

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

DECHANG YANG,

Petitioner,

v.

THOMAS BERGAMI, et al.,

Respondent.

Civil Action No. 3:25-CV-02877-B-BT

**RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER**

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I. Introduction

Petitioner seeks a temporary restraining order and habeas relief to require his immediate release from immigration detention. *See* ECF 19, 20. As explained herein, Petitioner shows no entitlement to either a temporary restraining order or habeas relief, as he is not entitled to immediate release. The Court should deny the request for a temporary restraining order and habeas relief.

II. Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of China. App. p. 2. Petitioner entered the United States without admission or parole near Tecate, California in September 2023. *Id.* On September 19, 2023, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”). *Id.* The NTA charged him with being present in the United States without admission or parole under INA 212(a)(6)(A)(i). *Id.* That same day he was released on his own recognizance.

Petitioner has not filed a motion for bond with the Immigration Court. His initial detained master hearing was October 16, 2025, but was reset for October 30, 2025, due to not having a Mandarin interpreter and for attorney prep time. On October 30, 2025, a Mandarin interpreter was not available and counsel again desired prep time but emphasized a Foochow interpreter was needed. As a result, the master hearing has been reset for November 17, 2025, at 9:30 am. App. p. 8.

III. Argument and Authorities

The Court should deny Petitioner’s petition and request for a TRO, for the following reasons:

A. Petitioner has not exhausted administrative remedies.

The Supreme Court “long has acknowledged the general rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts.” *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 144–45 (1992). Exhaustion “serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.” *Id.* at 145. The rationale for administrative exhaustion applies equally in the context of seeking relief of denial of a bond hearing via a writ of habeas corpus, even though the statute does not mandate exhaustion for situations other than appeals for final orders of removal. *See id.* at 144 (explaining that “where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs”). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “a petitioner must exhaust available avenues of relief and turn to habeas only when no other means of judicial review exists.” *Lee v. Gonzalez*, 410 F.3d 778, 786 (5th Cir. 2005).

Here, Petitioner has not yet attempted to obtain bond from an Immigration Judge, and so any request at this time to order a bond hearing via a writ of habeas corpus is premature, at best. Subsequent developments may moot the issues Petitioner is complaining about in this proceeding or cause his cases to develop in other ways that obviate the need for any decision by this Court. For these reasons, exhaustion of administrative procedures is appropriate and should occur before the matters presented in Petitioner’s petition become the subject of federal litigation.

B. Petitioner is not entitled to any relief, because he is an applicant for admission who may properly be subjected to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 without any requirement for a bond hearing.

This case turns on which of two separate statutory detention provisions can apply to aliens like Petitioner: 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), or 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The provision at § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies specifically to any “applicant for admission”—and calls for mandatory detention. The provision at § 1226(a), on the other hand, is more general in nature and simply says that “an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States”—with the Attorney General then given the discretion to either continue to detain the alien or to release the alien on bond or conditional parole. Thus, the decision before this Court is who constitutes an “applicant for admission” who is potentially subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A) and its more restrictive mandatory detention provision.

1. Petitioner is considered an applicant for admission because he entered the United States without being inspected, admitted, or paroled.

The statutory text provides the Court with the answer. “As with any question of statutory interpretation, [the] analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.” *Jimenez v. Quarterman*, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009). Section 1225(a)(1) deems any “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters)” to be an “applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); *see also Ascencio-Rodriguez v. Holder*, 595 F.3d 105, 108 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that an alien who

“was present in the country and had been for years,” but “whose entry into the United States was not lawful or authorized” was “not considered ‘admitted’ into the United States,” and that such aliens are “treated as ‘applicants for admission’” and “deemed to be legally at the border”).

Accordingly, by its very definition, the term “applicant for admission” includes two categories of aliens: (1) arriving aliens, but also (2) aliens present without admission. *See DHS v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (explaining that “an alien who tries to enter the country illegally is treated as an ‘applicant for admission’”); *Matter of Lemus-Losa*, 25 I&N Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012) (“Congress has defined the concept of an ‘applicant for admission’ in an unconventional sense, to include not just those who are expressly seeking permission to enter, but also those who are present in this country without having formally requested or received such permission . . .”). Indeed, that “arriving aliens” are just one subset of the larger group of “applicants for admission” is made clear by the fact that “arriving alien” is defined as “an applicant for admission *coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry*”—thus making clear that there are other types of applicants for admission. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1001.1(q) (emphasis added).

All aliens who are applicants for admission “shall be inspected by immigration officers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a). An applicant for admission seeking admission at a port-of-entry “must present whatever documents are required and must establish to the satisfaction of the inspecting officer that the alien is not subject to removal . . . and is entitled, under all of the applicable provisions of the

immigration laws . . . to enter the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(1); *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (describing the related burden of an applicant for admission in removal proceedings). “An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled or an alien who seeks entry at other than an open, designated port-of-entry . . . is subject to the provisions of [§ 1182(a)] and to removal under [§ 1225(b)] or [§ 1229a].” 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(2).

Here, Petitioner entered the United States in an unlawful fashion and without having been admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. He is, therefore, an alien present without admission and, consequently, an applicant for admission.

2. Because Petitioner is an applicant for admission, he is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

Applicants for admission may be placed in expedited removal proceedings under § 1225 or, as has occurred here with respect to Petitioner, he may be placed in § 1229a removal proceedings (which are the more comprehensive form of removal proceedings that also generally apply to aliens other than applicants for admission who are charged with removability). But even if placed in § 1229a proceedings, applicants for admission may be subjected to mandatory detention under § 1225 such that they are ineligible for release on bond. Specifically, aliens present without admission placed in § 1229a removal proceedings are both applicants for admission as defined in § 1225(a)(1) *and* aliens “seeking admission,” as contemplated in § 1225(b)(2)(A). Such aliens are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and thus ineligible for release on bond.

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018); *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), (B). Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), “an alien who is an applicant for admission” “*shall be detained* for a proceeding under section 1229a” “if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

Thus, according to the plain language of § 1225(b)(2)(A), applicants for admission in § 1229a removal proceedings “*shall be detained.*” *Id.* (emphasis added). “The ‘strong presumption’ that the plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent is rebutted only in ‘rare and exceptional circumstances,’” *Ardestani v. INS*, 502 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1991) (quoting *Rubin v. United States*, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). And as the Supreme Court observed in *Jennings*, nothing in § 1225(b)(2) “says anything whatsoever about bond hearings.” 583 U.S. at 297. Further, there is no textual basis for arguing that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to arriving aliens—no provision within § 1225(b)(2) refers to “arriving aliens,” or limits that clause to arriving aliens, and Congress instead intended for it to apply generally “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Where Congress means for a rule to apply only to “arriving aliens,” it has used that specific term of art or similar phrasing. *See, e.g., id.* §§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), 1225(c)(1).

The BIA’s recently issued published decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), is consistent with these principles. In its decision, the BIA

affirmed “the Immigration Judge’s determination that he did not have authority over [a] bond request because aliens who are present in the United States without admission are applicants for admission as defined under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 220.¹

The BIA concluded that aliens “who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer. Remaining in the United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not constitute an ‘admission.’” *Id.* at 228. To hold otherwise would lead to an “incongruous result” that rewards aliens who unlawfully enter the United States without inspection and subsequently evade apprehension for a number of years. *Id.*

In so concluding, the BIA rejected the alien’s argument that “because he has been residing in the interior of the United States for almost 3 years . . . he cannot be considered as ‘seeking admission.’” *Id.* at 221. The BIA determined that this argument “is not supported by the plain language of the INA” and creates a “legal conundrum.” *Id.* If the alien “is not admitted to the United States (as he admits) but he is not ‘seeking admission’ (as he contends), then what is his legal status?” *Id.* (parentheticals in original).

¹ Previously, § 1226(a) had been interpreted as an available detention authority for aliens who were present without admission and placed in § 1229a removal proceedings. *See, e.g., Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez*, 28 I&N Dec. 747, 747–48 (BIA 2023). However, as noted by the BIA, the BIA had not previously addressed this issue in a precedential decision. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 216.

The decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* is consistent not only with the plain language of § 1225(b)(2), but also with the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in *Jennings*. Specifically, in *Jennings*, the Supreme Court explained that § 1225(b) applies to all applicants for admission, noting that the language of § 1225(b)(2) is “quite clear” and “unequivocally mandate[s]” detention. 583 U.S. at 300, 303.

Similarly, relying on *Jennings* and the plain language of §§ 1225 and 1226(a), the Attorney General recognized in *Matter of M-S-* that §§ 1225 and 1226(a) describe “different classes of aliens.” 27 I&N Dec. 509, 516 (AG 2019). And in *Matter of Q. Li*, the BIA also held that an alien who illegally crossed into the United States between ports-of-entry and was apprehended without a warrant while arriving is detained under § 1225(b). 29 I&N Dec. 66, 71 (BIA 2025). These decisions make clear that all applicants for admission are subject to detention under § 1225(b). *See also Florida v. United States*, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2023) (explaining that “the 1996 expansion of § 1225(b) to include illegal border crossers would make little sense if DHS retained discretion to apply § 1226(a) and release illegal border crossers whenever the agency saw fit”).

Given that § 1225 is the applicable detention authority for all applicants for admission—both arriving aliens and aliens present without admission alike, regardless of whether the alien was initially processed for expedited removal proceedings under § 1225(b)(1) or placed directly into removal proceedings under § 1229a—and further given that both “§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention of aliens throughout the completion of applicable proceedings,” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 302, Petitioner has no

grounds to complain that he is subject to mandatory detention and is not entitled to a bond hearing.

Petitioner is properly considered an applicant for admission (specifically, an alien present without admission), and he was placed into removal proceedings under § 1229a. He is therefore subject to detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) and there is no requirement that he be eligible for bond.

3. The statutory history supports the Respondent's understanding of who is considered an applicant for admission.

The statutory text, as discussed above, is dispositive of the relevant issue and the Court need go no further. But if the Court needs more, the structure of the statutory scheme prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546, bolsters the understanding that under the current statutory scheme, all applicants for admission are subject to detention under § 1225(b). The broad definition of applicants for admission was added to the INA in 1996. Before 1996, the INA only contemplated inspection of aliens arriving at ports-of-entry. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), (b) (1994) (discussing “aliens arriving at ports of the United States” and “the examining immigration officer at the port of arrival”). Relatedly, any alien who was “in the United States” and within certain listed classes of deportable aliens was deportable. *Id.* § 1251(a). One such class of deportable aliens included those “who entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” *Id.* § 1251(a)(1)(B). Aliens were excludable if they were “seeking admission” at a port-of-entry or had been paroled into

the United States. *See id.* § 1225(a); *see also id.* § 1182(a). At the time, deportation proceedings and exclusion proceedings differed and began with different charging documents. *See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc.*, 509 U.S. 155, 175 (1993) (explaining the “important distinction” between deportation and exclusion). And the placement of an alien in exclusion or deportation proceedings depended on whether the alien had made an “entry” within the meaning of the INA. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994) (defining “entry” as “any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession”).

Former § 1225 provided that aliens “seeking admission” at a port-of-entry who could not demonstrate entitlement to be admitted (“excludable” aliens) were subject to mandatory detention, with potential release solely by means of parole under § 1182(d)(5). *See id.* §§ 1225(a), (b), § 1182(d)(5). The concept of “seeking admission” in former § 1225 appears to have been understood to refer to aliens arriving at a port-of-entry. *See id.* And aliens who entered without inspection and were deportable were taken into custody under the authority of an arrest warrant, and like other deportable aliens, could request bond. *See id.* §§ 1251(a)(1)(B), 1252(a)(1).

As a result, “[aliens] who had entered without inspection could take advantage of the greater procedural and substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings, while [aliens] who actually presented themselves to authorities for inspection were restrained by more summary exclusion proceedings.” *Martinez v. Att’y Gen.*, 693 F.3d 408, 413 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To remedy this unintended and undesirable consequence, the IIRIRA substituted ‘admission’ for ‘entry,’

and replaced deportation and exclusion proceedings with the more general ‘removal’ proceeding.” *Id.* Consistent with this dichotomy, the INA, as amended by the IIRIRA, defines *all* those who have not been admitted to the United States as “applicants for admission.” IIRIRA § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-579.

Moreover, Congress’s use of the present participle—“seeking”—in § 1225(b)(2)(A) should not be ignored. *See United States v. Wilson*, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (“Congress’ use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes.”). By using the present participle “seeking,” § 1225(b)(2)(A) “signal[s] present and continuing action.” *See Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co.*, 48 F.4th 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2022). And the phrase “seeking admission” should not be understood to refer to “something in the past that has ended or something yet to come.” *See Shell v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co.*, 941 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2019). Thus, when pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) an “examining immigration officer determines” that an alien “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” the officer does so contemporaneously with the alien’s present and ongoing action of seeking admission. Indeed, interpreting the present participle “seeking” as denoting an ongoing process is also consistent with its ordinary usage. *See, e.g., Samayoa v. Bondi*, 146 F.4th 128, 134 (1st Cir. 2025) (an inadmissible alien “seeking to remain in the country lawfully” applied for relief in removal proceedings); *Garcia v. USCIS*, 146 F.4th 743, 746 (9th Cir. 2025) (“USCIS requires all U visa holders seeking permanent resident status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m) to undergo a medical examination . . .”). Accordingly, just as the alien in *Samayoa* is not only an alien present without admission but also seeking to remain in the

United States, Petitioner are aliens present without admission, and therefore applicants for admission as defined in § 1225(a)(1), but also aliens seeking admission under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Congress's significant amendments to the immigration laws in the IIRIRA support the notion that such aliens are properly detained pursuant to § 1225(b)—specifically, § 1225(b)(2)(A). Congress, for example, eliminated certain anomalous provisions that favored aliens who illegally entered without inspection over aliens arriving at ports-of-entry. A rule that treated an alien who enters the country illegally more favorably than an alien detained after arriving at a port-of-entry would “create a perverse incentive to enter at an unlawful rather than a lawful location.” *United States v. Gambino-Ruiz*, 91 F.4th 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 140). Such a scenario reflects “the precise situation that Congress intended to do away with by enacting” the IIRIRA. *Id.* “Congress intended to eliminate the anomaly under which illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry.” *Ortega-Lopez v. Barr*, 978 F.3d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

As discussed by the BIA in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, during the IIRIRA's legislative drafting process, Congress asserted the importance of controlling illegal immigration and securing the land borders of the United States. *See* 29 I&N Dec. at 222–24 (discussing H.R. Rep. 104-469 (1996)). One goal of the IIRIRA was to “reform the legal immigration system and facilitate legal entries into the United States.” H.R. Rep.

No. 104-828, at 1. Affording bond hearings to aliens present without admission, who have evaded immigration authorities and illegally entered the United States, but not affording such hearings to arriving aliens, who are attempting to comply with U.S. immigration law, is anomalous with and runs counter to that goal.

4. Applicants for admission may be released from detention on an 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) parole, but that is a discretionary matter.

Importantly, applicants for admission may only be released from detention if the government invokes its discretionary parole authority under § 1182(d)(5), which can be exercised with respect to “any alien applying for admission to the United States” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). In *Jennings*, the Supreme Court placed significance on the fact that § 1182(d)(5) is the specific provision that authorizes release from detention under § 1225(b), at the government’s discretion. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 300. Specifically, the Court emphasized that “[r]egardless of which of those two sections [§ 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2)] authorizes . . . detention, applicants for admission may be temporarily released on parole” *Id.* at 288.

The parole authority under § 1182(d)(5), however, is “delegated solely to the Secretary of Homeland Security.” *Matter of Castillo-Padilla*, 25 I&N Dec. 257, 261 (BIA 2010); *see* 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a). And parole does not constitute a lawful admission or a determination of admissibility, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(13)(B), 1182(d)(5)(A), so an alien granted parole remains an applicant for admission, *id.* § 1182(d)(5)(A); *see* 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (providing that “[a]n arriving alien remains an arriving alien even if paroled pursuant to

[§ 1182(d)(5)], and even after any such parole is terminated or revoked”). Here, accepting Petitioner’s theory that applicants for admission are nonetheless eligible for bond under § 1226 would run headlong against the specific grant of parole authority as to applicants for admission, in § 1182(d)(5).

5. Recent decisions support Petitioner is an applicant for admission.

Recent decisions from other district courts are instructive and support the Respondents application of § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention to this Petitioner. In its very detailed analysis, the court in *Barrios Sandoval v. Acuna*, et al No. 25-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025), held that a petitioner allegedly present in the country for over nine years, but without admission or parole, was lawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2) and therefore not entitled to a bond hearing.² This holding was mirrored in *Oliveria v. Patterson, et al*, No. 25-01463, 2025 WL 3095972 (W.D. La. Nov. 4, 2025) involving a petitioner allegedly present in the country for over 3 years, but without admission or parole. The court in *Barrios Sandoval* and *Oliveria* engaged in a multi-part statutory analysis of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226 including: (1) who qualifies as an “applicant for admission” under § 1225(a), (2) whether detention is required for all “applicants for admission” under §1225(b), (3) what class of aliens (not “applicants for admission”) §1226 applies to, and (4) why the proper application of 1225(b) mandatory detention does not render § 1226 superfluous. *Id.* The court noted the distinction between

² Although argued in the briefing, the court did not consider jurisdiction stating, “[b]ecause the Court determines that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief under the facts presented, the Court declines to determine the applicability of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the INA cited by the Respondents.” *Barrios Sandoval*, 2025 WL 3048926 at *2; *Oliveira*, 2025 WL 3095972.

§1225(b)(1) and (b)(2), where (b)(1) sets forth expedited removal procedures and (b)(2) is for “standard” removal proceedings under § 1229a. *Id.* Importantly though, the court found that *both* sections require mandatory detention until the conclusion of the inspection process – whether by expedited removal or the conclusion of the § 1229a removal proceedings. *Id.* The court gave an example of how § 1226 can be properly applied, as the Supreme Court did in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 538 U.S. 281 (2018). Finally, the court explained how its analysis differed from that of other district court decisions that have rejected Respondents’ argument that § 1225(b) mandatory detention applies to petitioners like the ones in both *Barrios Sandoval* and *Oliveira*, as well as the instant case, where that petitioner is present without admission, regardless of the time that alien has resided unlawfully in the United States.

Similarly, the district court in *Kum v. Ross, et al*, No. 25-cv-451, ECF 15, (W.D. La. Nov. 6, 2025)(adopting report and recommendation, ECF 14, Oct. 22, 2025), correctly applied the definition of “applicant for admission” to a petitioner who was present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled under § 1225(a)(1). The court noted, as Respondents aver in this case, that an applicant for admission is subject to mandatory detention pending full removal proceedings under § 1225(b)(2)(A), also citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 299, and 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(3) (a noncitizen placed into Section 1229a removal proceedings in lieu of expedited removal proceedings under Section 1225(b)(1) “shall be detained” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)). The court further noted that an applicant for admission under § 1225(b) has no statutory entitlement to a bond hearing,

citing both *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 111, and *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 302. Accordingly, the court denied and dismissed the habeas petition in that matter.

Further, a sister court in the Northern District of Texas recently denied an injunction and request for a bond hearing under § 1226, noting the very real distinction between an “arriving alien” and an “applicant for admission” with respect to the application of § 1225(b) and its mandatory detention requirement. *See Garibay-Robledo*, 2025 WL 2638672. The *Robledo* opinion states:

To be sure, an arriving alien is an applicant for admission: Subsection 1225(a)(1) defines applicant for admission, in part, as “[a]n alien . . . who arrives in the United States.” But the same provision *also* defines an applicant for admission as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted.” *Id.* This is not the most intuitive definition of the term, but it is the one that Congress enacted into law.

Id. at *4. (emphasis added). The court conducted a review of legislative history and further noted that by defining “applicants for admission” broadly enough to encompass both arriving aliens and illegal entrants, Congress removed the previously existing incentives to enter the country illegally. *Id.* at *6-7.

Accordingly, this Court should follow the reasoning of the *Oliveira*, *Barrios Sandoval*, and *Garibay-Robledo* decisions and *Kum* report and recommendation. The Court should find that Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2) and subject to mandatory detention as an applicant for admission during the pendency of his removal proceedings under § 1229a.

C. The Due Process Clause does not entitle Petitioner to any relief.

As discussed above, the relevant immigration statutes, properly construed, provide no entitlement to relief for Petitioner. Nor does the Due Process Clause. Instead, mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) is constitutionally permissible—particularly where, as here, Petitioner has been detained for a very short period of time. The Supreme Court has held that detention during removal proceedings, even without access to a bond hearing, is constitutional. In *Demore v. Kim*, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of § 1226(c), which mandates the detention of certain aliens during removal proceedings without access to bond hearings. 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003). The Court “recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process,” and also reaffirmed its “longstanding view that the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 523, 526. The Court further explained that “when the Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome means to accomplish its goal.” *Id.* at 528. With respect to due process concerns, the Court recognized that it “has firmly and repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” *Id.* at 522.

Here, Petitioner is being detained for the limited purpose of removal proceedings and determining his removability. Such detention is not punitive or done for other reasons than to address removability, which will occur in the removal proceedings. Whether framed as a substantive or procedural due process claim, the principles set forth in

Demore govern this case. Substantive due process protects “only ‘those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” *Dep’t of State v. Muñoz*, 602 U.S. 899, 910 (2024) (quoting *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)). Any substantive due process claim therefore fails here because “the through line of history” is that the federal government has “sovereign authority to set the terms governing the admission and exclusion of noncitizens.” *Id.* at 911, 912. Indeed, Congress in exercising this “broad power over naturalization and immigration . . . regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 522 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Consistent with these principles, the Supreme Court has long recognized that “the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 526.

Similarly, Petitioner cannot succeed on a procedural due process claim. Such a claim fails because where Congress has substantively mandated detention pending removal proceedings, an alien cannot displace that substantive choice with a procedural due process claim. As discussed, aliens are not entitled to bond hearings as a matter of substantive due process. *See Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523–29. Under *Demore*, Congress may reasonably determine—as it did here—to subject aliens who were never inspected or admitted to this country to detention without bond while the government determines their removability. Congress has not created any procedural rights to a bond hearing for applicants for admission. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297. “Read most naturally,” § 1225 “mandate[s] detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have

concluded.” *Id.* And the statute says nothing “whatsoever about bond hearings.” *Id.* No procedural due process claim is stated.

1. Even if this Court were to find that Petitioner warrants additional process, the *Mathews* factors weigh in favor of continued detention.

Even if section 1225(b) did not squarely govern Petitioner’s claim, as it does, he would not be entitled to the immediate release that he seeks. Courts across the country have applied different approaches to determine the constitutionality of continued detention under various immigration statutes. *See, e.g., Rintobaye v. Castro*, No. SA-23-CV-1529-FB (HJB), 2024 WL 5375786, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2024), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. SA-23-CV-1529-FB, 2025 WL 377722 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2025) (collecting cases and comparing approaches). Some courts, but not all, utilize the three-factor balancing test Petitioner urges here, which is set forth in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), a case involving the termination of a citizen’s social security benefits. *Id.* The Supreme Court, however, “when confronted with constitutional challenges to immigration detention has not resolved them through express application of *Mathews*.” *Rodriguez Diaz*, 53 F.4th at 1206–07; *see also Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523, 526–29, 123 S.Ct. 1708; *see also Dusenbery v. United States*, 534 U.S. 161, 168, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002) (“[W]e have never viewed *Mathews* as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding due process claims.”).

Other circuits have applied the *Mathews* test to due-process challenges brought to challenge civil detention. The Fifth Circuit, however, has not applied *Mathews* to due-process challenges to section 1225. Petitioner makes no argument as to why this Court

should apply the *Mathews* test and offers no reason his procedural due-process claim should not be subject to the same standard as other due process challenges to section 1225 in this Circuit. *Andrade v. Gonzales*, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006). But even if the Court were to find that *Mathews* applies, the conclusion would nevertheless be the same—Petitioner’s detention is constitutional even under *Mathews*.

Mathews outlines a three-part “flexible” test to determine whether due process complies with the Constitution. *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 321. Under *Mathews*, courts consider: (1) the individual’s interest; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the right absent further procedures; and (3) the government’s interest. *Id.* at 334. Any analysis of these factors in the immigration context must “weigh heavily” the fact that “control over matters of immigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the executive and the legislature.” *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). A correct application of the *Mathews* test weighs against ordering the immediate release Petitioner requests.

Clearly Petitioner has a liberty interest in freedom from lengthy imprisonment. However, Petitioner’s liberty interest is diminished because he is illegally in this country with no permission to remain. *See, e.g., Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1208 (9th Cir. 2022). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “detention during deportation proceedings [remains] a *constitutionally valid* aspect of the deportation process.” *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. at 523 (emphasis added). Any assessment of the private interest at stake therefore must account for the fact that the Supreme Court has never held that aliens have a constitutional right to be released from custody during the pendency of removal

proceedings and, in fact, has held precisely the opposite. *See id.* at 530; *see also Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure.”).

Regarding the second *Mathews* factor, applicable statutes and regulations already provide extensive protections to all aliens detained pursuant to § 1225, including appeals to the BIA and the Circuit Court. There is no basis in law for imposing yet more procedures that neither Congress nor the relevant agencies have adopted.

Finally, as to the third factor and final *Mathews* factor, the government’s interests in maintaining the existing procedures are legitimate and significant. As a general matter, the Supreme Court has stressed that the government “need[s] . . . flexibility in policy choices rather than the rigidity often characteristic of constitutional adjudication” when it comes to immigration regulation. *Mathews v. Diaz*, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). Accepting Petitioner’s position would flout this directive by injecting that very rigidity into the discretionary detention regime Congress adopted.

In determining what process is due in immigration proceedings, “it must weigh heavily in the balance that control over matters of immigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the executive and the legislature.” *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). “[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.” *Mathews*, 426 U.S. at 81 n.17 (quoting *Harisiades v. Shaughnessy*, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)). “Congress has repeatedly shown that it considers immigration enforcement—even against otherwise

non-criminal [noncitizen]s—to be a vital public interest.” *Miranda v. Garland*, 34 F.4th 338, 364 (4th Cir. 2022). It is thus clear that, in the case of aliens seeking admission, “the government interest includes detention.” *Id.* And the Supreme Court has stated removal proceedings “would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character.” *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896). Further, “[t]he continued presence of an alien lawfully . . . undermines the streamlined removal proceedings [Congress] established, and permit[s] and prolong[s] a continuing violation of United States law.” *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 436 (2009); see *Landon*, 459 U.S. at 34 (“The government’s interest in efficient administration of the immigration laws . . . is weighty.”). Moreover, Petitioner has never been in ICE custody, ICE has not had an opportunity to determine whether Petitioner is dangerous or made a determination as to whether he is a flight risk.

Therefore, all three *Mathews* factors favor the Respondent, and this Court should accordingly dismiss the Petition.

D. Petitioner is Not Entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction.

Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order is premised on his claim that his detention is unlawful and he is entitled to a bond hearing. ECF 20. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires mandatory detention of “an alien who is *an applicant for admission*, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). And Section 1225(a)(1) expressly defines that “[a]n

alien present in the United States who has not been admitted ... shall be deemed for purposes of this Act *an applicant for admission.*” *Id.* § 1225(a)(1) (emphasis added). Petitioner does not contest that he is an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted.” By the plain language of § 1225(a)(1), then, Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” and thus subject to the mandatory detention provisions of “applicants for admission” under § 1225(b)(2). Importantly, Petitioner makes no mention of ever having been encountered by ICE, he has does not have permission to be in the United States lawfully.

But for all the reasons already discussed above in connection with the consideration of these issues in the context of Petitioner’s habeas petition, his claims fail on the merits and therefore Petitioner also is not entitled to any temporary or preliminary relief on them. Petitioner cannot show that these claims are likely to succeed on the merits because, in fact, they fail on the merits as outlined herein. *See Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway*, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974).

IV. Conclusion

Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order and petition for habeas should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On November 10, 2025, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with the clerk of court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the electronic case filing system of the court. I hereby certify that I have served all parties electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2).

/s/ Ann E. Cruce-Haag
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