

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAN WILFREDO PACHECO
MAYEN,

Petitioner,

v.

KEVIN RAYCRAFT, Acting Field
Office Director of Enforcement and
Removal Operations, Detroit Field
Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; PAMELA
BONDI, U.S. Attorney General;
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW,

Respondents.

Case No. 2:25-cv-13056

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Willian Wilfredo Pacheco Mayen is in the physical custody of Respondents at the North Lake Correctional Facility in Michigan. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

2. Petitioner has lived in the U.S. since 2003. His wife is a lawful permanent resident and they have four United States citizen children, who range in age from eight to twenty. His nine-year-old son A- P-C- travels via wheelchair and suffers from a combination of developmental delay, neurologic dysfunction, and skeletal dysplasia. A- is unable to feed himself and has vision and hearing problems, epilepsy, hypotonia, and metabolic disease.

3. Petitioner is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States without inspection. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Based on this charge in Petitioner's removal proceedings, DHS denied Petitioner release from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who initially entered the United States without inspection—to be subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), no matter how long they have resided in the United States.

4. Petitioner sought a bond redetermination hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ). On September 11, 2025, the IJ denied bond, concluding that he had no jurisdiction to set a bond for Petitioner. Exhibit A.

5. The IJ based his decision on the same legal analysis advanced by DHS. Indeed, the DHS policy states it was issued “in coordination with the Department of Justice (DOJ).” The IJ concluded that notwithstanding Petitioner’s 20 years of residing in the United States, he is nevertheless an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” and subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). This position has now been officially sanctioned and made binding in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

6. Petitioner’s detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are residing in the United States but are charged as inadmissible for having initially entered the United States without inspection.

7. For nearly thirty years, Respondents and the federal courts recognized that noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection and were

apprehended years later were eligible for a bond hearing before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

8. The government's novel position would mandate the detention, without a bond hearing, of millions of longtime residents of the United States. It is contrary to the plain language of the statute; Congress's intent and understanding of the detention statutes, expressed most recently in January 2025; long-standing agency practice; and the agency's conduct in this case. It is no surprise that, to the best of counsel's knowledge, this new interpretation has been squarely rejected by every federal court to address this issue, including in *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025), and *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, 2:25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025). *See infra* at ¶ 36. As court after court has held, § 1225 is a border inspection scheme that does not apply to noncitizens who were already residing in the United States when they were apprehended. Instead, § 1226(a) plainly applies. And those courts all rejected the government's argument that exhaustion is a barrier to habeas relief.

9. This Court should grant Mr. Pacheco Mayen's petition and order Respondents to either immediately release him or hold a new bond hearing within seven days.

10. Petitioner is not challenging any discretionary denial of bond; he is challenging the IJ's legal determination that Petitioner is not eligible for bond under § 1226(a) in the first place.

JURISDICTION

11. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the North Lake Correctional Facility in Baldwin, Michigan.

12. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause). *See Rosales-Garcia v. Holland*, 322 F.3d 386, 394 (6th Cir. 2003).

13. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. *See Ly v. Hansen*, 351 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2003) *vacated on other grounds by Hamama v. Adducci*, 946 F.3d 875 (6th Cir. 2020).

VENUE

14. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Michigan under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Petitioner is detained at the direction of, and is in the immediate custody of, Respondent Raycraft. *See Roman v. Ashcroft*, 340 F.3d 314, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2003).

15. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims and relevant facts occurred in the Eastern District.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

16. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

17. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

PARTIES

18. Willian Pacheco Mayen is a citizen of Guatemala who has been in immigration detention since August 2025. His wife is a lawful permanent resident

of the United States and their four children were born in the United States. He is eligible for relief from removal – cancellation of removal as a nonpermanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). This application has been pending with the Immigration Court since 2014.

19. Respondent Kevin Raycraft is the Acting Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Acting Director Raycraft is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

20. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

21. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

22. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

23. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

24. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

25. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

26. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

27. Third, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

28. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

29. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104—208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

30. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (explaining that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.”).

31. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt.

1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

32. However, on July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

33. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection are subject to the mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

34. The BIA has since adopted that position in a precedential decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). This decision mandates the detention, without a bond hearing in immigration court, of millions of noncitizens who have lived in the United States for years following their entry without inspection.

35. ICE and EOIR have adopted this position even though federal courts have rejected this exact conclusion. For example, after IJs in the Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who

entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here, the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2025).

36. Since July, every District Court to consider the issue has rejected the government's position and granted habeas relief: *See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, 2:25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025). *See, e.g., Guerrero Lepe v. Andrews*, 1:25-cv-01163, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); *Beltran Barrera v. Tindall*, No. 3:25-cv-541 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); *Oliveros v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-07117 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025); *Salazar v. Dedos*, No. 1:25-cv-00835 (D. N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); *Vazquez v. Feeley*, No. 2:25-cv-01542 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); *Cortes v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02677 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025); *Palma v. Trump*, No. 4:25CV3176 (D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-1093 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Ruben Benitez et al. v. Noem et al.*, 5:25-cv-2190-RGK (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, 25-CV-11631, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025) at *8-13; *Maldonado v. Olson*, 25-CV-3142, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025) at *11-14; *Dos*

¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding->

Santos v. Noem, 25-CV-12052, 2025 WL 2370988 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025) at *6-8; Order, *Gonzalez v. Noem*, 25-CV-2054 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2025), Dkt. 12 at *6-9; *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. 25-cv-2157, 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25-cv-5937, 2025 WL 2267803 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2025); *Bautista et al. v. Santacruz Jr. et al.*, No. 5:25-CV-1873-BFM, ECF No. 14, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2025); *Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *8 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025).

37. DHS’s and DOJ’s interpretation defies the INA. As the aforementioned courts explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

38. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

39. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute’s entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are “seeking admission” to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained

detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission.

that this mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

40. Congress intended for § 1226 to govern the detention on noncitizens who entered the U.S. without inspection. Congress most recently expressed this understanding earlier this year in the Laken Riley Act. This act added a subsection to § 1226 that specifically mandated detention for noncitizens who are inadmissible under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A) (noncitizens present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, like Petitioner), 1182(a)(6)(C) (misrepresentation), or 1182(a)(7) (lacking valid documentation) and have been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E); Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). Respondents’ interpretation of the statutes would render this recently amended section superfluous. *Lopez-Campos, supra*.

41. If Congress intended or understood § 1225 to govern the detention of noncitizens like Petitioner, who were apprehended years after entering the United States, it would have placed these amendments to the detention provisions within § 1225, not § 1226.

42. When Congress amended § 1225(b)’s predecessor statute—which authorized detention only of arriving noncitizens—to include individuals who had

not been admitted, legislators expressed concerns about recent arrivals to the United States who lacked the documents to remain in the country. There was no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress intended to subject all people present in the United States after an unlawful entry to mandatory detention and thereby transform immigration detention and sweep millions of noncitizens into § 1225(b). *See* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 157–58, 228–29 (1996); H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 209 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).

43. This is not a novel interpretation of the INA. It has been *Respondents'* own understanding of these provisions since they were first enacted thirty years ago—a view they held until suddenly reversing course two months ago in a policy ICE issued “in coordination with the Department of Justice.” *See supra* n.1. In fact, in Petitioner’s own case, the Respondents had previously agreed that § 1226 governs his custody status. Exhibit B (Warrant for Arrest of Alien and Notice of Custody Determination). An IJ previously released Petitioner on a bond in 2014, a determination that ICE did not appeal. Exhibit C.

44. When the IIRIRA passed, the agency drafted new regulations that provided: “[a]liens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” *Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum*

Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997). In fact, as recently as August 4, the Attorney General designated a prior BIA decision for publication in which the BIA reviewed the bond eligibility of a noncitizen who unlawfully entered the United States under § 1226(a). *Matter of Akhmedov*, 29 I&N Dec. 166, 166 n.1 and 166-67 (BIA 2025). “The longstanding practice of the government can inform a court’s determination of ‘what the law is.’” *Loper Bright*, 603 U.S. at 385-86.

45. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended.

FACTS

46. Petitioner has resided in the United States for 22 years. He lives in Detroit, Michigan. He lives in Vermont with his lawful permanent resident wife and their four United States citizen children.

47. For relief from removal, he is eligible for cancellation of removal as a nonpermanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).

48. Following Petitioner’s arrest and transfer to the North Lake Correctional Facility, DHS issued a custody determination to continue Petitioner’s detention without an opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions.

49. Petitioner subsequently requested a bond redetermination hearing before an IJ.

50. On September 11, 2025, an IJ in Chelmsford, Massachusetts, denied bond on jurisdictional grounds, consistent with this new DHS and DOJ policy. Exhibit A.

51. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and community.

52. Any new appeal to the BIA is futile. DHS's new policy was issued "in coordination with DOJ," which oversees the immigration courts. The BIA's precedential decision in *Yajure Hurtado* binds future BIA panels and all IJs. Finally, in the *Rodriguez Vazquez* litigation, where EOIR and the Attorney General are defendants, DOJ has affirmed its position that individuals like Petitioner are applicants for admission and subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Mot. to Dismiss, *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC (W.D. Wash. June 6, 2025), Dkt. 49 at 27–31.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I **Violation of the INA**

53. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

54. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

55. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT III
Violation of the Bond Regulations

56. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

57. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had

entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

58. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, EOIR has a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to individual like Petitioner.

59. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

COUNT III
Violation of Due Process

60. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

61. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001).

62. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

63. The government’s detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Issue an order preventing Respondent from transferring Petitioner outside of Michigan;
- c. Issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner or provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 7 days;
- d. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- e. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED September 29, 2025.

/s/ Russell Reid Abrutyn
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