

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA**

Omar Jamal,

Case No.: _____

Petitioner

v.

**VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement; Marcos Charles, Acting Executive Associate Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations; Peter Berg, Field Office Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations; U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Ryan Shea, Freeborn County Sheriff.

Respondents.

VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

1. Respondents are detaining Petitioner, Omar Jamal (), in violation of law.
2. Jamal is a citizen of Somalia who was ordered removed from the United States on February 24, 2011. Jamal was ordered removed to Canada, and in the alternative, Somalia. Jamal was granted withholding of removal with respect to Somalia.

3. Jamal appealed the removal order, and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appealed the grant of withholding of removal respecting Somalia. The Board issued a decision dismissing both appeals on September 15, 2011, rendering Jamal’s removal order administratively final on September 15, 2011.
4. Jamal was placed on an Order of Supervision (“OOS”) pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e). The exact date of the first order is unclear, but an OOS dated August 19, 2013 required Jamal to attend annual check ins, “assist ICE in obtaining any necessary travel documents,” and other irrelevant conditions.
5. In releasing Jamal on an OOS, ICE necessarily determined that he had demonstrated to ICE’s satisfaction that his removal would not occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.
6. It was also necessarily determined at that time that Jamal did not present an ongoing danger or a flight risk. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e)(2)-(6).
7. Some conditions of Jamal’s OOS included maintaining contact with ICE and complying with all check in requirements.
8. Jamal complied with all conditions of his OOS.
9. On September 2, 2025, Jamal was picked up and redetained by ICE. Jamal was detained in a targeted immigration enforcement action in the absence of any allegations that he had committed a crime and absent any new alternately valid basis for re-detention.
10. At the time of redetention, up through the present, there are no changed

circumstances that justify Respondents' decision to revoke Jamal's OOS and redetain Jamal indefinitely.

11. Jamal remains detained at this time. He is housed in the Freeborn County Jail, a facility designed to house and punish convicted criminals. Jamal's conditions of confinement are indistinguishable from those of convicted criminals housed alongside him.
12. The government is not in possession of any credible or persuasive documents or evidence that Jamal's removal is likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. This was true at the time Jamal was redetained, and it remains true at the time of this petition's filing.
13. It remains true at the time of this filing that Jamal cannot be deported to his country of origin, Somalia, because of the grant of withholding of removal.
14. Respondents have been unable to deport Jamal to Canada, one of the United States most stalwart allies, for more than a decade, indicating Canada's consistent unwillingness to accept Jamal.
15. Respondents have not identified any third country willing to accept Jamal, nor have Respondents obtained travel documents for Jamal to be deported to any country.
16. The redetention of Jamal serves no legitimate purpose. Instead, his detention is punitive. The redetention of Jamal is designed to send a message to other individuals with final orders of removal that they need to leave the United States or they will be jailed indefinitely and without any process.

17. Federal statutes and regulations require ICE to follow certain procedures before they redetained Jamal. ICE failed to comply with these laws prior to redetaining Jamal.
18. To remedy this unlawful detention, Jamal seeks declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of immediate release from detention.
19. Pending the adjudication of his Petition, Jamal seeks an order restraining the Respondents from transferring him to a location where he cannot reasonably consult with counsel, such a location to be construed as any location outside of the geographic jurisdiction of the day-to-day operations of U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement's ("ICE") Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations in the State of Minnesota.
20. Pending the adjudication of this Petition, Petitioners also respectfully request that Respondents be ordered to provide seventy-two (72) hour notice of any movement of Jamal.
21. Jamal requests the same opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner, at a meaningful time, and thus requests 72-hour-notice prior to any removal or movement of him away from the State of Minnesota.
22. Jamal requests an emergency preliminary order requiring Respondents to give Jamal due process prior to removing him to an allegedly safe third country (other than Canada) in the form of a full merits hearing for asylum, withholding of removal, and DCAT before an immigration judge relating to the proposed country of removal with a right to an administrative appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and

further requests that this injunction be made permanent.

23. Jamal requests an order compelling Respondents to release him pending the outcome of this petition.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

24. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), § 1361 (mandamus action), § 1651 (All Writs Act), and § 2241 (habeas corpus); Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution (“Suspension Clause”); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Administrative Procedure Act); and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act). This action further arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(3) and 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4, 241.13.
25. Because Jamal seeks to challenge his custody as a violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, jurisdiction is proper in this court.
26. Federal district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas petitions by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of their detention by DHS. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839–41 (2018); *Nielsen v. Preap*, 139 S. Ct. 954, 961–63 (2019); *Sopo v. U.S. Attorney Gen.*, 825 F.3d 1199, 1209-12 (11th Cir. 2016).
27. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 USC §§ 1391(b), (e)(1)(B), and 2241(d) because Jamal is detained within this District. He is currently detained at the Freeborn County Jail in Albert Lea, Minnesota. Venue is also proper in this Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A) because Respondents are operating in this district.

PARTIES

28. Petitioner Jamal is a citizen of Somalia. His Alien Registration Number (“A number”) is [REDACTED]. Petitioner Jamal is a resident of Minnesota. He is an alien with an administratively final removal order. Jamal is currently in custody at the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detention center in Albert Lea, Minnesota.
29. Respondent Pamela Bondi is being sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the head of the Department of Justice, which encompasses the BIA and the immigration judges through the Executive Office for Immigration Review. Attorney General Bondi shares responsibility for implementation and enforcement of the immigration detention statutes, along with Respondent Noem. Attorney General Bondi is a legal custodian of Jamal.
30. Respondent Kristi Noem is being sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, Secretary Noem is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to § 103(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), routinely transacts business in the Southern District of Minnesota, supervises the Albert Lea ICE Field Office, and is legally responsible for pursuing Jamal’s detention and removal. As such, Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Jamal.
31. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) is the federal agency

responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

32. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and is sued in his official capacity. Defendant Lyons is responsible for Petitioner's detention.
33. Respondent Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") is the subagency within the Department of Homeland Security responsible for implementing and enforcing the Immigration & Nationality Act, including the detention of noncitizens.
34. Respondent Marcos Charles is the Acting Executive Associate Director for ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ERO")
35. Respondent Peter Berg is being sued in his official capacity as the Field Office Director for the Minnesota Field Office for ICE within DHS. In that capacity, Field Director Berg as supervisory authority over the ICE agents responsible for detaining Jamal.
36. Respondent Ryan Shea is being sued in his official capacity as the Sheriff responsible for the Freeborn County Jail. Because Petitioner is detained in the Freeborn County Jail, Respondent Shea has immediate day-to-day control over Petitioner.

EXHAUSTION

37. ICE asserts authority to jail Jamal pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). No statutory requirement of exhaustion applies to Jamal's

challenge to the lawfulness of his detention. *See, e.g., Araujo-Cortes v. Shanahan*, 35 F. Supp. 3d 533, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“There is no statutory requirement that a habeas petitioner exhaust his administrative remedies before challenging his immigration detention.”); *Rodriguez v. Bostock*, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 1193850, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2025) (citing *Marroquin Ambriz v. Barr*, 420 F. Supp. 3d 953, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“this Court ‘follows the vast majority of other cases which have waived exhaustion based on irreparable injury when an individual has been detained for months without a bond hearing, and where several additional months may pass before the BIA renders a decision on a pending appeal.’”); *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *5 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) ((citing *Portela-Gonzalez v. Sec’y of the Navy*, 109 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992))).

38. To the extent that prudential consideration may require exhaustion in some circumstances, Jamal has exhausted all effective administrative remedies available to him as he has previously demonstrated to ICE’s satisfaction that his removal is not substantially likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. ICE has never rebutted this showing. Any further efforts would be futile.
39. Prudential exhaustion is not required when to do so would be futile or “the administrative body . . . has . . . predetermined the issue before it.” *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 148 (1992), *superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Woodford v. Ngo*, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).

40. Prudential exhaustion is also not required in cases where “a particular plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm if unable to secure immediate judicial consideration of his claim.” *McCarthy*, 503 U.S. at 147. Every day Jamal is unlawfully detained causes him and his family irreparable harm. *Jarpa v. Mumford*, 211 F. Supp. 3d 706, 711 (D. Md. 2016) (“Here, continued loss of liberty without any individualized bail determination constitutes the kind of irreparable harm which forgives exhaustion.”); *Matacua v. Frank*, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1025 (D. Minn. 2018) (explaining that “a loss of liberty” is “perhaps the best example of irreparable harm”); *Hamama v. Adducci*, 349 F. Supp. 3d 665, 701 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (holding that “detention has inflicted grave” and “irreparable harm” and describing the impact of prolonged detention on individuals and their families).
41. Prudential exhaustion is additionally not required in cases where the agency “lacks the institutional competence to resolve the particular type of issue presented, such as the constitutionality of a statute.” *McCarthy*, 503 U.S. at 147–48. Immigration agencies have no jurisdiction over constitutional challenges of the kind Jamal raises here. *See, e.g., Matter of C-*, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1992) (“[I]t is settled that the immigration judge and this Board lack jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the Act and the regulations.”); *Matter of Akram*, 25 I. & N. Dec. 874, 880 (BIA 2012); *Matter of Valdovinos*, 18 I. & N. Dec. 343, 345 (BIA 1982); *Matter of Fuentes-Campos*, 21 I. & N. Dec. 905, 912 (BIA 1997); *Matter of U-M-*, 20 I. & N. Dec. 327 (BIA 1991).
42. Because requiring Jamal to exhaust administrative remedies would be futile, would

cause him irreparable harm, and the immigration agencies lack jurisdiction over the constitutional claims, this Court should not require exhaustion as a prudential matter.

43. In any event, Jamal has indeed exhausted all remedies available to him.
44. ICE has denied Jamal release because: (A) it incorrectly believes Jamal is responsible for reestablishing that removal is not substantially likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future, (B) ICE seeks to punish Jamal for remaining in the United States after previously having been ordered removed, and (C) ICE seeks to punish Jamal to send a message to similarly situated persons who have not yet been detained as a way to encourage those similarly situated people to immediately leave the United States to avoid Jamal's fate.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

45. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-44 of this Complaint.
46. On September 2, 2025, Jamal was picked up and redetained by ICE. He has remained detained in Respondents' custody since that date.
47. Each time ICE has previously tried to obtain a travel document for Jamal, it has failed.
48. On an unknown date, Jamal may have been served with a Notice of Revocation of Release ("Notice"), revoking his OOS. The Notice has not been reviewed by Petitioner's counsel, but, assuming arguendo such a Notice exists, it likely claims in a conclusory manner that "ICE has determined there is a significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future in your case” based on unidentified “changed circumstances.”

49. The Notice, if any, does not provide a reasoned basis for believing that there is now a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
50. The Notice, if any, does not provide Jamal with sufficient information to be in a position to rebut the factual allegations underlying the Notice at an informal interview.
51. The Notice, if any, does not provide enough information or detail to allow this Court to meaningfully review the relevant claims made in the Notice.
52. Jamal does not understand the reason ICE now believes that there is a significant likelihood he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.
53. The Notice, if any, does not allege that Jamal has failed to comply with any of the terms of his OOS.
54. The Notice, if any, does not allege that Respondents have obtained a travel document allowing for Jamal’s immediate removal from the United States.
55. The Notice, if any, does not allege any new facts that might form an independent basis for taking Jamal into custody.
56. At the time of Jamal’s arrest, up through the present, ICE has no information that could reasonably lead it to believe changed circumstances exist that justify redetention under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3).
57. At the time of redetention, ICE had not yet begun the steps of having Jamal apply

- for a travel document from detention for some other allegedly safe third country.
58. Even after Jamal was detained by ICE in 2025, ICE waited two days or so before having Jamal apply for a travel document to Canada, demonstrating a lack of timely meaningful steps taken by Respondents to ensure Petitioner's removal from the United States in the reasonably foreseeable future; ICE has not had Jamal apply for travel documents to any other country.
59. As of September 21, 2025, Jamal has not had a meeting with the Canadian Consul and has received no response to the travel document request.
60. Jamal is not a citizen or national of Canada.
61. Jamal has no lawful status in Canada that might allow him to enter Canada.
62. Respondents maintain Jamal is ineligible for release from custody.
63. On April 30, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security issued a press release entitled *100 Days of Fighting Fake News*.¹ In that document, DHS referenced civil immigration detention and the present administration's heavy reliance on civil detention to accomplish its political aims. Specifically, the document states:
- The reality is that **prison isn't supposed to be fun. It's a necessary measure to protect society and punish bad guys.** It is not meant to be comfortable. **What's more: prison can be avoided by self-deportation.** CBP Home makes it simple and easy. If you are a criminal alien and we have to deport you, you could end up in Guantanamo Bay or CECOT. **Leave now.**
- (emphasis added).
64. Myriad courts around the country have granted habeas corpus petitions and/or

¹ Available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/04/30/100-days-fighting-fake-news>.

enjoined the current administration’s attempts to use civil detention punitively against noncitizens. *See, e.g., Mohammed H. v. Trump*, No.: 25-CV-1576-JWB-DTS, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 1692739, at *5 (D. Minn. June 17, 2025) (“Punishing Petitioner for protected speech or **using him as an example to intimidate other students into self-deportation is abusive and does not reflect legitimate immigration detention purposes.**”) (emphasis added); *Mahdawi v. Trump*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 1243135, at *11 (D. Vt. Apr. 30, 2021) (recognizing that immigration detention cannot be motivated by the desire to punish speech or to deter others from speaking); *Ozturk*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 1145250, at *60 (“So long as detention is motivated by those goals, and not a desire for punishment, the Court is generally required to defer to the political branches on the administration of the immigration system.”); *see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States*, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The order of deportation is not a punishment”).

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

65. Petitioner’s present detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and its implementing regulations at 8 C.F.R. pt. 241.
66. Section 1231 mandates detention “[d]uring the removal period.” *Accord* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). However, the same sections also require the government to actually remove the alien during this removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
67. The “removal period” is “90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Petitioner’s “removal period” ended on or around December 14, 2011.

68. Detention past the removal period can be lawful in circumstances not presented here. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C), (a)(6).
69. After a noncitizen has been detained past the removal period, they may seek and obtain their release by demonstrating “there is no significant likelihood of removal to the country to which he or she was ordered removed, or to a third country, in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a).
70. Once a noncitizen is released on an OOS, they are subject to certain conditions of release. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(1).
71. Redetention is permitted where it is alleged a noncitizen violated the conditions of release. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(2), (i).
72. Regulations also permit the government to withdraw or otherwise revoke release under specific circumstances. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(4). One permissible reason to revoke release occurs when, “on account of changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Once such a determination is made, the noncitizen must “be notified of the reasons for revocation of [their] release” and must be provided with “an initial informal interview... to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). “The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.” *Id.* If a noncitizen is not released following the informal interview, “the provisions

of [8 C.F.R. § 241.4] shall govern the alien’s continued detention pending removal.”

8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Once the provisions of § 241.4 take effect, it appears that the consequence is a total reset of the 90-day removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(b)(4).

73. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, a person subject to a final order of removal cannot, consistent with the Due Process Clause, be detained indefinitely pending removal. 533 U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001). “*Zadvydas* established a temporal marker: post-final order of removal detention of six months or less is presumptively constitutional.”

74. *Zadvydas* also stated:

After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, **the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink.**

533 U.S. at 701 (emphasis added).

75. *Zadvydas* further held that civil detention violates due process unless special, nonpunitive circumstances outweigh an individual’s interest in avoiding restraint. 533 U.S. at 690 (**immigration detention must remain “nonpunitive in purpose and effect”**) (emphasis added).

REMEDY

76. Respondents’ detention of Jamal violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Jamal’s ongoing detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s

guarantee that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. V.

77. Due Process requires that detention “bear [] a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed.” *Zadvydas, v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
78. Jamal seeks immediate release to the extent that Respondents justify his detention on the idea that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future; Respondents bear the burden of rebutting the prior showing made by Petitioner. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3). Respondents have failed to meet this burden.
79. Jamal seeks immediate release to the extent that Respondents have redetained him for the purpose of punishing him for remaining in the United States despite his final order of removal.
80. Jamal seeks immediate release to the extent that Respondents have redetained him for the purpose of punishing him to send a message to similarly situated individuals for the purpose of encouraging those similarly situated persons to leave the United States before they share Jamal’s fate.
81. Although neither the Constitution nor the federal habeas statutes delineate the necessary content of habeas relief, *I.N.S. v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A straightforward reading of [the Suspension Clause] discloses that it does not guarantee any content to . . . the writ of habeas corpus”), implicit in habeas jurisdiction is the power to order release. *Boumediene v. Bush*,

553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (“[T]he habeas court must have the power to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully detained.”).

82. The Supreme Court has noted that the typical remedy for unlawful detention is release from detention. *See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren*, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) (“The typical remedy for [unlawful executive detention] is, of course, release.”); *see also Wajda v. United States*, 64 F.3d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating the function of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “is to obtain release from the duration or fact of present custody.”).
83. That courts with habeas jurisdiction have the power to order outright release is justified by the fact that, “habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy,” *Schlup v. Delo*, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995), and that as an equitable remedy, federal courts “[have] broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief [and are] authorized . . . to dispose of habeas corpus matters ‘as law and justice require.’” *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243). An order of release falls under court’s broad discretion to fashion relief. *See, e.g., Jimenez v. Cronen*, 317 F. Supp. 3d 626, 636 (D. Mass. 2018) (“Habeas corpus is an equitable remedy. The court has the discretion to fashion relief that is fair in the circumstances, including to order an alien’s release.”).
84. Immediate release is an appropriate remedy in this case.

CAUSE OF ACTION

COUNT ONE: DECLARATORY RELIEF

85. Jamal re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in the

preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

86. Jamal requests a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that Jamal is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1).
87. Jamal requests a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that Jamal has previously demonstrated to ICE's satisfaction that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future ("NSLRRFF").
88. Jamal requests a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that ICE did not rebut Jamal's prior NSLRRFF showing prior to redetaining him.
89. Jamal requests a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that until ICE rebuts Jamal's prior NSLRRFF showing, Jamal may not be redetained.

COUNT TWO: VIOLATION OF THE IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY ACT
- 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3)

90. Jamal re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in ¶¶ 1-84 as if set forth fully herein.
91. Section 1231(a)(1)-(3) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3) governs the detention, release, and redetention of aliens with final orders of removal.
92. Respondents have failed to comply with these provisions prior to redetaining Petitioner after Petitioner's release on an OOS.
93. No independent alternative basis supports Respondents' decision to redetain Petitioner.
94. Petitioner is therefore detained in violation of the INA.

COUNT THREE: VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

95. Jamal re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in ¶¶ 1-84 as if set forth fully herein.
96. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause protects against arbitrary detention and requires that detention be reasonably related to its purpose and accompanied by adequate procedures to ensure that detention is serving its legitimate goals. It further requires that detention cease when a noncitizen has established to the government's satisfaction that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future after the noncitizen has been ordered removed and the government has failed to rebut that finding with competent and probative evidence.
97. Jamal is no longer subject to mandatory custody under the Immigration & Nationality Act. He has previously demonstrated to ICE's satisfaction that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The government has not rebutted this with credible evidence. The government does not presently have a travel document for Jamal. There are no new circumstances that otherwise justify Jamal's redetention. Thus, Respondents have violated Jamal's Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process.
98. Respondents have also independently violated Jamal's Fifth Amendment due process right by incarcerating him to punish him and to otherwise send a message to similarly situated individuals that they must leave the United States to avoid a similar fate.

COUNT FOUR: VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
- CONTRARY TO LAW AND ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AGENCY
POLICY

99. Jamal re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in ¶¶ 1-84 as if set forth fully herein.
100. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
101. Respondents have failed to articulate any reasoned explanation for redetaining Petitioner.
102. Respondents have failed to articulate any reasoned explanation for deviating from or otherwise ignoring or failing to comply with the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3).
103. Respondents’ decisions, which represent changes in the agencies’ policies and positions, have considered factors that Congress did not intend to be considered, have entirely failed to consider important aspects of the problem, and have offered explanations for their decisions that run counter to the evidence before the agencies.
104. Respondents’ decision to redetain Petitioner is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Omar Jamal, asks this Court for the following relief:

1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter.

2. Issue an emergency preliminary order restraining Respondents from attempting to move Jamal from the State of Minnesota during the pendency of this Petition.
3. Issue an emergency preliminary order requiring Respondents to provide 72-hour notice of any intended movement of Jamal.
4. Issue an emergency preliminary order requiring Respondents to give Jamal due process prior to removing him to an allegedly safe third country (other than Canada) in the form of a full merits hearing for asylum, withholding of removal, and DCAT before an immigration judge relating to the proposed country of removal with a right to an administrative appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
5. Expedite consideration of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1657 because it is an action brought under 28 U.S.C. Ch. 153.
 - a. To ensure expeditious processing, the district judge should not refer the case to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636.
6. Order Jamal's immediate release.
7. Declare that Respondents' action is arbitrary and capricious.
8. Declare that Respondents failed to adhere to binding regulations and precedent.
9. Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
10. Permanently enjoin Respondents from redetaining Jamal under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3) unless and until Respondents have obtained a travel document allowing for Respondent's removal from the United States.

11. Permanently enjoin Respondents from redetaining Jamal under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3) for more than three days after receiving a travel document.
12. Permanently enjoin Respondents from deporting Jamal to an allegedly safe third country (other than Canada) without first giving Jamal due process in the form of a full merits hearing for asylum, withholding of removal, and DCAT before an immigration judge relating to the proposed country of removal with a right to an administrative appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
13. Grant Jamal reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
14. Grant all further relief this Court deems just and proper.

DATED: September 21, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

RATKOWSKI LAW PLLC

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Attorney for Petitioner

Verification by Petitioner Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I am submitting this verification because I am the Petitioner. I hereby verify that the statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, including the statements regarding my detention status, are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that all of the factual allegations and statements in the Petition are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Omar Jamal
Omar Jamal

Dated: September 21, 2025