

The Honorable John H. Chun

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

SIGAL TZAFIR,

Petitioner,

v.

PAMELA BONDI, United States Attorney  
General, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Case No. 2:25-cv-02070-JHC

FEDERAL RESPONDENTS'<sup>1</sup> RESPONSE  
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR  
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Federal Respondents submit this response to Petitioner Sigal Tzafir's motion for a preliminary injunction asking the Court to prevent the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") from transferring Petitioner out of the Western District of Washington or removing or deporting Petitioner from the United States. Dkt. 11. Federal Respondents do not request a hearing and ask that the motion be decided on the pleadings.

**ARGUMENT**

"It frequently is observed that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, *by a clear showing*, carries the burden of persuasion." *Mazurek v. Armstrong*, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis in original) (internal

---

<sup>1</sup> Respondent Bruce Scott is not a Federal Respondent.

1 quotations omitted); *Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “A plaintiff  
2 seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he  
3 is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities  
4 tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 20.  
5 Alternatively, a plaintiff can show that there are “serious questions going to the merits and the  
6 balance of hardships tips sharply towards [plaintiff], as long as the second and third *Winter* factors  
7 are satisfied.” *Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc.*, 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal  
8 quotation omitted).

9 **a. Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief concerning removal should be denied**

10 Petitioner’s argument that she could be removed to a third country is speculative. The  
11 record contains no declaration or evidence supporting this allegation, except her counsel’s  
12 statement that she is “aware that [the government does] not always take this step [to designate a  
13 third country where it may attempt removal] before effectuating third-country removal” and that  
14 “this administration has developed a pattern of deporting individuals from the United States  
15 without providing proper process and without allowing them access to federal review.” Dkt. 11,  
16 pp. 4, 6. Again, Petitioner bears the burden to show that preliminary injunctive relief is warranted,  
17 and conclusory statements are insufficient to meet that burden. At minimum, Petitioner should be  
18 required to present some evidence that she will be removed to a third country before injunctive  
19 relief is granted. *Khamba v. Albarran*, No. 25-1227-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 2959276, at \*10 n. 15  
20 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025) (declining to grant preliminary injunction against third country removal  
21 because any such fear was “speculative,” and petitioner did “not allege any specific threat of third  
22 country removal”).

23 We recognize that other courts in this district have granted preliminary injunctive relief  
24 concerning third-country removals, but in one, there was evidence that the noncitizen’s attorney

1 had been told by DHS that it was seeking to deport her client to a third country. *See, e.g., Baltodano*  
2 *v. Bondi*, No. 25-1958-RSL, 2025 WL 3123991, at \*1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2025). Moreover, even  
3 then, the injunctive relief that the courts granted was limited to requiring DHS to provide notice  
4 and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the detainee if it elected to pursue third-country  
5 removal. *Id.* at \*5; *see also Nguyen v. Scott*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2419288, at \*29 (W.D.  
6 Wash. Aug. 21, 2025). Petitioner’s request here goes beyond that relief, and instead, seeks to  
7 prevent DHS from altogether pursuing a third-country removal while this habeas petition is  
8 pending. Dkt. 11, p. 7. Petitioner’s motion fails to provide a sound basis for such relief.  
9 Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction should be dismissed.

10 **b. Petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction preventing her from being**  
11 **transferred away from the NWIPC should be denied**

12 Likelihood of success on the merits is a threshold issue: “[W]hen a plaintiff has failed to  
13 show the likelihood of success on the merits, [the court] need not consider the remaining three  
14 *Winters* elements.” *Garcia v. Google, Inc.*, 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation  
15 omitted). Here, Petitioner does not show that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her claim  
16 regarding transfers, and in fact her arguments as to the first *Winter* factor relate either to removal  
17 or to the relief that she actually seeks in this habeas petition – release from detention. *See* Dkt. 11,  
18 p. 4. On this basis, Petitioner’s motion for injunctive relief should be denied.

19 Notwithstanding, DHS has broad authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g) to determine the  
20 placement and transfer of detainees to appropriate detention facilities. Section 1231(g) explicitly  
21 authorizes DHS to arrange for appropriate places of detention for individuals detained pending  
22 removal or a decision on removal. *See also* 2025 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,  
23 National Detention Standards, <https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2025/nds2025.pdf>.  
24 This includes the authority to acquire, build, lease, and operate detention facilities to meet

1 operational needs. Placement and transfer decisions are made based on operational priorities,  
2 including proximity to immigration courts, facility capacity, security needs, medical care, and the  
3 ability to meet detention standards. For example, detainees may be placed in facilities near  
4 immigration courts to ensure efficient processing and participation in removal proceedings.  
5 Transfers occur when detainees need to be relocated to other facilities due to medical care,  
6 overcrowding, operational necessity, or security concerns.

7 The Ninth Circuit's decision in *GEO Group v. Newsom*, 50 F.4th 745 (9th Cir. 2022),  
8 further reinforces DHS's authority over detention and transfers. In *Geo Group*, the court held that  
9 California's AB 32, which banned private detention facilities, was preempted by federal law. The  
10 court emphasized that federal immigration law grants DHS/ICE's exclusive authority to manage  
11 detention operations, including the ability to contract with private entities and determine  
12 appropriate detention locations. *Id.* at 751.

13 Furthermore, Petitioner's claims that she faces irreparable injury if she were transferred are  
14 vague and speculative. *See Winter*, 555 U.S. at 22 (the mere "possibility" of irreparable harm is  
15 insufficient; instead, the moving party must "demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the  
16 absence of an injunction."). Petitioner's argument on this factor rests on her allegation that if she  
17 is transferred to any immigration detention facility other than the Northwest ICE Processing  
18 Center, it will result in separating her from "her attorneys, her family, and her support system."  
19 Dkt. 11, p. 5. Here again, Petitioner provides no declaration, evidence, or facts describing current  
20 communication practices between her and her counsel or her family, and how those conditions  
21 would be materially different or worse at any other immigration detention facility in the United  
22 States. *See ICE National Detention Standards*, Section 5.4 "Telephone Access" (detailing  
23 nationwide facility standards to ensure for "reasonable and equitable access to telephone  
24 services."). The mere assertion that communication with counsel and family could be disrupted is

1 insufficient to establish a likelihood of irreparable harm. *See Tellez Gomez v. Bondi*, No. 25-2248,  
2 2025 WL 3176941, at \*1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 11, 2025) (denying motion for TRO on similar  
3 argument that if detainee was transferred, it would be a threat to access of counsel of his choosing).

4 As to the third and fourth *Winter* factors, Petitioner provides only that she “will suffer great  
5 harm if she is ... transferred. The respondents will suffer no harm if she stays where she is.” Dkt.  
6 11, p. 6. As discussed above though, Federal Respondents have an interest in operating its  
7 detention facilities in a manner to meet their operational needs, which is also within the public  
8 interest. Within that, detainees may need to be relocated to other facilities due to medical care,  
9 overcrowding, operational necessity, or security concerns. Meanwhile, Petitioner only provides  
10 vague claims that she will suffer irreparable harm contacting her counsel and family without a  
11 declaration, evidence, or facts to support it. Therefore, the balance of equities and the public  
12 interest tips in the favor of Federal Respondents.

13 //

14 //

15 //

16 //

17 //

18 //

19 //

20 //

21 //

22 //

23 //

24 //

1 **CONCLUSION**

2 Accordingly, Federal Respondents ask the Court to deny the motion for preliminary  
3 injunction.

4 DATED this 21st day of November, 2025.

5 Respectfully submitted,

6 CHARLES NEIL FLOYD  
7 United States Attorney

8 *s/ James C. Strong*

9 JAMES C. STRONG, WSBA No. 59151

10 Assistant United States Attorney

11 United States Attorney's Office

12 Western District of Washington

13 700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220

14 Seattle, Washington 98101-1271

15 Phone: 206-553-7970

16 Fax: 206-553-4067

17 Email: [james.strong@usdoj.gov](mailto:james.strong@usdoj.gov)

18 *Attorneys for Federal Respondents*

19 *I certify that this memorandum contains 1,303*  
20 *words in compliance with the Local Civil Rules.*