

United States District Court
Eastern District of Michigan

Edder Arnaldo Santos Franco,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 25-13188

v.

Honorable Brandy R. McMillion
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

Kevin Raycraft, in his official capacity
as Acting Field Office Director of
Enforcement and Removal Operations,
Detroit Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, in
her official capacity as Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security;
Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity
as U.S. Attorney General; Executive
Office for Immigration Review,

Respondents.

Response to Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Respondents submit this response to petitioner's request for a writ of habeas corpus, (ECF No. 1). As described in the attached brief, respondents respectfully request that the Court deny the petition because petitioner's detention does not violate the constitution or federal law.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: October 16, 2025

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Customs Enforcement; et al.,

Respondents.

**Respondents' Brief in Support of Their Response to Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus**

Issues Presented

- I. Should the Court dismiss all respondents except the ICE Field Office Director?
- II. Is petitioner's detention consistent with the due process clause when his detention is limited to a finite period, he received a hearing regarding his detention in immigration court, he has the right to appeal his detention administratively, and controlling law establishes that he is not due any more process under the Constitution?
- III. Should the Court require that petitioner exhaust his administrative remedies before pursuing this suit?

- IV. Is Santos Franco properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) when he unambiguously meets every element in the text of the statute and the structure and history of the statute support its application to Santos Franco?

- V. Is Santos Franco's detention proper under the regulations governing detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 when he is not detained under that provision and, even if those regulations applied to Santos Franco, they would not entitle him to release on bond?

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Introduction

Petitioner is a noncitizen who was not lawfully admitted to the United States, and he has no lawful immigration status. He is currently detained by ICE while the agency pursues administrative removal proceedings against him. Petitioner does not challenge the agency's decision to initiate removal proceedings against him or detain him in the first instance. Instead, petitioner only challenges the agency's decision to detain him under a statutory provision that does not entitle him to a bond hearing until the conclusion of his administrative immigration proceedings. The Court should reject this challenge for several reasons. First, the Court should dismiss all respondents except the ICE Field Office Director because he is the only proper respondent in this habeas suit. Second, the Court should reject petitioner's due process claim because administrative immigration proceedings define a noncitizen's constitutional due process rights and petitioner has received all process available in those proceedings. Third, the Court should require that petitioner address this challenge with the Board of Immigration Appeals before addressing it in this Court. Fourth, the text, structure, and history of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) demonstrate that ICE properly detained petitioner under that provision. Finally, no regulations entitled petitioner to release on bond because he is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2).

Background

Petitioner Edder Arnaldo Santos Franco is a native and citizen of Guatemala who unlawfully entered the United States at an unknown time and place without inspection or admission by an immigration official. (Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶ 4).

In 2016, Santos Franco applied for asylum with USCIS, a non-party immigration agency. (*See* Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶ 5). An asylum officer at USCIS charged Santos Franco with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) because he had entered the United States unlawfully and referred his application for asylum to immigration court. (*Id.* at ¶ 6).

In March 2020, Santos Franco appeared at a hearing in immigration court. (Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶ 7). At that hearing, he withdrew his application for asylum and filed an application for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status. (*Id.*). In 2023, after a merits hearing, the immigration court denied Santos Franco’s application for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status and ordered him removed to Guatemala. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 8–9). Santos Franco appealed the immigration court’s decision and that appeal is currently pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals. (*Id.*).

On August 26, 2025, immigration officials detained Santos Franco under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) because is an applicant for admission seeking admission and

not clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission. (Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶ 10). Santos Franco requested released on bond and the immigration court conducted a bond hearing on October 1, 2025, but denied Santos Franco’s request for release on bond because he was statutorily ineligible. (*Id.* ¶ 11). Santos Franco reserved his right to appeal the immigration court’s denial of his request for release on bond. (*Id.*).

On October 9, 2025, Santos Franco filed a petition in federal court seeking a writ of habeas corpus. (*See* Pet., ECF No. 1). In his petition, he named several respondents including Kevin Raycraft, the Acting ICE Field Office Director, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review. (*See* Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6–7).

Santos Franco does not challenge the agency’s initiation of removal proceedings against him, nor could he. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1–19). Santos Franco was not lawfully admitted, and he has no legal status. (*See* Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6–9). And, even if Santos Franco wished to challenge his removability, he could not do so in this Court because challenges to any aspect of removal proceedings must be filed in the Sixth Circuit in the first instance. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5), (g); *Hamama v. Adducci*, 912 F.3d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 2018).

Similarly, Santos Franco does not challenge the agency’s initial decision to detain him. (*See* Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16). ICE detained Santos Franco under 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶ 10). Santos Franco argues that ICE did not have the authority to detain him under § 1225(b)(2), but concedes that, even if § 1225(b)(2) were not a proper basis for his detention, ICE still would have had the lawful authority to detain him under a similar statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (*See* Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.11).

Standard of Review

A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if a petitioner is in federal custody in violation of the Constitution or a federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Argument

The Court should deny petitioner's request for a writ of habeas corpus. First, the Court should dismiss all respondents except the ICE Field Office Director. Second, the Court should reject Santos Franco's due process argument because he has received all process due under the Constitution. Third, the Court should require that Santos Franco pursue this issue in the Board of Immigration Appeals. Fourth, the Court should find that Santos Franco is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2) because the text, structure, and history of the statute demonstrate that it applies to Santos Franco. Finally, the Court should reject Santos Franco's argument that regulations entitle him to release on bond because the regulations he cites do not apply to him and, even if they did, a regulation cannot contradict the plain language of a statute.

I. The Court Should Dismiss All Respondents Except the ICE Field Office Director

A writ of habeas corpus may only be issued “to the person having custody of the person detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Except in extraordinary circumstances, the only proper respondent in a habeas corpus case is the detainee’s immediate custodian. *See Roman v. Ashcroft*, 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003). In the immigration context, that is the ICE Field Office Director. *See id.*

Here, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review are not proper respondents. Santos Franco alleges that Acting ICE Field Office Director Kevin Raycraft is his “immediate custodian.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7). Therefore, only the ICE Field Office Director is a proper respondent in this case and the remaining respondents should be dismissed. *See Roman*, 340 F.3d at 320.

II. Santos Franco’s Detention Does Not Violate the Due Process Clause

To succeed on a due process claim, a plaintiff must show that they “have a property interest that entitles them to due process protection” and, if so, the “court must then determine ‘what process is due.’” *Leary v. Daeschner*, 228 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2000). In the immigration context, the Supreme Court has frequently held that the process due under the constitution is coextensive with the removal procedures provided by Congress, *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 138–140 (2020), it has confirmed that statutory provisions denying bond

during administrative removal proceedings do not violate the due process clause because those proceedings have a definite end point, *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (“Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”), and it has held that even after a noncitizen is ordered removed and detention may have an indefinite end point, detention up to six months is presumptively valid under the due process clause, *see Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).

Here, Santos Franco does not present a plausible due process claim. Santos Franco was given notice of the charges against him, he has access to counsel, he has attended a hearing with an immigration judge, he has requested bond, he has reserved the right to appeal the denial of his request for bond, and he has been detained by ICE for eight weeks. (*See* Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶¶ 21, 23). The fact that he does not want to wait for a decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals on his appeal of the immigration judge’s bond order does not make those procedures constitutionally deficient. *See Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 138–140. Instead, Santos Franco’s only plausible challenge to his detention is that he is detained under the wrong statute, which, even if true, would make his detention unlawful, but it would not make it unconstitutional. *See id.*; *see also Al-Shabee v. Gonzales*, 188 F. App’x 333, 339 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Shabee’s disagreement with the Immigration Judge’s order, however, does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”).

Therefore, the Court should reject Santos Franco's due process claim.

III. The Court Should Require Administrative Exhaustion

When Congress has not imposed a statutory administrative exhaustion requirement, "sound judicial discretion governs whether or not exhaustion should be required." *Shearson v. Holder*, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). The exhaustion doctrine both allows agencies to "apply [their] special expertise in interpreting relevant statutes and promotes judicial efficiency." *Id.* (quotation omitted).

Here, the Court may require that Santos Franco appeal the immigration judge's denial of bond before considering the merits of his claim. Congress provided a robust administrative hearing and appeal process for noncitizens in removal proceedings that includes bond hearings, evidentiary hearings, motion practice, and appeals. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3). And requiring Santos Franco to exhaust that process before seeking review in federal court may reduce the number of similar cases filed in this Court. However, the agency acknowledges that Santos Franco is unlikely to obtain the relief he seeks through the administrative process based on a recent decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I &N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which is binding on the agency and the immigration courts, and which conclusively rejects Santos Franco's arguments in this case. *See Shawnee Coal Co. v. Andrus*, 661 F.2d 1083, 1093 (6th Cir. 1981)

(recognizing that administrative exhaustion may be excused if it would be futile).

IV. Santos Franco is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)

The Court should find that Santos Franco is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2) because he unambiguously meets every element in the text of the statute and, even if the text were ambiguous, the structure and history of the statute support the agency's interpretation.

A. The text of § 1225(b)(2) supports petitioner's detention under the statute

A court's "inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous." *BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States*, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). That is, when the text of a statute is unambiguous in the context of the facts of the case, "[t]hat is the only 'step' [of interpretation] proper for a court of law." *McGirt v. Oklahoma*, 591 U.S. 894, 914 (2020).

The statute at issue in this case—8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)—is simple and unambiguous. Including its statutory definitions, it is only three sentences long. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(13)(A), 1225(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). It states:

Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).¹ The first relevant term is “applicant for admission,” which is statutorily defined. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The statute deems any noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted” to be an “applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Thus, under the plain terms of the statute, all unadmitted noncitizens present in the United States are “applicants for admission,” regardless of their proximity to the border, the length of time they have been present in the United States, or whether they ever had the subjective intent to properly apply for admission. *See id.* While this may seem like a counterintuitive way to define an “applicant for admission,” “[w]hen a statute includes an explicit definition, [courts] must follow that definition, even if it varies from a term’s ordinary meaning.” *Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers*, 583 U.S. 149, 160 (2018) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, based on the plain text of the statute, Santos Franco is unambiguously an “applicant for admission” because he is a noncitizen, he was not admitted, and he was present in the United States when he was apprehended. (*See* Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶¶ 4, 21); *see also Chavez v. Noem*, —F. Supp. 3d—, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (concluding that § 1225(b)(2) applies to noncitizens present in the United States under plain meaning of the statute); *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, Civil No. 25-526 (D. Neb.), ECF

¹ The first clause referencing subparagraphs (B) and (C) is not relevant in this case.

No. 35, PageID.195–200 (Sept. 30, 2025) (same).

The next relevant portion of the statute is whether an examining immigration officer determined that Santos Franco was “seeking admission.” *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The statute defines “admission” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Therefore, the inquiry is whether an immigration officer determined that Santos Franco was seeking a “lawful entry.” *See id.* A noncitizen’s previous unlawful *physical* entry has no bearing on this analysis. *See id.*

A “lawful entry” is important to a noncitizen for two reasons. First, a noncitizen cannot legally enter the United States without a lawful entry. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(13), 1225(a)(3). Second, a noncitizen cannot *remain* in the United States without a lawful entry because a noncitizen is removable if he did not enter lawfully. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6). Indeed, the charge of removal against Santos Franco is based his unlawful entry. (*See* Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶ 6). So, unless Santos Franco obtains a lawful admission in the future, he will be subject to removal in perpetuity. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(13), 1182(a)(6).

The Act provides two examples of noncitizens who are not “seeking admission.” The first are those who withdraw their application for admission and “depart immediately from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4). The second are those who agree to voluntarily depart “in lieu of being subject to proceedings under

§ 1229a . . . or prior to the completion of such proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1). Even in removal proceedings, a noncitizen can concede removability and accept removal, in which case they will no longer be “seeking admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d).

Noncitizens present in the United States who have not been lawfully admitted and who do not agree to immediately depart are seeking lawful entry and must be referred for removal proceedings under § 1229a. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). In removal proceedings, if an unlawfully admitted noncitizen does not accept removal, he can seek a lawful admission. *See, e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. For instance, Santos Franco has conceded his removability, but applied to cancel his removal and adjust his status under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. (Exhibit 2 – Form EOIR-42B – App. for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status). If he is successful, he will be granted lawful status and the agency “shall record the alien’s lawful *admission* for permanent residence as of the date of the . . . cancellation of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(3) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Santos Franco is “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2) because he is pursuing a lawful admission through his removal proceedings. (Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶¶ 5–9).

The Court should reject petitioner’s argument that he is not “seeking admission” because it is not a reasonable interpretation of the text. According to Santos Franco, he chose to enter and remain in the United States unlawfully,

therefore, he is not “seeking” a lawful entry. (*See* Pet., ECF No. 1). This interpretation is not reasonable because it ignores the fact that he has not agreed to immediately depart, so logically he must be seeking to remain, which requires an “admission” *i.e.*, a lawful entry. (Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶¶ 5–9); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). It also defies the legal presumption created by the definition of “applicant for admission,” which characterizes all unlawfully present noncitizens as applying for admission until they are either removed or successfully obtain a lawful entry, regardless of their subjective intent. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Further, it would reward Santos Franco for knowingly violating the law, entitle him to better treatment than a noncitizen who lawfully presented himself at a port of entry, and encourage others to enter unlawfully, which defies the intent reflected in the plain text of the statute. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225; *see also* *Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, 679 F.3d 425, 432 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Santos Franco’s interpretation of “seeking admission” does not create an ambiguity in the statutory text because his proposed alternative is not reasonable.

The final textual requirement is that Santos Franco “be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Here, Santos Franco is not in expedited removal but rather has been placed in full removal proceedings where he will receive the benefits of the procedures (representation by

counsel, motions, hearings, testimony, evidence, and appeals) provided in § 1229a. (See Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶¶ 5–13). Therefore, he also meets this element in the text.

In sum, the text of § 1225(b)(2) unambiguously applies to Santos Franco. “Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.” *Caminetti v. United States*, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). This principle applies, even if petitioner contends that the plain application of the statute would lead to a harsh result. *See Jay v. Boyd*, 351 U.S. 345, 357 (1956) (courts “must adopt the plain meaning of a statute, however severe the consequences.”). Therefore, no further exercise in statutory interpretation is necessary or permissible in this case and the Court should conclude that Santos Franco’s detention under § 1225(b)(2) is lawful.

B. The structure § 1225 supports petitioner’s detention under the statute

If the plain language of a statute is ambiguous, a court may turn to the broader structure of the statute to determine its meaning. *See King v. Burwell*, 576 U.S. 473, 492 (2015). The structure of § 1225 demonstrates that Santos Franco is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2).

1. The structure of § 1225(b)(2) demonstrates that it applies to Santos Franco

Section 1225 addresses two types of unadmitted noncitizens: “arriving aliens”

and “applicants for admission.” *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), (b)(1). The provisions for “arriving aliens” relate to “stowaways,” “crewmen,” noncitizens “arriving on land . . . from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States,” and noncitizens present in the United States for less than two years. *See id.* §§ 1225(a)(2), (b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(1)(A)(iii)(II), (b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(C). The term “arriving alien” is similarly defined by regulation as “an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry.” 8 C.F.R. § 1.2. These noncitizens “arriving” at an international port are not entitled to the procedural protections in the full removal proceedings described in § 1229a. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Instead, because they only recently arrived, they are subject to “expedited” removal proceedings. *See id.*; *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 140 (holding that diminished due process provided in expedited removal proceedings was constitutional for arriving aliens detained under § 1225(b)(1)).

Meanwhile, § 1225(b)(2) applies to all “other aliens” who are “present” in the United States without a lawful admission. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). Those noncitizens, who may have been present for a long period of time and may no longer be near an international border, may be entitled to greater due process than “arriving aliens.” *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). Therefore, the statute provides them the maximum procedural protections available under the nation’s immigration laws, which satisfies the due process clause. *See* 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2)(A) (requiring detention during full removal proceedings under § 1229a); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (holding that mandatory detention of noncitizen who was long-term U.S. resident during removal proceedings complied with Due Process Clause).

Given this, the structure of § 1225 supports the conclusion that Santos Franco is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2). Congress used different words to differentiate recently arrived noncitizens from “applicants for admission” and gave each category of noncitizens different procedural protections, *see* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), which demonstrates that Congress intended the provisions to apply to different categories of noncitizens and results in a harmonious reading of the statute. *Pulsifer v. United States*, 601 U.S. 124, 149 (2024) (“different terms usually have different meanings.”); *Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc.*, 412 U.S. 609, 631–32 (1973) (“It is well established that our task in interpreting separate provisions of a single Act is to give the Act ‘the most harmonious, comprehensive meaning possible’ in light of the legislative policy and purpose.”). Therefore, the structure of the statute also supports Santos Franco’s detention under § 1225(b)(2).

2. Santos Franco cannot import provisions related to arriving aliens into § 1225(b)(2)

“A court does not get to delete inconvenient language and insert convenient language to yield the court’s preferred meaning.” *Borden v. United States*, 593 U.S.

420, 436 (2021); *see also Ames v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs.*, 605 U.S. 303, 309 (2025) (rejecting court-imposed element in Title VII case because statute did not require it). And when a statute defines two groups and assigns them different treatment, the Court must interpret the statute to give effect to the statutory distinction. *See Polselli v. Internal Revenue Serv.*, 598 U.S. 432, 441 (2023) (“We ordinarily aim to “giv[e] effect to every clause and word of a statute.”); *see also Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio*, 573 U.S. 41, 57 (2014) (holding that statute required different treatment for principal and derivative immigration beneficiaries).

The Court should reject Santos Franco’s argument that it should alter § 1225(b)(2) to include the limitations relevant to arriving aliens, so that it no longer applies to him. As noted above, his argument has no support in the text of the statute, which does not limit its application to the border or to recently arrived noncitizens and, instead, explicitly includes noncitizens already present in the United States like Santos Franco. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), (b)(2). And, the Court is not free to disregard the clear distinction between recently arrived noncitizens (“arriving aliens”) and those like Santos Franco who were successfully able to evade apprehension for many years (“applicants for admission”). *Borden*, 593 U.S. at 436; *Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez*, 572 U.S. 1, 16 (2014) (“Given that the drafters did not adopt that alternative, the natural implication is that they did not intend [it].”). Moreover, his reading of the statute, which would collapse the definitions of arriving

aliens and applicants for admission, would effectively erase Congress’s definition of “applicant for admission” and render half of the statute meaningless, which no canon of statutory interpretation would allow. *See Pulsifer*, 601 U.S. at 143 (rejecting interpretation of statute that “render[s] an entire subparagraph meaningless”).

3. Section 1225(b)(2) is not redundant

“Redundancies across statutes are not unusual events in drafting, and so long as there is no ‘positive repugnancy’ between two laws, a court must give effect to both.” *Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain*, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (citation omitted); *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020) (“redundancies are common in statutory drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure . . .”); *see also Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 305–06 (2018) (rejecting the argument that the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) must be limited because it overlapped with a provision of the Patriot Act).

Here, there is no “positive repugnancy” between § 1225(b)(2) and § 1226(a) or the Laken Riley Act. Section 1226(a) is similar to § 1225(b)(2), but it reaches noncitizens that are not covered by § 1225(b)(2). For instance, some noncitizens lawfully enter the United States on a visa but then overstay the visa. *See, e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a); *Wilkinson v. Garland*, 601 U.S. 209, 213 (2024). Noncitizens who overstay a visa do not fall within § 1225(b)(2) because they were admitted and inspected before entering the United States. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(1), 1227(a).

However, noncitizens who overstay a visa may be detained under § 1226(a). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Similarly, some noncitizens have their lawful status revoked when they commit certain crimes. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289–90. Those noncitizens usually cannot be detained under § 1225(b)(2), but they can be detained under § 1226. *See id.*

Further, while some noncitizens may facially fall within the scope of both statutes, the statutes do not overlap at all in practice. An “applicant for admission” must be detained under § 1225(b)(2) and cannot be detained under § 1226(a). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297 (“Read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) thus mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.”). This is because § 1225(b)(2) requires mandatory detention for noncitizens who fall within its terms until the conclusion of their administrative proceedings and detaining a noncitizen under § 1226(a), which allows release on bond, would nullify the mandatory detention required by § 1225(b)(2). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 300. Therefore, § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) are not redundant because § 1225(b)(2) always takes priority when it applies. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297; *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I &N Dec. at 220.

Similarly, § 1225(b)(2)’s overlap with the Laken Riley Act is not “positively repugnant.” Congress enacted the Laken Riley Act in January 2025 to prevent

noncitizens with criminal records from committing additional crimes. *See* Laken Riley Act, PL 119-1, 139 Stat 3 (Jan. 29, 2025). Consistent with that purpose, under the Laken Riley Act, if an unadmitted noncitizen has committed certain crimes, the agency must detain them during their administrative removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). However, Santos Franco has not committed any of the crimes listed in the Laken Riley Act. *See id.*; (Exhibit 1 – Reynolds Decl. ¶¶ 4–13). Therefore, the Laken Riley Act does not apply to him and it is not redundant with respect to him. And, in any event, as noted above, Santos Franco’s interpretation would effectively eviscerate all of the provisions in § 1225 relating to arriving aliens, so the specter of a potential redundancy with § 1226(c) cannot support his attempt to avoid the plain application of the statute. *See Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship*, 564 U.S. 91, 106 (2011) (“the canon against superfluity assists only where a competing interpretation gives effect ‘to every clause and word of a statute.’”). Therefore, the Court should reject Santos Franco’s argument that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to him because it could be redundant with other statutes enacted at different times for different reasons and which do not actually apply to Santos Franco.

4. *Jennings* does not support Santos Franco’s interpretation

Santos Franco argues that the Supreme Court held that § 1225(b)(2) only applies to noncitizens at the border and, in support, relies on *Jennings*, 583 U.S. 281. (*See* Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.12–13). However, *Jennings* did nothing of the sort.

In *Jennings*, the Supreme Court considered whether three statutes mandating detention during administrative proceedings—8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1), 1225(b)(2), and § 1226(c)—allowed detention without a bond hearing. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 291. In describing § 1225(b)(2), the Court characterized it as a broad “catchall” provision that applied to “applicants for admission” or “aliens seeking admission,” which are the exact words used in § 1225(b)(2). *See id.* at 287, 297. The Court further characterized § 1226 as applying to noncitizens “present” in the United States but made it clear that this category of noncitizens only included those that were admitted (unlike Santos Franco, who was not admitted). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288 (citing only § 1227(a), which only applies to noncitizens “in and admitted to the United States”). Ultimately, the Court concluded that § 1225(b)(1), § 1225(b)(2), and § 1226(c) mandated detention without parole during administrative immigration proceedings because the plain text of the statutes did not permit release on bond during administrative proceedings. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 302–303. Therefore, *Jennings* does not add any meaningful information about the scope of § 1225(b)(2)(A) because *Jennings* was only interested in its effect, not the precise contours of who fell within each statute. *See id.* at 287, 297. And it certainly did not hold that noncitizens like Santos Franco were beyond the scope of § 1225(b)(2) or that the statute only applied at the border. *See id.*

C. The history of the statute supports petitioner's detention under § 1225(b)(2)

“Legislative history is not the law” and “no amount of guesswork about the purposes behind legislation can displace what the law’s terms clearly direct.” *Martin v. United States*, 145 S. Ct. 1689, 1699–700 (2025). Therefore, even if the legislative history supported Santos Franco’s argument, it would not overcome the plain text of the statute and, as noted above, there is no serious dispute that he falls within the text. Nevertheless, even if the Court considered the legislative history or the agency’s historical practice it would not support Santos Franco’s argument.

1. The legislative history supports the agency’s interpretation

When a statute is ambiguous, courts may consider relevant legislative history, but even when legislative history is consulted it “is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.” *Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia*, 590 U.S. 644, 674 (2020). The only remotely ambiguous term in § 1225(b)(2) is “seeking admission” and there does not appear to be any relevant legislative history related to that term. However, the statute’s general legislative history supports the agency’s application of the statute.

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) was added to the Immigration and Nationality Act as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-546. Congress enacted IIRIRA to eliminate “an anomaly whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the United States were in a worse position than persons who had crossed the

border unlawfully.” *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc); *see also Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I &N 216, 223–25 (BIA 2025). Therefore, IIRIRA created the legal fiction that noncitizens who had already entered the United States illegally were deemed “applicants for admission” and treated as if they were still on the threshold. *See Torres*, 976 F.3d at 928; *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I &N at 223–25. This legal fiction was intended to deter individuals like Santos Franco from unlawfully entering the United States and to level the playing field between noncitizens who properly applied for entry at the border and those who knowingly violated the law. *See Torres*, 976 F.3d at 928; *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I &N at 223–25.

This legislative purpose is consistent with applying § 1225(b)(2) to Santos Franco because it would treat him for legal purposes as if he were still at the border, even though he has, in fact, physically entered the country. And Santos Franco does not cite any evidence from IIRIRA’s legislative history prior to its enactment that specifically or even generally supports his argument that he is beyond the scope of § 1225(b)(2). *Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.*, 513 U.S. 561, 579 (1995) (“Material not available to the lawmakers is not considered . . . to be legislative history.”).

2. The agency’s practice does not undermine its interpretation.

When interpreting an ambiguous statute relating to an agency’s statutory authority, courts “must exercise their independent judgment” and they are not bound

by the agency's practice. *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024). Therefore, the agency's previous interpretation of the statute is not relevant.

Even if it were, there is no evidence indicating that the agency interpreted the scope of § 1225(b)(2) differently in the past, although it has recently changed its interpretation regarding its discretion to apply it. Prior to May 2025, the agency believed it had discretion to detain noncitizens like Santos Franco under either § 1225(b)(2) or under § 1226(a) and primarily detained noncitizens like him under § 1226(a). *See Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 69 (BIA 2025). However, in May 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that noncitizens who fall within the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (arriving aliens) must be detained under that section and are "ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under . . . § 1226(a)." *See id.* Because the BIA's decision in *Matter of Q. Li* was binding on the agency and would naturally extend to § 1225(b)(2), the agency issued a new policy instructing its employees to comply with the new binding authority. (*See* Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.9). Neither *Matter of Q. Li* nor the agency's new policy indicates that it changes the agency's interpretation of the scope of § 1225(b)(2) (*i.e.*, who falls within the statute) in any way. (*See id.*). Instead, the agency has interpreted § 1225(b)(2) to apply to noncitizens like Santos Franco for at least several years. (*See* Exhibit 3 – BIA Dec.).

In addition, even if ICE's reliance on § 1225(b)(2) were entirely new, Santos

Franco could not prevent immigration officials from using their valid statutory authority simply because they pursued a different path in the past. A federal agency is entitled to a presumption that it acts in good faith and in accordance with law. *See United States v. Martin*, 438 F.3d 621, 634 (6th Cir. 2006). And a party generally cannot estop the government from changing its legal position without proving “affirmative misconduct,” *see Michigan Exp., Inc. v. United States*, 374 F.3d 424, 427–28 (6th Cir. 2004), and it is doubtful that the government may *ever* be estopped in the immigration context, *see Elia v. Gonzales*, 431 F.3d 268, 276 (6th Cir. 2005). None of the evidence in this case could meet that high standard. Therefore, Santos Franco’s arguments regarding ICE’s recent change in policy are insufficient to overcome the text, statutory structure, and legislative history of the text, all of which demonstrate that he is subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2).

V. No Regulations Entitle Santos Franco to a Bond Hearing

The Court should reject Santos Franco’s argument that his detention violates three regulations: 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16–17). First, a regulation cannot conflict with the statute that it implements. *See Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp.*, 474 U.S. 361, 367–68 (1986). The plain text of § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention during administrative immigration proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). And, in a controlling decision, the Supreme Court has rejected arguments that noncitizens detained under §

1225(b)(2) are entitled to bond hearings. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 301–306. Therefore, no regulation could entitle Santos Franco to a bond hearing if he falls within the scope of § 1225(b)(2) because such a regulation would conflict with the statutory text. Second, the regulations petitioner cites explicitly only apply to noncitizens detained under § 1226. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(a), 1236.1(a) (indicating that detention under those sections is governed by 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, which applies to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226). Therefore, under the plain terms of these regulations, they would not entitle Santos Franco to a bond hearing unless he were detained under § 1226.

Conclusion

Respondents respectfully request that the Court deny Santos Franco’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus because he is not detained in violation of federal law or the Constitution.

Respectfully submitted,

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Date: October 16, 2025

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on October 16, 2025, I electronically filed the foregoing paper with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the parties of record.

/s/ Zak Toomey _____

Zak Toomey

Assistant U.S. Attorney