

**DETAINED**

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**THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON**

MIGUEL ALFONSO SIRA-HURTADO,

Petitioner,


v.

Cammilla WAMSLEY, Seattle Field Office  
Director, Enforcement and Removal  
Operations, United States Immigration and  
Customs Enforcement (ICE); Bruce SCOTT,  
Warden, Northwest ICE Processing Center;  
Kristi NOEM, Secretary, United States  
Department of Homeland Security; Pamela  
BONDI, United States Attorney General;  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF  
HOMELAND SECURITY;

Respondents.

Case No.: 2:25-cv-2173

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS  
CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241**

Agency File Number: 

**INTRODUCTION**

1. This case challenges the unlawful re-detention of 26-year-old Miguel Alfonso Sira-Hurtado, who entered the United States on November 2, 2023, to seek asylum. Upon entry,

1 Mr. Sira-Hurtado was detained by Border Patrol and a day later, on November 3<sup>rd</sup>, he was  
2 released on his own recognizance for the purpose of continuing his removal proceedings.

3 2. In the years since his release, Mr. Sira-Hurtado has filed for asylum, complied  
4 with the check-in requirements imposed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),  
5 attended his scheduled court hearings, and applied for employment authorization.

6 3. On June 3, 2025, Mr. Sira-Hurtado attended a hearing in his removal proceedings  
7 before the immigration court in Seattle, Washington. At that hearing and acting on a motion from  
8 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the immigration judge (IJ) dismissed Mr. Sira-  
9 Hurtado's removal proceedings. DHS did not provide any substantive argument or justification  
10 related to the Motion to Dismiss.

11 4. Mr. Sira-Hurtado was then arrested by DHS in the hallway when he was leaving  
12 the immigration courtroom. Before re-detaining him, Respondents did not provide Mr. Sira-  
13 Hurtado with any written notice explaining the basis for the revocation of his release. Nor did  
14 they provide a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where ICE was required to justify the  
15 basis for re-detention or explain why Mr. Sira-Hurtado is a flight risk or danger to the  
16 community.

17 5. Mr. Sira-Hurtado has since been detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center  
18 (NWPIC) in Tacoma, Washington, for 150-days and has not been issued a Notice and Order of  
19 Expedited Removal, nor a new Notice to Appear to place him back into removal proceedings.

20 6. During his time in custody, Respondents have identified Mr. Sira-Hurtado as a  
21 potential *Franco v. Holder* class member due to his long-term memory issues. *See Franco-*  
22 *Gonzalez v. Holder*, CV-10-02211 DMG DTBX, 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014).

1 Respondents have not provided the IJ or BIA with the proper notice and documentation of Mr.  
2 Sira-Hurtado's mental health condition, and he has thus been unable to from access the process  
3 he is due as a prospective class member. *Id.*

4 7. In addition, as this Court has recently held in multiple cases, due process demands  
5 a hearing prior to the government's decision to terminate a person's liberty. *See Ledesma*  
6 *Gonzalez v. Bostock*, 2025 WL 2841574 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2025) (Whitehead, J.); *E.A. T.-B.*  
7 *v. Wamsley*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2402130 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2025) (Evanson, J.);  
8 *Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2637663 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2025)  
9 (Pechman, J.); *Kumar v. Wamsley*, 2025 WL 2677089 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2025) (Chun, J.).  
10 Many other courts have recently held the same.

11 8. By failing to provide such a hearing, Respondents have violated Mr. Sira-  
12 Hurtado's constitutional right to due process. Moreover, Respondents' actions appear to have  
13 been a coordinated effort to attempt to remove him expeditiously. However, delays since Mr.  
14 Sira-Hurtado's detention on June 3, 2025, have positioned him such that he is no longer legally  
15 subject to expedited removal, further underscoring the illegal nature of his detention. As of the  
16 date of this filing, Mr. Sira- Hurtado has resided in the country for more than two years. *See* 8  
17 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).

18 9. Accordingly, this Court should grant the instant petition for a writ of habeas  
19 corpus and order his immediate release. *See E.A.T.-B* 2025 WL 2402130, at \*6 (ordering  
20 immediate release because "a post-deprivation hearing cannot service as an adequate procedural  
21 safeguard because it is after the fact and cannot prevent an erroneous deprivation of liberty");  
22

1 *Ramirez Tesara*, at \*4 (similar); *Kumar*, 2025 WL 2677089, at \*3-4 (similar); *Ledesma*  
2 *Gonzalez*, 2025 WL 2841574, at \*9 (relying on *E.A. T.-B.*)

3 **JURISDICTION**

4 10. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration  
5 and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

6 11. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas  
7 corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States  
8 Constitution (Suspension Clause).

9 12. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et  
10 seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §  
11 1651.

12 13. No other petitions, appeals, or motions regarding habeas corpus have been filed  
13 with any other court.

14 **VENUE**

15 14. Venue is proper because Mr. Sira-Hurtado is in Respondents' custody at the  
16 NWIPC in Tacoma, Washington. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*,  
17 410 U.S. 484, 493–500 (1973), venue lies in the judicial district in which Mr. Sira-Hurtado  
18 currently is in custody.

19 15. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because  
20 Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a  
21 substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Western  
22 District of Washington.

1 **REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243**

2 16. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to  
3 show cause (OSC) to the Respondents “forthwith,” unless Petitioner is not entitled to relief 28  
4 U.S.C. § 2243. If an OSC is issued, the Court must require Respondents to file a return “within  
5 three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

6 17. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional  
7 law . . . affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or  
8 confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). “The application for the writ usurps the  
9 attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt  
10 action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120  
11 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); *see also Van Buskirk v. Wilkinson*, 216 F.2d 735, 737–38 (9th  
12 Cir. 1954) (habeas corpus is “a speedy remedy, entitled by statute to special, preferential  
13 consideration to insure expeditious hearing and determination”).

14 **PARTIES**

15 18. Petitioner Miguel Sira-Hurtado is a citizen of Venezuela who is presently  
16 detained at the NWPIC in Tacoma, Washington.

17 19. Respondent Cammilla Wamsley is the Field Office Director for ICE’s Seattle  
18 Field Office. The Seattle Field Office is responsible for local custody decisions relating to  
19 noncitizens charged with being removable from the United States. The Seattle Field Office’s area  
20 of responsibility includes Alaska, Oregon, and Washington. Respondent Wamsley is a legal  
21 custodian of Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

1 20. Respondent Bruce Scott is employed by the private corporation The GEO Group,  
2 Inc., as Warden of the NWIPC, where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody  
3 of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

4 21. Respondent Kristi Noem is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the  
5 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). She is the cabinet-level secretary responsible for all  
6 immigration enforcement in the United States.

7 22. Respondent Pamela Bondi is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General  
8 of the United States. She has responsibility over the Executive Office for Immigration Review,  
9 which decides removal cases and applications for relief from removal.

10 23. Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security is the federal agency that has  
11 authority over the actions of ICE.

#### 12 **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

13 24. Mr. Sira-Hurtado is a 26-year-old citizen and national of Venezuela.

14 25. Mr. Sira-Hurtado fled Venezuela in 2023 due to threats of harm from 

15  See Declaration of Miguel Alfonso Sira-  
16 Hurtado (“Sira-Hurtado Dec.”) ¶ 4.

17 26. Mr. Sira-Hurtado entered the United States on November 2, 2023, to seek asylum,  
18 and was subsequently apprehended by Border Patrol. Ex. A. <sup>1</sup>

19 27. According to his arrest records, DHS issued Mr. Sira-Hurtado a Notice to Appear  
20 (NTA) in removal proceedings and released him on his own recognizance. Ex. A and B.

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<sup>1</sup> All citations to exhibits are to the exhibits included with the declaration of Peyton Jacobsen.

1 28. Following his release on recognizance, Mr. Sira-Hurtado relocated to Seattle,  
2 Washington. *See* Sira-Hurtado Decl. ¶ 9.

3 29. On December 18, 2024, Mr. Sira-Hurtado filed an application for asylum. *Id.* ¶  
4 17.

5 30. Mr. Sira-Hurtado subsequently applied for employment authorization with the  
6 intention of supporting himself while waiting for the final adjudication of his asylum application.  
7 *Id.* ¶ 16. However, he was arrested and re-detained prior to the approval of his work permit  
8 application. *Id.*

9 31. In the months that followed, Mr. Sira-Hurtado complied with the check-in  
10 requirements imposed by ICE as part of his release on recognizance. *Id.* ¶ 18.

11 32. On April 7, 2024, Mr. Sira-Hurtado was arrested and charged with Driving While  
12 Under the Influence, a gross misdemeanor. *Id.* ¶ 19. The City of SeaTac amended the Driving  
13 While Under the Influence charge to Negligent Driving in the First Degree, a simple  
14 misdemeanor. *Id.* Mr. Sira-Hurtado plead guilty to the Negligent Driving in the First-Degree  
15 charge. *Id.*

16 33. On June 3, 2025, Mr. Sira-Hurtado appeared at the immigration court in Seattle,  
17 Washington, for a master calendar hearing (MCH) before the IJ. *Id.* ¶ 23. At the hearing, DHS  
18 moved to dismiss the removal proceedings, in spite of the fact that Mr. Sira-Hurtado had an  
19 unresolved application for asylum pending. *Id.* ¶ 26.

20 34. The IJ granted DHS's motion to dismiss, disregarding Mr. Sira-Hurtado's  
21 objection, request for additional time to secure representation, and restatement of fear of  
22 persecution in his home country. *Id.* ¶ 28.

1 35. Immediately following the hearing, ICE arrested Mr. Sira-Hurtado in the waiting  
2 room outside of the courtroom by around ten plain clothes individuals who were all wearing  
3 masks and hoodies. *Id.* ¶ 30.

4 36. Prior to Mr. Sira-Hurtado's re-arrest, he did not receive written notice of the  
5 reason for his re-detention. *Id.* ¶ 33.

6 37. Prior to Mr. Sira-Hurtado's re-arrest, DHS did not request a hearing to assess  
7 before a neutral decision maker whether Mr. Sira-Hurtado presented a flight risk or danger to the  
8 community, or whether his re-arrest was justified for some other reason. *Id.* ¶ 27.

9 38. Prior to Mr. Sira-Hurtado's re-detention, he never received a hearing before a  
10 neutral decisionmaker to determine if his re-detention is justified.

11 39. DHS made no argument or motion in front of the IJ addressing release factors or  
12 any change in circumstance relating to Mr. Sira-Hurtado's release on personal recognizance.

13 40. Mr. Sira-Hurtado has never received an arrest record from Respondents or any  
14 documentation related to his June 3, 2025, re-detention. *Id.* ¶ 36.

15 41. During his time in custody, Respondents have identified Mr. Sira-Hurtado as a  
16 potential *Franco v. Holder* class member due to his memory issues from a traumatic brain injury.  
17 *Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder*, CV-10-02211 DMG DTBX, 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29,  
18 2014). *See* Ex. D and F.

19 42. On June 20<sup>th</sup>, DHS filed a motion to re-open Mr. Sira-Hurtado's case in order to  
20 further assess his competency. Ex. D. Notably, their motion to re-open came only 17 days after  
21 they moved to dismiss his case. *Id.* DHS's Motion to Reopen was denied by the IJ because it did  
22 not provide the court with adequate information. *See* Ex. E. On July 31<sup>st</sup>, DHS filed a motion to

1 remand and reopen in the BIA, but again did not provide the court with medical documentation.

2 *See. Ex. F*

3 43. Respondents have not provided the IJ or BIA with the proper notice and  
4 documentation of Mr. Sira-Hurtado's mental health condition, and thus, he has not been able to  
5 access the process he is due as a prospective class member. *Id.*<sup>2</sup>

6 **MEMORANDUM OF LAW**

7 **Due Process Principles**

8 44. Due process requires that if DHS seeks to re-arrest a person like Mr. Sira-  
9 Hurtado—who has lived in the United States for years after DHS first released him, and has  
10 attended his removal proceedings and complied with the terms of his release—the government  
11 must afford a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether any re-detention is  
12 justified, and whether the person is a flight risk or danger to the community.

13 45. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other  
14 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”  
15 *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). As this Court recently recognized, this is the “the  
16 most elemental of liberty interests.” E.A. T.-B., 2025 WL 2402130, at \*3 (citation modified); see  
17 also Ramirez Tesara, 2025 WL 2637663, at \*3 (stating that the petitioner had “an exceptionally  
18 strong interest in freedom from physical confinement”).

19  
20  
21 <sup>2</sup> This information relevant to the habeas petition because it shows that Mr. Sira-Hurtado's case should  
22 procedurally be in removal proceedings, but for DHS's alleged non-compliance with the *Franco-Gonzalez v.*  
*Holder*, CV-10-02211 DMG DTBX, 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014) settlement, which requires  
providing EOIR with specific documentation to support the request for mental health safeguards.

1 46. Consistent with this principle, individuals released on parole or other forms of  
2 conditional release have a liberty interest in their “continued liberty.” *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408  
3 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).

4 47. Such liberty is protected by the Fifth Amendment because, “although  
5 indeterminate, [it] includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty,” such as the ability to  
6 be gainfully employed and live with family, “and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the  
7 [released individual] and often on others.” *Id.*

8 48. To protect against arbitrary re-detention and to ensure the right to liberty, due  
9 process requires “adequate procedural protections” that test whether the government’s asserted  
10 justification for a noncitizen’s physical confinement “outweighs the individual’s constitutionally  
11 protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation modified).

12 49. Due process thus guarantees notice and an individualized hearing before a neutral  
13 decisionmaker to assess danger or flight risk before the revocation of an individual’s release.  
14 *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law  
15 is the opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner.” (citation  
16 modified)); see also, e.g., *Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 485 (requiring “preliminary hearing to  
17 determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested  
18 parolee has committed . . . a violation of parole conditions” and that such determination be made  
19 “by someone not directly involved in the case” (citation modified)).

20 50. Several courts, including this one, have recognized that these principles apply  
21 with respect to the re-detention of the many noncitizens that DHS has recently begun taking back  
22 into custody, often after such persons have been released for months and years.

1 51. For example, in *E.A. T.-B.*, this Court applied the *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S.  
2 319 (1976), framework to hold that even in a case where the government asserted that mandatory  
3 detention applied, a person’s re-detention could not occur absent a hearing. The Court did the  
4 same in *Ramirez Tesara* and *Kumar*. See *Ramirez Tesara*, 2025 WL 2637663, at \*2–3; *Kumar*,  
5 2025 WL 2677089, at \*2–3.

6 52. In applying the three *Mathews* factors, the *E.A. T.B.* court held that the petitioner  
7 had “undoubtedly [been] deprive[d] . . . of an established interest in his liberty,” 2025 WL  
8 2402130, at \*3, which, as noted, “is the most elemental of liberty interests,” *Id.* (citation  
9 modified). The Court further explained that even if detention was mandatory, the risk of  
10 erroneous deprivation of liberty without a hearing was high because a hearing serves to ensure  
11 that the purposes of detention—the prevention of danger and flight risk—are properly served. *Id.*  
12 at \*4–5. Finally, the Court explained that “the Government’s interest in re-detaining non-citizens  
13 previously released without a hearing is low: although it would have required the expenditure of  
14 finite resources (money and time) to provide Petitioner notice and hearing on [ISAP] violations  
15 before arresting and re-detaining him, those costs are far outweighed by the risk of erroneous  
16 deprivation of the liberty interest at issue.” *Id.* at \*5. As a result, this Court ordered the  
17 petitioner’s immediate release. *Id.* at \*6.

18 53. This Court applied a similar analysis in *Ramirez Tesara*. There, the Court  
19 reasoned that the petitioner had a “weighty” interest in his liberty and was entitled to the “full  
20 protections of the due process clause.” 2025 WL 2637663, at \*3. When examining the value of  
21 additional safeguards, the Court also noted that despite the government’s allegations of ISAP  
22 violations, “the fact ‘that the Government may believe it has a valid reason to detain Petitioner

1 does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate the detention in a manner that comports with due  
2 process.” *Id.* at \*4 (quoting *E.A. T.-B.*, 2025 WL 2402130, at \*4). Finally, the Court reasoned  
3 that any government interest in re-detention without a hearing was “minimal.” *Id.* Accordingly,  
4 there too, the Court ordered the petitioner’s immediate release. *Id.* at \*5.

5 54. The *Kumar* court reached the same decision, again holding that all three factors  
6 weighed in favor of affording the petitioner a bond hearing. 2025 WL 2677089, at \*3–4.

7 55. This Court’s decisions in *E.A. T.-B.*, *Ramirez Tesara*, and *Kumar* are consistent  
8 with many other district court decisions addressing similar situations. See, e.g., *Valdez v. Joyce*,  
9 No. 25 CIV. 4627 (GBD), 2025 WL 1707737 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) (ordering immediate  
10 release due to lack of pre-deprivation hearing); *Pinchi v. Noem*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 5:25-  
11 CV05632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (similar); *Maklad v. Murray*, No.  
12 1:25- CV-00946 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2299376 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025) (similar); *Garcia v.*  
13 *Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-01006 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2420068 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025) (similar).

14 56. The same framework and principles apply here and compel Mr. Sira-Hurtado’s  
15 immediate release. Even if Respondents argue that changed circumstances justify a custody  
16 redetermination or that Mr. Sira-Hurtado failed to adhere to the conditions of his release, the  
17 *Mathews* factors still weigh in favor of providing Mr. Sira-Hurtado basic due process – such as  
18 written notice and a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. See *E.A.T.-B.*, 2025  
19 WL 2402130, at \*4 (citing *Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-05436-RFL,  
20 2025 WL 1983677, at \*7 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025)). Mr. Sira-Hurtado’s liberty interest in his  
21 freedom has been established, and it may only be revoked through methods that comport with  
22 due process. See *Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t*, 704 F- Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D.

1 Wash. 2023) (“The Supreme Court has consistently held that non-punitive detention violates the  
2 Constitution unless it is strictly limited, and, typically, accompanied by a prompt individualized  
3 hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to ensure that the imprisonment serves the government’s  
4 legitimate goals.”) (citations omitted)).

5 **EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES**

6 57. Because current law governing the immigration court system subjects Mr. Sira-  
7 Hurtado to the mandatory detention scheme under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), *see Matter of*  
8 *Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) (“Immigration judges lack authority to hear bond  
9 requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission.”),  
10 seeking a bond hearing before an immigration judge is futile and would not allow for the  
11 consideration of Mr. Sira-Hurtado’s release.

12 58. Through counsel, Mr. Sira-Hurtado has attempted on multiple occasions to seek  
13 humanitarian parole through the discretion of Respondents which has also been futile.

14 59. Petitioner has exhausted all available administrative remedies that could provide  
15 the relief he seeks, and the Court should find that further administrative exhaustion would be  
16 futile. *See Vasquez-Rodriguez v. Garland*, 7 F.4th 888, 896 (9th Cir. 2021) (“where the agency’s  
17 position appears already set and recourse to administrative remedies is very likely futile,  
18 exhaustion is not required.”).

19 **CLAIM FOR RELIEF**  
20 **Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process**  
21 **Procedural Due Process**

22 60. Mr. Sira-Hurtado restates and realleges all the prior paragraphs as if fully set forth  
23 herein.

1 61. Due process does not permit the government to re-detain Mr. Sira-Hurtado and  
2 strip him of his liberty without written notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral  
3 decisionmaker to determine whether re-detention is warranted based on danger or flight risk. See  
4 *Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 487–88. Such written notice and a hearing must occur prior to any re-  
5 detention.

6 62. Respondents revoked Mr. Sira-Hurtado’s release and deprived him of liberty  
7 without providing him written notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard by a neutral  
8 decisionmaker prior to his re-detention.

9 63. Accordingly, Mr. Sira-Hurtado’s re-detention violates the Due Process Clause of  
10 the Fifth Amendment.

11 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

12 WHEREFORE, Mr. Sira-Hurtado prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- 13 (1) Assume Jurisdiction over this matter;
- 14 (2) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause within three days  
15 as to why this Petition should not be granted as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2243;
- 16 (3) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to release Mr. Sira-Hurtado  
17 from custody immediately and permanently enjoining his re-detention absent written  
18 notice and a hearing prior to re-detention where Respondents must prove by clear and  
19 convincing evidence that his is a flight risk or danger to the community and that no  
20 alternative to detention would mitigate those risks;

- 1 (4) Declare that Mr. Sira-Hurtado's detention without an individualized determination  
2 before a neutral decisionmaker violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth  
3 Amendment;
- 4 (5) Award Mr. Sira-Hurtado attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice  
5 Act and on any other basis justified under law; and
- 6 (6) Grant such other relief as may be just and reasonable.
- 7

8 Dated: November 2, 2025

9 /s/ Sam M Sueoka

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