

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION**

M.A.M.H.	§	
<i>Petitioner,</i>	§	
v.	§	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-cv-00240
	§	
Kristi Noem, In Her Official Capacity	§	
As Secretary of the U.S. Department of	§	
Homeland Security, et al.,	§	
<i>Respondents.</i>	§	

**RESPONDENTS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND HABEAS PETITION**

Respondents¹ provide the following timely response to Petitioner's habeas petition and request for a TRO. Any allegations that are not specifically admitted herein are denied. Petitioner is not entitled to the injunctive relief she seeks, and this Court should deny her habeas petition.

Respectfully submitted,

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¹ The proper respondent in a habeas petition is the person with custody over the petitioner. 28 U.S.C. § 2242; see also § 2243; *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). That said, it is the named federal respondents, not the named warden in this case, who make the custodial decisions regarding aliens detained in immigration custody under Title 8 of the United States Code.

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I. Introduction and Overview of Issues in Dispute

Petitioner is lawfully detained on a mandatory basis as an applicant for admission pending removal proceedings before an immigration judge. This case is governed not only by the plain language of the statute, but also by Supreme Court precedent. There is no jurisdiction for this Court to review Petitioner's challenge to the Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") initial decision to detain her for adjudication of her removal proceedings, because her claims directly arise from the decision to commence and/or adjudicate removal proceedings against her. To the extent that Petitioner challenges the interpretation or the constitutionality of the statute under which her removal proceedings are brought, she must raise that challenge in the court of appeals upon review of a final order of removal. While as applied constitutional challenges may be brought in district court under certain circumstances, Petitioner has not raised any colorable claim that her mandatory detention under § 1225(b) is unconstitutional as applied to her. Her detention is neither indefinite, nor prolonged, as it will end upon the completion of her removal proceedings.

Finally, this Court lacks jurisdiction under habeas to order an immigration judge to hold a bond hearing. The only remedy available through habeas is release from custody, but even if this Court ordered Petitioner's immediate release, which it should not, such release would not provide her any lawful status in the United States and produce her no net gain. For these reasons and those that follow, this Court should deny her motion for a TRO and her habeas petition.

II. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner alleges that she is a citizen of  who is seeking asylum. *See* ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 4, and 59. She is detained in ICE custody within this district. *Id.*, ¶ 14 She alleges her detention is unlawful and she asks the Court to order her release, or, in the alternative, order Respondents to provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §1226(a). *Id.* ¶¶ 16-10. Petitioner claims she last entered the United States without inspection in  2013. *Id.* ¶¶ 2 and 59. At that

time, Petitioner alleges that she was deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and placed into removal proceedings; soon thereafter she was released on her own recognizance. *Id.*, ¶¶60-61 Petitioner alleges she applied for asylum. *Id.*, ¶62 In 2022, while her asylum application was pending, DHS officials filed a motion seeking to dismiss the removal proceedings “without prejudice.” *Id.*, ¶ 63 That motion was granted on [REDACTED] 2022. *Id.*

Soon after the first removal proceeding was dismissed, Petitioner re-filed her Asylum application. *Id.*, ¶64 On October 7, 2025, Petitioner was taken into ICE custody following an encounter with CBP officers at the Falfurrias Checkpoint where she lacked the necessary legal documents to enter, pass through, or to remain in the United States. *Id.* ¶¶ 65 Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear (NTA). Govt’s Exh. 1², pp. 1-4 Petitioner was an applicant for admission detained under § 1225(b), ineligible for release on bond. *Id.*, p. 4 and ECF 1, ¶ 66 Petitioner is scheduled for a detained master calendar hearing on [REDACTED] before Immigration Judge [REDACTED]. Govt. Exh. 1, pp. 5-6

Petitioner filed this habeas petition on or about October 22, 2025, alleging causes of action under the Due Process Clause, the INA, and the Administrative Procedure Act. She requests immediate release or an order directing Respondents to schedule a bond hearing³.

III. Standard of Review

In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner is challenging the legality of the restraint or imprisonment. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The burden is on the petitioner to show the

² Government Exhibit 1 is submitted under SEAL as it contains sensitive information concerning Petitioner’s immigration case. A copy of this Government Exhibit will be provided to opposing counsel via secured means upon filing.

³ Petitioner also asks that this Court impermissibly inject itself further into the immigration process to issue an order prohibiting DHS officials from seeking a stay on a favorable bond decision (if granted). *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 This attempt to prevent remedies afforded to DHS during the immigration process clearly falls outside the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

confinement is unlawful. *See Walker v. Johnston*, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941). Judicial review of immigration matters, including review of detention issues, is limited. *I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre*, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) The Supreme Court has thus “underscore[d] the limited scope of inquiry into immigration legislation,” and “has repeatedly emphasized that over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.” *Fiallo v. Bell*, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (internal quotation omitted) The plenary power of Congress and the Executive Branch over immigration necessarily encompasses immigration detention, because the authority to detain is elemental to the authority to deport, and because public safety is at stake. *See Shaughnessy v. United States*, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (“Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”)

In terms of Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm; (3) that the balance of equities favors the movant/Petitioner; and (4) the injunction is in the public interest. *See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); *Daniels Health Scis., LLC v. Vascular Health Scis., LLC*, 710 F.3d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 2013) Should Petitioner fail in supporting any one of these elements his claim for relief fails. *Clark v. Prichard*, 812 F.3d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that “[t]he party seeking such relief must satisfy a cumulative burden of proving each of the four elements”)

IV. Argument

As a threshold issue, the only relief available to Petitioner through habeas is release from custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; *DHS v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 118–19 (2020). Petitioner, however, has no claim to any lawful status in the United States that would permit her to reside

lawfully in the United States upon release. Even if this Court were to order her release from custody, she would be subject to re-arrest as an alien present within the United States without having been admitted. Ordering release in this circumstance produces no net gain to Petitioner, while mandating continued detention until at least the conclusion of removal proceedings furthers the government's interests in enforcing the immigration laws. ICE will release Petitioner from custody, but only under a grant of relief from removal or an executed removal order.

A. Mandatory Detention and the “Catchall” Provision

There are two types of aliens living unlawfully within the United States who are subject to “full” removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and not expedited removal: (1) those who have never been admitted but have lived in the United States for longer than two years (*i.e.*, inadmissible under § 1182); and (2) those who were once admitted but no longer have permission to remain (*i.e.*, removable under § 1227). 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2). As outlined in more detail below, Congress intended for the inadmissible aliens in this context to be detained on a mandatory basis under § 1225(b)(2)(A), while the removable aliens are detained under § 1226(a) and eligible to seek bond. This interpretation is consistent with the allocation of the burden of proof during removal proceedings. If the NTA charges the alien under 1182 as inadmissible, the burden lies on the alien to prove admissibility or prior lawful admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2). On the other hand, the burden is on the government to establish deportability for aliens charged under § 1227. *Id.* § 1229a(c)(3).

B. Start with the Statutory Text: § 1225(b) Unambiguously Defines an Applicant for Admission as an Alien Present in the United States Without Having Been Admitted.

The statutory language is unambiguous: “An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted ... shall be deemed ... an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 109; *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018); *Vargas v. Lopez*,

No. 25-CV-526, 2025 WL 2780351 at *4–9 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); *Chavez v. Noem*, No. 25-CV-23250CAB-SBC, 2025 WL 2730228 at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025). Even though DHS encountered Petitioner within the interior of the United States, she is nonetheless an applicant for admission who DHS has determined through the issuance of a Notice to Appear (NTA) is an alien seeking admission who is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted to the United States. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A); 1229a. In other words, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) mandates that she “shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a [“full” removal proceedings]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Given the plain language of § 1225(a)(1), Petitioner cannot plausibly argue that she is not an applicant for admission. Nor can Petitioner plausibly challenge a DHS’s officer’s determination that she is “seeking admission” simply because she is not currently at the border requesting to come in. The Fifth Circuit explored these nuances in detail while analyzing a different INA provision that is not at issue here (8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)). *See Martinez v. Mukasey*, 519 F. 3d 532, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2008).

In *Martinez*, the Court reviewed § 1182(h)(2), which statutorily bars certain aliens from eligibility for a discretionary inadmissibility waiver if, for example, the alien was “admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” and convicted of an aggravated felony since that “admission.” *Id.* The relevant question in *Martinez* was whether Congress intended to also statutorily bar those aliens who had adjusted their status to lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) within the interior of the United States, as opposed to only those who were initially admitted at the port of entry as LPRs. *Id.* at 541–42. *Martinez* argued that because he had adjusted his status to LPR while in the interior, as opposed to having been admitted as an LPR at the border, he was not statutorily barred from applying for the waiver under § 1182(h)(2).

Id. at 542. The government, however, argued that because of the agency's interpretation of the word "admission" in the INA's aggravated felony removal provision, the Court should find that aliens who adjusted their status to LPR are also barred from seeking discretionary waivers under § 1182(h)(2), reasoning that adjusting status "accomplished admission" for purposes of the aggravated felony provision. *Id.* (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); *In re Rosas-Ramirez*, 22 I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 1999)). The Fifth Circuit, as a result, was left with the task of deciding which interpretation to use to determine whether an LPR who adjusted status within the United States was statutorily barred from seeking a discretionary waiver. *Id.* at 543.

The Fifth Circuit rejected *Chevron* deference, because the Court found the language of the INA to be unambiguous:

For determining ambiguity... if this statutory text stood alone, we would define "admitted" by its ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning. ... Congress has relieved us from this task, however, by providing the following definition: "The terms 'admission' and 'admitted' mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of that alien into the United States *after inspection and authorization* by an immigration officer." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). Under this statutory definition, "admission" is the lawful entry of an alien after inspection, something quite different ... from post-entry adjustment....

Id. at 544. The Court further noted that the phrase "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" is an entirely separate term of art defined in § 1101(a)(20), which does encompass both admission to the United States as an LPR and post-entry adjustment of status. *Id.* at 546. Section 1182(h), however, expressly incorporates that term of art, as defined by § 1101(a)(20), separate and apart from its use of "admitted," as defined by § 1101(a)(13). In other words, waivers are denied only to those aliens who have been admitted [§ 1101(a)(13)] to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence [§ 1101(a)(20)].

Like the Fifth Circuit in *Martinez*, this Court should navigate these nuanced issues by

examining the unambiguous language of the controlling INA provisions in this case, which clearly define these various terms in proper context, to determine the following: Petitioner (1) has not been “admitted” to the United States after inspection by an immigration officer [§§ 1182(a)(6), 1101(a)(13)]; (2) is an “applicant for admission” [§ 1225(a)(1)];⁴ and (3) is subject to detention during “full” removal proceedings as an alien who DHS has determined to be seeking admission and who is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted [§ 1225(b)(2)(A)]. DHS is properly detaining Petitioner on a mandatory basis during her removal proceedings.

Notably, On September 5, 2025, the BIA issued a published decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In its decision, the BIA affirmed “the Immigration Judge’s determination that he did not have authority over [a] bond request because aliens who are present in the United States without admission are applicants for admission as defined under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings.” *Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 220.⁵

The BIA concluded that aliens “who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer. Remaining in the United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not constitute an ‘admission.’” *Id.* at 228. To hold otherwise

⁴ Nothing in § 1101(a)(4) contradicts this definition. Section 1101(a)(4) simply differentiates between an alien seeking admission to the United States at entry (with DHS) versus an alien by applying for a visa (with the State Department) with which to eventually seek admission at entry into the United States.

⁵ Previously, as alluded to in BIA decisions, DHS and the Department of Justice interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to be an available detention authority for aliens present without admission placed directly in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings. *See, e.g., Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez*, 28 I&N Dec. 747, 747 (BIA 2023); *Matter of R-A-V-P-*, 27 I&N Dec. 803, 803 (BIA 2020); *Matter of Garcia-Garcia*, 25 I&N Dec. 93, 94 (BIA 2009); *Matter of D-J-*, 23 I&N Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003). However, as noted by the BIA, the BIA had not previously addressed this issue in a precedential decision. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 216.

would lead to an “incongruous result” that rewards aliens who unlawfully enter the United States without inspection and subsequently evade apprehension for number of years. *Id.*

In so concluding, the BIA rejected the alien’s argument that “because he has been residing in the interior of the United States for almost 3 years . . . he cannot be considered as ‘seeking admission.’” *Id.* at 221. The BIA determined that this argument “is not supported by the plain language of the INA” and creates a “legal conundrum.” *Id.* If the alien “is not admitted to the United States (as he admits) but he is not ‘seeking admission’ (as he contends), then what is his legal status?” *Id.* (parentheticals in original). The BIA’s decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* is consistent not only with the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), but also with the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in *Jennings* and other caselaw issued after *Jennings*. Specifically, in *Jennings*, the Supreme Court explained that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) applies to all applicants for admission, noting that the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is “quite clear” and “unequivocally mandate[s]” detention. 583 U.S. at 300, 303 (explaining that “the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement” (quoting *Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States*, 579 U.S. 162, 171 (2016))).

Similarly, relying on *Jennings* and the plain language of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226(a), the Attorney General, in *Matter of M-S-*, unequivocally recognized that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226(a) do not overlap but describe “different classes of aliens.” 27 I&N Dec. at 516. The Attorney General also held—in an analogous context—that aliens present without admission and placed into expedited removal proceedings are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 even if later placed in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings. 27 I&N Dec. at 518-19. In *Matter of Q. Li*, the BIA held that an alien who illegally crossed into the United States between POEs and was apprehended without a warrant while arriving is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). 29 I&N Dec. at 71. This ongoing

evolution of the law makes clear that all applicants for admission are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). *Cf. Niz-Chavez v. Garland*, 593 U.S. 155, 171 (2021) (providing that “no amount of policy-talk can overcome a plain statutory command”); *see generally Florida v. United States*, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2023) (explaining that “the 1996 expansion of § 1225(b) to include illegal border crossers would make little sense if DHS retained discretion to apply § 1226(a) and release illegal border crossers whenever the agency saw fit”).⁶ *Florida’s* conclusion “that § 1225(b)’s ‘shall be detained’ means what it says and . . . is a mandatory requirement . . . flows directly from *Jennings*.” *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1273.

Given 8 U.S.C. § 1225 is the applicable detention authority for all applicants for admission—both arriving aliens and aliens present without admission alike, regardless of whether the alien was initially processed for expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or placed directly into removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a—and “[b]oth [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)] mandate detention . . . throughout the completion of applicable proceedings,” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 301–03, IJs do not have authority to redetermine the custody status of an alien present without admission.

Here, Petitioner is an applicant for admission (specifically, an alien present without admission), placed directly into removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. She is therefore

⁶ Though not binding, *Camreta v. Greene*, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (quoting 18 J. Moore et al., *Moore’s Federal Practice* § 134.02[1] [d], p. 134–26 (3d ed.2011)) (providing that “[a] decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case”); *Evans v. Skolnik*, 997 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2021) (same), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida’s decision is instructive here. *Florida* held that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) mandates detention of applicants for admission throughout removal proceedings, rejecting the assertion that DHS has discretion to choose to detain an applicant for admission under either 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) or 1226(a). 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275. The court held that such discretion “would render mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) meaningless.” *Id.*

subject to detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and ineligible for a custody redetermination hearing before an IJ. “It is well established . . . that the Immigration Judges only have the authority to consider matters that are delegated to them by the Attorney General and the [INA].” *Matter of A-W-*, 25 I&N Dec. 45, 46 (BIA 2009). “In the context of custody proceedings, an Immigration Judge’s authority to redetermine conditions of custody is set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) . . .” *Id.* at 46. The regulation clearly states that “the [IJ] is authorized to exercise the authority in [8 U.S.C. § 1226].” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d); *see id.* § 1003.19(a) (authorizing IJs to review “[c]ustody and bond determinations made by [DHS] pursuant to 8 C.F.R. part 1236”); *see id.* § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) (“[A]n IJ may not redetermine conditions of custody imposed by [DHS] with respect to . . . [a]rriving aliens in removal proceedings, including aliens paroled after arrival pursuant to [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)].”). “An [IJ] is without authority to disregard the regulations, which have the force and effect of law.” *Matter of L-M-P-*, 27 I&N Dec. 265, 267 (BIA 2018).

Aliens present without admission in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings are both applicants for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) and aliens seeking admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). As discussed above, such aliens placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a are applicants for admission as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and thus ineligible for a bond redetermination hearing before the IJ. Such aliens are also considered “seeking admission,” as contemplated in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). To be sure, “many people who are not *actually* requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless deemed to be ‘seeking admission’ under the immigration laws.” *Lemus*, 25 I&N Dec. at 743; *see Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 221; *Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. at 68 n.3; *see also Matter of Valenzuela-Felix*, 26 I&N Dec. 53, 56 (BIA 2012) (explaining that “an application for admission [i]s a continuing one”).

In analyzing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), the Supreme Court in *Jennings* equated “applicants for admission” with aliens “seeking admission.” See *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289. As noted above, the Supreme Court stated that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” *Id.* at 287. In doing so, it specifically cited 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)—and thus did not appear to consider aliens “seeking admission” to be a subcategory of applicants for admission. *Id.* The Supreme Court also stated that “[a]liens who are instead covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a different process . . . [and] ‘shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding’ . . .” *Id.* at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). The Supreme Court considered all aliens covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to be subject to detention under subparagraph (A)—not just a subset of such aliens. Moreover, *Jennings* found that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) “applies primarily to aliens *seeking entry* into the United States (*‘applicants for admission’ in the language of the statute*).” *Id.* at 297 (emphases added). The Court therefore considered aliens seeking admission and applicants for admission to be virtually indistinguishable; it did not consider them to be merely a subcategory of applicants for admission.

Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that aliens seeking admission are subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) detention: “In sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2).” *Id.* at 289.

C. Congress Intended to Mandate Detention of All Applicants for Admission, Not Just Those Who Presented for Inspection at a Designated Port of Entry.

Congress, in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), corrected an inequity in the prior law by substituting the term “admission” for “entry.” See *Chavez*, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4 (citing *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020); *United States v. Gambino-Ruiz*, 91 F.4th 918, 990 (9th Cir. 2024)). Under the prior version of the INA, aliens who lawfully presented themselves for inspection were not entitled to seek bond,

whereas aliens who “entered” the country after successfully evading inspection were entitled to seek bond. *Id.* DHS’s current interpretation of the mandatory nature of detention for aliens subjected to the “catchall” provision of § 1225 furthers that Congressional intent. *Id.* Petitioner’s interpretation, however, would repeal the statutory fix that Congress made in IIRIRA. *Id.*

1. Section 1226 Does Not Impact the Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission.

That does not leave § 1226(a) meaningless. Section 1226(a) is the applicable detention authority for aliens who have been admitted and are deportable who are subject to removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1227(a), and 1229a, and does not impact the directive in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) that “if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceedings under [8 U.S.C. § 1229a],” *id.* § 1225(b)(2)(A).⁷ As the Supreme Court explained, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “applies to aliens already present in the United States” and “creates a default rule for those aliens by permitting—but not requiring—the [Secretary] to issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289, 303; *Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. at 70; *see also M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 516

⁷ The specific mandatory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) governs over the general permissive language of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). “[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general . . .” *Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.*, 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992); *see RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank*, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (explaining that the general/specific canon is “most frequently applied to statutes in which a general permission or prohibition is contradicted by a specific prohibition or permission” and in order to “eliminate the contradiction, the specific provision is construed as an exception to the general one”); *Perez-Guzman v. Lynch*, 835 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing, in the context of asylum eligibility for aliens subject to reinstated removal orders, this canon and explaining that “[w]hen two statutes come into conflict, courts assume Congress intended specific provisions to prevail over more general ones”). Here, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) “does not negate [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] entirely,” which still applies to admitted aliens who are deportable, “but only in its application to the situation that [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)] covers.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts* 185 (2012).

(describing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as a “permissive” detention authority separate from the “mandatory” detention authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1225).⁸

Generally, such aliens may be released on bond or their own recognizance, also known as “conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303, 306. Section 1226(a) does not, however, confer the *right* to release on bond; rather, both DHS and IJs have broad discretion in determining whether to release an alien on bond if the alien establishes that he or she is not a flight risk or a danger to the community. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8); *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 39 (BIA 2006); *Matter of Adeniji*, 22 I&N Dec. 1102 (BIA 1999). Further, ICE must detain certain aliens due to their criminal history or national security concerns under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), (c)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(1)(i), 1236.1(c)(1)(i); *see also id.* § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(D). Release of such aliens is permitted only in very specific circumstances. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2).

Notably, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) references certain grounds of inadmissibility, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A), (D)-(E), and the Supreme Court in *Barton v. Barr*—after issuing its decision in *Jennings*—recognized the possibility that aliens charged with certain grounds of inadmissibility

⁸ Importantly, a warrant of arrest is not required in all cases. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a). For example, an immigration officer has the authority “to arrest any alien who in his presence or view is entering or attempting to enter the United States in violation of any law or regulation” or “to arrest any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest” *Id.* § 1357(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(a), (b) (recognizing the availability of warrantless arrests); *see Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. at 70 n.5. Moreover, DHS may issue a warrant of arrest within 48 hours (or an “additional reasonable period of time” given any emergency or other extraordinary circumstances), 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d); doing so does not constitute “post-hoc issuance of a warrant,” *Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. at 69 n.4. While the presence of an arrest warrant is a threshold consideration in determining whether an alien is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) detention authority under a plain reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), there is nothing in *Jennings* that stands for the assertion that aliens processed for arrest under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 cannot have been arrested pursuant to a warrant. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 302.

could be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 590 U.S. 222, 235 (2020); *see also Nielsen v. Preap*, 586 U.S. 392, 416-19 (2019) (recognizing that aliens who are inadmissible for engaging in terrorist activity are subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)). However, in interpreting provisions of the INA, the Board does not view the language of statutory provisions in isolation but instead “interpret[s] the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme and fit[s], if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.” *Matter of C-T-L-*, 25 I&N Dec. 341, 345 (BIA 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)). As the Supreme Court in *Barton* also noted, “redundancies are common in statutory drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure, sometimes because of congressional inadvertence or lack of foresight, or sometimes simply because of the shortcomings of human communication.” *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 239. “Redundancy in one portion of a statute is not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contrary to its text . . .” *Id.*; *see also Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 222 (“Interpreting the provisions of section [1226(c)] as rendering null and void the provisions of section [1225](b)(2)(A) (or even the provisions of section... 1225(b)(1)), would be in contravention of the ‘cardinal principle of statutory construction,’ which is that courts are to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, rather than to emasculate an entire section.”) (quoting *United States v. Menasche*, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)). The statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)—including the most recent amendment pursuant to the Laken Riley Act, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E), merely reflects a “congressional effort to be doubly sure” that certain aliens are detained, *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 239.

To reiterate, to interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) as not applying to all applicants for admission would render it meaningless. As explained above, Congress expanded 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) in 1996 to apply to a broader category of aliens, including those aliens who crossed the

border illegally. IIRIRA § 302. There would have been no need for Congress to make such a change if 8 U.S.C. § 1226 was meant to apply to aliens present without admission. Thus, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 does not have any controlling impact on the directive in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) that “if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under [8 U.S.C. § 1229a].” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

D. Petitioner Does Not Overcome Jurisdictional Hurdles.

1. Initial Decision to Commence Removal Proceedings

Where an alien, like this Petitioner, challenges the decision to detain her in the first place or to seek a removal order against her, or if an alien challenges any part of the process by which his or her removability will be determined, the court lacks jurisdiction to review that challenge. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); *see also Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294–95. In *Jennings*, the Court did not find that the claims were barred, because unlike Petitioner here, the aliens in that case were challenging their continued and allegedly prolonged detention during removal proceedings. *Id.* Here, Petitioner is challenging the decision to detain her in the first place, which arises directly from the decision to commence and/or adjudicate removal proceedings against her. *See id.*

2. Review of Any Decision Regarding the Admission of an Alien, Including Questions of Law and Fact, or Interpretation and Application of Constitutional and Statutory Provisions, Must Be Raised Before an Immigration Judge in Removal Proceedings, Reviewable Only by the Circuit Court After a Final Order of Removal.

Even if the alien claims she is not appropriately categorized as an applicant for admission subject to § 1225(b), such a challenge must be raised before an immigration judge in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(4). In other words, if an alien contests that she is an applicant for admission subject to removal under § 1225(b), any claim challenging her continued detention

under § 1225(b) is inextricably intertwined with the removal proceedings themselves, meaning that judicial review is available only through the court of appeals following a final administrative order of removal. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(4).⁹ This is consistent with the channeling provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which mandates that judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States must be reviewed by the court of appeals upon review of a final order of removal. *See SQDC v. Bondi*, No. 25–3348 (PAM/DLM), 2025 WL2617973 (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 2025).

E. On Its Face, and As Applied to Petitioner, § 1225(b) Comports with Due Process.

Section 1225 does not provide for a bond hearing, regardless of whether the applicant for admission is placed into full removal proceedings. The Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of § 1225(b) in *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 140 (finding that applicants for admission are entitled only to the protections set forth by statute and that “the Due Process Clause provides nothing more”). An “expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” *Olim v. Wakinekona*, 461 U.S. 238, 250 n.12 (1983).

That the alien in *Thuraissigiam* failed to request his own release in his prayer for relief does not make the holding any less binding here. *But see Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. 25–CV–337–KC, 2025 WL 2691828 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025). The alien in *Thuraissigiam* undisputedly brought his claim in habeas, and the Court noted that even if he had requested release, his claim would have failed. *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 118–19. Regardless of whether the alien in

⁹ While bond proceedings under § 1226(a) are separate and apart from removal proceedings under § 1229a, challenges to decisions under § 1225(b), including the mandatory detention provision found within that statute, are to be raised in the same § 1229a proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(4).

Thuraissigiam was on “the threshold of entry” as an applicant for admission detained under § 1225(b)(1), as opposed to an applicant for admission found within the interior and detained under § 1225(b)(2), the reasoning of *Thuraissigiam* extends to all applicants for admission. Petitioner is not entitled to more process than what Congress provided her by statute, regardless of whether the applicable statute is § 1225(b) or § 1226(a). *Id.*; *see also Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297–303.

Mandatory detention of an applicant for admission during “full” removal proceedings does not violate due process, because the constitutional protections are built into those proceedings, regardless of whether the alien is detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. The alien is served with a charging document (NTA) outlining the factual allegations and the charge(s) of removability against her. *Id.* § 1229a(a)(2). She has an opportunity to be heard by an immigration judge and represented by counsel of his choosing at no expense to the government. *Id.* § 1229a(b)(1), (b)(4)(A). She can seek reasonable continuances to prepare any applications for relief from removal, or she can waive that right and seek immediate removal or voluntary departure. *Id.* § 1229a(b)(4)(B), (c)(4). Should she receive any adverse decision, she has the right to seek judicial review of the complete record and that decision not only administratively, but also in the circuit court of appeals. *Id.* § 1229a(b)(4)(C), (c)(5).

Moreover, relief applications are heard more expeditiously on the detained docket than the non-detained docket. *See* Section 9.1(e), Executive Office for Immigration Review | 9.1 - Detention | United States Department of Justice (last accessed Nov. 5, 2025). Some relief applications are subject to an annual cap, requiring immigration judges to “reserve” decisions to grant the application. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1240.21(c); OPPM 17-04 (last accessed Nov. 5, 2025). Judges are not required to reserve decisions in detained cases, however. *Id.*

While an as-applied constitutional challenge, such as a prolonged detention claim, may be

brought before the district court in certain circumstances, Petitioner here raises no such claim where she has been detained for only a brief period pending her removal proceedings. For aliens, like Petitioner, who are detained during removal proceedings as applicants for admission, what Congress provided to them by statute satisfies due process. *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 140. The “catch all” provision at § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires two things: (1) a DHS determination that the alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted; and (2) detention during “full” removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Petitioner is scheduled for a hearing in removal proceedings before an immigration judge on the detained docket due to her presence without admission. *See Govt. Exh. 2*. As applied here to Petitioner, § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not violate due process. *See Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 140.

V. Conclusion

Petitioner is not left without a remedy, as such, her request for injunctive relief/TRO must fail. Though sparsely granted in only the most extenuating circumstances, Petitioner nonetheless may seek a humanitarian parole, which is granted in the exercise of DHS’s discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Petitioner is already in “full” removal proceedings before an immigration judge, which includes the right to counsel at no expense to the government and the right to seek judicial review administratively and through the circuit court. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Finally, detention is not indefinite, because removal proceedings will end, either with a grant of relief or with an order of removal. The Court should deny the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on November 6, 2025, this document was filed by CM/ECF.

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