

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
ABILENE DIVISION

JUANA HIGAREDA-CANO,

PETITIONER,

v.

KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; Todd Lyons, Acting Director
of ICE; Pamela BONDI, U.S. Attorney
General; Joshua Johnson, Acting Field
Office Director of Enforcement and
Removal Operations, Dallas Field Office,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Marcello Villegas, Warden of ERO
Bluebonnet Detention Facility

RESPONDENTS.

Civil Case No. 1:25-cv-225-H

**PETITIONER'S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

Petitioner, Juana Higareda-Cano, by and through undersigned counsel, files this emergency motion for a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") and/or a Preliminary Injunction. Petitioner seeks an immediate order compelling Respondents to release him from the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). Furthermore, Ms. Higareda Cano who was originally detained by ICE on September. She is now detained at the ERO Bluebonnet Detention Facility. Separated from her family and deprived of the

bond hearing the Immigration & Nationality Act, U.S. constitution, and decades of agency practice, leave no doubt he is entitled to.

Ms. Higareda Cano, however, has not been and will not be provided with the bond hearing required by 8 U.S.C. § 1226 as DHS in conjunction with Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR)¹ (collectively “the government”) recently announced they would be following a new novel interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Specifically, the government’s new novel interpretation subjects every noncitizen who entered the U.S. without inspection to mandatory detention without the statutorily required bond hearing before a neutral IJ. As a result, NAME is currently being unlawfully detained by ICE.

In recent weeks, district courts across the Country, including in the Western District of Texas, have been rejecting the government’s novel (unsupported) interpretation of the § 1225(b)(2)(A), granting the habeas petitions of individuals similarly situated to NAME, and ordering ICE to either immediately release the petitioner or promptly provide a bond hearing before a neutral IJ.² NAME respectfully requests that this Court join the rapidly

¹ The term EOIR or immigration courts are used interchangeably throughout this motion to refer to the agency vested with the responsibility of presiding over bond hearings, removal hearings, and appeals under the INA.

² See e.g., *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025); *Lopez Santos v. Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-01193, 2025 WL 2642278, at *5 (W.D. La. Sept. 11, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 25-cv-1093, 2025 WL 2472136, at *3 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Chafila v. Scott*, et. al., No. 2:25-CV-00437-SDN, 2025 WL 2688541, at *5–6 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2025) (citing *Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-06924, 2025 WL 2637503 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025); *Jimenez v. FCI Berlin, Warden*, No. 25-cv-00326, ECF No. 16 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025); *Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299; *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937, 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157, 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *R&R adopted sub nom. Rocha Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV-25-02157, 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Rodriguez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *Francisco T. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-03219, 2025 WL 2629839 (D. Minn. Aug. 29, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 25-CV-3142, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-CV-12486, 2025 WL

growing list of courts finding such detention unlawful and expeditiously ordering the government to remedy it.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Juana Higareda-Cano, is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection on or about May 1994 near El Paso, Texas. She has lived continuously in the country for approximately 31 years without departure.

She maintains a fixed and stable residence at [REDACTED] Dallas, Texas 75217, where she resided continuously prior to her apprehension by ICE. On September 12, 2025, ICE agents conducted a raid at Petitioner's home in search of her ex-partner, Rene Aguilar Tenorio, the father of her children, who has not lived at the residence for over 13 years. Petitioner's past relationship with Rene provides no lawful basis for her arrest. Despite this, ICE took Petitioner into custody without a judicial warrant, rendering her detention arbitrary and in violation of her constitutional rights.

Following her arrest, Ms. Higareda-Cano was transferred to the Bluebonnet Detention Facility. On September 15, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her.

Over the past three decades, Ms. Higareda-Cano has become deeply rooted in her community, forging strong family, social, and professional ties. Her immediate family includes two U.S. citizen children and two Lawful Permanent Resident parents, all of

2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); and *Diaz Diaz v. Mattivelo*, No. 1:25-CV-12226, 2025 WL 2457610 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2025).

whom rely on her for emotional and practical support. Beyond her family, Ms. Higareda-Cano has cultivated a network of friends and community members who would provide steadfast assistance and guidance upon her release. These long-standing connections underscore her stability, reliability, and integral role within her community.

Throughout her time in the United States, she has built a life marked by hard work, integrity, and service. She is a successful professional currently employed as a Sales Representative and has earned a promotion to Regional Sales Manager. Ms. Higareda-Cano further demonstrated her dedication to the community by obtaining an Evangelism Certificate from the Catholic Church and becoming a Licensed Practitioner of Neuro-Linguistic Programming, through which she provides support to individuals struggling with mental health challenges.

In Ms. Higareda-Cano's bond request to the Executive Office for Immigration Review, filed on October 24, 2025, seven letters were submitted on her behalf, each attesting to her good moral character, integrity, and compassion. To date, the Executive Office of EOIR has not yet considered her request. Additionally, a letter from her mother, Maria A. Higareda, describes Ms. Higareda-Cano's vital role in accompanying her to medical appointments and caring for her father during his ongoing medical crisis. Similarly, Ms. Higareda Cano's daughter, K  details how her mother provided emotional and financial support that helped her overcome an abusive marriage. In sum, Ms. Higareda-Cano has demonstrated exemplary moral character, a strong work ethic, and deep compassion for others. She has no criminal history and poses neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk.

Ms. Higareda Cano is eligible for adjustment of status under INA § 245(i). Her U.S. citizen sister, Socorro H. Saldivar, filed a petition for her around April 2001, which was approved on June 22, 2005. In addition, Ms. Higareda-Cano's U.S. citizen daughter filed a petition on September 15, 2025. Termination of these proceedings would permit Petitioner to pursue adjustment of status through a Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, before U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). USCIS policy allows for the concurrent adjudication of the I-130 petition and the I-485 application if Ms. Higareda-Cano is released from detention and proceedings are terminated.

In the alternative, Ms. Higareda-Cano is eligible for Cancellation of Removal under INA § 240A(b) (EOIR-42B), as her removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her Lawful Permanent Resident parents.

After detaining Ms. Higareda-Cano, ICE did not set a bond. Instead of providing her the bond hearing she is entitled to under the law, she remains detained without the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. And this was done even though, Ms. Higareda Cano, like many other noncitizens being detained without a bond hearing right now, has no criminal convictions or civil judgments against her in the United States or her native Mexico.

Because Ms. Higareda-Cano is being detained in ICE custody without being afforded the bond hearing required under the law, she seeks this Court's urgent intervention.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until the court makes a final decision on injunctive relief.³ To obtain a TRO, an applicant must establish four elements: (1) substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) substantial threat of irreparable harm; (3) the threatened injury outweighs any harm the order might cause the defendant; and (4) the injunction will not disserve the public interest.⁴

I. Ms. Higareda-Cano Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of her Claims.

A. Ms. Higareda-Cano is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of her Claim that Her Detention Without a Bond Hearing Based on Nothing More than Being EWI is Unconstitutional and Unlawful.

Ms. Higareda-Cano is substantially likely to succeed on the merits of her claims because her detention is unlawful under both the INA and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Respondents' new, radical interpretation of the INA—which subjects all noncitizens who entered without inspection (“EWI”) to mandatory detention—reverses nearly three decades of consistent agency practice, defies multiple canons of statutory construction, and violates the Constitution. This novel theory, recently rubber-stamped by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in *Matter of Hurtado*, 29 I & N Dec. 216 (BIA Sept. 5, 2025), is a thinly veiled attempt to achieve through executive fiat what Congress has not authorized: the categorical denial of bond hearings to a class of noncitizens long

³ *Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. Of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Loc. No. 70 of Alameda Cnty.*, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974).

⁴ *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see *Enrique Bernat F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc.*, 210 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2000).

understood to be eligible for them. As numerous federal district courts have already concluded, this position is legally indefensible.

i. Her Detention Violates Due Process.

Noncitizens are entitled to due process of the law under the Fifth Amendment.⁵ To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee's due process rights, courts apply the three-part test set forth in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Pursuant to *Mathews*, courts weight the following factors:

(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action;

(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and

(3) the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.⁶

Ms. Higareda-Cano addresses the *Mathews* factors in turn.

Private interest. It is undisputed Ms. Higareda-Cano has a significant private interest in being free from detention. "The interest in being free from physical detention" is "the most elemental of liberty interests."⁷ Moreover, when assessing the private interest,

⁵ *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003).

⁶ *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335.

⁷ *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).

courts consider the detainee's conditions of confinement, Ms. Higareda Cano, "whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration."⁸

Ms. Higareda-Cano has not only been held in ICE detention without a bond hearing or the possibility of obtaining one for weeks, she was also moved 214 of miles across the state of Texas in ICE's custody. As in *Günaydin*, "he is experiencing all the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement."⁹ The first *Matthews* factor supports Ms. Higareda-Cano's claim of a Fifth Amendment violation.

Risk of erroneous deprivation. Under this factor, courts must "assess whether the challenged procedure creates a risk of erroneous deprivation of individuals' private rights and the degree to which alternative procedures could ameliorate these risks."¹⁰ The government's new position claiming any noncitizen present in the U.S. without having been inspected by an immigration officer (colloquially referred to as "EWI") is subject to mandatory detention without a bond hearing is the sole reason she has been and continues to be unlawfully detained. Notably, the government's new position contradicts nearly three decades of consistent agency action holding bond hearings and setting bond for noncitizens who are EWI. Significantly, a bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator in accordance with

⁸ *Günaydin v. Trump*, No. 25-cv-01151 (JMB/DLM), 2025 WL 1459154, at *7 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (citing *Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons*, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021); *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)).

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Id.* at *8.

§ 1226(a), like the ones that took place for decades prior to July 2025, is exactly the place for any claimed interest the government has in detaining Petitioner (e.g. assuring appearance at hearings and public safety) to be heard and ultimately ruled on by a neutral adjudicator. This *Matthews* factor weighs in favor of Ms. Higareda-Cano, too.

Respondents' competing interests. Under this factor, the court weighs the private interests at stake and the risk of erroneous deprivation of those interests against Respondents' interests.¹¹ Petitioner does not dispute that the government and the public have a strong interest in the enforcement of the immigration laws. Ironically, it is Petitioner who is asking the Court to enforce such laws as the currently exist; meanwhile, the government is asking everyone to ignore multiple provisions of the INA. Ms. Higareda-Cano is not a flight risk nor a danger to the community. Nor is Ms. Higareda-Cano described in any of the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 which would subject him to mandatory detention without the right to a bond hearing before an IJ. Accordingly, the government's interest in upholding the Constitution and immigration laws is fulfilled through the relief sought by Ms. Higareda-Cano's habeas petition.

Because all three *Matthews* factors favor Ms. Higareda-Cano's position, this Court should determine that Ms. Higareda-Cano is likely to succeed in demonstrating that her detention without a bond hearing based on nothing more than being EWI contravenes her due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.¹²

¹¹ *Matthews*, 424 U.S. at 335.

¹² See *Martinez v. Secretary of Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01007-JKP, 2025 WL 2598379, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2025).

ii. Her Detention Violates the Relevant Statutes.

The government's detention of Petitioner without a bond hearing, based on its new interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(A), is contrary to the INA's plain text, its clear structural divisions, and its recent legislative amendments. Indeed, as several district courts have already pointed out:

the government's "interpretation of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and practice.¹³

Furthermore, the statutory scheme, read as a coherent whole, demonstrates that Petitioner's detention is governed by the discretionary framework of 8 U.S.C. 1226, which mandates the very bond hearing he has been denied.

First, the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens like Petitioner who were apprehended in the interior of the United States years after their entry. As a growing number of courts have found, the statute mandates detention only for

¹³ *Lepe v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); *see also*, *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25-Civ-5937, 2025 WL 2267803 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2025); *Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, — F.Supp.3d —, —, 2025 WL 2084238, at *9 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-cv-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486, — F.Supp.3d —, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE, Doc. 20 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Doc. 11, *Benitez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-02190 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, — F.Supp.3d —, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW, 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Aguilar Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-3142, — F.Supp.3d —, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Dos Santos v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-12052-JEK, 2025 WL 2370988 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025); *Rocha Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157, 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted* 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); Doc. 11, *Maldonado Bautista v. Santaacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01874-SSS-BFM, *13 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2025).

an individual who is (1) an “applicant for admission,” (2) is “*seeking admission*,” and (3) is determined by an examining officer to be “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”¹⁴ The government’s new interpretation, formalized and perceived as binding on IJs by the BIA’s decision in *Matter of Hurtado* issued on September 5, 2025, conveniently ignores the second, critical element: that the person must be actively “seeking admission.” A noncitizen who entered years ago and has since resided in the United States is not, by any plain sense meaning of the term, “seeking admission” when apprehended by interior enforcement officers. The statute’s use of the present progressive tense—“seeking”—unambiguously limits its application to the context of an arrival at a port of entry or the border, not to an arrest occurring long after the act of entry is complete.¹⁵

By reading the phrase “seeking admission” out of the statute, the government violates the foundational interpretive canon against surplusage, which requires that courts “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”¹⁶ This textual distinction reflects the INA’s broader structure, which carefully distinguishes between two different contexts of enforcement. Section 1225, titled “Inspection by immigration officers;

¹⁴ 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see also* *Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *2 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (affirming these “several conditions must be met” for a noncitizen to be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)).

¹⁵ *See* *Martinez v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing the use of present and present progressive tense to support conclusion that INA § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to individuals apprehended in the interior); *accord* *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025). *See also* *United States v. Wilson*, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (“Congress’ use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes.”); *Al Otro Lado v. McAleenan*, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (construing “is arriving” in 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1225 (1)(A)(i) and observing that “[t]he use of the present progressive, like use of the present participle, denotes an ongoing process”).

¹⁶ *Corley v. United States*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (U.S. 2009).

expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearings,” governs the process of inspection and admission at the border.¹⁷ In contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, titled “Apprehension and detention of aliens,” governs the arrest and detention of noncitizens already present within the United States.¹⁸ Petitioner, having been arrested in the interior decades after her entry, falls squarely within the purview of § 1226, and therefore, her detention is subject to the discretionary bond provisions of this statute.

Second, as numerous courts have repeatedly recognized in recent weeks, the government’s new interpretation of the detention provisions renders the recently enacted Laken Riley Act (“LRA”) entirely superfluous and devoid of any meaning whatsoever.¹⁹ In January 2025, Congress passed the LRA for the purpose of making noncitizens who are present in the U.S. without being admitted or inspected by an Immigration Office.²⁰ The LRA specifically targets for mandatory detention a narrow class of noncitizens who meet two distinct criteria: (1) a *status* requirement (being inadmissible as EWI, and thus an “applicant for admission” under), and (2) a *conduct* requirement (having been charged

¹⁷ See *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (recognizing that “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens *seeking admission into the country* under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) ... [and] to detain certain aliens *already in the country* pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c)”) (emphasis added).

¹⁸ *Id.* see also *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this country for . . . years.”).

¹⁹ See e.g., *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *6–7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (“The BIA also argued that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not render superfluous the Laken Riley Act. . . . But. . . considering both §§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(c)(1)(E) mandate detention for inadmissible citizens, whether one includes additional conditions for such detention does not alter the redundant impact.”).

²⁰ Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

with, arrested for, or convicted of specific offenses like burglary or theft).²¹ The very structure of this amendment is dispositive. By creating a new category of mandatory detention for EWI noncitizens *with* certain criminal histories, Congress legislated against the clear backdrop of the existing legal landscape—a landscape where EWI status *alone* was insufficient to trigger mandatory detention.

If the government’s new theory were correct, and all EWI noncitizens were already subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), then the LRA would accomplish nothing. It would be a meaningless legislative act. The canon against surplusage forbids such a conclusion. The LRA is powerful evidence that Congress understood and implicitly ratified the decades-long practice of affording bond hearings to EWI noncitizens who lacked the disqualifying criminal histories enumerated in 1226(c) or were among those described in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) such as arriving aliens (a discrete subset of “applicants for admission”).

The Executive Branch’s subsequent policy reversal is not merely a novel interpretation; it is an attempt to rewrite the statute and override a recent, specific legislative judgment, raising profound separation of powers concerns. Moreover, the BIA’s new interpretation, makes a liar out of the president who touted the LRA as a necessary piece of legislation that would “save countless innocent American lives” when he signed into law.²² After all, if the LRA did absolutely nothing because, as DHS and EOIR suddenly

²¹ 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).

²² <https://www.npr.org/2025/01/29/g-s1-45275/trump-laken-riley-act>

claim, every noncitizen covered by the LRA's amendments was already subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Third, the INA's implementing regulations and broader statutory framework confirm that Immigration Judges ("IJs") retain jurisdiction to grant bond to noncitizens in Petitioner's circumstances.²³ Among other things, the regulations create a specific jurisdictional bar preventing IJs from conducting bond hearings for "arriving aliens" under 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B). An "arriving alien" is defined as an "applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry."²⁴ By explicitly carving out this specific subset of "applicants for admission," the regulations create a powerful negative inference: IJs *do* have jurisdiction over "applicants for admission" who are not "arriving aliens," a category that includes Petitioner. Again, if all "applicants for admission" were already subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), this carefully drawn regulatory distinction would be entirely pointless.

Furthermore, the INA's distinct grants of arrest authority reinforce this conclusion. Sections 1225 and 1357(a)(2) authorize warrantless arrests at or near the border for those "entering or attempting to enter" the U.S. In contrast, both § 1226(a) and 1357(a) provide

²³ *Vazquez v. Feeley*, No. 2:25-CV-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *3–6 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) ("The EOIR's regulations drafted following the enactment of the IIRIRA explained this distinction.") (citing Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) ("Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection).

²⁴ 8 C.F.R. § 1.2.

the authority for warrant-based arrests for interior enforcement and arrests of noncitizens already present in the U.S.

Here, Petitioner was arrested in the interior far from the land border and years after her entry. Accordingly, her arrest was governed by the authority provided in §1226(a). Likewise, her continued detention is governed by the same statute that authorized her arrest: § 1226 which entitles her to a bond hearing before a neutral IJ. Accordingly, Respondents refusal to provide this statutorily required bond hearing based on its new (unsupported) interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Here, Ms. Higareda-Cano is likely to succeed on her claim that her detention without a bond hearing violates the INA for all the reasons discussed above. The likelihood of success tips even further in her favor given that it is her position—not the government’s—that numerous district courts have agreed with when granting habeas petitions in recent weeks on this exact issue—including courts within the Fifth Circuit.²⁵

II. Ms. Higareda-Cano Faces Immediate and Irreparable Harm.

A movant “must show a real and immediate threat of future or continuing injury apart from any past injury.”²⁶ Continued unlawful detention is, by its very nature, an irreparable injury. The Supreme Court has affirmed that “[f]reedom from imprisonment . .

²⁵ See e.g., *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025); *Lopez Santos v. Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-01193, 2025 WL 2642278, at *5 (W.D. La. Sept. 11, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 25-cv-1093, 2025 WL 2472136, at *3 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Chafila v. Scott, et. al.*, No. 2:25-CV-00437-SDN, 2025 WL 2688541, at *5–6 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2025) (citing *Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-06924, 2025 WL 2637503 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025); *Jimenez v. FCI Berlin, Warden*, No. 25-cv-00326, ECF No. 16 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025); *Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025).

²⁶ *Aransas Project v. Shaw*, 775 F.3d 641, 648 (5th Cir. 2014).

lies at the heart of the liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause.²⁷ Each day Ms. Higareda-Cano remains in custody, she is irreparably harmed by the loss of her fundamental liberty. Moreover, Petitioner’s detention at a remote facility, located miles from major cities in Texas and offering severely limited visiting hours, imposes an undue burden on her family’s ability to maintain contact. Her elderly parents, who have significant medical conditions, are unable to visit her, and other family members are effectively prevented from in-person visits due to the prohibitive costs of travel and lodging.

The harm is not merely abstract. Ms. Higareda-Cano has already been subjected to the being transported across the country in ICE custody—and all the humiliating and degrading things that go along with being transported while in custody (cuffs, chains, and repeated strip searches) Absent relief from this Court, Ms. Higareda-Cano will remain detained and potentially moved again, in what is becoming an increasingly long removal proceeding process, and as a result, denied her liberty, removed from her livelihood and freedom, and removed from what had previously been a community where her belongs.

III. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Weighs in Ms. Higareda-Cano’s Favor.

The final two factors for a preliminary injunction—the balance of hardships and public interest—“merge when the Government is the opposing party.”²⁸ Here, the balance of hardships weighs overwhelmingly in Ms. Higareda-Cano’s favor. The injury to Ms. Higareda-Cano —unconstitutional detention and risk to her well-being—is severe and

²⁷ *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

²⁸ *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).

immediate. Moreover, it is always in the public interest to prevent violations of the U.S. Constitution and ensure the rule of law.²⁹

Conversely, the harm to Respondents is nonexistent. Ms. Higareda-Cano is not among those Congress proscribed for mandatory detention. Nor is Ms. Higareda-Cano a danger to the community or a flight risk. Moreover, to the extent the government disagrees with any of these statements, it has the same recourse it has had for decades: making those arguments to a neutral adjudicator during a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226. Surely, Respondents cannot claim any, much less substantial, harm would be caused by affording Ms. Higareda-Cano a bond hearing, just as it has to similarly situated noncitizens for decades in accordance with the INA's statutory scheme.³⁰ Furthermore, the public interest is served by preserving "life, liberty, and happiness" and by preventing the waste of taxpayer resources on unlawful and unnecessary detention.

IV. Ms. Higareda-Cano Seeks the Same Injunctive Relief Being Granted to Nearly Every Similarly Situated Habeas Petitioner.

Ms. Higareda-Cano seeks injunctive relief to maintain the status quo by requiring ICE to either immediately release her or promptly provide her with a bond hearing before a neutral IJ. As stated above (repeatedly), the list of district courts that have recently concluded the government's new position is plainly incorrect is a long one that is growing by the day.

²⁹ *Id.* at 436 (describing public interest in preventing noncitizens "from being wrongfully removed, particularly to countries where they are likely to face substantial harm"); *see also Rosa v. McAleenan*, 583 F. Supp. 3d 840 (S.D. Tex. 2019).

³⁰ *See Martinez*, 2025 WL 2598379, at *5.

While courts have been fairly unanimous in this finding and granting relief, the specific remedy has varied slightly.³¹ For example, “[s]ome courts have determined that the appropriate relief for an immigration detainee held in violation of due process is the petitioner’s immediate release from custody.”³² Alternatively, “[m]any courts in recent days order[ed] a bond hearing, at which the Government bears the burden of justifying the immigration habeas petitioner’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.”³³ These remedies preserve rather than alter the status quo.³⁴ The status quo ante litem is “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” For nearly thirty years, bond hearings before a neutral IJ were the status quo for noncitizens who were EWI and not described in § 1226(c) or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h). This was the status quo, of course, because it is precisely what is required by the INA’s statutory scheme. Injunctive relief is, therefore, appropriate in NAME’s case.

CONCLUSION

³¹ See *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025) (discussing the various forms of relief ordered by courts granting habeas relief in similar cases).

³² *Id.* (citing *M.S.L. v. Bostock*, No. 6:25-CV-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *15 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025)).

³³ *Id.* (citing *Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos*, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729, at *9 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); *Morgan v. Oddo*, No. 24-cv-221, 2025 WL 2653707, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2025); *J.M.P. v. Arteta*, No. 25-cv-4987, 2025 WL 2614688, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2025); *Espinoza*, 2025 WL 2581185, at *14; and *Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar*, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2280357, at *12 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2025)).

³⁴ *Nguyen v. Scott*, 2025 WL 2419288, at *10 (W.D. Wa. Aug. 21, 2025) (citing *Phong Phan v. Moises Beccerra*, No. 2:25-cv-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993735, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); *Pinchi v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-05632-RMI-RML, 2025 WL 1853763, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2024) (finding the “moment prior to the Petitioner’s likely illegal detention” was the status quo).

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Ms. Higareda-Cano respectfully requests that the Court immediately grant his petition and this motion and issue a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction ordering his immediate release from ICE custody, or in the alternative a prompt bond hearing at which the government bears the burden of demonstrating flight or safety risk by clear and convincing evidence.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

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