examples. ECF No. 8.

Introduction

Petitioner Emmanuel McSweeney ("Petitioner") faces immediate irreparable harm: (1) removal to Haiti on the claim that he is not a citizen of the Bahamas; and (2) detention that prevents him from effectively litigating his motion to reopen and resolving his affairs. This Court should grant temporary relief.

Emmanuel McSweeney is a 29-year-old citizen of the Bahamas who is currently detained in Otay Mesa Detention Center. He was born in the Bahamas in 1996. Both his parents were born in the Bahamas. His mother is a Bahamian citizen. In 1998, Mr. McSweeney came to the United States with his mother from the Bahamas. In 2020, he was ordered removed by an immigration judge for overstaying his visa and for having misdemeanor convictions for possession of marijuana or cannabis. The immigration judge designated the Bahamas as the country of removal.

Following the order of removal, Mr. McSweeney was on immigration supervision until March 18, 2025. On that day, ICE arrested him during an immigration check-in in Florida. In a document titled "Notice of Revocation of Release," Mr. McSweeney was informed that ICE obtained travel documents to remove him to Cuba. The notice also informed Mr. McSweeney that he would have a prompt opportunity to challenge the revocation of his release. He did not receive that opportunity. According to the Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien form, an immigration officer wrote that Mr. McSweeney indicated that he did not have a fear of being removed to Venezuela.

Mr. McSweeney was then placed in a detention center in Florida where he did not speak to an immigration officer and remained in the same clothes he was arrested in for five days. Weeks later, he was placed on a plane and not told where he was going. Mr. McSweeney was brought to the detention center in San Diego. He later filed a pro se petition for habeas relief with this Court.

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On September 30, 2025, Respondents informed the Court that ICE now has travel documents to remove Mr. McSweeney. He would not be removed to the designated country of the Bahamas, but he would be removed to Haiti instead. According to Respondents, Haiti accepted Mr. McSweeney only after receiving confirmation from the Bahamas that Mr. McSweeney was not a citizen of the Bahamas. After the government's filing with the Court, government counsel informed Federal Defenders that Mr. McSweeney will be moved out of Otay Detention Center over the weekend and placed on a flight to Haiti likely on Wednesday.

Mr. McSweeney intends to file motion to the immigration judge in Maimi, Florida seeking to reconsider or reopen his removal proceedings to show that he is a citizen of the Bahamas. But there is a high prospect that he will be removed before an immigration judge can adjudicate this motion.

The requested temporary restraining order ("TRO") would preserve the status quo while Petitioner litigates these claims by (1) preventing ICE from removing Mr. McSweeney while his motion to reconsider/reopen is pending, (2) releasing him from detention to allow him to litigate this motion and resolve his affairs in Florida; and (3) prohibiting the government from removing him to Haiti during this process.

In granting this motion, this Court would not break new ground. Several years ago, a district court judge in Los Angeles granted a class of petitioners from Cambodia the same relief, prohibiting ICE from removing them without the opportunity to file a motion to reopen and have that motion adjudicated. See Chhoeun v. Marin, 306 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (attached to habeas petition as Exhibit B). Two years later, the same judge enjoined ICE from re-detaining class members without complying with the agency's own regulations. See Nak Kim Chhoeun v. Marin, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1233 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (attached to habeas petition as Exhibit C). Other courts have likewise granted temporary

Statement of Facts

A. Mr. McSweeney is a citizen of the Bahamas.

respectfully requests that this Court grant this TRO.

Emmanuel Johnson and his family entered the United States from the Bahamas in 1998. Exhibit C to TRO, Johnson Declaration at ¶ 1. Both of his parents were born in the Bahamas. *Id.* His mother had Bahamian citizenship. Mr. McSweeney has never been to Haiti. *Id.*

In 1998, Mr. McSweeney came to the United States with his mother from the Bahamas. In 2020, he was ordered removed by an immigration judge for remaining in the United States for a time longer than permitted and for having misdemeanor convictions for possession of marijuana or cannabis. The immigration judge "designated the Bahamas as the country of removal." Respondent's Response Exhibits (Resp. Exh.), ECF No. 9-2 at 13. On appeal, Mr. McSweeney did not contest that he was a native of the Bahamas. *Id.* On April 20, 2021, his appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was denied. *Id.*

Following his deportation in 2020, Mr. McSweeney was released from detention and remained in the United States.

B. Mr. McSweeney is detained after being told he would be removed to Cuba without an opportunity to respond to his re-detention.

On March 18, 2025, ICE rearrested Mr. McSweeney after he "reported to the

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After months of being detained, he learned from an immigration officer that the Notice of Revocation was incorrect. McSweeney Decl. Ex. C at ¶ 7. The government of Cuba had not issued travel documents for him. *Id.* He also learned that ICE did not have travel documents to remove him to the Bahamas. *Id.* at 10. What's more, Mr. McSweeney did not receive the *prompt interview* or the opportunity to respond to the reasons for the revocation of release as required under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. *Id.* at ¶ 7.

After Mr. McSweeney was detained in March of this year, he was sent to the Krome Detention Center in Miami, Florida. *Id.* at ¶ 8. He was placed in a cell with over 60 men in a cell that was meant for 25. The men in the cell were wearing the same clothes they were arrested in. Some of them men had not showered in weeks. For five days, Mr. McSweeney remained in the same clothes he was arrested in and was not allowed to shower. He slept on the floor and was given bagged lunches for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. *Id.* at ¶ 8. During his time in that detention center, he did not speak to an immigration officer.

On or about March 25, 2025, Mr. McSweeney was then placed on an airplane and not told where he was going. *Id.* at ¶ 9. He then arrived at the Otay Detention

Center in San Diego. Id.

About two months after being detained was the first time Mr. McSweeny spoke to an officer about his detention. Id. at \P 10. At that meeting, he was told that the Bahamas was not accepting him and would not issue travel documents. Id. at \P 10. Mr. McSweeney was told that immigration would attempt to get travel documents from Haiti a country he has never been to. Id.

C. Mr. McSweeney learns that he will be removed to Haiti within a week and he will be filing a motion to reconsider or reopen his prior removal proceedings.

On September 19, 2025, six months after his detention, ICE conducted, for the first time, a personal interview under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(i)(3). Resp. Exh. 9-2 at 33. During that interview, Mr. McSweeney informs ICE that he has provided his birth certificate from the Bahamas. He has informed ICE that his father lives in the Bahamas. Mr. McSweeney informs ICE that he has family and community support in Florida. His mother, sisters, wife, and two young children all live in Florida. He is a volunteer of a children's football team, he is a volunteer at his church, and he has letters of recommendation from the church and his pastor. *Id*.

On September 30, the government informed this Court that ICE now has travel documents from Haiti. Respondent's Response, ECF No. 9. According to the government's filing, on September 23, 2025, the Bahamian Consulate provided the Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) with a letter confirming that Mr. McSweeney is not a citizen of the Bahamas. With that letter, ERO was able to obtain travel documents from Haiti for Mr. McSweeney. After the government's filing with the Court, government counsel informed Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc. (FDSDI) that Mr. McSweeney will be moved out of Otay Detention Center over the weekend and placed on a flight to Haiti on Wednesday.

Mr. McSweeney has advised FDSDI that he fears being removed to Haiti and asked for assistance with reopening his immigration case. Mr. McSweeney will be

immigration court in Miami, Florida.

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filing a pro se motion to reconsider or reopen his removal proceedings with the

Argument

To obtain a TRO, a plaintiff "must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839-40 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a TRO and preliminary injunction involve "substantially identical" analysis). A "variant[] of the same standard" is the "sliding scale": "if a plaintiff can only show that there are 'serious questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied." Immigrant Defenders Law Center v. Noem, 145 F.4th 972, 986 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this approach, the four Winter elements are "balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another." All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). A TRO may be granted where there are "serious questions going to the merits' and a hardship balance. . . tips sharply toward the plaintiff," and so long as the other Winter factors are met. Id. at 1132.

Here, this Court should issue a temporary restraining order because "immediate and irreparable injury . . . or damage" is occurring and will continue in the absence of an order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Mr. McSweeney is a citizen of the Bahamas. He is now being removed to Haiti based on an error that he is not a citizen of the Bahamas. Respondents have stated that he will be removed from Otay Detention Center over the weekend and that he will be removed to Haiti within the week. This will not give him sufficient opportunity to have his motion

reconsidered or his motion to reopen adjudicated. What's more, Respondents redetained Petitioner in violation of his due process, statutory, and regulatory rights, preventing him from effectively litigating his motion to reconsider/reopen and resolving his affairs. This Court should grant Petitioner a stay of removal to adjudicate his motion, order Petitioner's release.

- II. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits, or at a minimum, he raises serious merits questions.
- A. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that procedural due process prevents his removal during the adjudication of his motion to reconsider and reopen.

Mr. McSweeney wishes to challenge his removal to the alternative country of Haiti. That is because, he can prove that he is in fact a citizen of the Bahamas. Because the Bahamas is the designated country he has chosen for his removal, he should be removed to that country. Mr. McSweeney also cannot be removed to Haiti because he has not been given an opportunity to make a credible fear application.

First, Mr. McSweeney can prove that he is a citizen of the Bahamas and that he should be removed to that country. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), a non-arriving alien who has been ordered removed "may designate one country to which the alien wants to be removed" and "the Attorney General shall remove the alien to the country the alien so designates." Mr. McSweeney designated the Bahamas.

According to the Respondents, the Bahamas recently provided ICE with a letter confirming that Mr. McSweeney is not a citizen. Mr. McSweeney has not seen that letter. Mr. McSweeney is a citizen of the Bahamas. According to the Government of the Bahamas, a person obtains automatic Bahamian citizenship if he was born in the Bahamas to married parents, with either parent being a Bahamian citizen or born to an un-married Bahamian female in or outside of the Bahamas. See The Government of the Bahamas, Department of Immigration,

https://www.immigration.gov.bs/applying-to-stay/applying-for-citizenship/#:~:text=AUTOMATIC%20BAHAMIAN%20CITIZENSHIP%20IS %20GIVEN,or%20outside%20of%20The%20Bahamas (last viewed on October 1, 2025). ICE has proof that Mr. McSweeney was born in the Bahamas. They have his birth certificate.

Mr. McSweeney can also provide additional information that his mother was also born in the Bahamas and was a citizen of the Bahamas. See Exhibit D. Based on these facts and the law in the Bahamas, Mr. McSweeney is a citizen of the Bahamas. Because the Bahamas is the designated country of removal, he should be removed to the Bahamas, not Haiti.

Second, U.S. law enshrines protections against dangerous and life-threatening removal decisions. By statute, the government is prohibited from removing an immigrant to any country where a person may be persecuted or tortured, a form of protection known as withholding of removal. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The government "may not remove [a noncitizen] to a country if the Attorney General decides that the [noncitizen's] life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the [noncitizen's] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." *Id.*; *see also* 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16, 1208.16. Withholding of removal is a mandatory protection.

Similarly, Congress codified protections in the CAT prohibiting the government from removing a person to a country where they would be tortured. See FARRA 2681-822 (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note) ("It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States."); 28 C.F.R. § 200.1; id. §§ 208.16-208.18, 1208.16-1208.18. CAT protection is also mandatory.

Due process also requires "ask[ing] the noncitizen whether he or she fears

persecution or harm upon removal to the designated country and memorialize in writing the noncitizen's response. This requirement ensures DHS will obtain the necessary information from the noncitizen to comply with section 1231(b)(3) and avoids [a dispute about what was said]." *Aden*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1019. "Failing to notify individuals who are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to due process." *Andriasian*, 180 F.3d at 1041.

If the noncitizen claims fear, measures must be taken to ensure that the noncitizen can seek asylum, withholding, and relief under CAT before an immigration judge in reopened removal proceedings. The amount and type of notice must be "sufficient" to ensure that "given [a noncitizen's] capacities and circumstances, he would have a reasonable opportunity to raise and pursue his claim for withholding of deportation." *Aden*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1009 (citing *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) and *Kossov v. I.N.S.*, 132 F.3d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1998)); *cf. D.V.D.*, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (requiring a minimum of 15 days' notice). "[L]ast minute" notice of the country of removal will not suffice, *Andriasian*, 180 F.3d at 1041; *accord Najjar v. Lunch*, 630 Fed. App'x 724 (9th Cir. 2016), and for good reason: To have a meaningful opportunity to apply for fear-based protection, immigrants must have time to prepare and present relevant arguments and evidence. Merely telling a person where they may be sent does not give them a meaningful chance to determine whether and why they have a credible fear.

Mr. McSweeney fears being removed to Haiti. According to the March 18, 2025 I-213, Mr. McSweeney was asked if he feared "persecution, torture, or physical harm if returned to his native country of Venezuela." Resp. Exh. ECF 9-2 at 19. There is no record of him being asked if he feared being sent to Haiti. He has not had the opportunity to make a credible fear application.

Mr. McSweeney would like to make this record before the immigration judge, and he has requested to reopen his case so that he could do so. Procedural due process prevents the government from removing him while his motion to reconsider or reopen is adjudicated.

That is precisely what the district court in *Chhoeun v. Marin*, 306 F. Supp. 3d 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2018), concluded. In *Chhoeun*, a class of hundreds of Cambodian nationals subject to old removal orders who ICE abruptly detained and threatened with imminent deportation challenged the government's conduct as a violation of Due Process, seeking a stay of removal so that they could pursue their motions to reopen. *Id.* at 1151. Applying the procedural due process test in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976), the court granted the petitioners' motion for a temporary restraining order, as well as a preliminary injunction. *Id.* at 1159–63.

In balancing the familiar three *Mathews v. Eldridge* factors—the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government's interest—the court concluded that the factors weighed in favor of the petitioners. First, the court found they "clearly have a strong liberty interest in remaining in this country" because they "grown up in our communities, obtained gainful and productive employment, and raised families of their own." *Id.* at 1159-60. Second, the court found that "the manner in which Petitioners were detained and the conditions of detention have made it prohibitively difficult for Petitioners with meritorious challenges to file motions to reopen"; thus, the petitioners "are at risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty *now*, if they are not afforded additional time to file and litigate motions to reopen." *Id.* at 1161. Finally, the court found that "the relief that Petitioners seek does not materially impinge on the Government's interests" because it required only a short delay. *Id.* Thus, the court granted relief, holding that their removals be enjoined for 60 days to allow the petitioners to file motions to reopen and extending that stay through the adjudication of the motions

for those who filed. Id. at 1151.

Here, the balancing of the factors is similar to *Chhoeun*. Mr. McSweeney has been in the United States for nearly 30 years. He is a citizen of the Bahamas and that is the designated country that he chose before the immigration judge. Mr. McSweeney has never lived in Haiti and has no family in that country. Moreover, there is a basis for fear for removal to Haiti. On July 15, 2025, the State Department has issued a warning to United States Citizens to not travel to Haiti "due to kidnapping, crime, terrorist activity, civil unrest, and limited health care." U.S. Department of State, *Haiti Travel Advisory*, available at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/haiti-travel-advisory.html. The travel warning is listed as Level 4, which "is the highest advisory level due to life-threatening risks." U.S. Department of State, *Travel Advisories*, available at https://travel.state.gov/en/international-travel/travel-advisories.html#accordion-45664e3835-item-ee5484c8be.

Moreover, the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest is high because ICE states that it now has travel documents for him and that he'll be put on the next plane to Haiti within days. Finally, any inconvenience to the government is minimal—Mr. McSweeney seeks only a short delay to have a chance to adjudicate his motion to reconsider and reopen his removal proceedings. Because these factors weigh heavily in Mr. McSweeney's favor, he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim.

B. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that ICE violated its own regulations.

ICE's own regulations provide extra process for someone who, like Petitioner, is re-detained following a period of release. Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l), ICE may re-detain an immigrant on supervision only with an interview and a chance to contest a re-detention. When an immigrant is specifically released after giving good reason why they cannot be removed, additional regulations apply:

ICE may revoke a noncitizen's release and return them to ICE custody due to failure to comply with conditions of release, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1), or if, "on account of changed circumstances," a noncitizen likely can be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. *Id.* § 241.13(i)(2).

The regulations further provide noncitizens with a chance to contest a redetention decision. ICE must "notif[y] [the person] of the reasons for revocation of his or her release." *Id.* § 241.13(i)(3). ICE must then "conduct an initial informal interview promptly" after re-detention "to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification." *Id.* During the interview, the person "may submit any evidence or information" showing that the prerequisites to re-detention have not been met, and the interviewer must evaluate "any contested facts." *Id.*

ICE is required to follow its own regulations. *United States ex rel. Accardi* v. *Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); see Alcaraz v. INS, 384 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The legal proposition that agencies may be required to abide by certain internal policies is well-established."). A court may review a redetention decision for compliance with the regulations. *See Phan v. Beccerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01757, 2025 WL 1993735, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); *Nguyen v. Hyde*, No. 25-cv-11470-MJJ, 2025 WL 1725791, at *3 (D. Mass. June 20, 2025) (citing *Kong v. United States*, 62 F.4th 608, 620 (1st Cir. 2023)).

None of the prerequisites to detention apply here. ICE never claimed that Petitioner violated the conditions of his release. Instead, ICE claimed that the detention was due to obtaining travel documents from Cuba. Nor did ICE provide the required prompt interview or opportunity to contest his removal. This is precisely why the district court in *Nak Kim Chhoeun v. Marin*, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1233 (C.D. Cal. 2020), enjoined ICE from detaining a class of Cambodian petitioners. Applying the three-factor *Mathews v. Eldridge* test, the court explained that notice of detention "provides great value," including giving the

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individual "an opportunity to contact an attorney, gather any documents they have, make FOIA requests for other documents, say goodbye to their families and loved ones, and wrap up their affairs, including ensuring adequate childcare and notifying their employers." Id. at 1249. Echoing the concerns here, the court determined that "[t]he extraordinary circumstances of this case—including the long-dormant removal orders, changes in the law and in Petitioners' lives, the sudden and unexpected threat of removal, and the barriers to accessing attorneys and documents while in detention—have undermined Petitioners' ability to avail themselves of the administrative procedures in place to protect them from erroneous removals." Id. at 1251. Thus, individuals must be released so they have "adequate time and opportunity to contact attorneys and access the system that has been constructed to prevent erroneous removals." Id.

Other courts have released re-detained immigrants after finding that ICE failed to comply with applicable regulations. District Judge Hiu recently granted release where ICE failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, holding that the "[g]overnment agencies are required to follow their own regulations." Rokhfirooz v. Larose, No. 25-CV-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025). District Judge Simmons granted a temporary restraining order on the basis that ICE failed to comply with the same regulations. Order on Motion for TRO, Tran v. Bondi et al, 25-cv-02334-JES-MSB (Sept. 29, 2025). Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 166 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); You v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 451, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387 (D. Mass. 2017); Zhu v. Genalo, No. 1:25-CV-06523 (JLR), 2025 WL 2452352, at *7–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2025); M.S.L. v. Bostock, No. 6:25-CV-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *10-12 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025); Escalante v. Noem, No. 9:25-CV-00182-MJT, 2025 WL 2491782, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. July 18, 2025); Hoac v. Becerra, No. 2:25-cv-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); Liu, 2025 WL 1696526, at *2; M.Q. v. United States, 2025

WL 965810, at *3, *5 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025). "[B]ecause officials did not properly revoke petitioner's release pursuant to the applicable regulations, that revocation has no effect, and [Mr. McSweeney] is entitled to his release (subject to the same Order of Supervision that governed his most recent release)." *Liu*, 2025 WL 1696526, at *3. Thus, Mr. McSweeney is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim for release.

III. Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.

Petitioner also meets the second factor, irreparable harm. "It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 'unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Where the "alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary." *Warsoldier v. Woodford*, 418 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., *Federal Practice and Procedure*, § 2948.1 (2d ed. 2004)).

Here, the potential irreparable harm to Petitioner is even more concrete. After living in the United States for nearly 30 years, Mr. McSweeney is at imminent risk of being removed on the basis of a factual error, without the opportunity to have his motion to reopen be adjudicated. What's more, "[u]nlawful detention certainly constitutes 'extreme or very serious damage, and that damage is not compensable in damages." Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 999 (9th Cir. 2017). The deportation to Haiti poses the risk of being held indefinitely in hazardous foreign prisons. See Wong et al., supra. These and other threats to Petitioner independently constitute irreparable harm.

IV. The balance of hardships and the public interest weigh heavily in petitioner's favor.

The final two factors for a TRO—the balance of hardships and public interest—"merge when the Government is the opposing party." Nken v. Holder,

Mr. McSweeney seeks is the chance to have his motion to reopen adjudicated before he is removed. The government "cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense" by being compelled to make sure he is not deported on the basis of a legal error. Zepeda v. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Moreover, it is always in the public interest to prevent individuals from being "wrongfully removed." Nken, 556 U.S. at 436; see also Moreno Galvez v. Cuccinelli, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1208, 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (when government's treatment "is inconsistent with federal law, . . . the balance of hardships and public interest factors weigh in favor of a preliminary injunction."). On the other hand, Petitioner faces weighty hardships: wrongful removal, unlawful detention, and removal to Haiti where he is likely to suffer imprisonment or serious harm. The balance of equities thus weigh in his favor.

V. Petitioner gave the government notice of this TRO, and the TRO should remain in place throughout habeas litigation.

Upon filing this motion, proposed counsel emailed the assigned AUSA, notice of this request for a temporary restraining and all the filings associated with it. Additionally, Petitioner requests that this TRO remain in place until the habeas petition is decided. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65(b)(2). Good cause exists, because the same considerations will continue to warrant injunctive relief throughout this litigation, and habeas petitions must be adjudicated promptly. See In re Habeas Corpus Cases, 216 F.R.D. 52 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). A proposed order is attached.

Case	β:25-cv-02488-RBM-DEB	Document 12 of 29	Filed 10/01/25	PageID.131	Page 17	
1	Conclusion					
2	For those reasons, Petitioner requests that this Court issue a temporary					
3	restraining order ordering the relief requested.					
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5	DATED: 10-	1-25	Respectfull	y submitted,		
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8			2.11/1/18	tury		
9			Emmanuel	McSweeney		
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	MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER					

EXHIBIT C

Filed 10/01/25

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
I, Emmanuel McSweeney, declare:


- 1. I was born in the Bahamas in 1996. My mother and my father were both born in the Bahamas. My mother had Bahamian citizenship. I came to the United States with my mother in 1998 from the Bahamas. I was one year old at the time. I have lived in the state of Florida ever since I arrived in the United States.
- 2. My mother and my father were both born in the Bahamas. My mother had Bahamian citizenship.
- 3. I was ordered removed on May 21, 2020. My appeal was dismissed on April 20, 2021.
- 4. I was released from immigration custody in 2020. I have been reporting to an immigration officer every year since my release.
- 5. On March 18, 2025, I went to my yearly check-in with immigration officials in Florida and I was detained.
- 6. At the time I was detained, I was given a document titled Notice of Revocation of Release. The document stated that the reason for my revocation was that the government of Cuba has issued travel documents for me and that I would be removed to that country.
- 7. The Notice of Revocation of Release also stated that under 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4, I would be "promptly afforded an informal interview" where I would have the "opportunity to respond to the reasons for the revocation."
- 8. I never got the opportunity to respond to the reasons for the revocation. After being detained for months, I learned from an officer that the Notice of Revocation of Release was incorrect and that Cuba had not issued travel documents for me.

- 9. After I was detained, I was sent to Krome Detention Center in Miami, Florida. The first night I slept in a visitation room. I was then placed in a cell that was meant for 25 men but there were at least 60 men in the cell. People were wearing the clothes they were arrested. Some of them men had not showered in weeks. I was not processed for 5 days. That means that I remained in the same clothes I was arrested in for five days and was not allowed to shower. I slept on the floor and was given bagged lunch for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. When my family came to see me at the detention center, they were told by officers that they did not know where I was located. The conditions were very difficult.
- 10. On or about March 25, 2025, I was placed on an airplane and not told where I was going. I then arrived at the Otay Detention Center in San Diego.
- 11. In May 2025, I spoke to a deportation officer for the first time. I was told that Bahamas was not accepting me and would not issue travel documents. I have cooperated in obtaining my travel documents.
- 12. I have two young children at home. I support my family financially by working multiple jobs like construction. I make very little money and do not have savings or property.
- 13. I graduated high school and have no legal education or training. I also do not have free access to the internet in custody.

Case	β:25-cv-02488-RBM-DEB Document 12 Filed 10/01/25 PageID.136 Page 22 of 29
1	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct,
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3	executed on 10-09-25, in San Diego, California.
4	X E. M. Javeses
5	Émmanual McSweeney Declarant
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EXHIBIT D







PRINCESS MARGARET HOSPITAL

29. April 2025

REGISTRAR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT Nassau, Bahamas

HEALTH INFORMATION MANAGEMENT UNIT

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

RE:

EMMANUEL MCSH'EENEY

D.O.B

Mother's Name

This letter is to verify that the above mentioned mother gave birth to a five baby BOY

REGINE DORCELY

Our research confirmed that the birth occured: On the Materiaty Ward of the Princess Margaret Hospital

If there are any queries or concerns: please contact the Medical Records Department at (242)397-1231

Yours Sincerely

CHRISTINE KING CURRY (Mrs.)

SR MEDICAL REGORDS OFFICER

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APR 2 9 2025

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Researched by: TRANIA MCKENZIE (Ms.)

Telephone (242) 322-2861 www.phabahampas.org (_P.O. Box N-3730; Nassau, Bahamas

