


1 **Sonxai Rasakhamdee**

2 A# [REDACTED]
3 Otay Mesa Detention Center
4 P.O. Box 439049
5 San Diego, CA 92143-9049

6 Pro Se¹



7
8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
9 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

10 **SONXAI RASAKHAMDEE,**

11 **Petitioner,**

12 **v.**

13 **KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the**
14 **Department of Homeland Security,**
15 **PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General,**
16 **TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director,**
17 **Immigration and Customs Enforcement,**
18 **JESUS ROCHA, Acting Field Office**
19 **Director, San Diego Field Office,**
20 **CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden at**
21 **Otay Mesa Detention Center,**

22 **Respondents.**

CIVIL CASE NO.: '25CV2816 RBM DEB

Notice of Motion
and
Memorandum of Law
in Support of
Temporary Restraining Order

23
24
25 ¹ Mr. Rasakhamdee is filing this petition for a writ of habeas corpus and all
26 associated documents with the assistance of the Federal Defenders of San Diego,
27 Inc. That same counsel also assisted the petitioner in preparing and submitting his
28 request for the appointment of counsel, which has been filed concurrently with
this petition, and all other documents supporting the petition. Federal Defenders
has consistently used this procedure in seeking appointment for immigration
habeas cases. The Declaration of Kara Hartzler in Support of Appointment
Motion attaches case examples.

Introduction

Petitioner Sonxai Rasakhamdee ("Petitioner") faces immediate irreparable harm: (1) revocation of his release on immigration supervision, despite ICE's failure to follow its own revocation procedures; (2) indefinite immigration detention with no reasonable prospect of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future to the country designated by the immigration judge ("IJ"); and (3) potential removal to a third country never considered by an IJ. This Court should grant temporary relief to preserve the status quo.

Since he was ordered removed, Petitioner has spent about 14 years in the United States without the government being able to remove him to Laos. Yet on September 15, 2025, the government re-detained him. ICE gave him no opportunity to contest his re-detention, and there are no apparent changed circumstances justifying it. ICE does not appear to have a travel document in hand, and Laos has overwhelmingly declined to issue travel documents for deportees. Worse yet, in the likely case that ICE still proves unable to remove Petitioner to Laos, ICE's own policies allow ICE to remove him to a third country never before considered by the IJ in Petitioner's case, with either 6-to-24 hours' notice or no notice at all.

Petitioner is therefore facing both unlawful detention and a threat of removal to a dangerous third country without due process. The requested temporary restraining order ("TRO") and injunction would preserve the status quo while Petitioner litigates these claims by (1) reinstating Petitioner's release on supervision, and (2) prohibiting the government from removing him to a third country without an opportunity to file a motion to reopen with an IJ.

In granting this motion, this Court would not break new ground. Several courts have granted TROs or preliminary injunctions mandating release for post-final-removal-order immigrants like Petitioner. *See Phetsadakone v. Scott*, 2025 WL 2579569, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 5, 2025) (Laos); *Hoac v. Becerra*, No.

2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (Vietnam); *Phan v. Beccerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993735, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (Vietnam); *Nguyen v. Scott*, No. 2:25-CV-01398, 2025 WL 2419288, at *29 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025) (Vietnam). These courts have determined that, for these long-term releasees, liberty is the status quo, and only a return to that status quo can avert irreparable harm.

Several courts have likewise granted temporary restraining orders preventing third-country removals without due process. *See, e.g., J.R. v. Bostock*, 25-cv-01161-JNW, 2025 WL 1810210 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 30, 2025); *Vaskanyan v. Janecka*, 25-cv-01475-MRA-AS, 2025 WL 2014208 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 25, 2025); *Ortega v. Kaiser*, 25-cv-05259-JST, 2025 WL 1771438 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025); *Hoac v. Becerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); *Phan v. Beccerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993735, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025). Petitioner therefore respectfully requests that this Court grant this TRO and injunction.

Statement of Facts

I. In 2011, ICE tried and failed to remove Mr. Rasakhamdee because the Laotian consulate refused to issue travel documents.

Sonxai Rasakhamdee and his father came to the United States in 1990 as refugees from Laos. Exhibit A to habeas petition, “Rasakhamdee Declaration,” at ¶ 1. Mr. Rasakhamdee became a lawful permanent resident and remained so until 2011, when he was ordered removed due to a conviction for manslaughter. *Id.* at ¶ 3. After he was ordered removed, he was detained pending his removal for about four months. *Id.* at ¶ 4. Since that time, Mr. Rasakhamdee has not violated his supervision or been convicted of any new offenses. *Id.* But on September 15, 2025, ICE arrested Mr. Rasakhamdee at his annual check in. *Id.* at ¶ 6.

II. The government is carrying out deportations to third countries without providing sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard.

When removable immigrants cannot be removed to their home country—including Laotian immigrants—ICE has begun deporting those individuals to third countries without adequate notice or a hearing. As explained in greater detail in Petitioner’s habeas petition, the Administration has reportedly negotiated with countries to have many of these deportees imprisoned in prisons, camps, or other facilities. For example, the government paid El Salvador about \$5 million to imprison more than 200 deported Venezuelans in a maximum-security prison notorious for gross human rights abuses, known as CECOT. Edward Wong et al, *Inside the Global Deal-Making Behind Trump’s Mass Deportations*, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2025. In February, Panama and Costa Rica took in hundreds of deportees from countries in Africa and Central Asia and imprisoned them in hotels, a jungle camp, and a detention center. *Id.*; Vanessa Buschschluter, *Costa Rican court orders release of migrants deported from U.S.*, BBC (Jun. 25, 2025). On July 4, 2025, ICE deported eight men to South Sudan. *See* Wong, *supra*. On July 15, ICE deported five men to the tiny African nation of Eswatini, where they are reportedly being held in solitary confinement. Gerald Imray, *3 Deported by US held in African Prison Despite Completing Sentences, Lawyers Say*, PBS (Sept. 2, 2025). Many of these countries are known for human rights abuses or instability. For instance, conditions in South Sudan are so extreme that the U.S. State Department website warns Americans not to travel there, and if they do, to prepare their will, make funeral arrangements, and appoint a hostage-taker negotiator first. *See* Wong, *supra*.

On June 23 and July 3, 2025, in light of procedural arguments regarding the viability of national class-wide relief rather than individual relief, the Supreme Court issued a stay of a class-wide preliminary injunction issued in *D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security*, No. CV 25-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1142968,

1 at *1, 3 (D. Mass. Apr. 18, 2025). That national injunction had required ICE to
2 follow the statutory and constitutional requirements before removing an
3 individual to a third country. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. D.V.D.*, 145 S. Ct.
4 2153 (2025) (mem.); *id.*, No. 24A1153, 2025 WL 1832186 (U.S. July 3, 2025).
5 On July 9, 2025, ICE rescinded previous guidance meant to give immigrants a
6 “‘meaningful opportunity’ to assert claims for protection under the Convention
7 Against Torture (CAT) before initiating removal to a third country” like the ones
8 just described. Exh. B to Habeas Petition.

9 Under the new guidance, ICE may remove any immigrant to a third country
10 “without the need for further procedures,” as long as—in the view of the State
11 Department—the United States has received “credible” “assurances” from that
12 country that deportees will not be persecuted or tortured. *Id.* at 1. If a country fails
13 to credibly promise not to persecute or torture releasees, ICE may still remove
14 immigrants there with minimal notice. *Id.* Ordinarily, ICE must provide 24 hours’
15 notice. But “[i]n exigent circumstances,” a removal may take place in as little as
16 six hours, “as long as the alien is provided reasonably means and opportunity to
17 speak with an attorney prior to the removal.” *Id.* Upon serving notice, ICE “will
18 not affirmatively ask whether the alien is afraid of being removed to the country
19 of removal.” *Id.* (emphasis original). Depending on whether immigrants assert a
20 credible fear, they will either be removed or screened by USCIS for withholding
21 or removal or Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief within 24 hours. *Id.* If
22 USCIS determines that an individual does not qualify, they will be removed there
23 despite asserting fear. *Id.*

24 Argument

25 To obtain a TRO, a plaintiff “must establish that he is likely to succeed on
26 the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
27 relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the
28 public interest.” *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008);

1 *Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.*, 240 F.3d 832, 839-40 & n.7
2 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a TRO and preliminary injunction involve
3 “substantially identical” analysis). A “variant[] of the same standard” is the
4 “sliding scale”: “if a plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious questions
5 going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—
6 then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips
7 sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two *Winter* factors are satisfied.”
8 *Immigrant Defenders Law Center v. Noem*, 145 F.4th 972, 986 (9th Cir. 2025)
9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this approach, the four *Winter* elements
10 are “balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker
11 showing of another.” *All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131
12 (9th Cir. 2011). A TRO may be granted where there are “‘serious questions going
13 to the merits’ and a hardship balance. . . tips sharply toward the plaintiff,” and so
14 long as the other *Winter* factors are met. *Id.* at 1132.

15 Here, this Court should issue a temporary restraining order and an
16 injunction because “immediate and irreparable injury . . . or damage” is occurring
17 and will continue in the absence of an order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Not only have
18 Respondents re-detained Petitioner in violation of his due process, statutory, and
19 regulatory rights. ICE policy also allows them to remove him to a third country in
20 violation of his due process, statutory, and regulatory rights. This Court should
21 order Petitioner’s release and enjoin removal to a third country.

22
23 **I. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits, or at a minimum, raises serious merits questions.**

24 **A. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that ICE**
25 **violated its own regulations.**

26 In addition to *Zadvydas*’s protections, a series of regulations provide extra
27 process for someone who, like Petitioner, is re-detained following a period of
28 release. Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l), ICE may re-detain an immigrant on

1 supervision only with an interview and a chance to contest a re-detention. When
2 an immigrant is specifically released after giving good reason why they cannot be
3 removed, additional regulations apply: ICE may revoke a noncitizen's release and
4 return them to ICE custody due to failure to comply with conditions of release, 8
5 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1), or if, "on account of changed circumstances," a noncitizen
6 likely can be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. *Id.* § 241.13(i)(2).

7 The regulations further provide noncitizens with a chance to contest a re-
8 detention decision. ICE must "notif[y] [the person] of the reasons for revocation
9 of his or her release." *Id.* § 241.13(i)(3). ICE must then "conduct an initial
10 informal interview promptly" after re-detention "to afford the alien an opportunity
11 to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification." *Id.* During the
12 interview, the person "may submit any evidence or information" showing that the
13 prerequisites to re-detention have not been met, and the interviewer must evaluate
14 "any contested facts." *Id.*

15 ICE is required to follow its own regulations. *United States ex rel. Accardi*
16 *v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); see *Alcaraz v. INS*, 384 F.3d 1150,
17 1162 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The legal proposition that agencies may be required to
18 abide by certain internal policies is well-established."). A court may review a re-
19 detention decision for compliance with the regulations. See *Phan v. Beccerra*, No.
20 2:25-CV-01757, 2025 WL 1993735, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); *Nguyen v.*
21 *Hyde*, No. 25-cv-11470-MJJ, 2025 WL 1725791, at *3 (D. Mass. June 20, 2025)
22 (citing *Kong v. United States*, 62 F.4th 608, 620 (1st Cir. 2023)).

23 None of the prerequisites to detention apply here. Since ICE last tried to
24 deport him in 2024, Petitioner has not violated the conditions of his release. And
25 there are no changed circumstances that justify re-detaining him. ICE already
26 tried—and failed—to remove Petitioner twice and has given Petitioner no
27 indication that agents have a travel document in hand for him. Of course, ICE
28 may be planning to renew their request for a travel document from Laos. But

absent any evidence for “why obtaining a travel document is more likely this time around[,] Respondents’ intent to eventually complete a travel document request for Petitioner does not constitute a changed circumstance.” *Hoac v. Becerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (citing *Liu v. Carter*, No. 25-3036-JWL, 2025 WL 1696526, at *2 (D. Kan. June 17, 2025)). Nor has Petitioner received the interview required by regulation. No one from ICE has ever invited him to submit evidence to contest his detention. *Id.*

“[B]ecause officials did not properly revoke petitioner’s release pursuant to the applicable regulations,” this Court will likely find that “petitioner is entitled to his release” on an order of supervision. *Liu*, 2025 WL 1696526, at *3.

B. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that his detention violates *Zadvydas*.

In *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court considered a problem affecting people like Mr. Rasakhamdee: Federal law requires ICE to detain an immigrant during the “removal period,” which typically spans the first 90 days after the immigrant is ordered removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(2). And after that 90-day removal period expires, ICE may detain the migrant while continuing to try to remove them. *Id.* § 1231(a)(6). If that subsection were understood to allow for “indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention,” it would pose “a serious constitutional threat.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 699. In *Zadvydas*, the Supreme Court avoided the constitutional concern by interpreting § 1231(a)(6) to incorporate implicit limits. *Id.* at 689.

As an initial matter, *Zadvydas* held that detention is “presumptively reasonable” for at least six months after the removal order becomes final. *Id.* at 701. This acts as a kind of grace period for effectuating removals. Following the six-month grace period, courts must use a burden-shifting framework to decide whether detention remains authorized. First, the petitioner must prove that there is “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

1 reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.*

2 If he does so, the burden shifts to “the Government [to] respond with
3 evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” *Id.* Ultimately, then, the burden of
4 proof rests with the government: The government must prove that there is a
5 “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” or the
6 immigrant must be released. *Id.*

7 Here, Petitioner was ordered removed more than six months ago, as his
8 removal order became final in 2011. Rasakhamdee Dec. at ¶ 3. Thus, it is clear
9 that the *Zadvydas* grace period has ended.

10 There is also strong evidence that there is no “significant likelihood of
11 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. Laos
12 refused to accept Mr. Rasakhamdee during the four months he was detained in
13 2011. Rasakhamdee Dec. at ¶ 4, 5. Nothing has changed since the last time ICE
14 attempted to deport him. And to date, there is no indication that ICE has obtained
15 a travel document.

16 Finally, Petitioner’s criminal history cannot change this equation. Not only
17 has Petitioner proved that he poses no danger or flight risk, *Zadvydas* also
18 squarely prohibits ICE from indefinitely detaining immigrants because they pose
19 risks of danger or flight. 533 U.S. at 684–91.

20 Thus, this Court will likely find that Petitioner warrants *Zadvydas* relief.

21
22 **C. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that he is**
23 **entitled to adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard prior**
to any third country removal.

24 Finally, Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that he
25 may not be removed to a third country absent adequate notice and an opportunity
26 to be heard. U.S. law enshrines protections against dangerous and life-threatening
27 removal decisions. By statute, the government is prohibited from removing an
28 immigrant to any third country where a person may be persecuted or tortured, a

1 form of protection known as withholding of removal. *See* 8 U.S.C.
2 § 1231(b)(3)(A). The government “may not remove [a noncitizen] to a country if
3 the Attorney General decides that the [noncitizen’s] life or freedom would be
4 threatened in that country because of the [noncitizen’s] race, religion, nationality,
5 membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” *Id.*; *see also* 8
6 C.F.R. §§ 208.16, 1208.16. Withholding of removal is a mandatory protection.

7 Similarly, Congress codified protections in the CAT prohibiting the
8 government from removing a person to a country where they would be tortured.
9 *See* FARRA 2681-822 (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note) (“It shall be the policy
10 of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary
11 return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for
12 believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless
13 of whether the person is physically present in the United States.”); 28 C.F.R.
14 § 200.1; *id.* §§ 208.16-208.18, 1208.16-1208.18.

15 To comport with due process, the government must provide notice of third
16 country removal and an opportunity to respond. Due process requires “written
17 notice of the country being designated” and “the statutory basis for the
18 designation, i.e., the applicable subsection of § 1231(b)(2).” *Aden v. Nielsen*, 409
19 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2019); *accord D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of*
20 *Homeland Sec.*, No. 25-cv-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (D. Mass. May
21 21, 2025); *Andriasian v. INS*, 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999).

22 Due process also requires “ask[ing] the noncitizen whether he or she fears
23 persecution or harm upon removal to the designated country and memorialize in
24 writing the noncitizen’s response. This requirement ensures DHS will obtain the
25 necessary information from the noncitizen to comply with section 1231(b)(3) and
26 avoids [a dispute about what was said].” *Aden*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1019. “Failing
27 to notify individuals who are subject to deportation that they have the right to
28 apply for asylum in the United States and for withholding of deportation to the

1 country to which they will be deported violates both INS regulations and the
2 constitutional right to due process.” *Andriasian*, 180 F.3d at 1041.

3 If the noncitizen claims fear, measures must be taken to ensure that the
4 noncitizen can seek asylum, withholding, and relief under CAT before an
5 immigration judge in reopened removal proceedings. The amount and type of
6 notice must be “sufficient” to ensure that “given [a noncitizen’s] capacities and
7 circumstances, he would have a reasonable opportunity to raise and pursue his
8 claim for withholding of deportation.” *Aden*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1009
9 (citing *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) and *Kossov v. I.N.S.*, 132
10 F.3d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1998)); cf. *D.V.D.*, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (requiring a
11 minimum of 15 days’ notice). “[L]ast minute” notice of the country of removal
12 will not suffice, *Andriasian*, 180 F.3d at 1041; accord *Najjar v. Lunch*, 630 Fed.
13 App’x 724 (9th Cir. 2016), and for good reason: To have a meaningful
14 opportunity to apply for fear-based protection, immigrants must have time to
15 prepare and present relevant arguments and evidence. Merely telling a person
16 where they may be sent, without giving them a chance to look into country
17 conditions, does not give them a meaningful chance to determine whether and
18 why they have a credible fear.

19 Respondents’ third country removal program skips over these statutory and
20 constitutional procedural protections. According to ICE’s July 7 guidance,
21 individuals can be removed to third countries “without the need for further
22 procedures,” so long as “the [U.S.] has received diplomatic assurances.” Exh. B to
23 Habeas Petition at 1. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim on
24 this fact alone, because the policy instructs officers to provide no notice or
25 opportunity to be heard. The same is true of the minimal procedures ICE offers
26 when no diplomatic assurances are present. The policy provides no meaningful
27 notice (6-24 hours), instructs officers *not* to ask about fear, and provides no actual
28 opportunity to see counsel and prepare a fear-based claim (6-24 hours), let alone

1 reopen removal proceedings.

2 Faced with similar arguments, several courts have recently granted
3 individual TROs against removal to third countries. *See J.R.*, 2025 WL 1810210;
4 *Vaskanyan*, 2025 WL 2014208; *Ortega*, 2025 WL 1771438; *Hoac*, 2025 WL
5 1993771, at *7; *Phan*, 2025 WL 1993735, at *7.

6 **II. Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.**

7 Petitioner also meets the second factor, irreparable harm. “It is well
8 established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes
9 irreparable injury.’” *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)
10 (quoting *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Where the “alleged
11 deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further
12 showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” *Warsoldier v. Woodford*, 418 F.3d
13 989, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., *Federal*
14 *Practice and Procedure*, § 2948.1 (2d ed. 2004)).

15 Here, the potential irreparable harm to Petitioner is even more concrete.
16 “Unlawful detention certainly constitutes ‘extreme or very serious damage, and
17 that damage is not compensable in damages.’” *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d
18 976, 999 (9th Cir. 2017). Third-country deportations pose that risk and more.
19 Recent third-country deportees have been held, indefinitely and without charge, in
20 hazardous foreign prisons. *See Wong et al., supra*. They have been subjected to
21 solitary confinement. *See Imray, supra*. They have been removed to countries so
22 unstable that the U.S. government recommends making a will and appointing a
23 hostage negotiator before traveling to them. *See Wong, supra*. These and other
24 threats to Petitioner’s health and life independently constitute irreparable harm.

25
26 **III. The balance of hardships and the public interest weigh heavily in petitioner’s favor.**

27 The final two factors for a TRO—the balance of hardships and public
28 interest—“merge when the Government is the opposing party.” *Nken v. Holder*,

1 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). That balance tips decidedly in Petitioner's favor. On
2 the one hand, the government "cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any
3 legally cognizable sense" by being compelled to follow the law. *Zepeda v. I.N.S.*,
4 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Moreover, it is always in the public interest to
5 prevent violations of the U.S. Constitution and ensure the rule of law. *See Nken*,
6 556 U.S. at 436 (describing public interest in preventing noncitizens "from being
7 wrongfully removed, particularly to countries where they are likely to face
8 substantial harm"); *Moreno Galvez v. Cuccinelli*, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1208, 1218
9 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (when government's treatment "is inconsistent with federal
10 law, . . . the balance of hardships and public interest factors weigh in favor of a
11 preliminary injunction."). On the other hand, Petitioner faces weighty hardships:
12 unlawful, indefinite detention and removal to a third country where he is likely to
13 suffer imprisonment or serious harm. The balance of equities thus favors
14 preventing the violation of "requirements of federal law," *Arizona Dream Act*
15 *Coal. v. Brewer*, 757 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014), by granting emergency
16 relief to protect against unlawful detention and unlawful third country removal.

17 **IV. Petitioner gave the government notice of this TRO, and the TRO should**
18 **remain in place throughout habeas litigation.**

19 Upon filing this motion, proposed counsel emailed Janet Cabral, from the
20 United States Attorney's Office, notice of this request for a temporary restraining
21 and all the filings associated with it. Additionally, Petitioner requests that this
22 TRO and injunction remain in place until the habeas petition is decided. Fed. R.
23 Civ. Pro. 65(b)(2). Good cause exists, because the same considerations will
24 continue to warrant injunctive relief throughout this litigation, and habeas
25 petitions must be adjudicated promptly. *See In re Habeas Corpus Cases*, 216
26 F.R.D. 52 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). A proposed order is attached.
27
28

Conclusion

For those reasons, Petitioner requests that this Court issue a temporary restraining order.

DATED: 10-19-25

Respectfully submitted,



SONXAI RASAKHAMDEE

Petitioner

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, caused to be served the within Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order by email to:

U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of California
Civil Division
880 Front Street
Suite 6253
San Diego, CA 92101

Date: 10-21-25



Kara Hartzler