thus, in violation of the APA, *i.e.,* 5 USC §706(2).

59. Therefore, this Court should find that §1226(a) applies to Petitioner's removal proceedings, *Yahure Hurtado* notwithstanding, and should order that he be promptly provided with a bond hearing.

Count Three

Due Process Violations—Unlawful Denial of a Bond Hearing

60. Petitioner incorporates by reference the above paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.

61. Although an alien without documentation, Petitioner is nonetheless entitled to due process of law.

62. Due process protects noncitizens like Petitioner from arbitrary government confinement.

63. The government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by a bond.

64. The Petitioner is a 26-year resident of northern Illinois, where he has peaceably lived with his parents. He has never been arrested or convicted on serious crime. And is presently taking steps to cancel his removal and become a US legal permanent resident. He is not a danger to the community, nor is he a flight risk.

65. The government's decision to not allow him a bond hearing is a violation of due process.

66. Therefore, this Court should order that the Petitioner be promptly provided with a bond hearing.

Count Four

Equal Access To Justice Act Under 28 USC §2412

67. In the event Petitioner prevails in this action, he requests attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, as amended, 28 USC §2412(d), 5 USC §504.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioners pray that this Court grant the following relief:

a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

b. Issue an order requiring Respondents to show cause why his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should not be granted;

c. Issue an order barring Respondents from relocating Petitioner's confinement to a place outside the jurisdiction of this Court;

d. Declare that the refusal to allow the Petitioner a bond hearing before an IJ violates the INA, APA, and Due Process;

e. Declare that the Petitioner's removal proceeding is subject to § 1226(a), *not* §1225(b);

f. Declare that the BIA decision *In Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and the July 8, 2025 DHS Guidance Memo are arbitrary and capricious under the APA, *i.e.,* 5 USC §706(2);

g. Issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to promptly provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an IJ pursuant to 8 USC §1226(a)(2);

h. Award Petitioners reasonable costs and attorney's fees; and,

i. Grant any other relief which this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted

Jeffrey W. Gunn
TAPIA-RUANO & GUNN P.C.
53 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 1215
Chicago, IL 60604
312-281-4867

VERIFICATION

I, Jeffrey W. Gunn, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct: I am the attorney for the Petitioner Pablo Aguilar in this habeas corpus proceeding; Petitioner has authorized me to act in his behalf; Petitioner is currently in detention at the North Lake Correctional Facility in Baldwin, Michigan, and is unable to appear at my offices to sign this Petition; I am familiar with his removal proceedings; and I have discussed this matter with Petitioner and his family. Accordingly, I can and do verify that the facts stated in this Petition are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.



Jeffrey W. Gunn

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Jeffrey W. Gunn, an attorney, certify that on November 3, 2025, I served the foregoing instrument on the persons listed below via this Court's electrical filing system and by mailing copies of the same to their addresses below:

Pamela Bondi
U.S. Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Kristi Noem
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. SE
Washington, D.C. 20032

Kevin Raycraft
Director of the ICE/EOR Detroit Field Office
985 Michigan Ave, Suite 207
Detroit, MI 48226

Jerome F. Gorgon, Jr.
Interim U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan
211 W. Fort Street, Suite 2001
Detroit, MI 48226

I so certify:



Jeffrey W. Gunn