

C.F.R. § 1240.61(a)(4) and is eligible for Cancellation of Removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).

5. Petitioner cannot be subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), including because Petitioner does not meet the criteria for Expedited Removal. *See Make the Road New York v. Noem*, No. 25-190, 2025 WL 2494908, at *23 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025).
6. Petitioner cannot be subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), including because, as a person already present in the United States, Petitioner is not presently “seeking admission” to the United States. *See Aguiriano v. Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631, 2025 WL 2403827, at *1, 8-13 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025).
7. On information and belief, Petitioner was not, at the time of arrest, paroled into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and therefore Petitioner could not “be returned” under that provision to mandatory custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) or any other form of custody. Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225 for this reason as well.
8. Instead, as a person arrested inside the United States and held in civil immigration detention, Petitioner is subject to detention, if at all, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. *See Aguiriano*, 2025 WL 2403827, at *1, 8-13 (collecting cases).
9. Petitioner is not lawfully subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), including because he has not been convicted of any crime that triggers such detention. *See Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 513-14, 531 (2003) (allowing mandatory detention under § 1226(c) for brief detention of persons convicted of certain crimes and who concede removability).

10. Accordingly, Petitioner is subject to detention, if at all, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
11. As a person detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Petitioner must, upon his request, receive a custody redetermination hearing (colloquially called a “bond hearing”) with strong procedural protections. *See Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons*, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021); *Doe v. Tompkins*, 11 F.4th 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2021); *Brito v. Garland*, 22 F.4th 240, 256-57 (1st Cir. 2021) (affirming class-wide declaratory judgment); 8 C.F.R. 236.1(d) & 1003.19(a)-(f).
12. Petitioner requests such a bond hearing.
13. However, on September 5, 2025, in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision which purports to require the Immigration Court to unlawfully deny a bond hearing to all persons such as Petitioner.¹¹
14. The responsible administrative agency has therefore predetermined that Petitioner will be denied a bond hearing.
15. Petitioner is being irreparably harmed by his ongoing unlawful detention. *See Aguiriano*, 2025 WL 2403827, at *6-8 (no exhaustion required because “[o]bviously, the loss of liberty is a . . . severe form of irreparable injury” (internal quotation marks omitted)); *Flores Powell v. Chadbourne*, 677 F. Supp. 2d 455, 463 (D. Mass. 2010) (declining to require administrative exhaustion, including because “[a] loss of liberty may be an

¹ The BIA’s reversal and newly revised interpretation of the statute are not entitled to any deference. *See Loper Bright Ent. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 412-13 (2024). *See also Elias Escobar v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 2823324, at *3 (D. Mass. October 3, 2025) (rejecting the BIA’s reasoning in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* because, in part, “the decision is inconsistent with other BIA decisions and with decades of the Department of Homeland Security’s practice”; *Choglo Chafra v. Scott*, 2025 WL 2688541, at *7-8 (D. Me. Sept. 22, 2025) (same).

irreparable harm”); *cf. Brito v. Garland*, 22 F.4th 240, 256 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing *Bois v. Marsh*, 801 F.2d 462, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1986), for proposition that “[e]xhaustion might not be required if [the petitioner] were challenging her incarceration . . . or the ongoing deprivation of some other liberty interest”).

16. The Immigration Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutional claims raised by Petitioner, and any attempt to raise such claims would be futile. *See Flores-Powell*, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 463 (holding “exhaustion is excused by the BIA’s lack of authority to adjudicate constitutional questions and its prior interpretation” of the relevant statute).
17. There is no statutory requirement for Petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies. *See Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 25-11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *4 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) (“[E]xhaustion is not required by statute in this context.”).
18. Accordingly, there is no requirement for Petitioner to further exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing this Petition. *See Portela-Gonzalez v. Sec’y of the Navy*, 109 F.3d 74, (1st Cir. 1997) (explaining that, where statutory exhaustion is not required, administrative exhaustion not required in situations of irreparable harm, futility, or predetermined outcome).
19. Based on these well-established principles, this court has specifically rejected the argument that exhaustion is required in a detained noncitizen’s challenge to the BIA’s decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, supra:

a court may hear unexhausted claims in circumstances in which the interests of the individual weigh heavily against requiring administrative exhaustion.” *Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne*, 677 F.Supp.2d 455,463 (D. Mass. 2010) (cleaned up). Such a circumstance “exists when substantial doubt exists about whether the agency is empowered to grant meaningful redress” as well as “when the potential decisionmaker ... can be shown to have predetermined the issue” *Id.*

Inlago Tocagon v. Moniz, 2025 WL 2778023 (Sept. 29 2025), at *2.

20. Accordingly, to vindicate Petitioner's constitutional rights, this Court should grant the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

21. Petitioner asks this Court to find that he was unlawfully detained and order his release.

JURISDICTION

22. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question).

23. Venue is proper because Jose is currently detained in the state of Rhode Island.

PARTIES

24. The Petitioner, Martir Andres Callejas, is a 39-year-old young man who lived with his United States citizen mother in New Jersey before his detention by the Defendants. He is eligible for his eligibility for Legal Permanent Resident status as a NACARA derivative based on his mother's approved NACARA and is eligible for Cancellation of Removal pursuant to

25. Respondent Patricia Hyde is the New England Field Office Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

26. Respondent Michael Krol is the New England Special Agent in Charge for Homeland Security Investigations for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

27. Respondent Todd Lyons is the Acting Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

28. Respondent Kristi Noem is the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security.

29. All respondents are named in their official capacities.

30. Petitioner is a El Salvadoran national who was detained by ICE while driving his vehicle.

He has no criminal history and suffers from liver problems.

31. On information and belief, Petitioner is currently in custody in the State of Rhode Island, and one or more of the Respondents is his immediate custodian.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process

32. On information and belief, Petitioner is currently being arrested and detained by federal agents without cause and in violation of his constitutional rights to due process of law.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the following:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the State of Rhode Island;
- (3) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days.
- (4) Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
- (5) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner immediately.
- (6) Grant any further relief this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Counsel for Petitioner

Hans Bremer

Dated: October 28, 2025

Hans J. Bremer, Esq.

RI Bar No.: 8063

Bremer Law & Associates, LLC

717 Allens Avenue, Suite 105

Providence, RI 02905

(401) 621-4000

hans.j.bremer@bremerlawllc.com

Counsel for Petitioner

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY **Warrant for Arrest of Alien**

File No. _____

Date: 08/27/2025

To: Any immigration officer authorized pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and part 287 of title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, to serve warrants of arrest for immigration violations

I have determined that there is probable cause to believe that CALLEJAS, MARTIR is removable from the United States. This determination is based upon:

- the execution of a charging document to initiate removal proceedings against the subject;
- the pendency of ongoing removal proceedings against the subject;
- the failure to establish admissibility subsequent to deferred inspection;
- biometric confirmation of the subject's identity and a records check of federal databases that affirmatively indicate, by themselves or in addition to other reliable information, that the subject either lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law; and/or
- statements made voluntarily by the subject to an immigration officer and/or other reliable evidence that affirmatively indicate the subject either lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to arrest and take into custody for removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the above-named alien. **R. Piepiora**

Digitally signed by R.
Piepiora 8169
Date: 2025.08.27
12:02:20 -04'00'

8169

(Signature of Authorized Immigration Officer)

R 8169 PIEPIORA - SDDO

(Printed Name and Title of Authorized Immigration Officer)

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that the Warrant for Arrest of Alien was served by me at BURLINGTON, MA
(Location)
on CALLEJAS, MARTIR on August 27, 2025, and the contents of this
(Name of Alien) (Date of Service)

notice were read to him or her in the SPANISH language.
(Language)

C. 9928 MANNING

Deportation Officer

Name and Signature of Officer

LIONBRIDGE

Name or Number of Interpreter (if applicable)