the interests of justice so require[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). "Appointment of counsel pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) is in the discretion of the district court unless an evidentiary hearing is required." *Dominguez v. Archambeault*, No. 20-CV-1384 JLS (AHS), 2021 WL 3022459, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2021) (citing *Terrovona v. Kincheloe*, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 1990)). "In deciding whether to appoint counsel, the district court 'must evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved." *Id.* (quoting *Weygandt v. Look*, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)).

As a threshold matter, Respondent questions whether Petitioner has demonstrated that he is financially eligible to receive Court-appointed legal representation. Financial eligibility requires that Petitioner be "financially unable to obtain adequate representation[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a). Here, Petitioner simply contends that "I do not think I can afford a lawyer" and that he does "not have any savings." Declaration of Loc Minh Nguyen at ¶ 9. This cursory statement is likely insufficient to demonstrate Petitioner is unable to obtain adequate representation.

Further, in determining whether appointment of counsel is appropriate, the Court must evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits. Petitioner contends that he will likely succeed on the merits of his habeas petition. Specifically, Petitioner argues that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future to Vietnam because Vietnam will not issue Petitioner a travel document, and because Petitioner has been in immigration custody for longer than the presumptively reasonable six-month period. Motion for Appointment of Counsel at 3–5, 6–8. But as Respondents will explain in greater detail in their forthcoming return to the petition, Petitioner is not likely to succeed on the merits because based on declarations expected to be made by Respondents, diligent efforts are being made to prepare a travel document package to send to the Vietnamese embassy. Furthermore, Petitioner has been in ICE custody since June 4, 2025, which is less than the presumptively reasonable period of detention under

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700-01 (2001). Petitioner cites numerous cases 1 finding that the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention does not reset 2 after previous release, and that the period is counted in the aggregate. Motion for Appointment of Counsel at 7-8. Yet, no binding authority has been provided, and Respondents cannot find binding authority, holding that the six-month period is aggregated. At a minimum, the Court should defer ruling on Petitioner's motion until after Respondents have filed their return, at which time the Court may be better positioned to determine whether Petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits.

Next, Respondent questions whether Petitioner has demonstrated that he is unable to adequately articulate his claims. Petitioner asserts that he has no legal education or training and lacks free access to the internet while in custody. Motion for Appointment of Counsel at 8–9. The Honorable Andrew G. Schopler recently rejected similar arguments in Randhawa v. Warden, et al., Case No. 25-cv-02444-AGS-BLM (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025), ECF No. 6. Judge Schopler reasoned:

Despite the "complexity of the law" and petitioner's "status as a detained immigrant"..., petitioner has not yet established that due process requires appointed counsel here. Many "habeas petitioners" face a lack of "legal training," "limited" access to "law library resources," and an inability "to conduct a factual investigation," none of which are "obstacles" that require "appointment of counsel in order to avoid due process violations." Roe v. Coursey, 469 F. App'x 622, 624 (9th Cir. 2012). Also, at this early stage, it is not clear that an evidentiary hearing will be needed. Thus, the motion for appointment of counsel is denied without prejudice.

See also, Alic v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., et al., Case No. 25-cv-1749-AJB-BLM (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025), ECF No. 10 (denying without prejudice motion for appointment of counsel); McSweeney v. Warden, et al., Case No. 25-cv-2488-RBM-DEB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025), ECF 6 (same).

The question is not whether Petitioner would benefit from Court-appointed counsel, but rather whether denial of Petitioner's motion would amount to a denial of due process. See Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728. Due process is not violated whenever a

3

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court declines to appoint counsel to an incarcerated habeas petitioner who lacks legal education and who has limited access to legal resources. *See, e.g., Tsmbaliuk v. Beckhelm*, No. 22-CV-1270 JLS (JLB), 2022 WL 4229308, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2022) (denying motion for appointment of counsel where incarcerated petitioner "doe[es] not know Law and would benefit [from] having legal representation").

Finally, Petitioner's speculation that he *may* need to review evidence, engage in discovery, or participate in an evidentiary hearing (Motion for Appointment of Counsel at 9–10) are insufficient to justify appointment of counsel at this time. As Judge Schopler recognized in *Randhawa*, "at this early stage, it is not clear that an evidentiary hearing will be needed." *Randhawa v. Warden, et al.*, Case No. 25-cv-02444-AGS-BLM (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025), ECF No. 6 at 2:14–15; *see also Cartwright v. San Diego Sheriff's Dep't*, No. 22cv1002-LL-JLB, 2023 WL 5020841, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2023) (denying motion for appointment of counsel in part because, "at this early stage of the proceedings, the Court is not in a position to determine whether an evidentiary hearing will be required.") (citing *Knaubert*, 791 F.2d at 728); *Tsmbaliuk*, 2022 WL 4229308, at *2 (same); *Dominguez*, 2021 WL 3022459, at *1 (same). "[W]hen a district court properly declines to hold an evidentiary hearing, the court's denial of a motion to appoint counsel at government expense does not amount to a denial of due process." *Knaubert*, 791 F.2d at 729–30.

The decision to appoint counsel is firmly within the Court's discretion. Respondent respectfully submits, however, that the record at this point does not demonstrate that the interests of justice require appointment of counsel in this action.

4

23 | ///

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24 | ///

25 | ///

26 | ///

27 | ///

28 ///

Case 3:25-cv-02441-AGS-MMP Document 8 Filed 10/01/25 PageID.68 Page 5 of 5 DATED: October 1, 2025 Respectfully submitted, **ADAM GORDON** United States Attorney s/Daniel D. Shin DANIEL D. SHIN Assistant United States Attorney Attorney for Respondents