

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
3 ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

4 Gurveer Singh,

5 Petitioner,

6 v.

7 TODD M. LYONS, *et al.*

8 Respondents.

Case No. 1:25-cv-01574 (LMB/WEF)

9 **PETITIONER'S REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION**
10 **TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

11 **INTRODUCTION**

12 Respondents' opposition repeats arguments that this Court has already rejected. In *Hasan*
13 *v. Crawford*, *Abreu v. Crawford*, and *Portillo v. Hott*, judges in this District have held that
14 individuals apprehended within the United States, even those who entered without inspection, are
15 detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and are entitled to bond hearings.

16 Respondents' reliance on *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* is misplaced: that decision binds
17 Immigration Judges and the BIA, but not this Court. Unless this Court intervenes, Petitioner will
18 remain indefinitely detained with no forum available to adjudicate his bond eligibility. The Great
19 Writ exists to prevent precisely this kind of unlawful restraint.

20
21 **I. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION**

22 Respondents argue this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and
23 1252(g). But these provisions concern review of removal orders, not detention challenges. The
24 Supreme Court in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 521 (2018), and the Fourth Circuit in *Miranda*

1 v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338 (4th Cir. 2022), both confirmed habeas jurisdiction over detention
2 claims. Numerous decisions in this District—Hasan, Abreu, Portillo—have squarely rejected
3 Respondents’ jurisdictional theory. Importantly, because Matter of Yajure Hurtado deprives
4 Immigration Judges and the BIA of authority to conduct bond hearings for individuals like
5 Petitioner, federal court is the only forum available to vindicate his rights.

7 **II. SECTION 1226(A) GOVERNS PETITIONER’S DETENTION**

8 Decades of statutory interpretation and regulatory history confirm that individuals
9 arrested inside the United States, including those who entered without inspection, are detained
10 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b). The 1997 Interim Rule explicitly recognized that such
11 individuals are bond-eligible, and for nearly thirty years EOIR uniformly provided bond
12 hearings. Congress ratified this practice in 2025 when it amended § 1226(c) in the Laken Riley
13 Act, carving out a subset of inadmissible noncitizens for mandatory detention—an amendment
14 that would be superfluous if all EWIs were already subject to § 1225 mandatory custody.

15 EDVA has recently reaffirmed this framework. In *Hasan v. Crawford* (2025) and *Abreu*
16 *v. Crawford* (2025), this Court held that detention of individuals apprehended in the interior falls
17 under § 1226(a). Courts across the country—including *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft* (E.D. Mich.
18 2025), *Dos Santos v. Noem* (D. Mass. 2025), and *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock* (W.D. Wash.
19 2023)—have uniformly rejected DHS’s attempt to reclassify EWIs as § 1225 detainees. This
20 Court should do the same.

21 More recently, this Court in *Quispe-Ardiles v. Noem, et al.* (VAED-1:25-cv-01382),
22 District Judge Michael S. Nachmanoff ordered respondents to immediately release the petitioner
23 from custody. The court there concluded that the petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
24 1226(a). There are conclusions made that noncitizens who falls under § 1226(a) are not subject

1 to mandatory detention, but rather, those detained under Section 1226(a) are entitled to a bond
2 hearing before an Immigration Judge at any time before entry of a final removal order. “Pending
3 a removal decision, the Attorney General may continue to detain an arrested noncitizen, release
4 them on bond, or release them on conditional parole, unless they fall within certain exceptions
5 involving criminal offenses and terrorist activities. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1)-(2), (c).” *See page*
6 *10.* See also cases like this one in which Judge Leonie M. Brinkema granted the petitioners’
7 habeas petitions and ordered that the petitioners be released from custody (see cases like 1:25-cv-
8 1574, 1:25-cv-1583, 1:25-cv-1590).

9 To show evidence of Petitioner’s prolonged detention, DHS-ICE’s refusal to grant him
10 parole, evidence of his Section 240 immigration hearing, pending asylum (filed on June 13,
11 2020), evidence of positive equities (and that he is not a danger to the community and not a flight
12 risk), and proposed release plan, see the enclosed **Exhibits A-K**.

13
14 **III. PROLONGED MANDATORY DETENTION WITHOUT A BOND HEARING**
15 **VIOLATES DUE PROCESS**

16 Even if the statute were ambiguous, due process demands a bond hearing. The Fifth
17 Amendment protects against indefinite civil confinement without individualized review.
18 *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), both
19 recognized limits on immigration detention. EDVA courts have repeatedly found that detentions
20 exceeding several weeks without bond hearings raise serious constitutional concerns.
21 Respondents’ position—that Petitioner can be held indefinitely with no review—is inconsistent
22 with both precedent and fundamental fairness.

