

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

OSCAR ACUNA ZAVALA,

Petitioner,

v.

KRISTI NOEM, et al.,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-02691-L-BN

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

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I. Introduction

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge his recent detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Petitioner alleges that he cannot be subject to mandatory immigration detention but, rather, must be released on bond. As explained herein, Petitioner is not entitled to any relief on his petition.

Petitioner is lawfully detained on a mandatory basis as an alien present in the United States without inspection or parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). A plain reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) supports a finding that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention. As an alien who has not been admitted into the United States, Petitioner is considered an applicant for admission in the United States and therefore “shall be detained” during the pendency of his removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

For these reasons, and those herein, the Court should deny the Petition.

II. Background

It is undisputed that Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. App. p. 5. He entered the United States at an unknown date and was not admitted or paroled after inspection and thus was charged as removable under INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). *Id.*

On August 24, 2025, Petitioner was placed into immigration proceedings with the issuance of a Notice to Appear. App. p. 6. On September 22, 2025, Petitioner sought a custody redetermination before the Immigration Judge. App. p. 9. The custody redetermination was denied based on a lack of jurisdiction to hear the request. *Id.* Thereafter, on November 4, 2025, Petitioner filed a Form EOIR-42B, application of

cancellation of removal and adjustment of status with the Immigration Court. Petitioner's next hearing date is November 20, 2025. App. p. 15.

Petitioner now brings this habeas claim asserting that he is bond-eligible because he should instead fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which gives the Attorney General the discretion to detain or release the alien on bond through the pendency of removal proceedings.

III. Relevant Immigration Law

This case implicates the interplay of various statutes that govern the civil detention of illegal aliens (1) pending a decision on removal, (2) during the administration of removal orders, and (3) in preparation for removal. *See generally* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226, 1231. Properly construed, these statutes provide that individuals such as Petitioner are considered applicants for admission to the United States and are therefore subject to mandatory detention.

A. Inspection and Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

“To implement its immigration policy, the Government must be able to decide (1) who may enter the country and (2) who may stay here after entering.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 286 (2018). Section 1225 governs inspection, the initial step in this process, *id.*, stating that all alien “applicants for admission . . . shall be inspected by immigration officers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3)). The statute—in a provision entitled “ALIENS TREATED AS APPLICANTS FOR ADMISSION”—dictates who “shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission,” defining that term to

encompass *both* an alien “present in the United States who has not been admitted *or* [one] who arrives in the United States . . .” *Id.* § 1225(a)(1)). (emphasis added).

Paragraph (b) of § 1225 governs the inspection procedures applicable to all applicants for admission. They “fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 Section 1225(b)(1) applies to those “arriving in the United States” and “certain other”¹ aliens “initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation.” *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),(iii). Aliens falling under this subsection are generally subject to expedited removal proceedings “without further hearing or review.” *See id.*, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But where the applicant “indicates an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution,” immigration officers will refer him or her for a credible fear interview. *Id.*, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii)). An applicant “with a credible fear of persecution” is “detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the alien does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” he is detained until removal from the United States. *Id.* at §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV).

¹ “Certain other aliens” are addressed in Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii), which gives the Attorney General the sole discretion to apply (b)(1)’s expedited procedures to an alien who “has not been admitted or paroled into the United States, and who has not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility,” subject to an exception inapplicable here. The statute therefore explicitly confirms application of its inspection procedures for those already in the country, including those who have been in the country for a period of years.

Section 1225(b)(2) is “broader” than (b)(1), “serv[ing] as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. Subject to exceptions not applicable here, “if the examining immigration officer determines that the alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien *shall* be detained for a removal proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added); *see also Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 68 (BIA 2025) (“for aliens arriving in and seeking admission into the United States who are placed directly in full removal proceedings, section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), mandates detention ‘until removal proceedings have concluded.’”) (citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 299). DHS retains sole discretionary authority to temporarily release on parole “any alien applying for admission” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); *see Biden v. Texas*, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022).

B. Apprehension and Discretionary Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

“Even once inside the United States, aliens do not have an absolute right to remain here. For example, an alien present in the country may still be removed if he or she falls ‘within one or more . . . classes of deportable aliens.’ §1227(a).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a), which outlines “classes of deportable aliens” among those already “in *and admitted* to the United States”) (emphasis added)). “Section 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and detaining that group of aliens pending their removal.” *Id.* “[O]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General,” it provides that an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision” on the removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

For aliens arrested under §1226(a), the Attorney General and the DHS have broad discretionary authority to detain an alien during removal proceedings.² *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1) (DHS “may continue to detain the arrested” alien during the pendency of removal proceedings).

Following apprehension under § 1226(a), a DHS officer makes an initial discretionary determination concerning release. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). DHS “may continue to detain the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1). “To secure release, the alien must show that he does not pose a danger to the community and that he is likely to appear for future proceedings.” *Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. 523, 527 (2021) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8)); *Matter of Adeniji*, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1113 (BIA 1999)). If DHS decides to release, it may set a bond or condition the release. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8).

If DHS determines that an alien should remain detained during the pendency of his removal proceedings, the alien may request a bond hearing before an immigration judge. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1003.19, 1236.1(d). The immigration judge conducts a bond hearing and decides whether release is warranted, based on a variety of factors that account for ties to the United States and risks of flight or danger to the community. *See*

² Although the relevant statutory sections refer to the Attorney General, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), transferred all immigration enforcement and administration functions vested in the Attorney General, with few exceptions, to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Attorney General’s authority—delegated to immigration judges, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d)—to detain, or authorize bond for aliens under section 1226(a) is “one of the authorities he retains . . . although this authority is shared with [DHS] because officials of that department make the initial determination whether an alien will remain in custody during removal proceedings.” *Matter of D-J-*, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 574 n.3 (A.G. 2003)

Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (identifying nine non-exhaustive factors); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (“The determination . . . as to custody status or bond may be based upon any information that is available to the Immigration Judge or that is presented to him or her by the alien or [DHS].”).

Section 1226(a) does not grant “any *right* to release on bond.” *Matter of D-J-*, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 575 (citing *Carlson*, 342 U.S. at 534). Nor does it address the applicable burden of proof or particular factors that must be considered. *See generally* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Rather, it grants DHS and the Attorney General broad discretionary authority to determine, after arrest, whether to detain or release an alien during his removal proceedings. *See id.* If, after the bond hearing, either party disagrees with the decision of the immigration judge, that party may appeal that decision to the BIA. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(3), 1003.19(f), 1003.38, 1236.1(d)(3). Included within the Attorney General and DHS’s discretionary authority are limitations on the delegation of that authority to the immigration court. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B), the immigration judge does not have authority to redetermine the conditions of custody imposed by DHS for any arriving alien.

C. Review of custody determinations at the BIA.

The BIA is an appellate body within EOIR. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). Members of the BIA possess delegated authority from the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1). The BIA is “charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the [INA] that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it,” including IJ custody determinations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1), 236. The BIA not only resolves

particular disputes before it, but also “through precedent decisions, [it] shall provide clear and uniform guidance to DHS, the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the [INA] and its implementing regulations.”

Id. § 1003.1(d)(1). “The decision of the [BIA] shall be final except in those cases reviewed by the Attorney General.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7).

IV. Argument and Authorities

The Petition should be denied for multiple reasons. Petitioner styles his habeas petition as three distinct claims: a violation of the INA (Count I), a violation of due process (Count II), and a violation of regulations (Count III). *See* ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 41-51. Counts II and III, however, present the same central statutory challenge presented in Count I: that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful because he is entitled to a bond hearing as an alien detained under Section 1226, not Section 1225. As discussed as follows, Petitioner’s habeas petition should be denied because he is subject to mandatory detention, not discretionary detention as he alleges.

A. **Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and not entitled to bond under the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).**

Petitioner’s statutory argument, and his habeas petition, must be denied because the plain text of the INA provides that he falls under the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than designated by the Attorney General. *See Matter of Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

1. Petitioner is considered an applicant for admission because he entered the United States without being inspected, admitted, or paroled.

“As with any question of statutory interpretation, [the] analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.” *Jimenez v. Quarterman*, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009). Section 1225(a)(1) deems any “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters)” to be an “applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this point: that aliens present in the country who have not been admitted are considered applicants for admission. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)); *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 109 (2020) (same).

Section 1225 of the INA provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission,” if that alien “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained” for removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Petitioner cannot contest that he is “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). As a straightforward statutory matter, as an alien “present in the United States who has not been admitted,” he is by definition “an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); *Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-CV-01467, 2025 WL 3048926, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025) (“[U]nder the plain text of § 1225(a)(1), any alien physically present in the United

States who has not been admitted is an ‘applicant for admission,’ regardless of how long they have been in the country or whether they intended to apply or enter properly.”). Thus, Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention. *See id.*

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) (instructing that “the alien *shall* be detained” in the case of “an alien seeking admission” who “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” (emphasis added)).

Accordingly, the term “applicant for admission” includes two categories of aliens: (1) arriving aliens, but also (2) aliens present without admission. *See DHS v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (explaining that “an alien who tries to enter the country illegally is treated as an ‘applicant for admission’”). Indeed, that “arriving aliens” are just one subset of the larger group of “applicants for admission” is made clear by the fact that “arriving alien” is defined as “an applicant for admission *coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry*”—thus making clear that there are other types of applicants for admission. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1001.1(q) (emphasis added).

All aliens who are applicants for admission “shall be inspected by immigration officers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a)). An applicant for admission seeking admission at a port-of-entry “must present whatever documents are required and must establish to the satisfaction of the inspecting officer that the alien is not subject to removal . . . and is entitled, under all of the applicable provisions of the immigration laws . . . to enter the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(1)); *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (describing the related burden of an applicant for admission in

removal proceedings). “An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled or an alien who seeks entry at other than an open, designated port-of-entry . . . is subject to the provisions of [§ 1182(a)] and to removal under [§ 1225(b)] or [§ 1229a].” 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(2) .

Here, there does not appear to be any dispute that Petitioner did not present at a port-of-entry but instead entered the United States elsewhere, in an unlawful fashion and without having been admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. He is, therefore, an alien present without admission and, consequently, an applicant for admission.

2. Because Petitioner is an applicant for admission, he is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

Applicants for admission may be placed in expedited removal proceedings under § 1225 or, as has occurred here with respect to Petitioner, he may be placed in § 1229a removal proceedings (which are the more comprehensive form of removal proceedings that also generally apply to aliens other than applicants for admission who are charged with removability). But even if placed in § 1229a proceedings, applicants for admission may be subjected to mandatory detention under § 1225 such that they are ineligible for release on bond. Specifically, aliens present without admission placed in § 1229a removal proceedings are both applicants for admission as defined in § 1225(a)(1) *and* aliens “seeking admission,” as contemplated in § 1225(b)(2)(A). Such aliens are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and thus ineligible for release on bond.

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018); *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (A), (B). Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), “an alien who is an applicant for admission” “*shall be detained* for a proceeding under section 1229a” “if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

Thus, according to the plain language of § 1225(b)(2)(A), applicants for admission in § 1229a removal proceedings “*shall be detained.*” *Id.* (emphasis added). “The ‘strong presumption’ that the plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent is rebutted only in ‘rare and exceptional circumstances,’ . . .” *Ardestani v. INS*, 502 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1991) (quoting *Rubin v. United States*, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). And as the Supreme Court observed in *Jennings*, nothing in § 1225(b)(2) “says anything whatsoever about bond hearings.” 583 U.S. at 297. Further, there is no textual basis for arguing that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to arriving aliens—no provision within § 1225(b)(2) refers to “arriving aliens,” or limits that clause to arriving aliens, and Congress instead intended for it to apply generally “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (A). Where Congress means for a rule to apply only to “arriving aliens,” it has used that specific term of art or similar phrasing. *See, e.g., id.* §§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), 1225(c)(1).

The BIA’s recently issued published decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), is consistent with these principles. In its decision, the BIA

affirmed “the Immigration Judge’s determination that he did not have authority over [a] bond request because aliens who are present in the United States without admission are applicants for admission as defined under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 220.³

The BIA concluded that aliens “who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer. Remaining in the United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not constitute an ‘admission.’” *Id.* at 228. To hold otherwise would lead to an “incongruous result” that rewards aliens who unlawfully enter the United States without inspection and subsequently evade apprehension for a number of years. *Id.*

In so concluding, the BIA rejected the alien’s argument that “because he has been residing in the interior of the United States for almost 3 years . . . he cannot be considered as ‘seeking admission.’” *Id.* at 221. The BIA determined that this argument “is not supported by the plain language of the INA” and creates a “legal conundrum.” *Id.* If the alien “is not admitted to the United States (as he admits) but he is not ‘seeking admission’ (as he contends), then what is his legal status?” *Id.* (parentheticals in original).

³ Previously, as alluded to in BIA decisions, § 1226(a) had been interpreted as an available detention authority for aliens who were present without admission and placed in § 1229a removal proceedings. *See, e.g., Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez*, 28 I&N Dec. 747, 747–48 (BIA 2023). However, as noted by the BIA, the BIA had not previously addressed this issue in a precedential decision. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 216.

The decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* is consistent not only with the plain language of § 1225(b)(2), but also with the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in *Jennings*. Specifically, in *Jennings*, the Supreme Court explained that § 1225(b) applies to all applicants for admission, noting that the language of § 1225(b)(2) is “quite clear” and “unequivocally mandate[s]” detention. 583 U.S. at 300, 303.

Similarly, relying on *Jennings* and the plain language of §§ 1225 and 1226(a), the Attorney General recognized in *Matter of M-S-* that §§ 1225 and 1226(a) describe “different classes of aliens.” 27 I&N Dec. 509, 516 (AG 2019). And in *Matter of Q. Li*, the BIA also held that an alien who illegally crossed into the United States between ports-of-entry and was apprehended without a warrant while arriving is detained under § 1225(b). 29 I&N Dec. 66, 71 (BIA 2025). These decisions make clear that all applicants for admission are subject to detention under § 1225(b). *See also Florida v. United States*, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2023) (explaining that “the 1996 expansion of § 1225(b) to include illegal border crossers would make little sense if DHS retained discretion to apply § 1226(a) and release illegal border crossers whenever the agency saw fit”).

Given that § 1225 is the applicable detention authority for all applicants for admission—both arriving aliens and aliens present without admission alike, regardless of whether the alien was initially processed for expedited removal proceedings under § 1225(b)(1) or placed directly into removal proceedings under § 1229a—and further given that both “§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention of aliens throughout the completion of applicable proceedings,” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 302, Petitioner has no

grounds to complain that he is subject to mandatory detention. Petitioner is properly considered an applicant for admission (specifically, an alien present without admission), and he was placed into removal proceedings under § 1229a. He is therefore subject to detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) and there is no requirement that he be eligible for bond.

3. The statutory history supports the Respondent's understanding of who is considered an applicant for admission.

The structure of the statutory scheme prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546, bolsters the understanding that under the current statutory scheme, all applicants for admission are subject to detention under § 1225(b). The broad definition of applicants for admission was added to the INA in 1996. Before 1996, the INA only contemplated inspection of aliens arriving at ports-of-entry. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)), (b) (1994) (discussing “aliens arriving at ports of the United States” and “the examining immigration officer at the port of arrival”). Relatedly, any alien who was “in the United States” and within certain listed classes of deportable aliens was deportable. *Id.* at § 1251(a). One such class of deportable aliens included those “who entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” *Id.* at § 1251(a)(1)(B). Aliens were excludable if they were “seeking admission” at a port-of-entry or had been paroled into the United States. *See id.*, at § 1225(a); *see also id.* at § 1182(a). At the time, deportation proceedings and exclusion proceedings differed and began with different charging documents. *See Sale v. Haitian*

Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 175 (1993) (explaining the “important distinction” between deportation and exclusion). And the placement of an alien in exclusion or deportation proceedings depended on whether the alien had made an “entry” within the meaning of the INA. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994) (defining “entry” as “any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession”).

Former § 1225 provided that aliens “seeking admission” at a port-of-entry who could not demonstrate entitlement to be admitted (“excludable” aliens) were subject to mandatory detention, with potential release solely by means of parole under § 1182(d)(5). *See id.*, at §§ 1225(a), (b), § 1182(d)(5). The concept of “seeking admission” in former § 1225 appears to have been understood to refer to aliens arriving at a port-of-entry. *See id.* And aliens who entered without inspection and were deportable were taken into custody under the authority of an arrest warrant, and like other deportable aliens, could request bond. *See id.*, at §§ 1251(a)(1)(B), 1252(a)(1). That meant that “[aliens] who had entered without inspection could take advantage of the greater procedural and substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings, while [aliens] who actually presented themselves to authorities for inspection were restrained by more summary exclusion proceedings.” *Martinez v. Att’y Gen.*, 693 F.3d 408, 413 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To remedy this unintended and undesirable consequence, the IIRIRA substituted ‘admission’ for ‘entry,’ and replaced deportation and exclusion proceedings with the more general ‘removal’ proceeding.” *Id.* Consistent with this dichotomy, the INA, as amended by the IIRIRA, defines *all* those who have not been

admitted to the United States as “applicants for admission.” IIRIRA § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-579.

Moreover, Congress’s use of the present participle—“seeking”—in § 1225(b)(2)(A) should not be ignored. *See United States v. Wilson*, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (“Congress’ use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes.”). By using the present participle “seeking,” § 1225(b)(2)(A) “signal[s] present and continuing action.” *See Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co.*, 48 F.4th 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2022). And the phrase “seeking admission” should not be understood to refer to “something in the past that has ended or something yet to come.” *See Shell v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co.*, 941 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2019). Thus, when pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) an “examining immigration officer determines” that an alien “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” the officer does so contemporaneously with the alien’s present and ongoing action of seeking admission. Indeed, interpreting the present participle “seeking” as denoting an ongoing process is also consistent with its ordinary usage. *See, e.g., Samayoa v. Bondi*, 146 F.4th 128, 134 (1st Cir. 2025) (an inadmissible alien “seeking to remain in the country lawfully” applied for relief in removal proceedings); *Garcia v. USCIS*, 146 F.4th 743, 746 (9th Cir. 2025) (“USCIS requires all U visa holders seeking permanent resident status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m) to undergo a medical examination . . .”). Accordingly, just as the alien in *Samayoa* is not only an alien present without admission but also seeking to remain in the United States, Petitioner is an alien present without admission, and therefore an applicant

for admission as defined in § 1225(a)(1), but also an alien seeking admission under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Congress's significant amendments to the immigration laws in the IIRIRA support the notion that such aliens are properly detained pursuant to § 1225(b)—specifically, § 1225(b)(2)(A). Congress, for example, eliminated certain anomalous provisions that favored aliens who illegally entered without inspection over aliens arriving at ports-of-entry. A rule that treated an alien who enters the country illegally more favorably than an alien detained after arriving at a port-of-entry would “create a perverse incentive to enter at an unlawful rather than a lawful location.” *United States v. Gambino-Ruiz*, 91 F.4th 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 140). Such a scenario reflects “the precise situation that Congress intended to do away with by enacting” the IIRIRA. *Id.* “Congress intended to eliminate the anomaly under which illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry.” *Ortega-Lopez v. Barr*, 978 F.3d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

As discussed by the BIA in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, during the IIRIRA's legislative drafting process, Congress asserted the importance of controlling illegal immigration and securing the land borders of the United States. *See* 29 I&N Dec. at 222–24 (discussing H.R. Rep. 104-469 (1996)). As alluded to above, one goal of the IIRIRA was to “reform the legal immigration system and facilitate legal entries into the United States.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 1. Affording bond hearings to aliens present without

admission, who have evaded immigration authorities and illegally entered the United States, but not affording such hearings to arriving aliens, who are attempting to comply with U.S. immigration law, is anomalous with and runs counter to that goal.

4. Persuasive authority from other courts.

In the absence of controlling authority, this Court should follow the multitude of district courts that have carefully interpreted the plain language of the INA and found aliens like the Petitioner subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Although the Government acknowledges that there are district court decisions that hold to the contrary⁴, it bears mention that (1) none of these decisions are binding, (2) *Hurtado* carries far more weight considering the BIA’s subject-matter expertise on the matter and the thoroughness of its analysis, and (3) many of the courts that have ruled against the Government “appear to defer substantially to each other.” *Olalde*, 2025 WL 3131942, at *1. Many district courts have adopted the Respondents’ and the BIA’s interpretation. *See, e.g., Barrios Sandoval*, 2025 WL 3048926 (denying habeas relief to inadmissible alien present in the country for 3 years without admission or parole because the alien is an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under §1225(b)(2); *Olalde*, 2025 WL 3131942; *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, No. 8:25-CV-00526, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025) (denying habeas relief to inadmissible alien in the country for 12

⁴ *But see Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, No. H-25-3726, 2025 WL 2886346, at * 3(S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025); *Vieira v. De Anda-Ybarra*, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. EP-25-cv-432-DB, 2025 WL 2937880, at *4-5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025); *Gonzales Martinez v. Noem*, No. EP-25-cv-430-KC, 2025 WL 2965859, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025); *Santiago v. Noem*, No. EP-25-cv-361-KC, 2025 WL 2792588, at *7-10 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025); *Hernandez-Fernandez v. Lyons*, No. 5:25-cv-773-JKP, 2025 WL 2976923, at *7-8 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025).

years based on 1225(b)(2) and inapplicability of 1226); *Chavez v. Noem*, No. 3:25-CV-02325, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (denying injunctive relief to inadmissible alien based on 1225(b)(2)); accord *Pena v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 2108913 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025) (albeit in a different context, but adopted the reasoning at issue here when it stated that a Brazilian national who entered the country illegally in 2005 “remains an applicant for admission” in 2025).

For instance, in *Garibay-Robledo*, 1:25-CV-00177, 2025 WL 2638672, a sister court observed that “the plain language of the mandatory-detention provision weighs *heavily against* the petitioner’s assertion that he is subject only to discretionary detention,” and that the argument to the contrary “*flatly contradicts* the statute’s plain language and the history of legislative changes enacted by Congress.” *Id.* at *4. The *Garibay-Robledo* court conducted a review of legislative history and further noted that by defining “applicants for admission” broadly enough to encompass both arriving aliens and illegal entrants, Congress removed the previously existing incentives to enter the country illegally. *Id.* at *6-7. See also, *Montoya Cabanas v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-cv-4830, 2025 WL 3171331, at *4-6 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025)(adopting the reasoning of *Garibay-Robledo* in denying a habeas petition).

More recently, in *Diaz Garcia v. Noem*, 1:25-CV-00247-H (N. Tex. Nov. 18, 2025), the court again denied a temporary restraining order finding that petitioner’s argument that he is not an applicant for admission because he entered illegally 15 years ago “improperly conflates entry with admission, thus collapsing the exact distinction IIRIRA sought to introduce through its expansive definition of “applicants for

admission.” *Id.* at p. 8. The court concluded that the logical import of section 1225(a) is that one who is an applicant for admission is “seeking admission.” *Id.*

Respondents respectfully maintain that this Petitioner is an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) in light of the legislative history and the reasoning outlined by the Supreme Court in *Jennings*. The contrary decisions of other districts should not be followed and should not override the clear congressional mandate of detention under the provisions of 8 U.S.C. §1225(b). Accordingly, the Court should not order a bond hearing or release under the reasoning of those decisions.

B. The Due Process Clause does not entitle Petitioner to any relief.

As discussed above, the relevant immigration statutes, properly construed, provide no entitlement to relief for Petitioner. Nor does the Due Process Clause. Instead, mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) is constitutionally permissible—particularly where, as here, Petitioner has been detained for a very short period of time. The Supreme Court has held that detention during removal proceedings, even without access to a bond hearing, is constitutional. In *Demore v. Kim*, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of § 1226(c), which mandates the detention of certain aliens during removal proceedings without access to bond hearings. 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003). The Court “recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process,” and also reaffirmed its “longstanding view that the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 523, 526. The Court further explained that “when the Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due Process Clause does not

require it to employ the least burdensome means to accomplish its goal.” *Id.* at 528. With respect to due process concerns, the Court recognized that it “has firmly and repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” *Id.* at 522.

Here, Petitioner is being detained for the limited purpose of removal proceedings and determining his removability. Such detention is not punitive or done for other reasons than to address removability, which will occur in the removal proceedings. Whether framed as a substantive or procedural due process claim, the principles set forth in *Demore* govern this case. Substantive due process protects “only ‘those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” *Dep’t of State v. Muñoz*, 602 U.S. 899, 910 (2024) (quoting *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)). Any substantive due process claim therefore fails here because “the through line of history” is that the federal government has “sovereign authority to set the terms governing the admission and exclusion of noncitizens.” *Id.* at 911, 912. Indeed, Congress in exercising this “broad power over naturalization and immigration . . . regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 522 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Consistent with these principles, the Supreme Court has long recognized that “the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 526.

Similarly, Petitioner cannot succeed on a procedural due process claim. Such a claim fails because where Congress has substantively mandated detention pending

removal proceedings, an alien cannot displace that substantive choice with a procedural due process claim. As discussed, aliens are not entitled to bond hearings as a matter of substantive due process. *See Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523–29. Under *Demore*, Congress may reasonably determine—as it did here—to subject aliens who were never inspected or admitted to this country to detention without bond while the government determines their removability. Congress has not created any procedural rights to a bond hearing for applicants for admission. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297. “Read most naturally,” § 1225 “mandate[s] detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.” *Id.* And the statute says nothing “whatsoever about bond hearings.” *Id.* No procedural due process claim is stated.

V. Conclusion

Petitioner is lawfully detained pending removal proceedings, and he does not claim any immigration status that would entitle him to immediate release from custody. Petitioner’s petition for habeas should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On November 20, 2025, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with the clerk of court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the electronic case filing system of the court. I hereby certify that I have served all parties electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2).

/s/ Ann E. Cruce-Haag
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