

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Ruben Abelardo Ortiz-Lopez,

Petitioner,

v.

LaDeon FRANCIS, in his official capacity as Acting Field Office Director of New York, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi NOEM in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; Pam BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General.

Respondents.

Case No. 1:25-cv-7985

**AMENDED VERIFIED
PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Ruben Abelardo Ortiz-Lopez brings this petition to challenge his unlawful detention as he left immigration court in Manhattan on September 25, 2025—a detention that resulted from an arrest that took place in front of his wife and young children. The arrest culminated in his wife being thrown against a wall and ultimately shoved to the ground violently by one of Respondents’ agents. Mr. Ortiz-Lopez is an asylum seeker from Ecuador who has been present in the U.S. since March 2024. At that time, Respondents determined he was subject to discretionary detention and released him. At his hearing on September 25, 2025, an immigration judge set his case for a future hearing on his asylum application. But rather than let him pursue adjudication of his asylum petition, Respondents violently detained him.

Mr. Ortiz-Lopez’s confinement is unlawful, and he brings this Petition seeking immediate and unconditional release. He also asks this Court to enjoin his transfer out of the New York City area.

PARTIES

1. Petitioner Ortiz-Lopez is a citizen of Ecuador who lives in New York. At the time this petition was filed, he was detained at 26 Federal Plaza in New York, New York.
2. Respondent LaDeon Francis is named in his official capacity as the Acting Field Office Director of the New York Field Office for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) within the United States Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, he is also responsible for the administration of immigration laws and the execution of detention and removal determinations and is a legal custodian of Petitioner. Respondent Francis’s address is New York ICE Field Office Director, 26 Federal Plaza, 7th Floor, New York, New York 10278.
3. Respondent Kristi Noem is named in her official capacity as the Secretary of Homeland Security in the United States Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, she is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2007); routinely transacts business in the Southern District of New York; is legally responsible for pursuing any effort to remove the Petitioner; and as such is a legal custodian of the Petitioner. Respondent Noem’s address is U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 800 K Street N.W. #1000, Washington, District of Columbia 20528.
4. Respondent Pam Bondi is named in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States. In this capacity, she is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws as exercised by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g). She routinely transacts business in the Southern District of New York and is legally responsible for administering Petitioner’s removal and custody proceedings and for the standards used in those proceedings. As such, she is the custodian of Petitioner. Respondent Bondi’s office

is located at the United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20530.

JURISDICTION

5. The federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus claims by non-citizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of their detention by ICE. *See, e.g., Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Petitioner was detained by Respondents on September 25, 2025.

6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution. This Court has authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202. The Court has additional remedial authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

VENUE

7. Venue is proper in this Court because Petitioner was detained by Respondents in Manhattan at the time of filing. *See* Exh. A (ICE detainee locator).

SPECIFIC FACTS ABOUT PETITIONER

8. Mr. Ortiz-Lopez is citizen of Ecuador and resident of New York who lived here with his family. He came to the U.S. seeking humanitarian protection in March 2024. He has two children, an 11-year-old and a 12-year-old.

9. Upon entry to the U.S., Mr. Ortiz-Lopez was detained by Respondents, charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and released.

10. On information and belief, Mr. Ortiz-Lopez was arrested in or around June 2024, but no conviction resulted from it because his criminal proceedings were dismissed shortly thereafter in

September 2024. He has had two immigration-court hearings since that arrest, including one in or around December 12, 2024 and his most recent hearing on September 25, 2025.

11. Mr. Ortiz-Lopez filed a timely application for asylum in April 2024. He has diligently attended immigration court and updated his address.

12. Upon exiting his most recent hearing on September 25, 2025, Mr. Ortiz-Lopez was surrounded and detained by Respondents without explanation. His wife and two young children were present during the arrest. The incident was documented in *The New York Times*, which published video footage showing one of Respondent's agents forcefully pushing Mr. Ortiz-Lopez's wife against a wall, causing her head to slam into ground as she fell to the floor—all while their children watched and cried in horror. See Andy Newman, *U.S. Agent Pushes Woman to Floor in Immigration Courthouse Confrontation*, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 2025, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/25/nyregion/ice-push-woman-nyc.html>.

CAMPAIGN OF DETENTIONS

13. On or about May 20, 2025, Respondents began a nationwide campaign to detain people attending their immigration court hearings. Initially, this was tied to motions to dismiss removal proceedings for people present in the U.S. for under two years, predicated on Respondents' intention to place them into expedited removal proceedings instead of full removal proceedings. After such a motion was made, and irrespective of the outcome, Respondents would then detain individuals immediately after their appearance in immigration court. But the detention campaign appears to have now expanded, targeting even people for whom no motion to dismiss has been made or who are not eligible for expedited removal for detention. These detentions, too, lack any individualized basis.

14. In New York City, this campaign has led to a large number of detentions in all three Manhattan immigration courthouses. The detentions are not individualized: on information and belief, Respondents create lists of individuals to be detained and then proceed to detain every single one, even in the face of protests such as that the person has minor children or medical conditions or cannot lawfully be subject to expedited removal.

15. Once detained, New Yorkers targeted by this campaign are subject to harsh detention conditions. Inside 26 Federal Plaza, detainees are held in crowded conditions and systematically denied access to legal calls despite a court order requiring such access and enjoining numerous other unlawful conditions. Family members often do not hear from loved ones for days and the ICE locator, an online portal, may not reflect their accurate location. Respondents will not confirm detainees' location during this time and will not facilitate legal calls or visits. ICE officials have used detainees' vulnerability once in custody to pressure them to accept deportation orders or stipulate to voluntary departure, regardless of their pending asylum claims.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

16. The INA provides for removal proceedings to be the “sole and exclusive” procedures for removing people from the United States, subject to a few narrow exceptions. 8 U.S.C. 1229a. Section 1229a(a)(3) states that “[u]nless otherwise specified in this chapter, a proceeding under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States.”¹

17. Mr. Ortiz-Lopez is currently in removal proceedings under section 1229a.

¹ “Attorney General” in Section 1254a now refers to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1103; 6 U.S.C. § 557.

18. Congress has authorized civil detention of noncitizens in removal proceedings for specific, non-punitive purposes. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S.Ct. 830, 833 (2018); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). For individuals who are “arriving” in the U.S. or who are subject to expedited removal because they have been present under two years and meet certain other requirements, mandatory detention is authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). For individuals who are in removal proceedings following entry without inspection and who are not subject to mandatory detention based on criminal history, detention is normally authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Individuals with a final order of removal may be subject to mandatory or discretionary detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).

19. In May 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that “an applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 69 (BIA 2025).

20. On July 8, Respondents promulgated an internal memo directing ICE attorneys to argue for an even more expansive interpretation of who is subject to mandatory detention. This memo, now leaked to the public, states that “effective immediately, it is the position of DHS that [any noncitizens who have not been admitted to the country] are subject to detention under INA § 235(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)] and may not be released from ICE custody except by INA § 212(d)(5) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)] parole. These [noncitizens] are also ineligible for a custody redetermination hearing (“bond hearing”) before an immigration judge and may not be released for the duration of their removal proceedings absent a parole by DHS.”

21. In September 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals adopted this legal interpretation as well. *See Matter of Yajure Furtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). As a result, immigration judges cannot and will not grant noncitizens like Mr. Ortiz-Lopez release on bond pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

22. In late July, the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District began to adopt Respondents' reasoning and changed its prior legal position to now argue in petitions pending in this district that detention of individuals who entered the U.S. without inspection is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and therefore mandatory, despite arguments to the contrary as recently as June 2025.

23. Respondents' position on their own detention authority contradicts decades of settled precedent that individuals who entered the U.S. without inspection is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Regulations promulgated nearly thirty years ago provide that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination” under Section 1226. 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). Until recently, Respondents consistently adhered to this interpretation. *See, e.g., Matter of Garcia-Garcia*, 25 I&N Dec. 93 (BIA 2009); *Matter of D-J-*, 23 I&N Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003); *see also* Transcript of Oral Argument at 44:24–45:2, *Biden v. Texas*, 597 U.S. 785 (2022) (No. 21-954) ([Solicitor General]: “DHS’s long-standing interpretation has been that 1226(a) applies to those who have crossed the border between ports of entry and are shortly thereafter apprehended.”).

24. Since this shift, a growing number of courts have rejected Respondents' contention that entrants without inspection previously released pursuant to § 1226(a) are now subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b). *E.g. Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, 1:25-cv-05937-DEH, 2025

WL 2267803, slip. op. at *10-18 (S.D.N.Y. August 8, 2025) (ECF No. 14) (“*Lopez Benitez*”); *Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *4 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025). *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 25 Civ. 11571 (JEK), 2025 WL 1869299, at *5-9 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Rodriguez v. Bostock*, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 1193850, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2025). In total, Petitioner is aware of district-court decisions in over 20 states holding Respondents’ new construction of the detention statutes unlawful.

25. Although civil immigration detention is authorized by statute, that detention serves only two legitimate purposes: mitigating flight risk and preventing danger to the community. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 854 (2d Cir. 2020).

26. DHS makes initial custody determinations pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), which requires that noncitizens be released from custody *only* “if they demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” *See Velesaca v. Decker*, 458 F. Supp. 3d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations require ICE officials to make an individualized custody determination”); *see also Lopez Benitez* at *20.

27. A person’s liberty cannot be infringed upon without “adequate procedural protections.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690-91. The Second Circuit has held that the *Mathews v. Eldridge* balancing test is applicable to determine the adequacy of process in the context of civil immigration confinement. *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 851 (citing *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). This test requires process sufficient to mitigate the risk of erroneous deprivation of a liberty interest. Revocation of conditional release from confinement, even civil immigration confinement, infringes on a protected liberty interest. The liberty interest in even conditional release is well-established in the context of parole; probation; and freedom from civil

immigration confinement. *See Valdez v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 4627 (GBD), 2025 WL 1707737, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) (finding immigration petitioner’s “liberty interest is clearly established”); *Ortega v. Bonnar*, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (applying case law from the probation and parole contexts to conclude that the non-citizen petitioner had a “liberty interest in remaining out of [immigration] custody”).

28. As to process, at a minimum, in the context of revocation of civil release, “an individual whose release is sought to be revoked is entitled to due process such as notice of the alleged grounds for revocation, a hearing, and the right to testify at such a hearing.” *Villiers v. Decker*, 31 F.4th 825, 833 (2d Cir. 2022).

29. Despite these baseline requirements, Respondents now regularly re-detain individuals notwithstanding an earlier determination to release them and do so without according any notice or process whatsoever. These redetentions violate noncitizens’ right to due process. *See Chipantiza-Sisalema v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5528 (AT), 2025 WL 1927931 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2025) (ordering the immediate release of a petitioner redetained by ICE because she did not pose “a risk of flight or a danger to the community” and her sudden redetention violated her right to due process); *Valdez v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 4627 (GBD), 2025 WL 1707737 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) (ordering the release of petitioner redetained after an immigration court hearing and concluding “Respondents ongoing detention of Petitioner with no process at all, much less prior notice, no showing of changed circumstances, or an opportunity to respond, violates his due process rights.”); *Savane v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV .6666 (GHW), 2025 WL 2774452, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2025) (finding due process violation, regardless of applicable detention statute, where ICE redetained noncitizen without notice or an opportunity to be heard).

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE
VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
(Redetention)

30. Mr. Ortiz-Lopez repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Petition as if fully set forth herein.

31. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the government from depriving any person of liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. *See generally Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).

32. Petitioner's detention violates the both the substantive and procedural components of the Due Process Clause. He was determined not to pose danger or flight risk as he was released from custody in March 2024; he has since applied for asylum and diligently attended immigration court. Respondents did not conduct an individualized analysis to conclude Petitioner is a danger or flight risk. He was also not accorded sufficient process prior to his sudden re-detention by ICE on September 25, 2025. He has received neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard as to whether a change in custody status was warranted. *See Lopez v. Sessions*, No. 18 CIV. 4189 (RWS), 2018 WL 2932726, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018) ("Petitioner's re-detention, without prior notice, a showing of changed circumstances, or a meaningful opportunity to respond, does not satisfy the procedural requirements of the Fifth Amendment"); *see also Chipantiza-Sisalema*, 2025 WL 1927931, at *3; *Valdez*, 2025 WL 1707737, at *4.

33. Respondents will now find that Mr. Ortiz-Lopez is ineligible for bond under *Matter of Yajure Furtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). But that determination is contradicted by Respondents' prior determinations in Mr. Ortiz-Lopez's case and the text and structure of the

detention statutes. Mandatory detention without access to a bond hearing violates Petitioner's right to due process.

34. Respondents' actions violate Mr. Ortiz-Lopez's right to due process.

COUNT TWO
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (Redetention)

35. Mr. Ortiz-Lopez repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Petition as if fully set forth herein.

36. Mr. Ortiz-Lopez was detained by federal immigration officials as removable when he entered the United States. The government exercised its discretion under the Immigration and Nationality Act to release him while he litigated that charge in immigration court. At the time of Mr. Ortiz-Lopez's arrest in September 2025, he had been living at liberty pursuant to that determination by federal immigration authorities.

37. The government lacked reliable information of changed or exigent circumstances that would justify Mr. Ortiz-Lopez's arrest on the same basis after federal immigration authorities previously decided he could pursue his claims for immigration relief at liberty.

38. His re-arrest based solely on the fact that he is subject to removal proceedings—which was also the predicate for his initial detention—is unreasonable and therefore violates the Fourth Amendment.

COUNT THREE
VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

39. Mr. Ortiz-Lopez repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Petition as if fully set forth herein.

40. The Administrative Procedure Act prohibits agency action which is arbitrary and capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

41. An action is an abuse of discretion if the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” *Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (quoting *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). An agency must articulate “a satisfactory explanation” for its action, “including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” *Dep’t of Com. v. New York*, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019) (citation omitted).

42. Respondents’ decision to detain Petitioner as part of their coordinated campaign and policy of detaining individuals attending immigration court, irrespective of the individual circumstances in their case, and then to subject them to mandatory detention, is arbitrary and capricious.

COUNT FOUR
RELEASE PENDING ADJUDICATION

43. Mr. Ortiz-Lopez repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Petition as if fully set forth herein.

44. Pursuant to *Mapp v. Reno*, this Court has the “inherent authority” to set bail pending the adjudication of a habeas petition when the petition has raised (1) substantial claims and (2) extraordinary circumstances that (3) “make the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective.” 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2001).

45. Mr. Ortiz-Lopez presents substantial claims. Moreover, extraordinary circumstances are also present, given the violence perpetrated against his family in connection with his detention and the unjustified nature of his current confinement.

46. He requests immediate release pending adjudication of the instant petition.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully requests that this Court:

1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
2. Enjoin Petitioner's transfer out of the New York City area;
3. Order Respondents to show cause why the writ should not be granted, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2243;
4. Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; the Fourth Amendment; and the Immigration and Nationality Act and implementing regulations;
5. Grant a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody without restraints on his liberty beyond those that existed prior to his redetention on September 25, 2025;
6. Award reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and
7. Grant such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: October 2, 2025

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on October 2, 2025, I electronically filed the attached the foregoing First Amended Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and accompanying Exhibits with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York using the CM/ECF system. Service will therefore be effected by the CM/ECF system.

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Attorney for Petitioner

28 U.S.C. § 2242 VERIFICATION STATEMENT

I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner because I am one of the Petitioner's attorneys. I have discussed with the Petitioner, and/or someone acting on his behalf, the events described in this Petition. On the basis of those discussions, I hereby verify that the statements made in this Petition are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

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