

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA**

YUVANIA ZAMORA CASTILLO,

CASE NO.

Petitioner,

JUDGE:

v.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE:

GARRETT J. RIPA, Field Office Director, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Miami Field Office, Enforcement and Removal Operations; **JUAN AGUDELO**, Acting Assistant Field Office Director and Office-in-Charge, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Broward Transitional Center, Pompano Beach, Florida; **Richard R. DEL TORO, JR.**, Sheriff, St. Lucie County, Florida, **JOHN DOE #1**, Deputy Sheriff, St. Lucie County, Florida, **JOHN DOE #2**, Deputy Sheriff, St. Lucie County, Florida, **UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT**, **KRISTI NOEM**, Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security; **PAMELA J. BONDI**, Attorney General of the United States; **TODD M. LYONS**, Acting Director, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

COMES NOW the Petitioner ("Petitioner"), YUVANIA ZAMORA CASTILLO, by and through her undersigned counsel, and petitions this Honorable Court to issue a writ of *habeas*

corpus to remedy her unlawful detention by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and in support thereof respectfully alleges as follows:

CUSTODY

1. This action arises out of Respondents’ unlawful and unconstitutional interrogation and detention of Petitioner; Respondents’ failure to properly train local law enforcement officers regarding the scope of their authority under, and proper implementation of, the 287(g) agreement between St. Lucie County and the United States Department of Homeland Security U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Respondents’ implementation of policies and practices that condone and perpetuate the unlawful behavior at issue in this Petition; and Respondents’ unlawful interrogation and arrest of Petitioner without any reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

2. Petitioner is in the custody of Defendant-Respondent (“Respondent”) GARRETT J. RIPA and JUAN AGUDELO at ICE’s Broward Transitional Center, 9300 North Powerline Road, Pompano Beach, Florida 33073.

3. Petitioner has been detained by Respondents since approximately September 26, 2025. Petitioner was initially detained at the St. Lucie County, Florida Jail, then transferred to the Martin County, Florida Jail, before being subsequently transferred to the ICE Broward Transitional Center in Pompano Beach, Florida where she continues to be detained even though the federal government has no significant likelihood of removing her from the United States.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*

5. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), and Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution (“Suspension

Clause”), as Petitioner is currently in custody under color of the authority of the United States in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

6. Venue for the complaint for injunctive relief is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), as Respondents are officers or employees of the United States. Venue for the habeas action is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 *et seq.*, as Respondents exercise control over Petitioner’s custody.

PARTIES

7. Petitioner is a citizen and national of Nicaragua and has been assigned Alien Registration Number A [REDACTED] by the Respondents. She is a resident of St. Lucie County, Florida.

8. Respondent-Defendants (“Respondents”) are government agencies and officials as more fully set forth below.

9. Suit is brought against Respondent GARRETT J. RIPA in his official capacity as the Field Office Director of the ICE office in Miami, Florida which controls the ICE Broward Transitional Center in Pompano Beach, Florida. In that capacity, he is the legal custodian of the Petitioner and has the power or ability to produce or release the Petitioner if directed to do so by this Court.

10. Suit is brought against Respondent JUAN AGUDELO, in his official capacity of Acting Assistant Field Office Director and Office-in-Charge, of the ICE Broward Transitional Center, Pompano Beach, Florida who oversees the day to day operations of the Broward Transitional Center and acts at the direction of Respondents RIPA, LYONS, NOEM and BONDI. In this capacity he is a custodian of Petitioner.

11. Respondent RICHARD R. DEL TORO, JR., is the Sheriff of St. Lucie County, Florida. Under state and municipal law, he is charged with ultimate responsibility for the training

and supervision of St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office ("SLCSO") Deputies, and for the administration and implementation of SLCSO policies, practices, and/or customs. Respondent DEL TORO is also the SLCSO signatory of a memorandum of agreement with U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), which authorizes certain deputy sheriffs to carry out limited, specified functions of federal immigration officers (the "287(g) MOA"). Respondent DEL TORO is sued in his official and individual capacities. During all times relevant to this Petition Respondent DEL TORO was acting under color of state law as a law enforcement agent of St. Lucie County.

12. Respondent JOHN DOE #1 is a deputy sheriff of the SLCSO. He is responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the SLCSO. JOHN DOE #1 arrested Petitioner without the authority to do so, but his identity is unknown. He is sued in his official and individual capacities. During all times relevant to this Complaint, Respondent JOHN DOE #1 was acting under color of state law as a law enforcement agent of St. Lucie County. Petitioner is unaware of the true name of Respondent DOE #1 and therefore sues this Respondent by fictitious name. This Doe Respondent is responsible and liable for the acts and/or damages alleged in this Petition. Petitioner will amend this Petition to allege DOE #1's true name when it has been ascertained.

13. Respondent JOHN DOE #2 is a deputy sheriff of the SLCSO. He is responsible for carrying out the policies, practices, and/or customs of the SLCSO. He also participated in the arrest of Petitioner, but his identity is unknown. He is sued in his official and individual capacities. During all times relevant to this Complaint, Respondent JOHN DOE #1 was acting under color of state law as a law enforcement agent of St. Lucie County. Petitioner is unaware of the true name of Respondent DOE #2 and therefore sues this Respondent by fictitious name. This Doe

Respondent is responsible and liable for the acts and/or damages alleged in this Petition. Petitioner will amend this Petition to allege DOE #2's true name when it has been ascertained.

14. Suit is brought against Respondent UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) as it is the agency responsible for administration of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §1101 *et. seq.*, including, but not limited to, the detention and removal of aliens from the United States. ICE is a component of the United States Department of Homeland Security.

15. Suit is brought against Respondent KRISTI NOEM in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. In that capacity, she has responsibility for the administration and enforcement of immigration laws.

16. Suit is brought against Respondent PAMELA J. BONDI in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States. In that capacity she has responsibility for the administration and enforcement of immigration laws and delegates this responsibility to the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), which is subject to her control and direction. Respondent BONDI is legally responsible for administering the Petitioner's deportation proceedings.

17. Suit is brought against Respondent TODD M. LYONS in his official capacity as the Acting Director of ICE, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security. In that capacity he is responsible for the administration of ICE and the implementation of the immigration laws of the United States.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

18. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause (OSC) to Respondents "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an OSC is issued, the Court must require Respondents to file a return "within

three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.* (emphasis added).

19. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The Great Writ has been referred to as “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added).

20. Habeas corpus must remain a swift remedy. Importantly, “the statute itself directs courts to give petitions for habeas corpus ‘special, preferential consideration to insure expeditious hearing and determination.’” *Yong v. INS*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit warned against any action creating the perception “that courts are more concerned with efficient trial management than with the vindication of constitutional rights.” *Id.*

OVERVIEW OF THE 287(g) PROGRAM

21. The 287(g) program is named for Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1357(g). Through the 287(g) program, state and local law enforcement officers collaborate with the federal government to enforce federal immigration laws.

22. Section 287(g) of the INA allows the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enter into formal written agreements (Memoranda of Agreement or MOAs) with state or local law enforcement agencies that deputize selected state and local law enforcement officers to perform certain functions of federal immigration agents. As of October 15, 2025, Respondent U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had signed 287(g) agreements with 1033 state or local law enforcement agencies across 40 states.

23. These MOAs are negotiated between DHS and the local authorities and include delegation of authority to some state and local officers. Deputized local law enforcement officers are required to abide by federal civil rights laws and regulations. In general, deputized officers are authorized to: 1) interview individuals to ascertain their immigration status; 2) check DHS databases for information on individuals; 3) issue immigration detainers to hold individuals until ICE takes custody; 4) enter data into ICE's database and case management system; 5) issue a Notice to Appear (NTA), which is the official charging document that begins the removal process; 6) make recommendations for voluntary departure in place of formal removal proceedings; 7) make recommendations for detention and immigration bond; and 8) transfer noncitizens into ICE custody.

24. Respondent ICE has created three types of 287(g) agreements: the "jail enforcement" model which is designed to identify and process removable aliens with criminal convictions or pending criminal charges – who are arrested by state or local law enforcement agencies," the "task force model" which "serves as a force multiplier for law enforcement agencies to enforce limited immigration authority with ICE oversight during their routine police duties," and the "warrant service officer" model which "allows ICE to train, certify and authorize state and local law enforcement officers to serve and execute administrative warrants on aliens in their agency's jail."¹

25. Under the jail enforcement model (JEM), deputized officers *may interrogate suspected noncitizens who have been arrested on state or local charges to determine their immigration status*. Deputized officers may issue immigration detainers, which are administrative

¹ See <https://www.ice.gov/identify-and-arrest/287g> (last accessed October 16, 2025).

requests from ICE to law enforcement agencies to hold a non-citizen for up to 48 hours after they would otherwise be released.


26. Under the warrant service officer (WSO) model, ICE trains, certifies, and authorizes selected state and local law enforcement officers to execute ICE administrative warrants. These officers are permitted to perform the arrest functions of an immigration officer *within the law enforcement agency's jails and/or correctional facilities*. The WSO model differs from the jail enforcement model in that ICE does not authorize the local law enforcement officer to interrogate alleged noncitizens about their immigration status.

27. Under the task force model (TF), local law enforcement agents who encounter suspected noncitizens during their daily activities are authorized to question and arrest individuals that they believe violated immigration law—in other words, they can enforce immigration law *during routine police activity*. These deputized local law enforcement agents can issue ICE detainers, arrest warrants, and search warrants, as well as inquire into individuals' immigration status.

28. Under all 287(g) Agreements, law enforcement agencies act under Federal authority as delegated by Respondent ICE.

29. Upon information and belief, Respondent DEL TORO, JR., has executed 287(g) agreements on behalf of the St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office (SLSCO) under the Warrant Service Officer Model and the Task Force Model.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

30. Petitioner is a 44-year-old female citizen and national of Nicaragua and has been assigned file number A  by the Respondents. She resides in St. Lucie County, Florida.

31. On or about February 15, 2008, Petitioner entered the United States without being inspected by an immigration officer and subsequently applied for asylum in the United States.

32. On or about October 30, 2008, Petitioner was ordered removed from the United States by the Immigration Court in Miami, Florida. She thereafter appealed the Immigration Court's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals which dismissed her appeal on October 29, 2021. Petitioner is therefore subject to an administrative final order of removal.

33. Petitioner has never received notice from the Respondents to submit for removal from the United States.

34. On or about June 4, 2016, Petitioner married Rommel Emil Madriz, a citizen of the United States.

35. On or about December 13, 2016, Mr. Madriz, through prior counsel, filed a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) seeking to classify the Petitioner eligible for permanent residence in the United States as the Spouse of a U.S. citizen. On or about September 8, 2018, USCIS approved the I-130 petition. *See* Exhibit No. 1. USCIS sent the approved petition to the Department of State's National Visa Center (NVC).

36. On or about November 18, 2021, Petitioner, through prior counsel, filed an Application for Permission to Reapply For Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) with USCIS. On or about November 18, 2024 USCIS approved the application. *See* Exhibit No. 2.

37. On or about September 26, 2025, JOHN DOE #1 AND JOHN DOE #2, appeared at Petitioner's residence in Port St. Lucie, St. Lucie County, Florida.

38. Neither JOHN DOE #1 nor JOHN DOE #2 was in possession of a judicial warrant allowing for the arrest of the Petitioner.

39. Neither JOHN DOE #1 nor JOHN DOE #2 was in possession of an administrative warrant allowing for the arrest of the Petitioner.

40. JOHN DOE #1 knocked on the door of Petitioner's residence. Petitioner opened the door and remained inside her home. Petitioner denied entry into her home by

41. JOHN DOE #1 advised Petitioner that she had to come out of her home into the entryway to speak with JOHN DOE #1. and JOHN DOE #2.

42. When Petitioner declined, JOHN DOE #1 asked if JOHN DOE #1 AND JOHN DOE #2 could enter Petitioner's home. Petitioner refused to allow them entry into her home.

43. Petitioner asked why she had to exit her home and was advised by JOHN DOE #1 that she had a "ICE detainer" and that she had to come with them.

44. A "detainer" issued by ICE is not an arrest warrant.

45. Respondent JOHN DOE #1 further advised that they were going to call ICE and if ICE said "yes" then Petitioner was going to have to "go with them" and "if they say "no" then you're good to go." JOHN DOE #1 further advised Petitioner that "at this point you are being detained and are not free to go."

46. Respondent JOHN DOE #1 further stated to the Petitioner "you're not under arrest. All we're going to do is take you to jail. You're going to get a court date and everything like that."

47. Respondent JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2 thereafter forcibly removed Petitioner from her home.

48. Petitioner has no criminal history, is not a danger to the community, and is not a flight risk.

49. Petitioner's removal from the United States is not reasonably foreseeable in the immediate future.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

50. Petitioner has exhausted her administrative remedies to the extent required by law, and her only remedy is by way of this action.

51. There has been no prior judicial review of this matter.

IRREPARABLE INJURY

52. Petitioner has suffered, is suffering, and will continue to suffer irreparable injury unless equitable relief is ordered by this Honorable Court. Respondents' conduct is depriving Petitioner of her liberty without providing her due process of law. The deprivation of her liberty is, in and of itself, irreparable harm.

53. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2243, this Court can order the Respondents to file a response within three days, unless they can show cause for additional time. ("The writ or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days is allowed.").

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I **(UNLAWFUL SEIZURE)**

54. Petitioner repeats and realleges each of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 53 as if the same were incorporated herein in full.

55. This is an action for damages in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution Amendments 4, 5 and 14.

56. Respondent JOHN DOE #1 nor Respondent JOHN DOE #2 had no probable cause that Petitioner had committed a crime nor did exigent circumstances exist to allow for the arrest of the Petitioner.

57. Respondents JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2 acting under color of state law violated Petitioner's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure when they knowingly, intentionally and willfully removed Petitioner from her home and arrested her without a warrant or other legal authority.

58. Respondents JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2 interrogated and detained Petitioner without reasonable, individualized, articulable suspicion that Petitioner was engaged in unlawful activity. They found her in her home with the door closed.

59. Neither Petitioner nor a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter because:

- a. Respondents JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2 specifically appeared at Petitioner's residence for the sole purpose of taking Petitioner into custody;
- b. Respondent JOHN DOE #1 told Petitioner she was not free to leave. This is inconsistent with not being under arrest;
- c. Respondents JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2 were in uniform and armed; and
- d. Respondents JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2 approached Petitioner jointly and with purpose;

60. Respondents JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2's conduct violated Petitioner's right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

61. Respondents JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2's conduct was in violation of any 287(g) Agreement signed by Respondent DEL TORO, JR.

62. As a result of Petitioner's unlawful arrest, Respondents DEL TORO, JR., JOHN DOE #1, and JOHN DOE #2 caused the Petitioner to be transferred to ICE custody.

63. Petitioner is currently in the custody of Respondent ICE under or by color of the authority of the United States based on her detainment at the Broward Transitional Center in Pompano Beach, Florida.

64. As a result of Respondents' actions, Petitioner suffered damages including, but not limited to, violation of her constitutional rights, loss of liberty, monetary damages, emotional distress and physical pain and suffering.

65. Petitioner has been forced to retain undersigned counsel to pursue the instant action and is indebted for a reasonable attorney's fee.

COUNT II
(UNLAWFUL ARREST)

66. Petitioner repeats and re-alleges each of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 53 as if the same were incorporated herein in full.

67. Petitioner was not charged or arrested for violation of a criminal law.

68. Respondents JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2 arrested Petitioner without legal authority to do so and in the absence of any exigent circumstances, probable cause, or reason to believe that she had engaged in any criminal activity.

69. As a result of Respondents actions, Petitioner suffered damages including, but not limited to, violation of her constitutional rights, loss of liberty, monetary damages, emotional distress and physical pain and suffering.

COUNT III
(PERSONAL SUPERVISOR LIABILITY)

70. Petitioner repeats and re-alleges each of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 53 as if the same were incorporated herein in full.

71. Respondent DEL TORRO, JR. was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations of Petitioner's rights by knowingly and intentionally creating, implementing, enforcing, encouraging, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in a policy, practice, and/or custom in which local law enforcement officials engaged in the unconstitutional conduct described in the foregoing claims.

72. Respondent DEL TORRO, JR. was personally involved in and proximately caused the aforementioned violations through his deliberate indifference to Petitioners' rights and his grossly negligent training and supervision of his subordinates, including but not limited to Respondents JOHN DOE#1 and JOHN DOE #2.

73. Respondent DEL TORRO, JR., the St. Lucie County Sheriff, is responsible for implementing and administering the policies, practices, and/or customs of the SLCSO.

74. Respondent DEL TORRO, JR. is also responsible for supervising, monitoring, and disciplining SLCSO deputies in the commission of their duties, including Respondents JOHN DOE#1 and JOHN DOE #2.

75. Respondent DEL TORRO, JR. was or should have been aware that only SLCSO deputies authorized pursuant to the 287(g) MOA could enforce federal immigration law, absent express direction and supervision from federal authorities.

76. Respondent DEL TORRO, JR. was or should have been aware that Respondents JOHN DOE#1 and JOHN DOE #2 were not authorized to enforce federal immigration law under the 287(g) MOA.

77. Respondent DEL TORRO, JR. was or should have been aware that SLCSO deputies who were not certified under the 287(g) MOA, including Respondents JOHN DOE#1 and JOHN DOE #2, are neither trained nor directed to enforce federal immigration law or execute civil immigration warrants.

78. Respondent DEL TORRO, JR. was or should have been aware that SLCSO deputies who not certified under the 287(g) MOA, including Respondents JOHN DOE#1 and JOHN DOE #2, are neither trained nor directed on proper procedures regarding immigration records, including federal civil immigration warrants, identified in the NCIC database.

79. Respondent DEL TORRO, JR. ratified the unlawful seizure and arrest of Petitioner by failing to object to or repudiate her seizure and arrest by Respondents JOHN DOE#1 and JOHN DOE #2.

80. Respondent DEL TORRO, JR. ratified the unlawful seizure and arrest of Petitioner by his actions approving of her seizure and arrest by Respondents JOHN DOE#1 and JOHN DOE #2 and failing to take any disciplinary actions against them.

81. As a result of Respondent DEL TORRO, JR.' acts and/or omissions, Petitioner suffered damages, including but not limited to violation of her constitutional rights, loss of liberty, monetary damages, emotional distress, and physical pain and suffering.

COUNT IV
(UNLAWFUL DETENTION)

82. Petitioner repeats and re-alleges each of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 53 as if the same were incorporated herein in full.

83. Petitioner was unlawfully arrested by RESPONDENTS JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2.

84. Petitioner was unlawfully detained by RESPONDENT DEL TORO, JR., and transferred to the custody of Respondent ICE.

85. Petitioner's detention violates 8 U.S.C. 1231.

86. Petitioner was unlawfully detained.

87. Petitioner is being detained for immigration purposes when Respondents know that they cannot affect her prompt deportation from the United States in the reasonably foreseeable future, that Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and has not violated the terms and/or conditions of her Order of Supervision.

88. Respondents have no permissible basis for depriving Petitioner of her liberty in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) as well as their respective implementing regulations. A judicial order requiring Petitioner's release from custody would remedy Respondents' unlawful conduct.

89. Petitioner is being unlawfully held by Respondent ICE as a result of a violation of her rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.

90. Other than as punishment for a crime, due process permits the government to take away liberty only "in certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances . . . where a special justification . . . outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (quotations omitted). Such special justification exists only where a restraint on liberty bears a "reasonable relation" to permissible purposes. *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); *see also Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. In the immigration context, those purposes are "ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings and preventing danger to the community." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (quotations omitted).

91. Those substantive limitations on detention are closely intertwined with procedural due process protections. *Foucha*, 504 U.S. 78-80. Noncitizens have a right to adequate procedures to determine whether their detention in fact serves the purpose of ensuring their appearance or protecting the community. *Id.* at 79; *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. 692; *Casas-Castrillon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 535 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2008). Where laws and regulations fail to provide such procedures, the habeas court must assess whether the noncitizen's immigration detention is reasonably related to the purpose of ensuring his appearance or protecting the community. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 699.

92. Because Petitioner was detained without any determination that she poses a danger or flight risk, and because she in fact poses no danger or flight risk, her detention violates due process.

93. Petitioner has been forced to retain undersigned counsel to pursue the instant action and is indebted for a reasonable attorney's fee.

RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, Petitioner, YVANNIA ZAMORA CASTILLO, prays that this Honorable Court grant her the following relief:

1. Accept jurisdiction over this action.
2. Immediately issue an order directing Respondents to show cause why the writ should not be granted.
3. Issue a writ of *habeas corpus*, directed to Respondents, ordering Petitioner's immediate release from custody.
4. Order that Respondent immediately release Petitioner if she is subsequently transferred from her current detention to any other facility and continuing thereafter.

5. Order Respondents to provide this Honorable Court and counsel for the Petitioner with at least three days' notice prior any attempt to deport the Petitioner from the United States.

6. Declare as unlawful and unconstitutional Respondents' conduct because it violates Petitioner's substantive due process rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

7. Declare as unlawful and unconstitutional Respondents' conduct because it violates Petitioner's procedural due process rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

8. Declare as unlawful and unconstitutional Respondents' conduct because it violates Petitioner's rights against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

9. Award Petitioner her suit money, costs and attorney's fees incurred as a result of bringing this action.

10. Grant such further relief as Petitioner may request and/or this Honorable Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.

Respectfully submitted,

DEVORE LAW GROUP, P.A.
Attorneys for Petitioner
4100 RCA Blvd.
Suite 110
Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33410
Telephone: (561) 478-5353
Facsimile: (561) 478-2144

By: s/ Jeffrey A. Devore
JEFFREY A. DEVORE, ESQ.
Florida Bar No. 0845493
jdevore@devorelawgroup.com

VERIFICATION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242 I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner because I am the Petitioner's attorney and I have discussed with the Petitioner the facts and events described in this Petition. Based on those discussions, I hereby verify that the statements made in this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

By: s/ Jeffrey A. Devore
JEFFREY A. DEVORE, ESQ.
Florida Bar No. 0845493
jdevore@devorelawgroup.com


Exhibit No. 1


U.S. Department of Homeland Security
 West Palm Beach Field Office
 9300 Belvedere Rd.
 Royal Palm Beach, FL 33411
 U.S. Citizenship
 and Immigration
 Services



NOTICE OF APPROVAL OF RELATIVE IMMIGRANT VISA PETITION

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PETITIONER

Rommel Emil Madriz


NAME OF BENEFICIARY	
Yuvania Del Carmen Zamora Castillo	
CLASSIFICATION	FILE NO.
201(b)	
	RECEIPT
DATE PETITION FILED	DATE OF APPROVAL
December 13, 2016	September 8, 2018

DATE: September 8, 2018

The visa petition you filed has been approved. The beneficiary for whom you filed has been given the appropriate classification. Note the approval gives no assurance that the beneficiary will automatically be found eligible for visa issuance, admission to the United States or adjustment to lawful permanent resident status. Whether the beneficiary gets a visa is decided only when an application is made to a consular officer; whether the beneficiary is admitted or adjusts status in the United States is decided only when an application is made to an immigration officer.

1. YOUR PETITION TO CLASSIFY THE BENEFICIARY AS AN IMMEDIATE RELATIVE OF A UNITED STATES CITIZEN HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO THE UNITED STATES CONSULATE AT _____ . THIS COMPLETES ALL ACTION BY THIS SERVICE ON THE PETITION. THE UNITED STATES CONSULATE, WHICH IS PART OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WILL CONTACT THE BENEFICIARY AND GIVE INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT GETTING A VISA. QUESTIONS ABOUT GETTING A VISA SHOULD BE MADE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSUL.
2. IF YOU BECOME A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES AND AN IMMIGRANT VISA HAS NOT YET BEEN ISSUED TO THE BENEFICIARY, NOTIFY THIS OFFICE IMMEDIATELY, GIVING THE DATE OF YOUR NATURALIZATION. IF THE PETITION WAS IN BEHALF OF YOUR SON OR DAUGHTER, PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER THAT PERSON IS STILL UNMARRIED. THIS INFORMATION MAY BE HELPFUL TO THE BENEFICIARY IN GETTING A VISA FASTER.
3. YOUR PETITION FOR PREFERENCE CLASSIFICATION HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO THE UNITED STATES CONSULATE AT _____ . THIS COMPLETES ALL ACTION BY THE SERVICE. THIS SERVICE DOES NOT ISSUE VISAS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. VISAS ARE ISSUED ONLY BY UNITED STATES CONSULS WHO ARE EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE. WHEN THE BENEFICIARY'S TURN IS REACHED ON THE VISA WAITING LIST, THE UNITED STATES CONSUL WILL CONTACT THE BENEFICIARY AND GIVE INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT GETTING A VISA. VISAS ARE ISSUED ACCORDING TO THE DATE THE PETITION WAS FILED. QUESTIONS ABOUT GETTING A VISA SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE UNITED STATES CONSUL.
4. YOUR PETITION SAYS THAT THE BENEFICIARY IS IN THE UNITED STATES AND WILL APPLY TO BECOME A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT. THE ENCLOSED APPLICATION (FORM I-485) SHOULD BE COMPLETED AND SUBMITTED BY THE BENEFICIARY WITHIN 30 DAYS. (IF THE BENEFICIARY PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED SUCH AN APPLICATION AND HAD IT RETURNED, IT SHOULD BE RESUBMITTED WITHIN 30 DAYS.)
5. THE BENEFICIARY WILL BE INFORMED OF THE DECISION MADE ON THE PENDING APPLICATION TO BECOME A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT.
6. THE PETITION SAYS THAT THE BENEFICIARY IS IN THE UNITED STATES AND WILL APPLY TO BECOME A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT. THE BENEFICIARY MAY NOT APPLY TO BECOME A PERMANENT RESIDENT UNTIL A VISA NUMBER IS AVAILABLE. INFORMATION ABOUT VISA NUMBERS MAY BE OBTAINED FROM THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, D.C.
7. ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF YOUR PETITION UNACCOMPANIED BY COPIES HAVE BEEN MADE A PERMANENT PART OF THE PETITION. ANY OTHERS ARE BEING RETURNED WITH THIS FORM.
8. YOUR APPROVED PETITION WAS FORWARDED TO THE NATIONAL VISA CENTER (NVC). THE NVC WILL THEN FORWARD THE PETITION TO THE APPROPRIATE CONSULATE. THE CONSULATE WILL CONTACT THE BENEFICIARY AND GIVE INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT GETTING A VISA. QUESTIONS ABOUT GETTING A VISA SHOULD BE MADE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSULATE. SEE ADDRESS IN REMARKS.
9. YOUR APPROVED PETITION AND PENDING APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE (FORM I-485) HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO THE IMMIGRATION COURT HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE FORM I-485. IN THIS INSTANCE THE COURT IN

Remarks: Your Petition for Alien Relative, Form I-130 has been approved.

Very Truly Yours

Wendy Wilcox
 Wendy Wilcox

Exhibit No. 2