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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

MYKE JONATHAN CUX JOCOP,
a.k.a. Mike Cux Jocop,

*Petitioner*,

v.

SERGIO ALBARRAN, Field Office Director of the San Francisco Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the United States,

*Respondents*.

Case No.: 3:25-cv-09059-JD

**REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

**IMMIGRATION HABEAS CASE**

## I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Myke Jonathan Cux Jocop ("Mr. Cux Jocop") was previously released from immigration custody and has been living in the community—working, pursuing his immigration case, and taking care of his partner and their four young children—for more than five years. During that time, his only conviction from more than 12 years ago was vacated as legally invalid. Yet less than two weeks ago Respondents re-detained him without notice. They claim they did so because of unexplained "violations" of his release conditions for which they have provided no evidence or explanation. Mr. Cux Jocop vigorously contests these violations and has consistently endeavored to comply with requirements of the ISAP program, even affirmatively reaching out to his case officer when the smartphone application has appeared to malfunction. In any event, Respondents do *not* claim that Mr. Cux Jocop currently poses any risk of flight or danger to the community that would justify his continuing civil detention.

As this Court has already found, Mr. Cux Jocop is likely to show that his re-detention is unconstitutional. After voluntarily agreeing to the *Zepeda Rivas* settlement and allowing Mr. Cux Jocop to remain at liberty through the settlement period and beyond, Respondents cannot arbitrarily re-incarcerate him without process. Nothing in Respondents' arguments or new evidence undermines this Court's determination that Mr. Cux Jocop is entitled to pre-deprivation process to ensure any detention would be constitutionally permissible. The Court should convert its TRO into a preliminary injunction.

## II. RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Respondents do not contest that Mr. Cux Jocop is an indigenous Kachiquel man from Guatemala who [redacted] Dkt. 3, at 2; *see* Dkt. 7. [redacted] 7, at 3. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31. For nearly five years, Mr. Cux Jocop's case has been pending before the immigration court while he lives peacefully in the community. During that time, Respondents removed Mr. Cux Jocop's ankle monitor and granted him work authorization. See Exh. C (Work Permit Approval). In defending their decision to re-incarcerate him without

notice, Respondents make several misleading statements and omissions:

First, Respondents' narrative about Mr. Cux Jocop's criminal history omits the fact that he actually has *no* convictions. In 2021, a California state court vacated his sole prior conviction, dating from 2013, upon finding it legally invalid, and all charges were dismissed. Exh. B (Vacatur); *see Bent v. Garland*, 115 F.4th 934, 941 (9th Cir. 2024) (finding that a vacatur under Cal. Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1) is based on the legal invalidity of the conviction). Moreover, Respondents misleadingly refer to a 2017 arrest for "another violation" of California Penal Code sec. 261.5(c), but their own submissions reflect that this was related to an alleged probation violation from the 2013 conviction. *See* Dkt. 7-1 at ¶¶ 12, 14; Dkt. 7-2, at 40 (Rap Sheet) (referring to Case No. 421033A); Exh. B (Vacatur of 2013 conviction in case No. 421033A). The charges stemming from the 2017 probation violation were also ultimately dismissed. *See* Declaration of Peter Weiss ("Weiss Decl."), ¶ 21. After Mr. Cux Jocop was released from ICE custody in 2020, he learned that there was a warrant for a probation violation, turned himself in to address the warrant, and was released on his own recognizance a day later. *See* Exh. A, Declaration of Myke Jonathan Cux Jocop ("Cux Jocop Decl."), ¶ 3. He immediately appeared at ICE to inform them of these circumstances, and Respondents allowed him to remain at liberty. *Id.* When the 2013 conviction was subsequently vacated, any probation violations arising from it were also dismissed. *See* Exh B (Vacatur).

Second, Mr. Cux Jocop contests Respondents' vague allegations of four ISAP program violations. Dkt. 7, at 3; Exh. A (Cux Jocop Decl.), ¶ 17. As explained in Mr. Cux Jocop's declaration, over his more than five years of participation in ISAP, he has consistently attended dozens of in-person check-ins, telephonic check-ins, and video call check-ins. *Id.*, ¶¶ 6-10. He has never failed to upload a photo of himself to the BI SmartLINK app on a day when he had a scheduled biometric check in. *Id.*, ¶ 11. A few times after Mr. Cux Jocop uploaded his photo, he received a phone call or a message from his ISAP case officer, saying they had not received it. *Id.*, ¶¶ 15-16. Whenever this happened, Mr. Cux Jocop explained to the officer that he had already uploaded his photo, and uploaded it again. *Id.*. No officer described these occasions as violations, and Mr. Cux Jocop believed they were related to technical problems with the app.

*Id.*; *see also* Dkt. 3-4, 3-5 (noting reports of glitches with SmartLINK). Mr. Cux Jocop was completely unaware that ICE or ISAP alleged he had any violations until the day they re-detained him. Exh. A (Cux Jocop Decl.), ¶ 17. Mr. Cux Jocop has attempted to obtain evidence of his compliance, but ISAP apparently restricted access to his account history. *Id.*, ¶ 20.

After his release pursuant to this Court's TRO order, Mr. Cux Jocop reported to ICE in person the following Monday as instructed. *Id.*, ¶ 21. Respondents placed him back on monitoring, including in-person, video, and biometric check ins. *Id.*, ¶ 22. He is committed to continuing to appear as directed, as he has in the past. *See id.*, ¶ 17, 22. His immigration case and applications for relief remain pending before the immigration court. Weiss Decl., ¶ 6.

## III. ARGUMENT

The standard for TROs and preliminary injunctions are "substantially identical." *See Washington v. Trump*, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017). A TRO or preliminary injunction is appropriate if there are "serious questions" going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor. *Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). This Court granted a TRO, and nothing in Respondents' filing establishes that the TRO should not convert to a preliminary injunction.

### a. Mr. Cux Jocop is Likely to Succeed on the Merits

Mr. Cux Jocop is likely to succeed in showing—and has at least raised serious questions—that Respondents may not re-detain him after five years at liberty without providing him a hearing before a neutral adjudicator. Neither the statutory framework for his detention nor the *Zepeda Rivas* settlement agreement undermine Mr. Cux Jocop's right to due process. Given that Respondents have not even claimed Mr. Cux Jocop is currently a flight risk or danger, a pre-deprivation hearing is crucial to ensure detention complies with the Constitution.

#### i. Respondents' Arguments Regarding 8 U.S.C. § 1231 Are Irrelevant to Mr. Cux Jocop's Due Process Right to a Pre-Deprivation Hearing

First, Respondents claim that Mr. Cux Jocop is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, but this argument does nothing to negate Mr. Cux Jocop's due process claims. Dkt. 7 at 7. Courts in this district and elsewhere have repeatedly held that individuals detained under § 1231 and then released for years while their protection claims proceed retain a strong interest in their

liberty requiring pre-deprivation process. *See, e.g.*, *Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-05436-RFL, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139205 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025); *Alva v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-06676-RFL, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163060 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Arzate v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-cv-00942-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161136 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2025). Rather, "regardless of which detention statute applies," the constitution protects Mr. Cux Jocop's strong liberty interest in his five-years-long freedom, and prevents his re-detention without *any* notice or process. *Mendoza v. Albarran*, No. 25-cv-08205-VC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195992, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025). Courts have regularly found that due process requires a pre-deprivation hearing even for those otherwise subject to "mandatory" detention. *See, e.g., Duong*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185024 (granting PI for individual detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)). Nor does the fact that Mr. Cux Jocop would be detained under the post-removal order statute undermine his constitutional rights; the Ninth Circuit has clearly held that the "liberty interests of persons detained under § 1231(a)(6) are comparable to those of persons detained under § 1226(a)." *Diouf v. Napolitano*, 634 F.3d 1081, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2011).

Respondents repeatedly cite *Johnson v. Guzman-Chavez*, 594 U.S. 523 (2021), to support their contention that individuals detained under § 1231(a)(6) are "not entitled" to any bond hearing. But that decision held only that individuals subject to reinstatement of removal such as Mr. Cux Jocop are detained under § 1231 rather than § 1226, and therefore do not automatically receive a bond hearing under the regulations implementing the latter provision. *See id.* at 527 (citing the regulations). It did not consider a due process challenge to *re*-detention for someone already released. *See generally id.* In fact, the Supreme Court subsequently explicitly declined to answer the question whether the Due Process Clause may entitle individuals detained under § 1231(a)(6) to a bond hearing at some point. *Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. 573, 583 (2022). And as the Ninth Circuit has explained, the government's ability to subject noncitizens to immigration detention "is always constrained by the requirements of due process." *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017).

Nor do the regulations promulgated by DHS concerning re-detention under § 1231(a)(6) operate as a shield to constitutional challenges, as Respondents would have it. ECF 7, at 15–16

(citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)). *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (rejecting the dissent's contention that the post-order detention regulations were sufficient to protect a noncitizen's liberty interest). Contrary to Respondents' argument, Mr. Cux Jocop does not lodge a facial challenge to the post-order custody regulations. *See* ECF 1. Rather, he contends that in his particular circumstances—where he has lived without incident in the community for more than five years while his immigration court proceeding is ongoing—he has a sufficient liberty interest and is due notice and an opportunity to contest any alleged ISAP violations prior to re-incarceration. Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 40-45. The government has previously conceded that as-applied constitutional challenges to the post-order regulations "remain available." *Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. at 583. Mr. Cux Jocop raises at least serious questions that, in his particular case, the constitution requires more than the minimal post-detention process set forth by the regulations.

**ii. The *Zepeda Rivas* Settlement Did Not Eliminate Mr. Cux Jocop's Strong Interest in His 5-Years-Long Liberty**

Respondents' contention that Mr. Cux-Jocop's release was "always temporary" under the *Zepeda Rivas* litigation—and that the government can therefore re-arrest him without any process whatsoever—fails on both its reading of the settlement agreement and the law. Again, the majority of courts to consider this issue have rejected Respondents' position. *See Alas v. Albarran*, No. 25-cv-08774-VC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207060 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025) (granting TRO preventing re-detention of individual released under *Zepeda-Rivas*); *Qazi v. Albarran*, No. 2:25-cv-02791-TLN-SCR, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191922 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 29, 2025) (granting PI); *Duong v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-07598-JST, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185024 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2025) (same); *Carballo v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-cv-00978-KES-EPG (HC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158839 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025) (same).

Although the *Zepeda-Rivas* bail process was based on avoiding harm from COVID-19, Judge Chhabria took particular care to avoid releasing individuals who posed a flight risk or danger to the community. *See Zepeda-Rivas v. Jennings*, 445 F. Supp. 3d 36, 40 (N.D. Cal. 2020). After initially appealing the preliminary injunction in *Zepeda-Rivas*, the government then voluntarily dismissed its appeal and agreed to a settlement that allowed Mr. Cux Jocop to remain at liberty. *See generally Zepeda Rivas*, No. 20-v-02731-VC, ECF 1205-1, at 21

("*Zepeda Rivas* Settlement"). By doing so, the government necessarily determined Mr. Cux Jocop did *not* pose a flight risk or danger; if he *had*, the government certainly would not have voluntarily permitted him to remain in the community. That determination is analagous to a prior release decision by DHS that, as numerous courts have found, gives noncitizens a protected liberty interest in release. *See Alas*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207060, *2 (citing *Pinchi v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-05632-PCP, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142213 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025).

Further, Respondents' claim that the settlement agreement made clear Mr. Cux Jocop would be re-detained is wrong. Dkt. 7, at 12. Despite "rigorously negotiating" the agreement, *id.* at 13, the government included no terms in the settlement requiring re-detention of class members at the end of the 3-year period, nor establishing that release would necessarily be temporary. *See Zepeda Rivas* Settlement. Instead, the agreement stated that, subsequent to its sunset date, re-arrest "will occur pursuant to generally applicable law and policy." *Id.*, at 16 (Section III.G). That undoubtedly includes the constitutional principles regarding the due process rights of those previously released from custody. *See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Further, the government voluntarily agreed that the settlement "shall not have any preclusive effect" on a class member's legal challenge to the basis for their custody "now or in the future." *Zepeda Rivas* Settlement (Section VII.B). Thus, as Judge Tigar explained, the settlement does not override Mr. Cux Jocop's due process right to notice and a hearing before the revocation of his yearslong liberty. *See Duong*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185024, at *12.

In any event, Respondents' arguments regarding Mr. Cux Jocop's expectations about the duration of his liberty are a red herring. Under *Morrissey* and its progeny, the crucial question to determine whether there is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause is the *level of freedom* enjoyed during release—not whether, as Respondents' contend, the release is "conditional." Dkt. 7, at 15; *see, e.g., Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 481 (finding due process right in release even though parole officer had "broad discretion" to revoke parole); *Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina*, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010); *Young v. Harper*, 520 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1997) (considering whether a preparole program "is more similar to parole or minimum security imprisonment"). Indeed, even a person released from custody by mistake has a protected liberty

interest because he "like a parolee, was able to be—and was—gainfully employed and free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life." *Hurd v. District of Columbia*, 864 F.3d 671, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Here, Respondents do not contest that during the last five years, Mr. Cux Jocop has lived with his family, worked, and pursued his asylum case, and that his re-detention would cause "grievous loss" for him and his family. *See Morrisey*, 408 U.S. at 481; Dkt. 3-2, ¶¶ 5–6. Mr. Cux Jocop has doubtless enjoyed the same level of freedom as the conditionally released people in *Morrissey*, *Young*, and *Hurd*.

Ignoring the majority of courts that have agreed with this Court's TRO reasoning, Respondents cite the lone decision concluding otherwise, *Giorges v. Kaiser*, No. 25cv7683-NW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201578 (Oct. 10, 2025), and a case on which it heavily relied, *Uc Encarnacion v. Kaiser*, No. 22-cv-04369-CRB, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188274 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2022). Dkt. 7, at 12-13. Yet as Judge Chhabria explained, *Giorges*' reliance on *Encarnacion*—in which a noncitizen was detained upon the BIA's reversal of an IJ's bond order—is misplaced, because in *Encarnacion* the IJ's release order never became final while on appeal before the BIA. *See Alas*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207060, at *2; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39. Here, by contrast, the *Zepeda Rivas* bail order finding Mr. Cux Jocop *not* to be a flight risk or danger became final, at the latest, upon the government's settlement and decision not to pursue its appeal of *Zepeda Rivas*. Further, unlike in *Encarnacion*, neither the IJ nor BIA has *ever* found that Mr. Cux Jocop is a flight risk or danger such that he should be detained.

Finally, Mr. Cux Jocop's substantial interest in his continued liberty is further buttressed by the government's delays. Despite an asylum officer finding he had a reasonable fear of persecution more than four years ago, the immigration judge has still not resolved his claims for relief. By "cho[osing] to allow [Mr. Cux Jocop's]'s proceedings to continue for [nearly] five years while he reintegrated into the community" the government allowed him to develop a

substantial liberty interest. *Duong*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185024, at *14. Respondents' fail to establish that Mr. Cux Jocop can nevertheless be re-detained without process.

**iii. The *Mathews* Test Weighs Heavily in Mr. Cux Jocop's Favor**

Respondents acknowledge that the *Mathews* test is "flexible" and can apply to due process challenges to immigration detention. Dkt. 14, at 10. They provide no compelling reason to overturn the Court's proper application of that framework in its TRO order. *See* Dkt. 6.

First, Mr. Cux Jocop's interest in his freedom from bodily restraint is at the "heart of the liberty" inherent in the Due Process Clause. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Mr. Cux Jocop has spent the last five years at liberty caring for his family. Respondents claim that Mr. Cux Jocop's interest is reduced because he was released pursuant to the *Zepeda* Rivas litigation. Dkt. 7, at 15. As explained above, that is wrong. But even assuming that Mr. Cux Jocop would be subject to re-detention under § 1231(a)(6), the Due Process Clause puts limits on that statute. *Zadvdas*, 533 U.S. at 690. Given that Respondents are attempting to re-detain Mr. Cux Jocop *long beyond* the six month post-removal order period identified in *Zadvydas*, and his case has been pending more than four years before an immigration judge, there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. *Id.* at 701. Mr. Cux Jocop has a strong interest in remaining at liberty while his case proceeds.

Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is extraordinarily high. Indeed, respondents have not even attempted to assert that Mr. Cux Jocop is *currently* a risk of flight or danger to the community, the only permissible justifications for civil immigration detention. *See generally* Dkt. 7; *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. Mr. Cux Jocop has no criminal convictions, and has dutifully appeared for his immigration appointments—including the most recent scheduled appointment at which ICE arrested him upon arrival. Dkt. 3-2, ¶ 22. A judge in this District already determined Mr. Cux Jocop is *not* a flight risk or danger, and that determination has been confirmed by his conduct for the past five years. Although Respondents allege without evidence or detail that Mr. Cux Jocop missed four biometric check ins, they do not contend—nor could they, in light of his long history of compliance with ICE—that this actually makes him a flight risk. In any event, he vigorously contests any violations, has provided evidence of technological

glitches with SmartLINK, and has been prevented by Respondents from accessing evidence of his compliance. Exh. A (Cux Jocop Decl.), ¶ 20; Dkt. 3-4, 3-5. In these circumstances, a hearing prior to detention is particularly important. *Zinermon v. Burch*, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (a hearing is usually required "before the State deprives a person of liberty"); *J.O.L.R. v. Wofford*, No. 1:25-cv-01241-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202706, at *14-15 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (where compliance with release conditions was contested, issuing PI requiring pre-deprivation hearing at which government bears the burden by clear and convincing evidence).

Respondents' contention that the regulations provide sufficient safeguards to protect against unwarranted detention is belied by the negligible steps they took here, which they claim satisfies their obligations. Dkt. 7, at 16 Though the regulations require that a noncitizen previously released under § 1231(a)(6) "be notified of the reasons" for revoking release, 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1), neither ICE nor ISAP ever provided Mr. Cux Jocop notice that he was out of compliance prior to his re-detention. Exh. A (Cux Jocop Decl.), ¶ 17. The letter they provided him upon re-detention states only in conclusory terms "you violated the conditions multiple times" without any explanation, dates, or specifics. Dkt 7-2, at 33. Although the regulations require an interview to afford an opportunity to "respond to the reasons for revocation," 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1), the handwritten notation apparently memorializing that "interview" is not signed by Mr. Cux Jocop and does not show he was given any further information regarding the supposed "violations," nor an opportunity to access his SmartLINK application or other evidence of compliance. Dkt. 7-2, at 27. The regulations relied upon by Respondents clearly offer little protection to prevent erroneous re-detention. Instead, for those far beyond the 90-day removal period like Mr. Cux Jocop, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly required a hearing at which Respondents bear the burden to justify further detention by clear and convincing evidence. *See Singh v. Holder*, 638 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011); *Diouf*, 634 F.3d at 1091–92.

Third, Respondents' interest in detaining Mr. Cux Jocop *without an individualized hearing* is low. *See Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 994 ("The government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by a lesser bond or

alternative conditions."). Respondents' claims that *one* additional hearing would overburden the immigration system is specious in comparison to the "staggering" cost to taxpayers of detention itself. *Id.* at 996. Nor do Respondents contend that there is any urgent need to incarcerate Mr. Cux Jocop for removal; rather, his case remains ongoing and he has continued to judiciously comply with ICE directives even after his most recent release. Exh. A (Cux Jocop Decl.), ¶ 22. The *Mathews* test weighs in Mr. Cux Jocop's favor, and he is likely to succeed on his procedural due process claim. *See* Dkt. 1, at 17–18.

**b. Mr. Cux Jocop Would Suffer Irreparable Harm if Detained**

Respondents ignore the Ninth Circuit's recognition of the "irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention," *Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 995, and do not contest Mr. Cux Jocop's allegations of "alarmingly poor conditions in ICE detention centers." Dkt. 3, at 16. Unwarranted detention would also leave Mr. Cux Jocop's family without his income, and would leave his four young children without a caregiver during the day, while his partner is at work. Dkt. 3-2. Respondents argue that there is no irreparable harm where Mr. Cux Jocop is not clearly entitled to relief, but that is wrong. *See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying a sliding scale approach to PI factors). Regardless, Mr. Cux Jocop has shown that detention would violate his constitutional rights, which "unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012).

**c. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Favor Mr. Cux Jocop**

Finally, Respondents allege no concrete harm to the government from a preliminary injunction. Dkt. 7. Respondents' statement regarding "Congress' mandate that aggravated felons be detained" appears to be cut and pasted from another case; Mr. Cux Jocop has no convictions and is not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Dkt. 7, at 18. In *this* case, the public interest "lies on the side of affording fair procedures to all persons," including Mr. Cux Jocop. *Lopez v. Heckler*, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983). Here, that requires a hearing before a neutral adjudicator before Mr. Cux Jocop is arbitrarily and unnecessarily detained.

## II. CONCLUSION

For all the above reasons, and those stated in Mr. Cux Jocop's TRO Motion, this Court should convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction.

Dated: November 3, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Peter Weiss
Peter Weiss
Etan Newman
*Pro Bono* Attorneys for Mr. Cux Jocop