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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY**

CESAR A. L. L.,

*Petitioner,*

v.

LUIS SOTO, Director of Delaney Hall, *et al.*,

*Respondents.*

HON. MICHAEL E. FARBIARZ

Civil Action No. 25-16303 (MEF)

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**ANSWER TO THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS  
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241**

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## PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On July 22, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Petitioner pending removal proceedings for his presence in the United States without admission or parole. On August 11, 2025, Petitioner had a custody redetermination hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). *See* ECF 1 (“Pet”) ¶ 4. The IJ granted release on bond in the amount of \$8,500. *Id.* On August 11, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) filed a Notice of Service of Intent to Appeal Custody Redetermination (Form EOIR-43) to automatically stay Petitioner’s release on bond pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) and initiated an appeal. *Id.* ¶ 5. The Form EOIR-43 stay remains in effect until the BIA decides the appeal or for 90 days, whichever comes first. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2); *see also* EOIR-7.3(a)(4)(B), Procedure: Stays of Bond Decisions. On August 21, 2025, DHS filed an appeal of the IJ’s bond determination with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). *See* ECF 1 ¶ 5. That appeal is currently pending before the BIA.

Petitioner now brings a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and Due Process Clause require ICE to release him. The Court should dismiss or deny the petition. Petitioner’s detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and mandatory detention under § 1225(b) comports with due process. To the extent Petitioner challenges the automatic-stay provision of the regulations, the Court should reject such a challenge. The automatic stay provision is not a detention statute, it is a means for administrative review of an IJ’s decision. Respondents’ authority to detain here, which is the relevant inquiry in a

habeas, comes directly from 8 U.S.C. § 1225. The fact that DHS has invoked the automatic-stay provision to keep Petitioner in detention during DHS’s bond appeal does not change the constitutionality of the detention. The automatic stay was invoked in support of the statutory scheme implemented by Congress under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which requires mandatory detention. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss or deny the petition.

## **BACKGROUND**

### **I. Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Background**

Over the past century, Congress has enacted a multi-layer statutory scheme for the civil detention of aliens pending a decision on removal, during the administrative and judicial review of removal orders and in preparation for removal. *See generally* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226, 1231. This case concerns the detention authorities for aliens pending removal proceedings. Below, we discuss the relevant statutory and regulatory backdrop for the two detention provisions at issue—8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)—as well as the framework for adjudicating removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. In addition, we briefly discuss the impact of DHS’s invocation of the automatic-stay provision and the fact that it does not change the constitutionality of Petitioner’s detention.

#### **A. Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)**

Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” who are defined as “alien[s] present in the United States who [have] not been admitted” or “who arrive[] in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two

categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to (1) “arriving aliens” and (2) aliens who “ha[ve] not been admitted or paroled into the United States” and have not been “physically present in the United States” for two years. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). “Arriving aliens” are defined by regulation as “an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry ...” 8 C.F.R. § 1.2. These aliens are generally subject to expedited removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). If the alien does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express fear of persecution, or does not “have such a fear” after inquiry by an officer, the alien is detained until removed. *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV).

Section 1225(b)(2) is “broader” and “serves as a catchall provision.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. Indeed, it “applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” *Id.* Under § 1225(b)(2), an alien “who is an applicant for admission” shall be detained for a removal proceeding “if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 2025) (“[A]liens who are present in the United States without admission are applicants for admission as defined under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings.”) Still, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has the sole discretionary authority to temporarily release on parole “any alien applying for

admission to the United States” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” *Id.* § 1182(d)(5)(A).

### **B. Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)**

Section 1226 provides for arrest and detention on a warrant “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under § 1226(a), immigration officials may detain an alien during removal proceedings, release the alien on bond, or release the alien on conditional parole.<sup>1</sup> By regulation, immigration officers can release an alien if the alien demonstrates that he “would not pose a danger to property or persons” and “is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). An alien can also request a custody redetermination by an Immigration Judge any time before a final order of removal is issued. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1), 1003.19. At a custody redetermination hearing, the Immigration Judge may continue detention, release the alien on bond, or release the alien on conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1). Immigration Judges have broad discretion in deciding whether to release an alien on bond. *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 39–40 (BIA 2006) (listing nine factors for IJs to consider). But an alien “who presents a danger to persons or property should not be released during the pendency of

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<sup>1</sup> Being “conditionally paroled under the authority of § 1226(a)” is distinct from being “paroled into the United States under the authority of § 1182(d)(5)(A).” *Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales*, 501 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that because release on “conditional parole” under § 1226(a) is not a parole, the alien was not eligible for adjustment of status under § 1255(a)); *Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez*, 28 I. & N. Dec. 747, 749 (BIA 2023).

removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 38.

### **C. Removal Proceedings Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a**

Removal proceedings under § 1229a are commonly referred to as “full removal proceedings” or “240 removal proceedings” due to the statutory section of the INA in which they appear. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; INA § 240. The proceedings take place before an Immigration Judge. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), (b)(1). Aliens in 1229a proceedings have an opportunity to apply for relief from removal. *See, e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents); 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (adjustment of status). The proceedings are adversarial, allowing the alien the right to counsel, examine and present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4). Either party may appeal the Immigration Judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(C); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 1240.15. And, if the BIA issues a final order of removal, an alien may also seek judicial review at a U.S. court of appeals through a petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

### **D. Review Before the Board of Immigration Appeals**

The BIA is an appellate body within the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and possesses delegated authority from the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(a)(1), (d)(1). The BIA is “charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the [INA] that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it,” including IJ custody determinations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1), 236.1, 1236.1. The BIA not only resolves particular disputes before it, but is also

directed to, “through precedent decisions, [] provide clear and uniform guidance to DHS, the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the [INA] and its implementing regulations.” *Id.* § 1003.1(d)(1). Decisions rendered by the BIA are final, except for those reviewed by the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7).

If an automatic stay of a custody decision is invoked by DHS, regulations require the BIA to track the progress of the custody appeal “to avoid unnecessary delays in completing the record for decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(3). The stay lapses in 90 days, unless the detainee seeks an extension of time to brief the custody appeal, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(4), or unless DHS seeks, and the BIA grants, a discretionary stay. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(5). If the BIA denies DHS’s custody appeal, the automatic stay remains in effect for five business days. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(d). DHS may, during that five-day period, refer the case to the Attorney General under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) for consideration. *Id.* Upon referral to the Attorney General, the release is stayed for 15 business days while the case is considered. The Attorney General may extend the stay of release upon motion by DHS. *Id.*

## **II. Petitioner’s Immigration History**

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Guatemala who admits to unlawfully entering the United States without inspection in or around 2000. *See* ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”) ¶ ¶1, 18. On July 22, 2025, ICE detained Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2) pending his removal proceedings. *See* Pet. ¶ 24.<sup>2</sup> On July 29, 2025, ICE initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner by filing a Notice to Appear, charging Petitioner as removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for being present in the United States without admission or parole, and INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for being an immigrant without valid documents. *See* Exhibit A, “Notice To Appear”; *see* 8 C.F.R. § 1103.13 (defining Notice to Appear as “written instrument which initiates proceedings before an Immigration Judge.”).

On August 11, 2025, Petitioner had a bond hearing before an IJ. *See* Pet. ¶ 26. The IJ determined that he had jurisdiction to redetermine Petitioner’s custody and held a bond hearing pursuant to INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).<sup>3</sup> The IJ ordered Petitioner released on bond in the amount of \$8,500.00. *See Id.* On the same day, DHS filed a Form EOIR-43, Notice of ICE Intent to Appeal Custody Redetermination, invoking an automatic stay of the IJ’s custody decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2). *See* Pet. ¶28. On August 21, 2025, DHS filed an appeal of the IJ’s determination to the BIA. *See* Pet. ¶ 29. On August 25, 2025, Petitioner filed a Form

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<sup>2</sup> As discussed more fully throughout this brief, this provision states that an alien “who is an applicant for admission” shall be detained pending removal proceedings “if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 12255(b)(2)(A). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted” or who “arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Petitioner acknowledges he is present in the United States but has “never been admitted.” *See* Pet. ¶¶ 3, 18.

<sup>3</sup> The IJ made this determination prior to the precedential BIA decision *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216.

EOIR-42B, Application for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents, as relief from removal. *See* Pet. ¶ 30. On October 28, 2025, Petitioner is scheduled to have a hearing on the merits of his Cancellation of Removal application. *See* Pet ¶ 33.

### **III. Procedural History**

Petitioner filed this habeas petition on October 9, 2025, challenging his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner argues that the proper authority for his detention arises under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and claims that any detention under § 1225(b)(2)—which, unlike § 1226(a), is mandatory and does not allow for a bond hearing—violates the INA and its regulations, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and the Due Process Clause. *See* Pet. ¶¶ 47-59. Petitioner also asserts that the automatic-stay provision (8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2)) violates his procedural and substantive due process rights and exceeds the authority conferred by Congress through the INA.

Petitioner seeks release from detention and requests that the Court enjoin Respondents from transferring Petitioner during the pendency of this action. *See id.* at Prayer for Relief. On October 9, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to answer the petition on or before October 15, 2025, at 9:00 am. *See* ECF No. 3. Respondents now move to dismiss the petition.

#### **STANDARD OF REVIEW**

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) authorizes a court to grant a writ of habeas corpus where a prisoner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, which is applicable to § 2241 petitions through Rule 1(b), provides this Court with the authority to dismiss a habeas petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” *See also Moncrieffe v. Yost*, 367 Fed. Appx. 286, 288 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting summary dismissal of a § 2241 habeas petition is appropriate pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases). “Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.” *McFarland v. Scott*, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 4).

### **LEGAL ARGUMENT**

The Court should dismiss the petition because Petitioner’s detention is lawful. The plain text of the INA demonstrates that Petitioner is correctly considered an “applicant for admission” and subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner’s detention also comports with due process.

#### **I. Petitioner is Properly Detained Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)**

In Counts 1-3, Petitioner challenges his detention under § 1225(b)(2) on grounds that applying that authority to him violates the INA, its regulations, and the APA. *See* Pet. ¶¶ 46-59. Petitioner is incorrect as a matter of plain meaning. The text of § 1225(b)(2) is clear: it allows for mandatory detention to any alien “present in

the United States who has not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), (b)(2). Petitioner falls in that category, and his arguments to the contrary are unavailing.

**A. Petitioner’s Detention is Lawful Under the Plain Text of the INA**

Where, as here, the question is one of statutory interpretation, “we start where we always do: with the text of the statute.” *Van Buren v. United States*, 593 U.S. 374, 381 (2021). 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) provides, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained” pending removal proceedings. This provision, then, has three key components. The alien must be: (1) an “applicant for admission”; (2) who is “seeking admission”; and (3) an examining immigration officer has determined the alien “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Petitioner meets all three.

**Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” under the INA.** An “applicant for admission” means any “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted” or “who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Petitioner does not dispute that he is present in the United States but has “never been admitted.” See Pet. ¶¶ 1, 18. Indeed, DHS issued a Notice to Appear on the basis that Petitioner is “an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” See Exhibit A (Notice To Appear) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)). Petitioner meets the statutory definition of an “applicant for admission” under § 1225(a)(1).

**Petitioner is also “seeking admission.”** The INA defines “admission” as

“the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). When it comes to interpreting “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2), the phrase must be read in context with “applicant for admission” as defined by § 1225(a). See *Abramski v. United States*, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (instructing courts to “interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context, ‘structure, history and purpose.’” (quotation omitted)). As noted above, Congress defined ‘applicant for admission’ under § 1225(a) to include both those who arrive in the United States *and* those present without admission. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Both are understood to be “seeking admission” under § 1225(a)(1). See *Matter of Lemus*, 25 I. & N. 734, 743 (BIA 2012) (recognizing “‘applicant for admission’” includes “not just those who are expressly seeking permission to enter, but also those who are present in this country without having formally requested or received such permission.”).

This is not to say the words “seeking admission” and “applicant for admission” are identical. The former is broader than the latter. For example, the INA contemplates that “stowaways” may seek admission by requesting asylum, yet stowaways are excluded from the definition of “applicant of admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2). In addition, an applicant for admission must be physically present in the United States, while an alien can “seek admission” in the United States *or* outside of it, such as in an embassy before a consular officer. See *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631, 2025 WL 2403827, at \*9 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025) (although ruling against ICE, noting terms have slightly different breadth). That is why, in § 1225(a)(3),

immigration officers must inspect all aliens “who are applicants for admission *or otherwise* seeking admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis added).

The relevant phrases play out in a commonsense way in § 1225(b)(2). The statute begins with a limiting clause: the subsection applies to “any applicant for admission,” which means only those physically present and who can be detained. This avoids the conclusion that § 1225(b)(2) applies to those “seeking admission” from abroad; say, in an embassy. Having made clear that § 1225(b)(2) applies only to those present, it continues with a second clause” mandating detention if the immigration officer finds the “alien seeking admission” is not entitled to it. *See Adamowicz v. I.R.S.*, 552 F. Supp. 2d 355, 367–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[A] limiting clause or phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”).

Here, Petitioner is an applicant for admission who is present in the United States without being admitted. He satisfies the second element, “seeking admission,” under § 1225(b)(2).

**An examining immigration officer charged Petitioner with being inadmissible under the INA.** Petitioner also meets the final element under § 1225(b)(2), which is that an examining immigration officer determined he “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Here, an examining officer made that determination when DHS issued a Notice to Appear charging Petitioner with

being inadmissible under the INA. See Exhibit A (Notice To Appear) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)).

For the reasons above, Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” under the plain meaning of § 1225(a)(1), and subject to mandatory detention under the text of § 1225(b)(2)(A). See *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216; *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, No. 25-526, 2025 WL 2780351, at \*9 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025) (finding alien properly detained under § 1225(b)(2) because he was present in United States without having been admitted, and thus an applicant for admission under § 1225(a)); *Chavez v. Noem*, No. 25-02325, 2025 WL 2730228, at \*4-5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (same); *Pipa-Aquise v. Bondi*, No. 25-1094, 2025 WL 2490657, at \*1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2025) (same); *Pena v. Hyde*, No. 25-11983, 2025 WL 2108913, at \*2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025) (upholding detention under § 1225(b)(2) of alien “present in the country but [who] has not yet been lawfully granted admission”); but see *Rivera Zumba v. Bondi*, No. 25-14626 (KSH), 2025 WL 2753496, at \*7–9 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025) (holding noncitizen residing in the United States for 20 years was not affirmatively “seeking admission” and therefore not subject to § 1225(b)(2)); but see *Mugliza Castillo v. Lyons, et al.*, No. 25-16219 (MEF), (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2025) (rejecting argument that petitioner is detained under § 1225(b)(2), finding detention under § 1226(a)).

For the reasons above, Respondents respectfully submit that the Court should dismiss Counts 1 through 3 of the petition because Petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2) is authorized under the INA.

**B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in *Jennings* and Recent BIA Decision Support Applying § 1225(b)(2)**

Respondents’ reading of the statutory text is supported by recent Supreme Court and BIA precedent. As the Supreme Court has recognized, applicants for admission “fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). The former, which is not relevant here, applies to arriving aliens and “certain other” aliens “initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation.” *Id.* It is also temporally limited to arriving aliens and aliens present less than two years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). But the latter provision—§ 1225(b)(2), which is at issue here—is a “broader ... catchall provision” applying to “all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” *Id.* Here, Petitioner is an applicant for admission who is not covered by § 1225(b)(1), and so he falls within the “catchall provision” in § 1225(b)(2).

The BIA is the highest-level administrative body for interpreting immigration law. It, too, recently adopted this understanding of § 1225(b)(2) in a decision that binds all Immigration Judges and is persuasive authority here. See *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) to require detention of aliens present in the United States without admission); see also *Ahmed v. Ashcroft*, 341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) unless the interpretation is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”).

The BIA’s interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) follows directly from the plain text. As

discussed above, § 1225(b) requires ICE to detain two types of “applicants for admission”—those who have “arrived in the United States” and those “who ha[ve] not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). “[A]rrive[d] in the United States” means an alien who has just entered the country—such as at the airport or at the U.S. border—or did so very recently. *See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 139 (2020). But aliens “have not been admitted” if no immigration officer inspected them or authorized them to be here. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (defining “admission”). Petitioner falls into that latter category. As the Supreme Court recognized, and as the BIA has held, the latter category is broader and includes Petitioner because he is present in the United States without admission or parole. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 (noting § 1225(b)(2) is a “broader,” “catchall provision” that “applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1)”).

### C. Petitioner’s Arguments Cannot Re-Write § 1225’s Plain Meaning

Petitioner contends that § 1226(a) provides the sole authority for his detention, and thus any detention under § 1225(b)(2) must violate the INA. *See* Pet. ¶¶34-41, Petitioner is mistaken for several reasons.<sup>4</sup>

Petitioner describes § 1226(a) as “authorizing detention for noncitizens in standard non-expedited removal proceedings before a IJ.” *See* Pet. ¶ 34. But § 1225 is much narrower; it covers only “applicants for admission,” which, as noted above, is

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<sup>4</sup> Petitioner’s arguments largely track those accepted by almost all district courts to have considered this issue. *See also Rivera Zumba*, 2025 WL 2753496. For the reasons provided here, Respondents respectfully disagree with those decisions and Petitioner’s arguments here.

a specifically defined subset of aliens that explicitly includes those “present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a). Petitioner fits squarely within that definition. And where, as here, there is any arguable overlap between two statutory provisions, the “commonplace rule of statutory interpretation is that the specific governs the general, particularly when Congress has targeted specific solutions in the context of a general statute.” *Aristy-Rosa v. Attorney Gen.*, 994 F.3d 112, 116 n.4 (3d Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted). The specific detention authority in § 1225 governs over the general authority described in § 1226.

Along these lines, the argument that § 1225(b)(2) is cabined to recent aliens seeking admission, cannot be squared with the INA. Indeed, any such argument ignores half the definition of “applicant for admission.” Congress defined an applicant for admission to mean two things: (1) an arriving alien; *or* (2) an alien present without being admitted. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The former is someone “coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port of entry. 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (defining “arriving alien”).

But there is also a second type of person covered under y § 1225(b)(2)—an alien present without being admitted—which must mean something else. Petitioner falls in this “broader” or “catchall” category. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. He is an alien present in the United States without being admitted within the definition of § 1225(a)(1), so the “catchall provision” in § 1225(b)(2), which “applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1),” governs. *Id.*<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Even though § 1225(b) requires the detention of both types of applicants for

The Laken Riley Act (“LRA”), which added § 1226(c)(1)(E) to the statute, does not alter this conclusion. *See* Pet. ¶ 34. That provision now requires mandatory detention for various types of “inadmissible” aliens, which, according to Petitioner, “makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). *Id.* Respondents disagree.

The LRA arose, according to Congress, after an inadmissible alien “was paroled into this country through a shocking abuse of that power.” 171 Cong. Rec. H278 (daily ed. Jan 22, 2025) (statement of Rep. McClintock). Congress passed the law out of concern that the executive branch “ignore[d] its fundamental duty under the Constitution to defend its citizens.” *Id.* at H269 (statement of Rep. Roy). One member of Congress noted this redundancy, stating that “every illegal alien is currently required to be detained by current law throughout the pendency of their asylum claims.” *Id.* at H278 (statement of Rep. McClintock). The LRA thus reflects a

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admission, immigration officials did not always interpret it that way. Specifically, DHS’s predecessor agency, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), read § 1225(b) to apply only to those who have arrived in the United States. That is, while INS detained arriving aliens, INS chose whether to detain aliens who have not been admitted. *Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures*, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312-01, 10323, 1997 WL 93131, (Mar. 6, 1997) (“Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.”). Aliens present without admission were detained under § 1226(a). *See id.* As of July 8, 2025, however, ICE has taken the position that all applicants for admission, including those who are present without admission, are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). ICE takes this position because it accords with the plain language of the statute and is consistent with recent caselaw from the BIA, the highest-level administrative body for interpreting immigration law. *See Matter of Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

“congressional effort to be doubly sure” that such unlawful aliens are detained. See *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020) (recognizing redundancies in statutory drafting are “common . . . sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure.”). That does not change what Congress intended when it passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), which added 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(1) to the INA. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-546; see also *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998) (“These later-enacted laws, however, are beside the point. They do not declare the meaning of earlier law. . . or a change in the meaning of an earlier statute.”); see also *S. Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe*, 522 U.S. 329, 355 (1998) (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”) (quoting *United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank*, 374 U.S. 321, 348–349 (1963)). In sum, nothing in the LRA requires that the alien who falls under § 1225(b)(2) be treated as an alien detained under § 1226(a).

Indeed, the legislative history of the INA cuts against Petitioner’s argument that detention under § 1225(b)(2) is improper for aliens in his situation.<sup>6</sup> Congress passed the IIRIRA to correct “an anomaly whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the United States were in a worse position than persons who had crossed the border unlawfully.” *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en

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<sup>6</sup> To be sure, when the plain text of a statute is clear, that meaning controls, and courts “need not consider . . . extra-textual evidence” like legislative “history, purpose, and post-enactment practice.” *N.L.R.B. v. SW General, Inc.*, 580 U.S. 288, 305 (2017). But to the extent legislative history is relevant, it supports Respondents.

banc). It “intended to replace certain aspects of the [then] current ‘entry doctrine,’ under which illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry.” *Id.* (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225). Respondents’ reading of § 1225(b)(2) makes sense. It would not put aliens who “crossed the border unlawfully” in a better position than those “who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry.” *Id.* Otherwise, aliens who presented at a port of entry would be subject to mandatory detention, but those who crossed illegally, like Petitioner, would be eligible for bond.

In the end, Petitioner’s argument is premised on the notion that § 1225(b) and § 1226(a) are mutually exclusive provisions. They are not. *See Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, No. 25-526, 2025 WL 2780351, at \*7-9 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025) (rejecting argument that two provisions apply to distinct groups and concluding alien may properly be detained under § 1225(b)(2) even if also subject to § 1226(a)).

For the reasons above, the Court should dismiss Counts 1 through 3 because Petitioner’s detention is lawful under § 1225(b)(2).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> If the court holds that § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner, the appropriate remedy is a bond hearing conducted by an Immigration Judge, not immediate release. *See Valeriano v. Bondi*, No. 25-16100 (MAS), ECF No. 4 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2025), at 2. (“As Petitioner acknowledges, even under his reading of the relevant immigration statutes, he is still subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), albeit with an entitlement to seek bond from an immigration judge. Should Petitioner prevail in this matter, the proper relief would constitute an order directing the Government to provide Petitioner with the bond hearing to which he contends he is entitled under § 1226(a).”); *cf. Barbot v. Warden Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility*, 966 F.3d 274, 278–79 (3d Cir. 2018); *but see, e.g., Rivera Zumba*, 2025 WL 2753496, at \*10–11 (ordering release and “temporarily enjoin[ing] respondents from re-arresting petitioner under

## II. Petitioner’s Detention Does Not Violate the Due Process Clause

As discussed above, the INA authorizes Petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2). Notwithstanding this statutory framework, Petitioner argues in Counts 1 through 3 that his continued detention without a bond hearing violates the substantive and procedural components of the Due Process Clause. *See* Pet. ¶¶ 46-59. The Court should reject this argument.

An applicant for admission who remains in the country unlawfully is entitled to due process rights. *See Pena v. Hyde*, No. 25-11983, 2025 WL 2108913, at \*2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025) (citing *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)); *see also Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). But those rights are coterminous “only to those rights and protections Congress set forth by statute”; the Due Process Clause “requires nothing more.” *Id.* (quoting *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 140). That is because “the Constitution gives the political department of the government plenary authority to decide which aliens to admit, and a concomitant of that power is the power to set the procedures to be followed in determining whether an alien should be admitted.” *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 139 (citation omitted) (cleaned up). Those procedures authorize detention pending removal proceedings, which is a

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. . . 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) for 14 days after her release”). Moreover, contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, *see* Pet. ¶¶ 49, 66, the burden of proof in any such hearing falls on Petitioner. “Nothing in § 1226(a)’s text . . . even remotely supports the imposition” of the burden on the government to prove that an alien is a danger or a flight risk, much less by clear and convincing evidence. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 306.

“constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.” *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003).

Here, as discussed above, Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” under the plain text of the INA whose detention complies with § 1225(b)(2). “And because Petitioner’s detention complies with the relevant statutes, namely Section 1225(b), ‘the Due Process Clause provides nothing more.’” *Pipa-Aquise v. Bondi*, No. 25-1094, 2025 WL 2490657, at \*2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2025) (quotation omitted); *see also Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 138 (recognizing, as to, aliens who have never “been admitted into the country pursuant to law, the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.” (quotation omitted)).

Moreover, as noted above, the automatic-stay provision of the regulations is not a detention statute, it is a means for review of an Immigration Judge’s decision. DHS’s decision to invoke the automatic-stay provision does not change the constitutionality of the detention. The automatic stay was invoked in support of the statutory scheme implemented by Congress under 18 U.S.C. § 1225, which requires mandatory detention. On September 5, 2025, after the Immigration Judge granted Petitioner’s bond, the BIA decided *Matter of Yahure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. Dec. 2016 (BIA 2025). That decision, which is binding on all Immigration Judges, states: “Based on the plain language of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission.” Petitioner’s temporary

detention pursuant to the automatic stay of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) is reinforced by Congress's command to detain Petitioner throughout the removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2). The operative automatic stay of release pending appeal at issue in this case is a temporary measure that merely ensures the DHS has an opportunity to vindicate Congress's mandatory detention framework. Because Petitioner shall be detained during removal proceedings and the proceedings are ongoing, the temporary detention is lawful.

Nor is Petitioner's detention under § 1225 without bond unconstitutionally prolonged. Although "nothing in the statutory text imposes any limit on the length of detention" under § 1225(b)(2), *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297, courts within this District considering as-applied due process challenges under the statute have looked to whether the detention without bond has become so prolonged as to be considered unreasonable. *See Adel G. v. Warden, Essex Cnty. Jail*, No. 19-13512 (KM), 2020 WL 1243993, at \*2 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2020) (collecting cases). That, in turn, asks whether the detention has become "so unreasonable as to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty which cannot comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause." *Id.* (quoting *Dryden v. Green*, 321 F.Supp.3d 496, 502 (D.N.J. 2018)). This is a high bar. While there is no "bright line rule which marks the border between constitutional and unconstitutional detention" under § 1225(b), several courts "within this district have previously found that detention for fifteen months or less is insufficient to support an as-applied challenge to detention under § 1225(b)." *Id.* (citing cases). Here, Petitioner has been detained § 1225(b)(2) since July 22, which is

less than three months. Petitioner’s detention comports with due process. *See, e.g., Pipa-Aquise*, 2025 WL 2490657, at \*1 (holding “two-month detention” under § 1225(b) did not violate due process); *Cf. Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (finding post-final-order detentions under six months presumptively reasonable); *German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility*, 965 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that Due Process Clause demands bond hearing only when detention pending removal under § 1226(c)—which, like § 1225(b)(2), requires mandatory detention—has become “unreasonably prolonged,” which is “highly fact-specific inquiry,” without a bright line).<sup>8</sup>

#### A. Petitioner’s Substantive Due Process Claim fails

Whether framed as a substantive or procedural due process claim, the principles set forth in *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) govern this case. Substantive due process protects “only ‘those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” *Dep’t of State v. Muñoz*, 602 U.S. 899, 910 (2024) (quoting *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 720- 21 (1997)). Petitioner’s substantive due process claim fails because “the through line of history” is that the federal government has “sovereign authority to set the terms governing the admission and exclusion of noncitizens.” *Id.* at 911-12. And in exercising this “broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” *Demore*,

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<sup>8</sup> Courts outside this District have held similarly that § 1225(b) detention, for thirteen months, is not unconstitutionally prolonged. *See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bondi*, No. 25-791, 2025 WL 2490670, at \*3 (E.D. Va. June 24, 2025) (collecting cases)

538 U.S. at 521. For more than a century, the Supreme Court has recognized that “the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 526.

**B. Petitioner’s Procedural Due Process Claim Fails**

Nor can Petitioners succeed on a procedural due process claim. To establish a procedural due process violation, an individual “must first” show that the government has infringed on a “protected” liberty or property interest. *URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett*, 631 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2011). Only then should courts consider “whether the process leading to that deprivation passes constitutional muster.” *Gonzalez-Droz v. Gonzalez-Colon*, 660 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011). A protected liberty or property interest “may arise from two sources—the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the states [or federal government].” *Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc.*, 68 F.3d 525, 535 (1st Cir. 1995) *abrogated on other grounds by Depoutot v. Rafaelly*, 424 F.3d 112, 118 n.4 (1st Cir. 2005); *see also Centro Medica del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecia*, 406 F.3d 1, 8 n. 4 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that to invoke a protected interest, a plaintiff must identify a right recognized by state law).

The procedural due process claim fails because, where Congress has substantively mandated detention pending removal proceedings, Petitioner cannot displace that *substantive* choice with a *procedural* due process claim. As discussed, aliens are not entitled to bond hearings as a matter of substantive due process. *See Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523-29. Under *Demore*, Congress may reasonably determine—

as they did here—to subject aliens who were never inspected or admitted to this Country to detention without bond while the government determines their removability. And “an alien in [Plaintiff’s] position has only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). Congress has not created any procedural rights to a bond hearing for Applicants for Admission (like Petitioner). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297. “Read most naturally,” § 1225 “mandate[s] detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.” *Id.* The statute says nothing “whatsoever about bond hearings.” *Id.* Petitioner is currently detained not by virtue of DHS’s appeal of his release on bond and the resulting automatic stay; instead, he is detained because he is subject to the mandatory detention provision of § 1225.

**C. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) is Not *Ultra Vires***

Petitioner’s temporary detention pursuant to the automatic stay of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) is reinforced by Congress’ mandate to detain him throughout his removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and does not exceed the statutory power Congress delegated. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a.” The Supreme Court has held that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is a mandatory detention statute and that aliens detained pursuant to that provision are not entitled to bond. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287.

In this case, Petitioner falls squarely within the ambit of Section 1225(b)(2)(A)'s mandatory detention requirement as he is an "applicant for admission" to the United States. As described above, an "applicant for admission" is an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted. The Supreme Court has confirmed an alien present in the country but never admitted is deemed "an applicant for admission" and that "detention must continue" "until removal proceedings have concluded" based on the "plain meaning" of 8 U.S.C. § 1225. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289 & 299. Applying this reasoning, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently confirmed in a habeas action that an unlawfully present alien, who had been unlawfully present in the country for approximately 20 years, was nonetheless an "applicant for admission" upon the straightforward application of the statute. See *Webert Alvarenga Pena, Petitioner, v. Patricia Hyde, et al.*, No. CV 25-11983-NMG, 2025 WL 2108913 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025). The Court explained this resulted in the "continued detention" of an alien during removal proceedings as commanded by statute. *Id.* DHS's invocation of the stay of release pending appeal in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) not only is not contrary to law, but also ensures that DHS has an opportunity to vindicate Congress' mandatory detention scheme.

In this case, because Petitioner is being detained during his removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and his proceedings are uncontrovertibly ongoing through BIA, his temporary detention pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) is lawful and is not *ultra vires*. The automatic stay will cease upon a

decision of the BIA or 90 days, whichever is shorter. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(4). The argument by Petitioner that his detention exceeds statutory authority is clearly invalid and should be rejected. Respondents' position is further supported by the recent ruling from the BIA that IJs lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens, like the Petitioner, who are present in the United States without admission. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

Petitioner's detention pending the conclusion of removal proceedings here is presumptively reasonable.

### CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss or deny the petition.

Respectfully submitted,

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