UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANGELO DIVISION

Jesus Eduardo JANDRES-ORDONEZ, Petitioner, v. Pamela BONDI, Attorney General; Kristi NOEM, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security; Joshua JOHNSON, Field Office Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Defendants.	)	No. 6:25-CV-00084 et al. Alien No. A[redacted]

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

COMES NOW, JESUS EDUARDO JANDRES-ORDONEZ, Petitioner, by and through his counsel, JAVIER A. GARCIA, in the above-styled and numbered cause, and petitions this Honorable Court for a writ of habeas corpus and injunctive relief to remedy his indefinite detention, in violation of the laws and regulations of the United States. In support of this petition and complaint for injunctive relief, Petitioner would show unto the court the following:

Petitioner, Jesus Eduardo JANDRES-ORDONEZ, is in the physical custody of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) by order of Field Office Director Joshua Johnson, detained at the Eden Detention Center, 702 East Broadway Street, Eden, Texas, a facility contracted by ICE to hold immigration detainees. See Exhibit 1. He has been detained at that facility by Defendants since August 25, 2025, approximately.

I. PARTIES

Petitioner, Jesus Eduardo JANDRES-ORDONEZ, is a native and citizen of El Salvador. The Petitioner's legal name is accurately denoted as Jesus Eduardo JANDRES-ORDONEZ in all Department of Justice documents and correspondence.

Defendant, Joshua JOHNSON, is the Field Office Director for Detention and Removal with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and administers the immigration laws on behalf of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Attorney General, and as such has immediate control and custody of the Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity only.

Defendant, Kristi NOEM, is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). She is responsible for the administration, implementation and enforcement of the immigration laws and is a legal custodian of the Petitioner. 8 USC § 1103(a). She is sued in her official capacity only.

Defendant, Pamela BONDI, is the Attorney General of the United States, and is authorized by law to administer and enforce the immigration laws pursuant to 8 USC § 1103(g). She is sued in her official capacity only.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This action arises under Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (the codification of the Great Writ), 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), the Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., and the Administrative Procedures Act (A.P.A.), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.

This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241, Art. I § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the Petitioner is presently in the physical custody under color of the authority of the United States, and such custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. *See INS v. St. Cyr*, 533 US 289 (2001); *Zadvydas v. Davis, et. Al.*, 533 US 678; *Heikkila v. Barber*, 345 US 229 (1953); *Felker v. Turpin*, 518 US 651 (1996). This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the A.P.A., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

Venue lies in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, the judicial district in which Defendant JOHNSON, Field Office Director, ICE, is located, and it is the District in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, including the facility in which the Petitioner is currently detained. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

III. CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner, JESUS EDUARDO JANDRES-ORDONEZ (hereinafter JANDRES-ORDONEZ) entered the United States without inspection on or about October 18, 2015, at the age of 14, with his mother.

The Petitioner was arrested on or about August 25, 2025, while on his way to work in Lugo, Texas. He was transferred to the custody of ICE, where he remains today.

On October 21, 2025, an Immigration Judge ruled JANDRES-ORDONEZ is subject to mandatory detention and he had no jurisdiction to determine eligibility for bond citing *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). See Exhibit 2. JANDRES-ORDONEZ reserved appeal. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) waived appeal.

JANDRES-ORDONEZ is being held contrary to law in violation of his constitutionally protected liberty interest.

IV. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

First, exhaustion does not bar this Court's review because it is not a statutory requirement in these circumstances. *See Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, 25 Civ. 5937, 2025 WL 2371588, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025). When a "'legal question is fit for resolution and delay means hardship,' a court may choose to decide the issues itself." *Pizarro Reyes*, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (quoting *Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc.*, 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000)).

Assuming arguendo that the case does not pose a legal question fit for resolution, then a person seeking habeas relief must first exhaust available

administrative remedies. *Hinojosa v. Horn*, 896 F.3d 305, 314 (5th Cir. 2018). "The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires not that only administrative remedies selected by the complainant be first exhausted, but instead that all those prescribed administrative remedies which might provide appropriate relief be pursued prior to seeking relief in the federal courts." *Id.* at 314 (quoting *Hessbrook v. Lennon*, 777 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1985), *abrogated on other grounds by McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 117 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1992), *superseded by statute on other grounds*, *Woodford v. Ngo*, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2006); *see* also *Lee v. Gonzales*, 410 F.3d 778, 786 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[A] petitioner must exhaust available avenues of relief and turn to habeas only when no other means of judicial review exists.").

Conversely, "[e]xceptions to the exhaustion requirement are appropriate where the available administrative remedies either are unavailable or wholly inappropriate to the relief sought, or where the attempt to exhaust such remedies would itself be a patently futile course of action." *Fuller v. Rich*, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (quoting *Hessbrook*, 777 F.2d at 1003); *Hinojosa*, 896 F.3d at 315 (finding that procedures provided a basis for the Plaintiffs to rectify the wrongful determination that they are not citizens, so they could not show that pursuing such remedies would be futile); *Fuller* F.3d at 62 (finding that the Plaintiff could not show his appeal would be futile as Plaintiff did not file an appeal even though it was untimely).

There is no administrative remedy to compel the Immigration Judge to consider JANDRES-ORDONEZ's eligibility for an immigration bond as he asserted he had no jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter.

The Immigration Judge relied on the binding precedential decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and any attempt for the Petitioner to appeal this

decision to the authority that issued that precedential decision (the Board of Immigration Appeals) would be a patently futile course of action.

The Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies to the extent required by law, and his only remedy is by way of this habeas petition. He has sought release through the administrative procedures established by regulation. The Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the Defendant's actions, and the Immigration Judge's interpretation of the relevant statutes. The Petitioner is being detained indefinitely, at the whim of the agency.

Assuming arguendo that the Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the Petitioner should be exempt from complying with the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine as his continued detention, in spite of his vested liberty interest, will result in irreparable harm (i.e. loss of liberty) and/or such administrative remedies would be futile and/or there are constitutional questions that cannot be resolved through the administrative process.

V. IMMIGRATION JUDGE'S JURISDICTION AND MANDATORY DETENTION

The issue here largely involves a question of statutory interpretation, which is historically within the province of the courts. *Id.* The Agency concludes that § 1225, not § 1226, applies to JANDRES-ORDONEZ's detention. As almost every district court to consider this issue has concluded, "the statutory text, the statute's history, Congressional intent, and § 1226(a)'s application for the past three decades" support finding that § 1226 applies to these circumstances. *Pizarro Reyes*, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4; *see also Lopez-Arevelo*, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7 ("In recent weeks, courts across the country

have held that this new, expansive interpretation of mandatory detention under the INA is either incorrect or likely incorrect."); *Rodriguez v. Bostock*, No. 3:25-cv-5240, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 & n.3 (W.D. Wash. Sep. 30, 2025) (collecting cases and noting that "[e]very district court to address" the statutory question "has concluded that the government's position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice"); *Belsai D.S. v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-3682, 2025 WL 2802947, at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (joining the "chorus" of courts concluding that § 1226 applies). The court need not repeat the "well-reasoned analyses" contained in these opinions and instead simply notes its agreement. *Chogllo Chafla v. Scott*, No. 2:25-cv-437, 2025 WL 2688541, at *5 (D. Me. Sep. 21, 2025).

Notwithstanding the Petitioner's pending immigration proceedings, the claim in question is ripe for review. The pendency of removal proceedings has not prevented numerous other courts from finding jurisdiction nor granting a temporary restraining order in similar situations.[1]

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[1] Several district courts that have addressed this question have concluded that the government's position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice: See, e.g., Aceros, v. Kaiser, et al., 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179594, 2025 WL 2637503 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025); Maldonado Vazquez v. Feeley, 2:25-CV-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182412, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); Romero v. Hyde, CV 25-11631-BEM, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160622, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); Martinez v. Hyde, CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141724, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (denying government's motion for reconsideration); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128085, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); dos Santos v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-12052-JEK, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157488, 2025 WL 2370988 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025); Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156344, 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Rocha Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156336, 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157214, 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Leal-Hernandez v. Noem, 1:25-CV-02428-JRR, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165015,

The INA provision on which the Federal Respondents rely to determine the Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention reads:

> [I]n the case of *an alien who is an applicant for admission*, if the examining immigration officer determines that *an alien seeking admission* is not clearly and beyond entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (also known as INA § 235(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

The phrases "an alien who is an applicant for admission" and "an alien seeking admission" are not synonymous as the first term can describe a

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2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); Aguilar Maldonado v. Olson, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158321, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183335, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Beltran Barrera v. Tindall, 3:25-CV-541-RGJ, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184356, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2:25-CV-12486, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169423, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175767, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); Jimenez v. FCI Berlin, Warden, 25-CV-326-LM-AJ, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176165, 2025 WL 2639390 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025); Chogllo Chafla v. Scott, 2:25-CV-00437-SDN, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, 2025 WL 2688541 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2025); Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-01789-ODW (DFMX), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158808, 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025) (granting individualized bond hearings on ex parte motion for temporary restraining order after finding likelihood of success); Mosqueda v. Noem, 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174828, 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (same); Kostak v. Trump, CV 3:25-1093, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167280, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025) (same); Garcia Jimenez v. Kramer, No. 4:25CV3162, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157245, 2025 WL 2374223 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (granting relief from stay of bond order pending BIA appeal); Mayo Anicasio v. Kramer, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157236, 2025 WL 2374224 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same); But see Pena v. Hyde, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144234, 2025 WL 2108913 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025) (denying habeas petition of noncitizen because he was mandatorily detained under section 1225, but where individual is not similarly situated to Bond Denial Class members because his case was focused on the effect of an approved I-130 petition made on his behalf).

noncitizen who for weeks, months, or years is an applicant for admission, whether present in the country or not, while the latter term describes a current activity, namely standing at the border and asking to be allowed in the United States. This foregoing interpretation of the words "an alien seeking admission" is consistent with § 1225(b)'s role in governing the process that "begins at the Nation's borders and ports of entry." *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287, 138 S. Ct. 830, 200 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2018). According to the *Jennings* court, § 1225(b)(2) serves as a "catchall" for aliens seeking admission who are "not clearly and beyond a doubt" entitled to admission, but not for one of the reasons set forth in §1225(b)(1), i.e., fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation. *Id.*,; *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Aliens to whom § 1225(b)(2) applies and who are detained may be temporarily released on parole for "urgent humanitarian reason or significant public benefit," but they must return to custody when the Secretary of Homeland Security concludes that the purposes of the parole have been served. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).

In *Jennings*, the Supreme Court recognized that a different provision of the INA, namely 8 U.S.C. § 1226, applies to aliens who are *already present* in the United States, but might be removable because they either were inadmissible at the time of entry or have been convicted of one or more statutorily-enumerated criminal offenses. *See* 583 U.S. at 288. (emphasis added). Section 1226(a) reads as follows:

> On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney General-

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on--

(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or

(B) conditional parole . . . .

Here, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to the Petitioner because he was already present in the United States when he sought admission at the age of 14 years old.

The Agency's overly broad interpretation of the statutory/regulatory scheme entails holding every non-citizen who entered without inspection subject to mandatory detention with no opportunity to be released on bond. Such interpretation is contrary to BIA precedent (*Matter of Akhmedov,* 29 I&N Dec. 166 (BIA 2025)), contrary to Congressional intent (See Generally, Public Law 119-1; The Laken-Riley Act) and decades of contrary interpretation and the Petitioner should be allowed apply for an immigration bond and have an Immigration Judge determine is eligibility for and immigration bond, to avail himself of his constitutional right to liberty during deportation proceedings. *Doherty v. Barr*, 503 US 901 (1992)(finding that even aliens unlawfully present in the US have a "substantive due process right to liberty during deportation proceedings.")

In *Matter of Akhmedov*, the BIA's position is that those who entered unlawfully are necessarily detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which gives an Immigration Judge discretion to grant a bond to a detainee. The Department of Justice, however, paints with a broad brush and holds that anyone who enters without inspection is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, a much more stringent provision under which immigration judges lack jurisdiction to grant bond.

The Immigration Judge's findings that all non-citizens who enter without inspection are subject to mandatory detention and thus ineligible for bond would run contrary to Congressional intent as it would make the Laken-Riley Act unnecessary and superfluous. Congress would have had no need to carve out an exception that excludes non-citizens who entered without inspection *and* have been charged with a theft or assault offenses from requesting bond if *everyone* who entered unlawfully was ineligible for bond, thus demonstrating congressional intent that those who entered without inspection are eligible for bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226.

V. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. V. "Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action." *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 US 71, 80 (1992). See also *St. John v. McElroy*, 917 F. Supp. 243, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)("[T]the private interest affected is St. John's liberty interest, which is of the highest constitutional import."); *Doherty v. Barr*, 503 US 901 (1992)(finding that even aliens unlawfully present in the US have a "substantive due process right to liberty during deportation proceedings.")

Substantive due process requires that detention authorized for non-punitive purposes not be "excessive in relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve." *United States v. Salerno*, 481 US 739, 747 (1987). Government detention violates the Due Process Clause unless it is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural safeguards, or in certain

special and non-punitive circumstances "where a special justification...outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 US 346, 356 (1997).

Even if the Petitioner's continued detention did not violate his constitutional right to substantive due process, his continued detention violates his constitutional right to procedural due process. The Petitioner has been indefinitely deprived of his liberty by the decision of the Immigration Judge without being heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. *Matthews v. Eldridge*, 424 US 319, 334 (1976).

This Honorable Court must consider three factors in analyzing a violation of procedural due process claim: 1) the nature of the private interest affected by the government action; 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest as a result of the procedures used and the probable value of additional or substitute safeguards; and, 3) the government's interest in using its own procedures and the fiscal and administrative burdens by additional or substitute safeguards. *Matthews, supra* at 335.

The private interest here is the right to be considered for an immigration bond under the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Freedom from government custody or detention "lies at the heart of the liberty" that due process protects. *Zadvyas, supra* at 690. The Defendants have failed to demonstrate that Petitioner presents an identified and articulable threat to the community, or a flight risk, so as to justify his continued detention.

The risk of an erroneous deprivation of his liberty interest is substantive and grave considering that he has been in ICE custody for over two months already, and the Agency has erroneously held he has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the Petitioner's application for an immigration bond. The value of

additional and substitute safeguards is nil, as they continue to detain him indefinitely.

The government's interest in using its own procedures and the fiscal and administrative burdens by additional or substitute safeguards is not particularly relevant as the government's fiscal and administrative burdens are actually higher while the Petitioner is detained than they would otherwise be if he was released.

VI. REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

For all the reasons outlined, *supra*, which are incorporated and re-urged herein as if fully set forth verbatim, the Petitioner respectfully requests injunctive relief in the form of the entry of an order enjoining the Defendants from further and continuing detention of the Petitioner, absent a new basis for such detention arising subsequent to this action, and independent of his manner of entry to the United States.

This injunction is necessary as Defendants have shown themselves unwilling to hold any administrative hearing to adjudicate the Petitioner's application for an immigration bond under their own administrative framework.

VII. REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

For all the reasons outlined, *supra,* which are incorporated and re-urged herein as if fully set forth verbatim, the Petitioner respectfully requests declaratory relief in the form of the entry of a decree which specifies the rights and liabilities of the parties to the instant litigation. The Petitioner also

requests that this Honorable Court retain continuing jurisdiction over this civil action and that, after reasonable notice of hearing and hearing had, it enter any further declaratory, mandatory, or other injunctive order that is necessary to enforce any declaratory judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 22.02.

VIII. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

The Petitioner is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs of court, both of which he respectfully requests under the Equal Access to Justice Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The position of the Defendants herein is not substantially justified, and no circumstances exist which would render an award of fees and costs unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

IX. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, in view of the arguments and authority noted herein, Petitioner respectfully prays that the Defendants be cited to appear and answer herein and that, upon due consideration, this Honorable Court:

(a) grant Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus and issue a declaratory judgment stating that Defendants' continuing detention of the Petitioner is arbitrary and capricious, clearly contrary to law, and in excess of statutory jurisdiction, and that Petitioner be released on recognizance, or in the alternative, permitted to apply for an immigration bond as pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);

(b) issue an order enjoining Defendants from further, continuing detention of the Petitioner absent new cause arising subsequent to this action and not dependent upon his status at entry to the United States;

(c) retain jurisdiction over this civil action to the extent necessary to ensure the entry of any declaratory, injunctive, or mandatory order that may be necessary or proper to enforce any declaratory judgment;

(d) award Petitioner reasonable attorney's fees and costs; and

(e) grant such other relief at law and in equity as justice may require.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Javier A. Garcia

Javier A. Garcia
Rushton Hoffman and Associates, PLLC
Attorneys for Petitioner
Texas Bar No. 24025942
5909 West Loop S., Ste. 150
Bellaire, TX 77401
(713)838-8500
(713)838-9826 Fax

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

Exhibit	Description
1	Order of the Immigration Judge denying bond

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
CONROE IMMIGRATION COURT

Respondent Name:
JANDRES-ORDONEZ, JESUS EDUARDO

To:
Hoffman, Robert Kenneth
5909 West Loop South
Suite 150
Bellaire, TX 77401

A-Number:
[redacted]

Riders:
In Custody Redetermination Proceedings

Date:
10/21/2025

ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

The respondent requested a custody redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236. After full consideration of the evidence presented, the respondent's request for a change in custody status is hereby ordered:

☑ Denied, because
NO JURISDICTION - PER HURTADO

☐ Granted. It is ordered that Respondent be:
- ☐ released from custody on his own recognizance.
- ☐ released from custody under bond of $
- ☐ other:

☐ Other:

Immigration Judge: McPhail, John 10/21/2025

Appeal: Department of Homeland Security: ☑ waived ☐ reserved
Respondent: ☐ waived ☑ reserved

Appeal Due: 11/20/2025

Certificate of Service

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To: [ ] Alien | [ ] Alien c/o custodial officer | [E] Alien atty/rep. | [E] DHS

Respondent Name : JANDRES-ORDONEZ, JESUS EDUARDO | A-Number : [redacted]

Riders:

Date: 10/21/2025 By: HERNANDEZ, VICTORIA, Court Staff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Javier A. Garcia, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Injunctive Relief", including all attachments, will be served on Defendants via US Postal Service Certified mail addressed as follows:

Pamela Bondi
Attorney General
US Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Kristi Noem
Secretary
US Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Joshua Johnson
Field Office Director
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Dallas District Office
8101 N. Stemmons Frwy
Dallas, TX 75247

Nancy Larson
US Attorney
1100 Commerce Street, Third Floor
Dallas, TX 75242-1699

On this the 30 day of October 2025.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Javier A. Garcia

Javier A. Garcia
Rushton Hoffman and Associates, PLLC
Attorneys for Petitioner
Texas Bar No. 24025942
5909 West Loop S., Ste. 150
Bellaire, TX 77401
(713)838-8500
(713)838-9826 Fax