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10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
12

13 TRUNG DANG MAI

14 Petitioner,

15 v.

16 MARK BOWEN, et al.,

17 Respondents.
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No. 5:25-cv-02707-PA-MAR

**RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO
PETITIONER'S *EX PARTE*
APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER [DKT. 5]**

**Declaration of Christopher Jensen filed
herewith]**

Honorable Percy Anderson
United States District Judge

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Petitioner Trung Dang Mai, a Vietnamese citizen (and a native of the Philippines),
3 who is subject to a final removal order, was detained on September 24, 2025. *See* (the
4 “Application”) [Dkt 5]; Declaration of Christopher Jenson (“Jenson Decl.”) ¶ 9.

5 Petitioner first claims he cannot be removed and his detention is indefinite because
6 Vietnam’s acceptance rate and repatriation of pre-1995 immigrants remains relatively
7 low. [Dkt. No 5]. Although many otherwise removable pre-1995 Vietnamese nationals
8 like Petitioner were previously released under an order of supervision (OSUP) because
9 Vietnam would not accept them due to that country’s political relationship with the
10 United States at the time, that Vietnamese policy has since been dismantled. As a result,
11 and contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants such as
12 Petitioner are now routinely removed to Vietnam. *See, e.g., Huynh v. Semaia, et al.*,
13 2:24-cv-10901-MRA-DFM.¹ Simply put, circumstances for Vietnam removals have
14 changed dramatically since Petitioner’s placement on supervised release many years ago.

15 Second, Petitioner argues that the government previously released him, and that
16 the government did not comply with the procedural requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)
17 in revoking his release and re-detaining him. [Dkt. No. 5]. To the contrary, however,
18 Petitioner, upon his re-detention, was served with a notice of Revocation of Release.
19 Jenson Decl. ¶ 10. Had this not occurred, it would still not justify immediate habeas
20 release. To the contrary, other courts have recognized that complaining that the reasons
21 for revocation of supervised release are insufficient is not enough to establish entitlement
22 to the extraordinary remedy of a TRO. Moreover, such courts have recognized that while
23 regulations such as 8 C.F.R. § 214.13(i) create procedural safeguards, they do not create
24 independent substantive rights that override the statutory grant of detention authority.

25 Finally, Petitioner complains that he does not want to be removed to a third
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27 ¹ In *Huynh*, the petition was held in abeyance to see if the government could remove the
28 Vietnamese petitioner. The detained petitioner was then indeed promptly removed to
Vietnam, thereby mooting his habeas petition, which was dismissed on April 9, 2025.

1 country without sufficient advance notice. Beyond generally citing the government's
2 policies regarding third country removal, Petitioner presented no evidence that he in fact
3 faces removal to a third country (other than Vietnam which is a country designated for
4 removal in Petitioner's order of removal). Jenson Decl. ¶ 11. In fact, ICE has submitted a
5 request for Petitioner's travel documents from Vietnam (Jenson Decl. ¶12). By contrast,
6 there is no evidence that he faces removal to a third country.

7 Accordingly, the TRO Application should be denied.

8 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

9 **A. Underlying Facts**

10 Petitioner is a Vietnamese citizen (and a native of the Philippines). *See* Jenson
11 Decl. at ¶ 4. On or about  1985, the Petitioner was admitted to the United
12 States. *Id.* On or about May 21, 2004, Petitioner was convicted of Assault of a Person
13 with a Semiautomatic Firearm, in violation of California Penal Code (CPC) section
14 245(B) and sentenced to 3 years in prison. *Id.* ¶ 5. On or about July 29, 2004, an
15 Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed to Vietnam. *Id.* ¶ 6. Petitioner waived
16 appeal and the order of removal became final. *Id.*

17 On or about March 5, 2007, Petitioner was convicted of Possession of a
18 Controlled Substance for Sale, in violation of §11378 of the Cal. Health & Safety Code
19 and for Participation in a Criminal Street Gang, in violation of CPC § 186.22(A) and
20 sentenced to 2 years in prison. Jenson Decl. ¶ 7.

21 On or about March 19, 2025, Petitioner was arrested for Driving Under the
22 Influence, in violation of § 23152(f) of the Cal. Vehicle Code. On or about September
23 24, 2025, Petitioner was taken into ICE custody for removal. *Id.* ¶ 9. On the same date,
24 Petitioner was served with a Notice of Revocation of Release. *See Exhibit A.*

25 On October 23, 2025, ICE completed and sent a travel document request for
26 Petitioner's removal to Vietnam to its headquarters for review and submission. Jenson
27 Decl. ¶ 12.

1 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

2 Courts have recognized very few circumstances justifying the issuance of an *ex*
 3 *parte* temporary restraining order. *See Reno Air Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. McCord*, 452 F.3d
 4 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006). A TRO is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy ... that
 5 should not be granted unless the movant, *by a clear showing*, carries the burden of
 6 persuasion.” *Lopez v. Brewer*, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012). For a TRO to issue,
 7 the movant must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a likelihood
 8 of suffering irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of
 9 equities tips in its favor, and (4) the TRO is in the public interest. *See Winter v. Nat. Res.*
 10 *Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Where a litigant seeks their ultimate relief by
 11 preliminary injunctive means, that is improper since “judgment on the merits in the guise
 12 of preliminary relief is a highly inappropriate result.” *Senate of California v. Mosbacher*,
 13 968 F.2d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 1992).

14 IV. ARGUMENT

15 **A. Petitioner has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits because**
 16 **he has not established that “there is no significant likelihood of removal**
 17 **in the reasonably foreseeable future.”**

18 Showing a likelihood of success on the merits is a requisite threshold issue.
 19 Indeed, “when a plaintiff has failed to show the likelihood of success on the merits, [the
 20 court] need not consider the remaining three *Winters* elements.” *Garcia v. Google, Inc.*,
 21 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). To succeed on a habeas petition,
 22 Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
 23 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner he has not shown, and indeed
 24 cannot show, that his current custody is unlawful.

25 The INA governs the detention and release of noncitizens during and following
 26 their removal proceedings. *See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. 523, 527 (2021).
 27 When a noncitizen receives a final removal order, their detention is mandatory for the
 28 following 90 days. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). After that time, detention is within ICE’s

1 discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Under *Zadvydas v. Davis*, detention for six
2 months following a final removal order is presumptively valid. 533 U.S. 678, 701
3 (2001). After that time, a noncitizen may request release, and it is his burden to show
4 “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.*
5 The law does not require that “every [noncitizen] not removed must be released after six
6 months.” *Id.* Instead, it prevents only “indefinite” or “potentially permanent” detention.
7 *Id.* at 689–91.

8 Here, Petitioner does not challenge the validity of his final removal order or that 8
9 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) governs his detention. However, Petitioner speculatively argues,
10 without evidentiary support, that he should be released from his current detention
11 because “removal to Vietnam is not reasonably foreseeable.” [Dkt. 5]. That contention is
12 both factually incorrect and misapprehends the *Zadvydas* standard.

13 In *Zadvydas*, the Supreme Court instructed that detention for six months following
14 a final removal order is presumptively valid.

15 After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that
16 there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
17 future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
18 showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior post
19 removal confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable
20 future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of
21 course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six
22 months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been
23 determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
24 foreseeable future.

22 *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. Thus, according to *Zadvydas*, the noncitizen “may be held in
23 confinement until it has been determined that there is ***no significant likelihood of***
24 ***removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.***” *Id.* (bold italic emphasis added).

25 Here, there is certainly a significant likelihood that Petitioner will be removed to
26 Vietnam in the reasonably foreseeable future. He was re-detained more than 69 days ago,
27 on September 24, 2025, and the government requested review and submission of his
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1 travel documents from ICE headquarters for removal to Vietnam. Jenson Decl. ¶ 12.
2 There is no bar against Petitioner's removal to his home country of Vietnam, and the
3 government is currently arranging for that removal. *Id.* ¶¶ 11-12.

4 Effectuating his removal is thus affirmatively likely. Pre-1995 Vietnamese
5 immigrants are now routinely removed to Vietnam. When petitions have been filed in
6 this District claiming that Vietnam does not accept such removals, they have been
7 proven incorrect and mooted by the government's prompt removal of the petitioner to
8 Vietnam. *See, e.g., Huynh v. Semaia, et al.*, 2:24-cv-10901-MRA-DFM (petition by
9 Vietnamese national asserting *Zadvydas* claim mooted by removal to Vietnam); *Le Van*
10 *Minh v. DHS, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02245-HDV-JDE (August 18, 2025 petition by Vietnamese
11 national mooted by September 2, 2025 removal of petitioner to Vietnam); *Tan Minh Vo*
12 *v. DHS et al.*, 5:25-cv-02791-SVW-MBK (petition by Vietnamese national asserting
13 *Zadvydas* claim mooted by November 5, 2025 removal of petitioner to Vietnam). In
14 *Huynh*, for example, the petition was held in abeyance to see if the government could
15 timely remove the Vietnamese petitioner—consistent with the Supreme Court's
16 directives in *Zadvydas*. The detained petitioner was then indeed promptly removed to
17 Vietnam, thereby mooted his habeas petition, which was dismissed.

18 It is true that that *historically* there were barriers years ago to removing Petitioners
19 and similarly situated Vietnamese immigrants who had final removal orders. That issue
20 was exhaustively addressed in more recent litigation, as the political relationship
21 between the United States and Vietnam changed. In 2020, Judge Carney explained the
22 then-current state of affairs:

23 The parties now agree that Vietnam does not maintain a blanket policy of
24 refusing to repatriate pre-1995 immigrants. ... Instead, Vietnam now
25 considers each request from ICE on a case-by-case basis. (*Id.*) ICE
26 frequently requests travel documents from Vietnam for pre-1995
27 immigrants, and Vietnam issues them in a non-negligible portion of cases.
28 Petitioners do not appear to dispute that once Vietnam issues a travel
document, removal becomes significantly likely, rendering class members
unable to meet their initial burden under *Zadvydas*.

1 *Trinh, supra*, 466 F. Supp. 3d at 1090.

2 Courts therefore properly deny *Zadvydas* claims under such circumstances. *See*
3 *Malkandi v. Mukasey*, 2008 WL 916974, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 2, 2008) (Martinez, J.)
4 (denying *Zadvydas* petition where petitioner had been detained more than 14 months post-
5 final order); *Nicia v. ICE Field Off. Dir.*, 2013 WL 2319402, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 28,
6 2013) (Martinez, J.) (holding petitioner “failed to satisfy his burden of showing that there
7 is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” where he
8 had been detained more than seven months post-final order). That Petitioner does not yet
9 have a specific date of anticipated removal does not make his detention indefinite. *See*
10 *Diouf v. Mukasey*, 542 F. 3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008) (where there is no evidence that
11 the country of removal would refuse to accept the petitioner or that removal is barred by
12 the laws of the United States, that the detention did not have a certain end date did not
13 demonstrate that detention was “indefinite”).

14 Because Petitioner has failed to establish a likelihood of success on his claims that
15 his detention is unlawful, the petition should be denied.

16 **B. Petitioner’s Complaints about Procedural Deficiencies in His Re-**
17 **detention Do Not Establish a Basis for a TRO**

18 Petitioner next complains that ICE has not followed the procedures applicable to
19 ICE’s revocation of supervised release. [Dkt. No. 5] (alleging that ICE did not notify
20 Petitioner of the reasons for his revocation). However, and contrary to Petitioner’s
21 suggestions, upon his re-detention, he was served with a Notice of Revocation of
22 Release. Jenson Decl. ¶ 10; *see Exhibit A*.

23 The government’s authority to re-detain individuals who ICE had previously
24 released is discretionary. Indeed, the government is allowed to revoke for nearly any
25 reason, and the process for objections is very limited. As the Ninth Circuit recognized,
26 “[w]hile the regulation provides the detainee some opportunity to respond to the reasons
27 for revocation, it provides no other procedural and no meaningful substantive limit on
28 this exercise of discretion as it allows revocation ‘when, in the opinion of the revoking

1 official ... [t]he purposes of release have been served ... [or] [t]he conduct of the alien, or
2 *any other circumstance*, indicates that release would no longer be appropriate.”
3 *Rodriguez v. Hayes*, 578 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009), *opinion amended and*
4 *superseded*, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010), citing §§ 241.4(l)(2)(i), (iv) (emphasis in
5 original).

6 The government is thus broadly authorized to exercise its discretion to revoke
7 such release pursuant to 8 CFR § 241.1(l)(1), and 8 CFR § 241.4(l)(2). *See Moran v.*
8 *U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, 2020 WL 6083445, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020)
9 (dismissing petitioners’ claim that § 241.4(l) was a violation of their procedural due
10 process rights and noting, “[Petitioners] fail to point to any constitutional, statutory, or
11 regulatory authority to support their contention that they have a protected interest in
12 remaining at liberty in the United States while they have valid removal orders.”).

13 While a small number of District Court decisions have found that a supervised
14 release was not properly revoked, such decisions generally (1) involve a non-citizen’s
15 detention *during* their removal proceedings (i.e. before the non-citizen has yet been
16 found removable by an Immigration Court, such that they are not being detained for
17 purposes of enforcing a removal order), rather than their detention being after an
18 administratively final removal order is issued; (2) typically involve no revocation
19 documentation at all—which is not the case here; and (3) involve some sort of *genuine*
20 structural impediment to removal, *e.g.*, an appellate stay, which also is not the case here.

21 Furthermore, the appropriate remedy for any such procedural deficiency would
22 *not* be automatic release from custody, but rather to remedy the specific procedural
23 deficiency that might be established. That is consistent with the well-established
24 principle that injunctive relief must be *narrowly tailored* to the specific wrong at issue.
25 *See e.g. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1214 (9th Cir. 2022).

26 Other District Courts have correctly applied this point. In *Ahmad v. Whitaker*, for
27 example, the government revoked the petitioner’s release but did not provide him an
28 informal interview. *Ahmad v. Whitaker*, 2018 WL 6928540, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4,

2018), *rep. & rec. adopted*, 2019 WL 95571 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2019). The petitioner argued that revocation of his release was unlawful because, he contended, the federal regulations prohibited re-detention without, among other things, an opportunity to be heard. *Id.* In rejecting his claim, the court held that although the regulations called for an informal interview, petitioner could not establish “any actionable injury from this violation of the regulations” because the government had procured a travel document for the petitioner, and his removable was reasonably foreseeable. *Id.* Similarly, in *Doe v. Smith*, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that even if the ICE detainee petitioner had not received a timely interview following her return to custody, there was “no apparent reason why a violation of the regulation ... should result in release.” *Doe v. Smith*, 2018 WL 4696748, at *9 (D. Mass. Oct. 1, 2018). The court elaborated, “[I]t is difficult to see an actionable injury stemming from such a violation. Doe is not challenging the underlying justification for the removal order.... Nor is this a situation where a prompt interview might have led to her immediate release—for example, a case of mistaken identity.” *Id.*

The Hon. Judge Blumenfeld similarly denied a preliminary injunction motion in a somewhat similar case alleging a lack of sufficient re-detention process, noting that the evidentiary burden had not been met, and also that it was unclear that release would be the appropriate remedy for any violations of revocation procedure. *See Long Ton v. Kristi Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02033-SB-AGR [Dkt. no. 17] (September 3, 2025) (Order Denying Application for Preliminary Injunction).

Petitioner’s TRO Application fails to establish any violations of release revocation procedure. *See* Jenson Decl. ¶ 10. But even if it had, it would not warrant a TRO barring detention.

C. Petitioner’s Request for a TRO against Third Country Removal is Irrelevant and Unsupported by Any Evidence

Petitioner next complains that he might face third country removal without notice. As discussed above, however, the government has taken steps to effectuate his removal

1 to Vietnam, the Petitioner's country of citizenship. *Id.* ¶ 4. And to the extent he
 2 speculates that the government must nonetheless actually be intending instead to remove
 3 him to a third country, because Vietnam supposedly does not accept any pre-1995
 4 Vietnamese immigrants, as explained above, Petitioner's claim on that point is entirely
 5 erroneous. *See Trinh v. Homan*, 466 F.3d 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2020). Further still, issuing a
 6 TRO should not be done for speculative purposes based on counterfactual scenarios. Due
 7 to the speculative nature of Petitioner's potential removal to an as of yet unidentified
 8 third country, granting Petitioner injunctive relief on this issue would be premature. *See*
 9 *Morales Sanchez v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-cv-02530-AB-DTB, 2025 WL 3190816, at *4 (C.D.
 10 Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (denying temporary restraining order where "Petitioner's fear of being
 11 removed to [an unidentified] third country" was "speculative" and therefore failed to
 12 "establish[] a likelihood of success on the merits"); *Cabrera-Trillo v. Noem*, No. 3:25-
 13 cv-02865-CAB-MSB, 2025 WL 3215338, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2025) (denying as
 14 premature temporary restraining order where possible third country of removal was
 15 unidentified).

16 Finally, ICE normally provides advance notice of third country removals. While
 17 Petitioner argues that ICE memoranda nonetheless suggest it would not technically *need*
 18 to provide prior notice in some cases, if it receives sufficient assurances from the
 19 receiving nation, he fails to demonstrate that this possibility applies to his own case,
 20 much less in a way that requires a TRO to be issued.

21 **D. The Balance of Interests Favors the Government**

22 It is well settled that the public interest in enforcement of the United States's
 23 immigration laws is significant, particularly when it involves the enforcement of a final
 24 removal order (as here). *See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte*, 428 U.S. 543, 556-
 25 58 (1976); *Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo*, 659 F.2d 1211, 1221 (D.C. Cir.
 26 1981) ("The Supreme Court has recognized that the public interest in enforcement of the
 27 immigration laws is significant.") (citing cases); *see also Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418,
 28 435 (2009) ("There is always a public interest in prompt execution of removal

orders[.]”). This public interest outweighs Petitioner’s private interest here.

V. CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s TRO Application should be denied.

Dated: December 2, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

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First Assistant United States Attorney
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DANIEL A. BECK
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Special Assistant United States Attorney

Attorneys for Federal Respondents

* The undersigned, counsel of record for the Federal Respondents certifies that this brief contains 3,098 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.

DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER JENSON

I, Christopher Jenson, do hereby declare and state as follows:

1. I am employed as a Deportation Officer ("DO") by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ERO"). I am currently assigned to the travel unit in the Adelanto Sub-office in Adelanto, California, under the ERO Los Angeles Field Office.

2. I have been employed by DHS since September 4, 2018. The facts in this declaration are based on my personal and professional knowledge, consultation with other ICE personnel, and review of official documents and records maintained by DHS and other relevant sources obtained during the regular course of business.

3. My responsibilities as DO include the review of detained alien cases. As part of my duties, I reviewed the case of Trung Dang Mai (MAI).

4. MAI is a native of the Philippines and a citizen of Vietnam, who was admitted to the United States on or about  1985, as a refugee.

5. On or about May 21, 2004, MAI was convicted of assault of a person with a semiautomatic firearm in violation of section 245(B) of the California Penal Code (CPC) and sentenced to three years in prison.

6. On or about July 29, 2004, an Immigration Judge ordered MAI removed to Vietnam. MAI waived appeal and the Immigration Judge's order of removal became final.

7. On or about March 5, 2007, MAI was convicted of possession of controlled substance for sale in violation of section 11378 of the California Health & Safety Code and participation in a criminal street gang in violation of CPC § 186.22(A) and sentenced to at least two years in prison.

8. On or about March 19, 2025, MAI was arrested for driving under the influence in violation of section 23152(f) of the California Vehicle Code.

9. On or about September 24, 2025, MAI was taken into ICE custody for removal.

Exhibit A

*Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations
Los Angeles Field Office*

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
34 Civic Center Plaza
Santa Ana, CA 92701



**U.S. Immigration
and Customs
Enforcement**

Mai, Trung Dang
c/o Santa Ana Federal Building
34 Civic Center Plaza
Santa Ana, CA 92701



Notice of Revocation of Release

This letter is to inform you that your order of supervision has been revoked and you will be detained in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at this time. This decision has been made based on a review of your official alien file and a determination that there are changed circumstances in your case. ICE has determined there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

ICE has determined that you can be removed from the United States pursuant to the outstanding order of removal against you. On July 29, 2004, an Immigration Judge in Eloy, AZ ordered you removed from the United States to Vietnam. ICE has determined it is appropriate to enforce the removal order and remove you to Vietnam.

Based on the above, and pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, you are to remain in ICE custody at this time. You will promptly be afforded an informal interview at which you will be given an opportunity to respond to the reasons for the revocation. If you are not released after the informal interview, you will receive notification of a new review, which will occur within approximately three months of the date of this notice.

You are advised that you must demonstrate that you are making reasonable efforts to comply with the order of removal and that you are cooperating with ICE's efforts to remove you by taking whatever actions ICE requests to affect your removal. You are also advised that any willful failure or refusal on your part to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary for your departure, or any conspiracy or actions to prevent your removal or obstruct the issuance of a travel document, may subject you to criminal prosecution under 8 U.S.C. Section 1253(a).



Signature and Title of Authorized Official

SDDO

9/24/2025
Date

Notice of Revocation of Release
Mai, Trung Dang A [REDACTED] 943

Page 2

PROOF OF SERVICE

(1) Personal Service (Officer to complete both (a) and (b) below.)

(a) I B. YIM [Signature] DEPORTATION OFFICER,
Name of ICE Officer Title
certify that I served Mai, Trung Dang with a copy of
Name of detainee
this document at SANTA ANA FEDERAL BUILDING on 09/24/2025, at 1500 HRS

Institution

Date

Time

(b) I certify that I served the custodian C. Shield [Signature],
Name of Official
SDDO, at SANTA ANA FEDERAL BUILDING, on
Title Institution
9/24/2025 with a copy of this document.
Date

OR

(2) Service by certified mail, return receipt. (Attach copy of receipt)

I _____, _____, certify
Name of ICE Officer Title
that I served _____ and the custodian _____,
Name of detainee Name of Official
with a copy of this document by certified mail at _____ on _____.
Institution Date

() cc: Attorney of Record or Designated Representative
(X) cc: A-File