

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

FELIPE VASQUEZ AVILA,
Petitioner,

v.

KRISTI NOEM,
Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.,
Respondents.

Civil No. 5:25-cv-01363-FB-ESC

**PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
MOTION TO SET HEARING, AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM**

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE CHESTNEY:

Petitioner–Plaintiff FELIPE VASQUEZ AVILA (“Mr. Vasquez”) respectfully moves this Court to consider the instant Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) based on the reasons included her Application for a Preliminary Injunction (the “Application”), filed contemporaneously with his Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on October 22, 2025 (ECF No. 1). For the reasons that follow, Petitioner also asks that that Court hold a hearing on this matter, be it telephonically or in person, so that the parties may address the factual and legal context of Mr. Vasquez’s TRO.

In accordance with the instructions Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(3) and Local Civil Rule 7.1(g), Mr. Vasquez requests that the Court set the Application for oral argument at the earliest practicable time—ideally within forty-eight (48) hours—given the urgency of the issues presented.

Immediate judicial consideration is necessary because Mr. Vasquez faces ongoing, irreparable harm: he is presently in civil immigration custody at the South Texas Detention Center in Pearsall, Texas, and he is being denied an immigration bond hearing in violation of law, specifically, Section 236(a) of the INA [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)]. The plain language of Section 236(a) explicitly provides that “the Attorney General (1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and (2) may release the alien on . . . bond of at least \$1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or . . . conditional parole . . .” unless they are subject to the mandatory detention provisions of Section 236(c). Despite the clear language of this section, current BIA policy limits the immigration courts from entertaining such bond requests, contrary to law. This means that noncitizens like Mr. Vasquez, who have lived in the United States for years, are ineligible to apply for an immigration bond with the immigration court as a practical matter, regardless of the statute’s guarantee of an immigration bond hearing to such persons.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3), the Court must set a hearing on a request for injunctive relief “at the earliest possible time,” and the Supreme Court has emphasized that a TRO is a short-term measure designed only to preserve the status quo until a full hearing can be held. *See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters*, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). Consistent with that mandate, courts in this Circuit set such matters swiftly where irreparable harm is imminent in order to “preserve the district court’s power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits.” *Canal Auth. of Fla. v. Callaway*, 489 F.2d 567, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1974).

Counsel for Mr. Vasquez has conferred via email today with Ms. Ann Cruce-Haag, the Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned to represent Respondents in this case. As of the filing

of this motion, government counsel has not indicated whether the government opposes the request for an expedited hearing. Given the exigent circumstances, Mr. Vasquez respectfully requests that the Court waive any further conference requirement under Local Rule 7.1.

Mr. Vasquez is prepared to present argument and evidence by in-person appearance or, if the Court prefers, by videoconference. Should the Court require live testimony, Petitioner requests that Respondents be directed to produce Mr. Vasquez at the hearing.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. Statutory and Regulatory Authority Confirms Bond Eligibility.

Congress expressly authorized release on bond during removal proceedings. INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), provides:

“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) [mandatory detention], the Attorney General—(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and (2) may release the alien on—(A) bond ... or (B) conditional parole.”

The implementing regulation is equally clear: “Custody and bond determinations made by the Department of Homeland Security ... may be reviewed by an Immigration Judge.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(a). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1) (permitting requests for IJ bond redetermination).

Thus, as a matter of plain statutory and regulatory text, individuals like Mr. Vasquez who are detained pending § 240 removal proceedings under § 1226(a) are legally entitled to request a bond from an immigration judge.

B. The Supreme Court Recognizes § 1226(a) as the Discretionary Bond Scheme.

The Supreme Court has squarely acknowledged that § 1226(a) creates a discretionary detention framework with bond authority, unlike the mandatory detention provisions of § 1226(c) or § 1225(b). In *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289–90 (2018), the Court explained that under § 1226(a), “the Attorney General may release the alien on bond” and that custody is therefore subject to individualized bond determinations.

Yet, the BIA’s decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which reclassified long-term EWI respondents as § 1225(b) “applicants for admission” and thereby stripped IJs of bond jurisdiction, cannot be reconciled with the statutory structure recognized in *Jennings*. This Court is not bound to defer to an administrative interpretation that conflicts with the statute’s text and with Supreme Court precedent.

C. Intra-Circuit Precedent Affirms Jurisdiction to Review Bond Determinations.

In recent months, numerous federal district courts within the Fifth Circuit have consistently recognized that individuals detained under § 1226(a) are bond-eligible. For example, in *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-1093, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167280 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025), the court granted a TRO ordering an individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a) where DHS had improperly asserted mandatory detention under § 1225(b). The court rejected the government’s position as inconsistent with the statutory framework and the detainee’s constitutional rights.

Likewise, in *Maldonado v. Macias*, 150 F. Supp. 3d 788 (W.D. Tex. 2015), the court carefully distinguished between detainees held under § 1225(b), who must rely solely on discretionary parole, and those detained under § 1226(a), who are entitled to seek bond before an IJ. *Id.* at 794–98. *Maldonado* emphasized that the absence of IJ review is

precisely what makes § 1225(b) detention more constitutionally suspect — by contrast, § 1226(a) detainees have a recognized bond process.

Earlier, in *Kambo v. Poppell*, No. SA-07-CV-800-XR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77857, at *14–*18 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2007), the court explained that § 1226(a) governs discretionary detention and recognized the immigration judge’s authority to adjudicate bond requests in that context. However, the Kambo court also concluded that nothing in Section 1226 or Section 1252 precluded the court from exercising jurisdiction over the habeas petition, though the court observed that it lacked “jurisdiction to review the decision to deny release on bond itself or the Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of Section 1226(a)” *Id.* at 35.

More recently, multiple federal district courts in Texas, and in other circuits, have echoed this reasoning. *See Fuentes v. Lyons*, No. 5:25-cv-00153, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025). Indeed, as almost every district court that has taken up this issue has concluded, including courts in this district, “the statutory text, the statute’s history, Congressional intent, and § 1226(a)’s application for the past three decades” clearly support the finding that § 1226 is the applicable statute, not § 1225. *See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 2886346, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025) (quoting *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) and citing *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025)); *Rodriguez*, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 & n.3 (collecting cases); *Belsai D.S. v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 2802947, at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025)).

“In recent weeks, courts across the country have held that this new, expansive interpretation of mandatory detention under the INA is either incorrect or likely incorrect.” *Lopez-Arevelo*, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7. Thus, the Court may grant habeas relief where

the government's attempted to circumvent that process. *See* App'x A, Recent Habeas Decisions from U.S. District Courts.

D. Persuasive Authorities from Other Circuits.

Moreover, federal courts across the country have long recognized that detention under § 1226(a) is distinct from mandatory detention under § 1225(b), and that the former scheme guarantees access to individualized bond determinations before an immigration judge. These decisions underscore the error in extending § 1225(b)'s no-bond regime to long-term residents like Mr. Vasquez.

Circuit courts outside the Fifth Circuit, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in *Rosales-Garcia v. Holland*, 322 F.3d 386, 412 (6th Cir. 2003), have also held that the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens raised the same constitutional concerns as did the indefinite detention of the removable resident aliens in *Zadvydas*. Essentially, *Rosales* supports the conclusion that the immigration judges have authority to consider bond requests under § 1226(a) where an inadmissible noncitizen, such as an arriving alien at the port of entry who is otherwise ineligible for bond, has reached the point of becoming seemingly indefinite.

For example, in *Prieto-Romero v. Clark*, 534 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the petitioner had not been denied due process precisely because he received a bond hearing under § 1226(a). The court explained that such a hearing "afforded him an individualized determination of the government's interest in his continued detention by a neutral decisionmaker." Similarly, in *Rodriguez v. Robbins* ("*Rodriguez IP*"), 804 F.3d 1060, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit held that detention under § 1225(b) cannot continue indefinitely; at six months, the statutory basis

for custody shifts to § 1226(a), which requires a bond hearing. That court noted that relying solely on discretionary parole was inadequate, as it left detainees vulnerable to errors and deprived them of neutral review.

Other circuits have reached similar conclusions. The Third Circuit in *Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec.*, 656 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2011), held that Congress did not intend to authorize “prolonged, unreasonable detention” without the safeguard of a bond hearing, emphasizing that due process requires an opportunity to test the necessity of continued custody. District courts around the country have also intervened in comparable cases. In *Cuello v. Adduci*, No. 10-13641, 2010 WL 4226688, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2010), the court granted habeas relief to a § 1226(a) detainee who had never received a bond hearing, holding that his continued detention without meaningful custody review violated due process

Taken together, these decisions reinforce two key points: first, that § 1226(a) detention is fundamentally tied to the availability of bond review before an immigration judge; and second, that the absence of such review has consistently been viewed by courts as constitutionally suspect. When considered alongside the plain text of § 1226(a) and the Supreme Court’s recognition in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), that § 1226(a) represents a discretionary bond framework, this body of case law demonstrates why the II’s reliance on *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* to deny jurisdiction was misplaced.

5. Application to Petitioner Reveals Statutory Eligibility to Request Bond.

Mr. Vasquez has lived in the United States since around 2004. He was placed into § 240 removal proceedings (*i.e.*, removal proceedings before the immigration court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a) and charged as removable due to being subject to a ground

of inadmissibility under INA §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) & 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) [8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) & 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)].

By the plain language of the applicable statute, Mr. Vasquez’s detention falls within § 1226(a), not § 1225(b). As a noncitizen who entered the United States without inspection, he is not properly classified as an “arriving alien” or applicant for admission—and indeed, he has now lived continuously in the United States for around twenty-one years. BIA precedent reflects that, prior to summer 2025, similarly situated noncitizens with a lengthy history in the United States had long been held eligible to apply for immigration bonds, including those deemed inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] for having entered the country without inspection. As such, Mr. Vasquez is entitled to seek release on bond before an immigration judge. *See, e.g.*, App’x B, Previous Bond Decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Accordingly, the immigration courts’ refusal to exercise jurisdiction, based on the BIA’s decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, is legally erroneous and contrary to the statutory scheme, the regulations, and both binding and persuasive judicial precedent.

CONCLUSION & PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner respectfully prays that the Court consider his Motion for a TRO and Application for Preliminary Injunction, enter an order setting a hearing on Petitioner’s requests for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction at the earliest practicable time, and grant any other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATE: October 31, 2025.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

By my signature below, I hereby certify that on this day, I served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing *Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Motion to Set Hearing, and Incorporated Memorandum*, as well as any and all attachments thereto, on Counsel for Respondents-Defendants by serving the same via email to Ms. Ann Cruce-Haag, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Texas, via Ann.Haag@usdoj.gov and/or by filing the same using the Court's CM/ECF system.

/s/ John M. Bray
John M. Bray
Attorney for Petitioner

DATE: October 31, 2025.