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District Judge Ricardo S. Martinez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

LUIS RAMOS NEVAREZ,

Petitioner,

v.

CAMMILLA WAMSLEY, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Case No. 2:25-cv-02064-RSM

**FEDERAL RESPONDENTS’  
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER’S  
APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY’S  
FEES**

Noted for Consideration:  
February 23, 2026

Respondents oppose Petitioner’s motion for an award of \$4,587.65 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, Dkt. 17, because Respondents’ position in this case was substantially justified.

**LEGAL STANDARD**

A party may recover fees and costs under the EAJA only if (1) the party prevailed in the action; (2) the government’s position was not “substantially justified”; (3) no special circumstances would make an award unjust; (4) the requested fees and costs are reasonable; and (5) the party filed a timely and supported application. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (d); *United States v. Milner*, 583 F.3d 1174, 1196 (9th Cir. 2009).

1 Although the EAJA creates a presumption in favor of awarding fees to prevailing parties,  
2 fee shifting is not mandatory. *Flores v. Shalala*, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995). “Attorney’s fees  
3 are not available if the position of the United States is ‘substantially justified,’” *id.*, meaning  
4 “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” *Pierce v. Underwood*, 487 U.S. 552,  
5 566 (1992). The government bears the burden of demonstrating substantial justification by  
6 showing that it had “a reasonable basis both in law and fact.” *Flores*, 49 F.3d at 569–70 (quoting  
7 *Pierce*, 487 U.S. at 565). “[T]he government need not establish that it was correct or ‘justified to  
8 a high degree’ . . . but only that its position is one that a ‘reasonable person could think [is]  
9 correct.’” *Ibrahim v. U.S. Homeland Security*, 912 F.3d 1147, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2019) (*en banc*)  
10 (quoting *Pierce*, 487 U.S. at 566 n.2).

#### 11 ARGUMENT

12 Respondents’ position was substantially justified because it weighed the government’s  
13 interest in Petitioner’s detention against Petitioner’s private interest in not being detained, as  
14 required by the *Mathews* balancing test that formed the basis of the Petition. *See* Dkt. 2 at 7–8  
15 (citing *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). The Court acknowledged the  
16 government’s asserted interests but found them to be outweighed by Petitioner’s private interest  
17 in this case. *See* Dkt. 15 at 3–4. This disagreement, however, does not render Respondents’ position  
18 unjustified. The Ninth Circuit has held “[t]hat the Government lost does not raise a presumption  
19 that its position was not substantially justified.” *Edwards v. McMahon*, 834 F.2d 796, 802 (9th Cir.  
20 1987) (citation omitted). This principle is particularly applicable where, as here, the governing  
21 legal test requires a case-by-case balancing of factors about which reasonable litigants may reach  
22 different conclusions.

23 Nor does Respondents’ acknowledgement that other cases within this district have required  
24 pre-deprivation hearings for petitioners subject to mandatory detention render their opposition

1 unjustified. *See* Dkt. 12 at 6 n.1. Those cases underscore that there is no categorical rule requiring  
2 pre-deprivation hearings; rather, courts apply the *Mathews* balancing test to the circumstances of  
3 each case. *See, e.g., E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1321–24 (W.D. Wash. 2025)  
4 (conducting individualized *Mathews* analysis); *see also* Dkt. 15 at 3–4 (same). Here, Respondents  
5 set forth Petitioner’s specific circumstances, *see* Dkt. 12 at 2–3 & Dkt. 13, and were substantially  
6 justified in arguing that the *Mathews* factors weighed against the Petitioner under those facts, *see*  
7 Dkt. 12, even though the Court ultimately reached a different conclusion.

8 **CONCLUSION**

9 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s application for attorney’s fees should be denied.

10  
11 DATED this 17th day of February, 2026.

12 Respectfully submitted,

13 s/ Sean M. Arenson  
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23 *Attorney for Federal Respondents*

24 I certify this memorandum contains 548 words, in  
compliance with the Local Civil Rules.