

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA**

Khai Nguyen,

Case No.: 5:25-CV-01204-JD

Petitioner

v.

Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement; Marcos Charles, Acting Executive Associate Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations; Mark Siegel, Field Office Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations; U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Scarlet Grant, Warden of Cimarron Correctional Facility.

Respondents.

**PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM OF
LAW IN SUPPORT OF
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER UNDER FRCP 65(b) AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
UNDER FRCP 65(a)**

**EXPEDITED HANDLING
REQUESTED**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS	i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	ii
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES	1
BACKGROUND ON HABEAS CORPUS	1
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY	6
ARGUMENT	7
I. The Government Is Abridging Petitioner’s Constitutional Right to Due Process	9
II. The Government’s Evidence of Removability Does Not Satisfy <i>Zadvydas</i> or 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3)	12
III. Petitioner’s Interest in Avoiding Unnecessary Extended Detention Far Exceeds the Government’s Interests in Detaining Petitioner	14
IV. The Government’s Detention of Petitioner Is Punitive	16
V. A Temporary Restraining Order Is Warranted.	17
CONCLUSION	21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page(s)
Cases	
<i>Boumediene v. Bush</i> , 553 U.S. 723 (2008)	1, 3, 20
<i>Bridges v. Wixon</i> , 326 U.S. 135 (1945)	15
<i>Caballo Coal Co. v. Ind. Mich. Power Co.</i> , 305 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2002)	18
<i>Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer</i> , 781 F. Supp. 3d 137	5, 16, 19
<i>Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc.</i> , 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981)	18
<i>Davis v. Garland</i> , 91 F.4th 1259 (8th Cir. 2024)	14
<i>Ex parte Milligan</i> , 71 U.S. 2 (1866)	2
<i>Garcia Gomez v. Gonzales</i> , 498 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2007)	14
<i>Gutierrez-Almazan v. Gonzales</i> , 491 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 2007)	14
<i>Hamdan v. Rumsfeld</i> , 548 U.S. 557 (2006)	2
<i>Hamdi v. Rumsfeld</i> , 542 U.S. 507 (2004)	2
<i>Hoac v. Becerra</i> , No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025)	5, 15, 19
<i>Khalil v. Trump</i> , No. 25-CV-01963 (MEF/MAH), 786 F. Supp. 3d 871 (D.N.J. June 11, 2025)	4

<i>Korematsu v. United States</i> , 323 U.S. 214 (1944)	2
<i>Lonchar v. Thomas</i> , 517 U.S. 314 (1996)	19
<i>Mahdawi v. Trump</i> , 781 F. Supp. 3d 214 (D. Vt. Apr. 30, 2025)	4
<i>Matacua v. Frank</i> , 308 F. Supp. 3d 1019 (D. Minn. 2018)	19
<i>Mathews v. Diaz</i> , 426 U.S. 67 (1976)	14
<i>Mathews v. Eldridge</i> , 424 U.S. 319 (1976)	14, 15
<i>Mohammed H. v. Trump</i> , 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (D. Minn. June 17, 2025)	3, 4, 17
<i>Noem v. Abrego Garcia</i> , 145 S. Ct. 1017 (2025)	4
<i>Ozturk v. Trump</i> , 783 F. Supp. 3d 801 (D. Vt. May 16, 2025)	4
<i>Rasul v. Bush</i> , 542 U.S. 466 (2004)	2
<i>Reno v. Flores</i> , 507 U.S. 292 (1993)	15
<i>Roble v. Bondi</i> , No. 25-cv-3196, 2025 WL 2443453 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025)	4, 18
<i>Rokhfirooz v. Larose</i> , No. 25-CV-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025)	5, 15, 19
<i>Rombot v. Souza</i> , 296 F. Supp. 3d 383 (D. Mass. 2017)	5, 15, 19
<i>Sanchez v. Barr</i> , 919 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2019)	15

<i>Sarail A. v. Bondi</i> , No. 25-CV-2144, 2025 WL 2533673 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025).....	4, 18
<i>United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy</i> , 347 U.S. 260 (1954)	15
<i>United States v. Caceres</i> , 440 U.S. 741 (1979)	15
<i>Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.</i> , 555 U.S. 7 (2008)	18
<i>Zadvydas v. Davis</i> , 533 U.S. 678 (2001)	passim
Statutes	
28 U.S.C. § 2241	1
28 U.S.C. § 451	2
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3)	6, 7
Constitutional Provisions	
U.S. Const. amend. V	14
U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2	1
Rules	
Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)	17
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)	1, 20
Regulations	
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(1)	passim
8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13	passim
8 C.F.R. pt. 241	7

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Petitioner Khai Nguyen has filed a petition seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. *See* ECF No. 1. Nguyen subsequently filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), which this Memorandum supports.

Due to the uniqueness of this petition and motion being filed during an ongoing shutdown of the federal government, Petitioner seeks to have his TRO decided without first providing Notice to the Respondents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).

BACKGROUND ON HABEAS CORPUS

The origin of the writ of habeas corpus lies in clause 39 of the Magna Carta, which stated that no free man could be imprisoned except by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. *See Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 740 (2008) (citations omitted). The Magna Carta, and especially clause 39, was designed to limit the king’s power by protecting the most fundamental rights of free men. *See Boumediene*, 553 U.S. at 739-42 (collecting sources).

When the United States seceded from Great Britain, the Framers of the Constitution and the States that were to make up the Union, in order to ensure sufficient signatories, reserved debate on most of the civil rights for a few years in what would later become the Bill of Rights. However, one right was so fundamental and so undisputed that it was placed into the actual Constitution. *See generally* U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The Framers and the States thus recognized and agreed that habeas corpus is the most fundamental and important civil right in any free society. *Cf. Boumediene*, 553 U.S. at 743 (“Surviving accounts of the ratification debates provide additional evidence that the Framers deemed

the writ to be an essential mechanism in the separation-of-powers scheme.”). As Alexander Hamilton explained in *The Federalist* No. 84:

“[T]he practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny. The observations of the judicious Blackstone ... are well worthy of recital: ‘To bereave a man of life ... or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a *more dangerous engine* of arbitrary government.’ And as a remedy for this fatal evil he is everywhere peculiarly emphatical in his encomiums on the *habeas corpus* act, which in one place he calls ‘the bulwark of the British Constitution.’ ” C. Rossiter ed., p. 512 (1961) (quoting 1 Blackstone *136, *id.*, at *438).

Throughout the history of the United States, habeas corpus has had three principal eras of importance. First, there was the post-reconstruction era following the civil war. *See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (ruling that civilians cannot be tried by military tribunals when civilian courts are open and functioning); Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 385, 28 U.S.C. § 451 et seq. The second era occurred during World War 2 when the United States placed persons of Japanese origin in internment camps. *See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States*, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), *abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii*, 585 U.S. 667 (2018). Most recently, there was the war on terror and associated detentions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. *See Rasul v. Bush*, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (foreign nationals housed at Guantanamo Bay had the right to challenge their detention via habeas corpus); *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (U.S. citizens designated as “enemy combatants” and detained in the United States have a constitutional right to due process, including a meaningful opportunity to challenge their detention before a neutral decisionmaker); *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, 548

U.S. 557 (2006) (military commissions used to try Guantanamo Bay detainees lacked congressional authorization and violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Convention); *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 740 (2008) (foreign detainees at Guantanamo Bay have a constitutional right to habeas corpus and the Military Commissions Act of 2006's procedures were an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus).

We are now in the fourth major era of habeas, which began when the present administration started arbitrarily revoking student visas and detaining students on the basis of those revocations, deporting individuals not from El Salvador to Salvadoran prison without due process, jailing immigrants for exercising their rights to free speech, and announcing an intent to use civil detention punitively against criminal aliens. *Accord, cf.*, ECF No. 1-1, Exhibit 1, *100 Days of Fighting Fake News*, HOMELAND SECURITY (Apr. 30, 2025).¹

The student visa issue showed that the administration's animus against immigrants is not restricted to immigrants who are present without authorization or in violation of law. *Accord Mohammed H. v. Trump*, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1158 (D. Minn. June 17, 2025) ("Punishing Petitioner for protected speech or **using him as an example to intimidate other students into self-deportation is abusive and does not reflect legitimate immigration detention purposes.**") (emphasis added). The administration's animus against criminal aliens and other noncitizens with unexecuted final orders of removal is especially pronounced. *See* ECF No. 1-1, Exhibit A ("**The reality is that prison isn't**

¹ Available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/04/30/100-days-fighting-fake-news>.

supposed to be fun. It's a necessary measure to protect society and punish bad guys. It is not meant to be comfortable. What's more: prison can be avoided by self-deportation. CBP Home makes it simple and easy. If you are a criminal alien and we have to deport you, you could end up in Guantanamo Bay or CECOT. Leave now.") (emphasis added).

Over the past few months, courts around the country have found that the present immigration administration is using immigration detention punitively, as well as to coerce noncitizens into self-deporting from the United States. *E.g.*, *Mohammed H. v. Trump*, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1158 (D. Minn. June 17, 2025); *Khalil v. Trump*, No. 25-CV-01963 (MEF/MAH), 786 F. Supp. 3d 871 (D.N.J. June 11, 2025), *opinion clarified*, No. 25-CV-01963 (MEF/MAH), 2025 WL 1981392 (D.N.J. July 16, 2025), and *opinion clarified*, No. 25-CV-01963 (MEF/MAH), 2025 WL 1983755 (D.N.J. July 17, 2025); *Noem v. Abrego Garcia*, 145 S. Ct. 1017 (2025); *Mahdawi v. Trump*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 214, 232-33 (D. Vt. Apr. 30, 2025); *Ozturk v. Trump*, 783 F. Supp. 3d 801, 811 (D. Vt. May 16, 2025) ("Ms. Ozturk argued that her detention is punishment for her op-ed, and that her punishment is intended to serve as a warning to other non-citizens who are contemplating public speech on issues of the day. The Court found that Ms. Ozturk has presented credible evidence to support her argument.").

Moreover, in courts around the country, a cornucopia of judges from a variety of districts have granted habeas petitions on expedited bases that are nearly identical the petition presented by Nguyen. *Roble v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-3196, 2025 WL 2443453 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release); *Sarail A. v. Bondi*, No. 25-

CV-2144, 2025 WL 2533673 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release); *Sonam T. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-2834, *slip op.*, ECF No. 19 (D. Minn. Sept. 16, 2025); *see also Sonam T. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-2834, ECF No. 25 (D. Minn. Sept. 19, 2025) (ordering release); *Yee S. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-02782-JMB-DLM, ECF No. 13 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release); *Constantinovici v. Bondi*, No. 3:25-CV-02405-RBM-AHG, ECF No. 15 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release); *Rokhfirooz v. Larose*, No. 25-CV-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release); *Hoac v. Becerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (finding petitioner was likely to succeed on unlawful redetention claim because “there is no indication that an informal interview was provided”); *Rombot v. Souza*, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387-88 (D. Mass. 2017) (holding that ICE’s failures to follow regulatory revocation procedures rendered detention unlawful); *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 164 W.D.N.Y. 2025 (“because ICE did not follow its own regulations in deciding to redetain [the petitioner], his due process rights were violated, and he is entitled to release”).

In other more recent cases in the district of Minnesota, the federal respondents have been voluntarily agreeing to release people whose circumstances are nearly identical to Petitioner. *Accord Mehran S. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3724, ECF No. 11 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2025) (ordering release); *Omar J. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3719 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2025), ECF No. 11 (ordering release).

In this district, there are three other similarly situated habeas petitions pending. *See*

Momennia v. Bondi, No. 5:25-CV-1067-J (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2025); *Bahadorani v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-01091-PRW (W.D. Okla. Sept. 21, 2025); *Pham v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-01157-SLP (W.D. Okla. Oct. 6, 2025). The judges in each of those cases have granted the petitioner's request to have their petitions adjudicated on an expedited basis. *Accord Momennia v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-1067-J (W.D. Okla.), ECF No. 12; *Bahadorani v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-01091-PRW (W.D. Okla.), ECF Nos. 12-13; *Pham v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-01157-SLP (W.D. Okla.), ECF No. 14.

The Petitioner in this case, Khai Nguyen is a victim of the present government's animus against immigrants. His detention lacks legitimacy because it is intended to be punitive. His detention lacks legitimacy because it occurred in violation of law. Mr. Nguyen requires a writ of habeas corpus.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Nguyen is a citizen of Vietnam who was ordered removed from the United States on March 3, 1998. ECF No. 1, ¶ 2. Nguyen did not appeal his order of removal, rendering it administratively final 30 days later on April 2, 1998, after the appeal deadline lapsed. *Id.*

Nguyen does not recall his exact length of prior civil detention but believes that he was detained in immigration detention for about three years, in excess of six months prior to being released on an Order of Supervision ("OOS") on under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) and 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13, and believes he was released on the OOS in or around 2001. *See id.*, ¶ 3.

In releasing Nguyen from custody and placing him on an OOS, Respondents necessarily concluded, among other things, that: (1) "[t]ravel documents for the alien are

not available or, in the opinion of the Service, immediate removal, while proper, is otherwise not practicable or not in the public interest;" (2) "[t]he detainee is presently a non-violent person;" (3) "[t]he detainee is likely to remain nonviolent if released;" (4) "[t]he detainee is not likely to pose a threat to the community following release;" (5) "[t]he detainee is not likely to violate the conditions of release;" and (6) "[t]he detainee does not pose a significant flight risk if released." *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e)(1)-(6).

ARGUMENT

Petitioner's present detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and its implementing regulations at 8 C.F.R. pt. 241. Section 1231 mandates detention "[d]uring the removal period." *Accord* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). However, the same section also requires the government to actually remove the alien during this removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Petitioner's removal period began on April 2, 1998, "[t]he date the order of removal [became] administratively final." 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).

The "removal period" is "90 days." 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Petitioner's removal period therefore elapsed on July 1, 1998 (90 days after the 30-day appeal period elapsed following the order of removal, assuming *arguendo* Petitioner did not waive appeal causing the removal period to begin on the date the removal order issued). *See* ECF No. 1, ¶ 66.

Once a noncitizen is released on an OOS, they are subject to certain conditions of release. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(1). Redetention is permitted where it is alleged a noncitizen violated the conditions of release. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(2), (i). No allegation is made that Petitioner violated the conditions of release.

Regulations also permit the government to withdraw or otherwise revoke release under specific circumstances. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(4). One permissible reason to revoke release occurs when, “on account of changed circumstances, the Service determines that **there is a significant likelihood** that the alien may be removed **in the reasonably foreseeable future.**” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) (emphasis added). Once such a determination is made, the noncitizen must “be notified of the reasons for revocation of [their] release” and must be provided with “an initial informal interview... to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). “The revocation custody review **will** include an evaluation of any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.” *Id.* (emphasis added). If a noncitizen is not released following the informal interview, “the provisions of [8 C.F.R. § 241.4] shall govern the alien’s continued detention pending removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Once the provisions of § 241.4 take effect, it appears that the consequence is a total reset of the 90-day removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), though this regulation is likely *ultra vires* to statute as an arbitrary or capricious interpretation of statute that exceeds statutory authority. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(b)(4); ECF No. 1, ¶ 71.

Under the Supreme Court’s decision in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, a person subject to a final order of removal cannot, consistent with the Due Process Clause, be detained indefinitely pending removal. 533 U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001). *Zadvydas* established a temporal marker: post-final order of removal detention of six months or less is presumptively constitutional. *Zadvydas* at 701. *Zadvydas* also stated:

After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, **the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink.**

533 U.S. at 701 (emphasis added).

I. The Government Is Abridging Petitioner’s Constitutional Right to Due Process.

Because Nguyen was released under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 on an order of supervision “after the expiration of the removal period,” and after he “has provided good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal to the country to which he... was ordered removed, or to a third country, in the reasonably foreseeable future,” any future determinations as to whether there is a significant likelihood of removing Nguyen in the reasonably foreseeable future are governed by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a)-(b).

Thus, if *Zadvydas* is read in conjunction with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3), the Service was required to rebut, **with evidence**, Nguyen’s previous showing that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future **before** the Service redetained Nguyen. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. The Service is required to provide credible evidence of the changed circumstances used to justify redetaining Nguyen. *See id.*

The Service cannot meet this burden, as the Notice of Revocation of Release (“Notice”) that was ostensibly served on Nguyen does not identify the changed circumstances that justify redetention. *See generally* ECF No. 1, ¶ 49 (“**Nguyen does not**

recall ever having been served with a [Notice] purporting to revoke his OOS, nor does he recall having been given any sort of informal interview to challenge the Notice.”) (emphasis added). This is dispositive because the government, not Petitioner, bears the burden of making an evidentiary showing that satisfies *Zadvydas* by rebutting the showing Petitioner previously made that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future prior to his release on his OOS. If the Court were to allow the government to arbitrarily reset the removal period more than twenty years later and then force Petitioner to make another new showing that removal is not significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, the Court would necessarily render 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1), (3) superfluous while simultaneously negating the Supreme Court’s principal holding in *Zadvydas*. The Court must disallow the government’s implicit attempts to improperly shift the evidentiary burden to Petitioner.

Nguyen cannot be removed to Vietnam because he does not have a valid travel document and Vietnam will not issue one to him; Nguyen also lacks a Vietnamese birth certificate. *See* ECF No. 1, ¶ 12. Nguyen cannot be removed to an allegedly safe third country until the government obtains a travel document for Petitioner that allows him to enter that allegedly safe third country. **The government has been unable to obtain a travel document that would permit Nguyen’s removal to any country since at least April 2, 1998, a period of more than 27 years.** Nguyen was taken into custody prior to the government applying for a travel document for Nguyen. The government still does not have a travel document for Nguyen even though, as of the time of this filing, a significant

period has elapsed since Petitioner was redetained. Moreover, ICE has not even identified as of yet the third country it hopes to remove Petitioner to (if any), nor has it received any indication from any country that a travel document for Nguyen is expected soon.

Zadvydas stated that “for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” 533 U.S. at 701. Petitioner’s aggregate period of prior civil confinement is believed and alleged to far exceed six months. *See* ECF No. 1, ¶ 3. This means that “the reasonably foreseeable future,” as applied to the facts of Petitioner’s case, is significantly shorter than would be the case for an individual with a significantly shorter period of prior post-removal confinement. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701.

Zadvydas, in the context of Petitioner’s case, requires the government to have sufficient evidence to rebut the previously established showing that Petitioner’s removal is not significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. Because Petitioner was already confined post-final-order and then released on an OOS after a finding was made that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the government was required to already have a valid travel document for Petitioner prior to detaining Petitioner under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3). At absolute minimum, the government would have needed to have already applied for said travel document *and* been given some sort of positive affirmation from the relevant third-country government that a travel document for Petitioner would be received by a specific date certain in the very near future that would permit the government to promptly deport Petitioner after redetaining him.

II. The Government's Evidence of Removability Does Not Satisfy *Zadvydas* or 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3).

The only evidence the government relies upon to assert that Petitioner's removal was significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future consists of the Notice of Revocation of Release (if any) (which, assuming *arguendo* such a notice exists and was served, likely states in a completely conclusory fashion that "ICE has determined there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future in your case" based on unidentified "changed circumstances"). At the time of Nguyen's arrest, up through the present, ICE has no information that could reasonably lead it to believe changed circumstances exist that justify redetention under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3).

Thus, the government's preliminary determination that removal to Vietnam or some other country is significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future requires presuming facts that have no basis for being presumed. Namely, it must be presumed that: (1) ICE has learned that Vietnam has changed its policy and decided to issue travel documents to Vietnamese people in the United States despite lacking formal records of the Vietnamese person's supposed citizenship; and/or (2.a) ICE has identified an allegedly safe third country for removal that will accept Nguyen (even though the government has been unable to accomplish this task for more than two decades); and (2.b) the allegedly safe third-country will issue a travel document in the reasonably foreseeable future. Such presumptions are arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, unconstitutional, and are otherwise reliant upon abuses of discretion in the present context because such presumptions are grounded on conclusory opinions and beliefs rather than on fact and

experience. Perhaps more importantly, because the government's determination—*i.e.*, that changed circumstances now support concluding that Petitioner's removal is significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future—relies on a series of suppositions rather than actual evidence, the evidence is not competent under *Zadvydas*' burden-shifting scheme and is otherwise incapable of satisfying the strict and explicit requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3).

The government, in response to this petition (if notice is given and/or after notice is given), will likely argue that the Notice (if any) complied with § 241.13(i)(2) because it identified changed circumstances, namely the facts that ICE: (1) was in the process of trying to identify a safe third country that will accept Nguyen, and (2) has determined that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future in Nguyen's case. However, in this scenario, the only alleged "changed circumstance" would be that ICE is thinking about requesting a travel document from a third country that has not previously agreed to accept Nguyen. It is unclear how this could factually constitute a changed circumstance considering that ICE has ostensibly been in the process of requesting a travel document for an allegedly safe third country that would accept Nguyen since 1998. It is unclear how this could legally constitute a changed circumstance considering that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(1) explicitly provides that one condition of release on an OOS is "that the alien continue to seek to obtain travel documents," and it is not alleged in the Notice that Petitioner has violated any of his OOS conditions. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3).

Even assuming *arguendo* that *Zadvydas*' burden-shifting scheme is somehow inapplicable to Petitioner's case, the Notice (if any) remains legally deficient because the likely half-sentence explanation of the changed circumstances allegedly justifying redetention is "inadequate to enable [this Court] to perform any meaningful review." *Cf. Gutierrez-Almazan v. Gonzales*, 491 F.3d 341, 343-44 (7th Cir. 2007). In similar circumstances, when circuit courts of appeals are reviewing denials by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") of motions to accept an untimely brief, circuit courts have held the BIA holding "the reason stated by the respondent insufficient for us to accept the untimely brief in our exercise of discretion" is insufficient to allow for meaningful review of the agency's determination. *See, e.g., Gutierrez-Almazan v. Gonzales*, 491 F.3d 341, 343-44 (7th Cir. 2007); *Garcia Gomez v. Gonzales*, 498 F.3d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); *see also Davis v. Garland*, 91 F.4th 1259, 1261-62 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing *Garcia Gomez v. Gonzalez*, *inter alia*, before granting a petition for review based on the Board's failure to provide "an adequate explanation" for its decision, preventing this Court from "conduct[ing] a meaningful review of the BIA's... order").

III. Petitioner's Interest in Avoiding Unnecessary Extended Detention Far Exceeds the Government's Interests in Detaining Petitioner.

Under the Fifth Amendment, no citizen or noncitizen may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. *See* U.S. Const. amend. V; *Mathews v. Diaz*, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (due process is flexible, and the protections depend on the situation, considering the private interest at issue, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and

the Government's interest). These protections extend to deportation proceedings. *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).

“The essence of due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.” *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 348–49; *cf. Bridges v. Wixon*, 326 U.S. 135, 152–53 (1945) (administrative rules are designed to afford due process and to serve as “safeguards against essentially unfair procedures”); *United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (agencies are required to follow their own regulations); *Sanchez v. Barr*, 919 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2019) (Paez, J., concurring) (“A court’s duty to enforce an agency regulation is most evident when compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution or federal law.”) (quoting *United States v. Caceres*, 440 U.S. 741, 749 (1979)).

The *Mathews v. Eldridge* balancing test counsels heavily in favor of finding a due process violation. Petitioner’s private interest here is avoiding unnecessary periods of confinement in excess of those which are truly necessary to effect his lawful removal from the United States. *See* 424 U.S. at 334–35. The risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest is especially high where, as occurred in Petitioner’s case, the government detains an individual who has previously been thought to be unremovable in the absence of any newly acquired proof that the individual’s removal can now be effected and then subsequently fails to give them the mandated Notice and/or informal interview. *E.g., Rokhfirooz*, 2025 WL 2646165, at *4 (no regulatory compliance); *Hoac*, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (no informal interview provided); *Rombot*, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 387–88 (no

regulatory compliance); *Ceesay*, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 164 (“because ICE did not follow its own regulations in deciding to redetain [the petition], his due process rights were violated, and he is entitled to release.”). Petitioner’s substantial liberty interests and the risk of erroneous deprivation of said interests far outweigh the government’s interest in executing a 27-year-old removal order relating to an individual who was previously determined to not constitute a flight risk or ongoing danger to the community. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e)(2)-(6).

IV. The Government’s Detention of Petitioner Is Punitive.

Zadvydas held that civil detention violates due process unless special, nonpunitive circumstances outweigh an individual’s interest in avoiding restraint. 533 U.S. at 690 (**immigration detention must remain “nonpunitive in purpose and effect”**) (emphasis added).

The government’s redetention of Petitioner is punitive. First, the government detained Petitioner without first obtaining a travel document, which necessarily requires increasing the detention period beyond that which would be necessary to effect a removal after a travel document had already been obtained. Second, the present administration has expressed and vocalized an intent to use civil detention punitively against noncitizens for the dual purposes of: (1) encouraging self-deportation, and (2) coercing foreign recalcitrant governments to issue travel documents for its citizens ordered deported from the United States by demonstrating through a systematic campaign of abuse and terror that the recalcitrant government’s citizens detained in post-removal-order custody will suffer immensely in the absence of such travel documents being issued. *Accord* ECF No. 1-1,

Exhibit 1, *100 Days of Fighting Fake News*, HOMELAND SECURITY (Apr. 30, 2025) (“**The reality is that prison isn’t supposed to be fun. It’s a necessary measure to protect society and punish bad guys. It is not meant to be comfortable. What’s more: prison can be avoided by self-deportation.** CBP Home makes it simple and easy. If you are a criminal alien and we have to deport you, you could end up in Guantanamo Bay or CECOT. Leave now.”) (emphasis added);² *Mohammed H. v. Trump*, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1158 (D. Minn. June 17, 2025) (“Punishing Petitioner for protected speech or **using him as an example to intimidate other students into self-deportation is abusive and does not reflect legitimate immigration detention purposes.**”) (emphasis added). Third, Petitioner is being punished via civil detention simply for being a native of a country that kept poor documentary evidence of its own citizenship logs and thereby lost, destroyed, or failed to create evidence of Nguyen’s citizenship.

The foregoing contentions are buttressed by the realization that Petitioner is detained in the Cimarron Correctional Facility, a facility designed to house and punish convicted criminals. Petitioner’s conditions of confinement are indistinguishable from those of convicted criminals, further demonstrating that Petitioner’s detention is punitive.

V. **A Temporary Restraining Order Is Warranted.**

In determining whether to grant a TRO, this Court must consider four factors:

² To the extent necessary to accord the requested relief, Petitioner requests that the Court judicially notice this press release under Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The fact of the press release’s issuance, and the fact of its contents, both constitute adjudicative facts not subject to reasonable dispute because the press release “can be accurately and readily determined from [federal government] sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”

- (1) the probability that the moving party will succeed on the merits;
- (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the moving party;
- (3) the balance between harm to the moving party and the potential injury inflicted on other party litigants by granting the injunction; and
- (4) whether the issuance of a TRO is in the public interest.

See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981); *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Consideration of these four factors does not require mathematical precision but rather should be flexible enough to encompass the particular circumstances of each case. *See Dataphase*, 640 F.2d at 113. The basic question is whether the balance of equities so favors the moving party “that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until the merits are determined.” *Id.* Although the probability of success on the merits is the predominant factor, circuit courts have “repeatedly emphasized the importance of a showing of irreparable harm.” *Caballo Coal Co. v. Ind. Mich. Power Co.*, 305 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner incorporates all prior arguments by reference and submits that he has demonstrated that all four factors weigh strongly in favor of granting the requested TRO.

With respect to the merits of the TRO specifically, Petitioner relies heavily on the many cases that have recently resulted in expedited judicial orders for release for persons who are nearly identically situated to this Petitioner. *See, e.g., Roble v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-3196, 2025 WL 2443453 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release); *Sarail A. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-2144, 2025 WL 2533673 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release); *Sonam T. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-2834, *slip op.*, ECF No. 19

(D. Minn. Sept. 16, 2025) (R&R recommending granting habeas and ordering release); *see also Sonam T. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-2834, ECF No. 25 (D. Minn. Sept. 19, 2025) (ordering release); *Mehran S. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3724, ECF No. 11 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2025) (ordering release); *Omar J. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3719 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2025), ECF No. 11 (ordering release); *Yee S. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-02782-JMB-DLM, ECF No. 13 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release); *Constantinovici v. Bondi*, No. 3:25-CV-02405-RBM-AHG, ECF No. 15 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release); *Rokhfirooz*, 2025 WL 2646165, at *4; *Hoac*, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4; *Rombot*, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 387-88; *Ceesay*, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 164.

In this district, there are three other similarly situated habeas petitions pending. *See Momennia v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-1067-J (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2025); *Bahadorani v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-01091-PRW (W.D. Okla. Sept. 21, 2025); *Pham v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-01157-SLP (W.D. Okla. Oct. 6, 2025). The judges in each of those cases have granted the petitioner's request to have their petitions adjudicated on an expedited basis. *Accord Momennia v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-1067-J (W.D. Okla.), ECF No. 12; *Bahadorani v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-01091-PRW (W.D. Okla.), ECF Nos. 12-13; *Pham v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-01157-SLP (W.D. Okla.), ECF No. 14. The expedited treatment of all of these petitions demonstrates a collective understanding from the courts that the allegations made in such petitions necessarily involve claims that, if true, result in irreparable and immediate harm in the form of unlawful or unconstitutional civil detention for which no monetary remedies are available. *See Matacua v. Frank*, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1025 (D. Minn. 2018) (loss of liberty is the paradigmatic irreparable harm); *Lonchar v. Thomas*,

517 U.S. 314, 324–25 (1996) (emphasizing special urgency of habeas cases); *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (habeas is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action).

Lastly, Petitioner requests that this Motion be granted without notice to the government under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). Petitioner’s counsel states in a concurrently filed Meet and Confer Statement:

On September 30, 2025, the undersigned had reason to confer with Assistant U.S. Attorney Don Evans, who works in the Western District of Oklahoma and is the attorney assigned (or at least believed to be assigned, based on the undersigned’s conversation with Mr. Evans) to two of the other nearly identical cases filed by the undersigned in this district since September 17, 2025. *See Momennia v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-1067-J (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2025); *Bahadorani v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-01091-PRW (W.D. Okla. Sept. 21, 2025). The undersigned did not speak to Mr. Evans about this case specifically, but was discussing whether a TRO was needed in the *Bahadorani* case and was told by Mr. Evans that there is a significant likelihood of his inability to respond or confer further if the government did in fact shut down on October 1, 2025, as appeared likely to occur.

In the *Momennia* case, the federal respondents had until October 1, 2025 to file their responsive documents and evidence, and they blew the deadline leading the undersigned to file a motion seeking action by the Court and the Court responding by ordering the Respondents to respond to the OSC no later than October 10, 2025 notwithstanding Temporary General Order 25-8. *See Momennia v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-1067-J (W.D. Okla.), ECF No. 12. Similarly, in *Bahadorani*, an order was issued to respond notwithstanding Temporary General Order 25-8. *See Bahadorani v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-01091-PRW (W.D. Okla.), ECF No. 13.

It is the undersigned’s understanding that until an OSC is issued, and until the federal respondents are ordered to respond notwithstanding Temporary General Order 25-8, there is no ability for anyone from the U.S. Attorney’s Office to confer with the undersigned about any motions while the government is shut down. Once those orders are issued, the government *might* be able to confer with the undersigned, but it is unclear if the scope of their duties permit only casework, or also settlement discussion. Consequently, at present, it is functionally impossible for the undersigned

to meet and confer. As such, issuing a TRO without notice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B) is appropriate so long as the Court determines that the specific facts alleged in the verified habeas corpus petition clearly show immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to Petitioner before the government reopens allowing the government to be heard in opposition.

Petitioner's Meet and Confer Statement.

In light of the unique circumstances in this case, combined with Petitioner's verified habeas corpus petition, the Court can and should grant the immediate motion without first giving the government notice or opportunity to respond. The Order should be in effect for 14 days and should be continuously renewed until the government can be heard on the merits of the petition and/or this motion.

CONCLUSION

The Government has wide—but not unlimited—discretion in the immigration realm. At its foundation, due process prohibits detaining an individual without justification. Petitioner has established, and the Government has not sufficiently rebutted, that his detention is rooted in improper purposes and lacks an individualized legal justification.

The Court must grant Petitioner's emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and order Petitioner's immediate release from custody.

DATED: October 15, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

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