

Defenders of San Diego, Inc. is routinely appointed to represent immigrants in bringing Zadvydas claims. See Exhibit A, Declaration of Kara Hartzler in Support of Appointment Motion ("Hartzler Dec."), ¶¶ 2–3 (attaching appointment orders from 2006 to 2024). This Court should follow that practice and appoint Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc. to represent Mr. Thai in this habeas case.

#### STATEMENT OF FACTS

## I. Mr. Thai is detained indefinitely.

Hai Thai fled Vietnam and arrived in the United States in 1979. Declaration of Hai Thai attached to habeas petition as Exhibit A ("Thai Dec"), at ¶ 1. He sustained several convictions and was ordered removed in 2009. Id. at ¶ 3. ICE detained him for approximately 90 days while attempting to remove him. Id. at ¶ 4–5. But when the Vietnamese consulate did not issue travel documents for him, ICE released him on supervision. Id. at ¶ 5. After failing to attend a check in appointment in 2011 or 2012, he was again detained for about 90 days. Id. at ¶ 6. But since then, he has complied with his check in requirements.

ICE's inability to remove Mr. Thai over the last 16 years reflects Vietnam's reticence to accept pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants. As detained in Mr. Thai's habeas petition, the operative repatriation treaty with Vietnam exempts people who immigrated to the United States before 1995. Agreement Between the United States of America and Vietnam, at 2 (Jan. 22, 2008). A subsequent MOU<sup>3</sup> provides a framework for repatriating some people in that group, but Vietnam accepted only four people in two years under that MOU, while not fulfilling 14 requests. Asian Law Caucus, Resources on Deportation of Vietnamese Immigrants Who Entered the U.S. Before 1995 (Jul. 15, 2025) (providing links to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> available at <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/08-322-Vietnam-Repatriations.pdf">https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/08-322-Vietnam-Repatriations.pdf</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>https://cdn.craft.cloud/5cd1c590-65ba-4ad2-a52cb55e67f8f04b/assets/media/ALC-FOIA-Re-Release-MOU-bates-1-8-8-10-21.pdf.

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f0cc12a064e9716d52e6052/t/618e99e5613 d7372c1bb197e/1636735461479/Trinh+-+Doc+161+Order+Granting+Stip+Dismissal.pdf.

28

Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983); accord Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997).

Mr. That is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim, but he will be unable to effectively articulate his claims without assistance. And he cannot afford to retain paid counsel to litigate his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Thus, the appointment of counsel is appropriate.

### I. Mr. Thai will likely succeed on the merits.

As described in detail in Mr. Thai's habeas petition, which has been filed concurrently with this motion and which he fully incorporates here by reference, Zadvydas held that federal law does not authorize the government to detain an immigrant indefinitely pending removal. Rather, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) presumptively permits the government to detain an immigrant for 180 days after his or her removal order becomes final. After those 180 days have passed, the immigrant must be released unless his or her removal is reasonably foreseeable. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.

Thus, 180 days after a removal order becomes final, an immigrant facing indefinite detention may come forward with "good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Id.* If the immigrant meets their initial burden, "the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing." *Id.* Otherwise, the immigrant must be released. *See id.* 

Here, Mr. Thai was ordered removed in 2009, and he spent about 90 days in custody before ICE released him. *Id.* at ¶¶ 4–5. He was later redetained and held for an additional 90 days in 2011 or 2012. *Id.* at  $\P$  6. Thus, he has been detained for more than six months.

There is good reason to believe that he will not be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. ICE has proved unable to remove him for 16 years. The Vietnamese consulate rejected a travel documents request. And there is an

immigrants—for this refusal. Thus, this Court will likely grant Zadvydas relief,

obvious explanation—the Vietnam's policy toward pre-1995 Vietnamese

1

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11

12 13

15

14

16 17

18

19 20

21 22

23 24

25 26

27

28

just like other courts. See Nguyen v. Scott, No. 2:25-CV-01398, 2025 WL 2419288, at \*17 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025); Hoac v. Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at \*4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); Nguyen v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-11470-MJJ, 2025 WL 1725791, at \*5 (D. Mass. June 20, 2025). What's more, the regulations do not permit Mr. Thai's re-detention. ICE may revoke a noncitizen's release and return them to ICE custody due to failure to

comply with conditions of release, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1), or if, "on account of changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future." Id. § 241.13(i)(2). The regulations further provide noncitizens with a chance to contest a re-detention decision. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).

Neither of these regulations were followed here. Mr. Thai did not violate the conditions of his release. And there are no changed circumstances that justify re-detaining him. Thus, he is likely to succeed on the merits of his petition.

II. Mr. Thai cannot adequately articulate his claims in the absence of counsel, in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved in his habeas petition.

In deciding whether a petitioner needs a lawyer's assistance to effectively litigate his habeas petition, a court must measure "the [petitioner]'s ability to articulate his claims against the relative complexity of the matter." Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. In addition, counsel may be appointed during federal habeas proceedings if the appointment of an attorney is "necessary for the effective utilization of discovery procedures . . . [or] if an evidentiary hearing is required." Weygandt, 718 F.2d at 954 (cleaned up).

Zadvydas cases involve complex legal issues grounded in constitutional law, statutory interpretation, administrative procedure, and habeas law. See

4

5

3

6 7

8

10 11

12 13

14 15

16 17

18 19

20

2122

23

2425

26

2728

Hartzler Dec, attached orders (describing complexities in appointing counsel). They also implicate immigration law. The Ninth Circuit has declared that "[w]ith only a small degree of hyperbole, the immigration laws have been deemed second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity." *United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar*, 295 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotations omitted). "A lawyer is often the only person who could thread the labyrinth." *Id*.

Mr. Thai lacks experience and legal training to contend with this complicated area of law. Thai Dec. at  $\P$  12. Nor does he have free access to the internet, so he cannot research up-to-date information about Vietnam and its policies. *Id.* He also lacks the funds needed to hire a lawyer. *Id.* at  $\P\P$  7, 12. Accordingly, he would likely be unable to litigate his habeas petition effectively.

Additionally, professional assistance may be "necessary for the effective utilization of discovery procedures" in this case. Weygandt, 718 F.2d at 954. In order to prove his eligibility for Zadvydas relief, Mr. Thai may well need to view evidence in the government's possession—for example, communications between ICE and the Vietnamese governments or internal paperwork documenting ICE's removal efforts. See, e.g., Lopez-Cacerez v. McAleenan, No. 19-CV-1952-AJB-AGS, 2020 WL 3058096, at \*4 n.1 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2020) (relying on ICE's "internal documentation" to reject ICE's noncooperation defense and find that the petitioner was fully cooperating with ICE's efforts to remove him). Mr. Thai would likely have to litigate his entitlement to any such discovery, because at least some courts have required immigrants to show good cause before obtaining discovery in a habeas case. See Toolasprashad v. Tryon, No. 12CV734, 2013 WL 1560176, at \*2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2013) (collecting cases). Moreover, Mr. Thai is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on any material factual disputes, Owino v. Napolitano, 575 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2009), meaning that "an evidentiary hearing [may be] required." Weygandt, 718 F.2d at 954. Those considerations also support the need for appointment of counsel. See id.

Case	3:25-cv-02436-RBM-MMP	Document 3 38	Filed 09/17/25	PageID.59	Page 7 of
1	D. Conclusion				
2					
3	For those reasons, this Court should follow the regular practice of courts in				
4	this district and appoint Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc. to represent Mr. Thai in litigating this habeas petition.				
5	in magazing and naccas poundin.				
6					
7	DATED 0/4/200	,			
8	DATED: <u>9/11/20</u> 2.	S	Respectful	lly submitted	,
9			4	$\Omega_{i}$	
10	HAI THAI				
11			Petitioner		
12					
13					
14					
15					
16		*			
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					
26					
27					
28					
	PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL				

#### **PROOF OF SERVICE**


I, the undersigned, caused to be served the within Motion for Appointment of Counsel by hand delivery to:

U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of California Civil Division 880 Front Street Suite 6253 San Diego, CA 92101

Date: 9/17/2025

K'ara Hartzler

# **EXHIBIT** A



- My name is Kara Hartzler. I am an appellate attorney at Federal
  Defenders of San Diego, Inc. In that capacity, I was assigned to
  investigate Mr. Thai's immigration habeas case to determine whether—
  in keeping with longstanding district practice—Federal Defenders
  should seek to be appointed as counsel.
- 2. In this district, Federal Defenders is regularly appointed to handle Zadvydas petitions for those who meet the six-month cutoff. Traditionally, Federal Defenders helps the detainee prepare an initial habeas petition and appointment motion, and the court formally appoints Federal Defenders in the course of reviewing the petition.
- This declaration attaches several orders appointing Federal Defenders to habeas cases following this procedure. The oldest order is from 2006 and the most recent is from 2024.
- 4. I have followed that procedure in this case by helping to prepare a habeas petition and appointment motion. I believe that granting appointment in this case would conform to longstanding district practice.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, executed on September 16, 2025, in San Diego, California.

KARA HARTZLER

Declarant