

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division**

Ismoil SAMADOV,

Petitioner,

v.

Donald J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as
President of the United States;

Russell HOTT, in his official capacity as Field
Office Director of Washington, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement;

Paul PERRY, in his official capacity as Warden of
Caroline Detention Center;

Todd LYONS, Acting Director,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

Kristi NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of
the United States Department of Homeland Security;

Pamela BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice,

Respondents.

Case No. 1:25-cv-1441

**AMENDED PETITION
FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND
COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

INTRODUCTION

1. This case challenges the unlawful detention of Petitioner Ismoil Samadov (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Samadov”), a father of three young United States citizen children, who is currently in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Caroline Detention Center in Bowling Green, Virginia. An Uzbek national who has lived and worked in the United States for over two decades, Mr. Samadov was granted withholding of removal and protection under the Convention against Torture in 2011 because of the persecution and torture he

would face if returned to Uzbekistan. As a result, because his removal could not be effectuated, and he had already been detained beyond the period authorized for that purpose, ICE released him under an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”).

2. Mr. Samadov has fully complied with his conditions of supervision, reporting to ICE as required. However, on or about August 29, 2025, ICE detained him, without the required notice or opportunity to be heard, and despite no change in circumstances rendering his removal reasonably foreseeable. Mr. Samadov has been unlawfully detained since that time.

3. Respondents-Defendants’ actions violate the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and implementing regulations; the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”); the *Accardi* doctrine, which obligates administrative agencies to follow their own rules, procedures, and instructions, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

4. There was no basis for Defendants’ re-detention of Mr. Samadov, which was carried out in violation of agency rules and without the required findings and procedures. Nor is there any basis for Mr. Samadov’s continued detention, as he cannot be removed to Uzbekistan and no other country has agreed to accept him. Therefore, his removal is not reasonably foreseeable.

5. Mr. Samadov thus petitions this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, ordering Respondents to release him from detention.

PARTIES

6. Petitioner Ismoil Samadov is an Uzbek national who was granted relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) in 2005 and mandatory withholding of removal in 2011. *Yusupov & Samadov v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.*, 650 F.3d 968, 974–74, 993 (3d Cir. 2011). Mr. Samadov is currently detained at the Caroline Detention Center in Bowling Green, Virginia.

7. Respondent Donald J. Trump is named in his official capacity as the President of the United States. In this capacity, he is responsible for the policies and actions of the executive branch, including the Department of State and Department of Homeland Security. Respondent Trump's address is the White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20500.

8. Respondent Russell Hott is named in his official capacity as the Acting Field Office Director of the Washington Field Office for Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") within the United States Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, he is responsible for the administration of immigration laws and the execution of detention and removal determinations and is a custodian of Petitioner. Respondent Hott's address is Washington ICE ERO Field Office, 14797 Murdock St., Chantilly, VA 20151.

9. Respondent Paul Perry is the Director of the Caroline Detention Center where Petitioner is currently detained. Mr. Perry is the highest ranking official at the Caroline Detention Center. In this capacity, he is responsible for the immediate execution of detention over Petitioner and is the immediate custodian of Petitioner. Respondent Perry's address is Caroline Detention Center, 11093 SW Lewis Memorial Dr., Bowling Green, VA 22427.

10. Respondent Todd Lyons is the Acting Director of ICE. As the senior official performing the duties of the Director of ICE, he is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States; routinely transacts business in the Eastern District of Virginia; is legally responsible for pursuing any effort to remove the Petitioner; and as such is a custodian of the Petitioner. His address is ICE, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, 500 12th St. SW, Mail Stop 5900, Washington, DC 20536-5900.

11. Respondent Kristi Noem is named in her official capacity as the Secretary of Homeland Security in the United States Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, she

is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to Section 103(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a); routinely transacts business in the Eastern District of Virginia; is legally responsible for pursuing any effort to detain and remove the Petitioner; and as such is a custodian of the Petitioner. Respondent Noem's address is U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the General Counsel, 2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20528-0485.

12. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. In this capacity, she routinely transacts business in the Eastern District of Virginia; is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to Section 103(g) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g); and as such, is a custodian of the Petitioner. Respondent Bondi's address is U.S. Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20530-0001.

JURISDICTION & VENUE

13. This case arises under the United States Constitution. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus); the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution (art. I, § 9, cl. 2, or the "Suspension Clause"); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); Article III of the U.S. Constitution; and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 *et seq.*

14. Federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by non-citizens challenging both the lawfulness and the constitutionality of their detention. *See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); *Aguilar v. Lewis*, 50 F. Supp. 2d 539, 542–43 (E.D. Va. 1999).

15. An actual and justiciable controversy exists between the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and this Court has authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201(a), 2202. The Court has additional remedial authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to preserve this Court's jurisdiction, including authority to enjoin the removal of Petitioner or his transfer out of this District.

16. Administrative exhaustion is unnecessary as it would be futile. *See, e.g., Aguilar*, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 542–43.

17. Venue is proper in this district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and (e)(1) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred within this district.

18. Mr. Samadov is physically within the Commonwealth of Virginia.

FACTS

19. Mr. Samadov is a 48-year-old citizen of Uzbekistan who escaped persecution based on his religious and political beliefs amid false charges and persecution. He arrived in the United States in 1999. It is indisputable that he is likely to be tortured on religious and political grounds if returned to Uzbekistan. *See Yusupov & Samadov*, 650 F.3d at 993.

20. In his initial immigration proceedings in 2004, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) granted Mr. Samadov deferral of removal under CAT, but found he was ineligible for withholding of removal under a national security exemption. *Id.* at 972–73. That decision was ultimately overturned by the Third Circuit, which found that there was no evidence in the record to support this conclusion. *Id.* 981–92. The Third Circuit thus directed the BIA to grant Mr. Samadov “mandatory withholding of removal as a matter of law.” *Id.* at 993.

21. Mr. Samadov lives with his long-term partner and their three U.S. citizen children, ages 10, 7, and 3. His youngest child faces significant health challenges as a result of a congenital kidney defect that has required repeated and consistent visits to a urologist for the child’s entire life.

22. Mr. Samadov owns and operates a small logistics company, which transports goods to warehouses for companies like Amazon. He is the family’s sole financial provider, as the children’s mother is a full-time student and caregiver for the children.

23. Since being granted withholding of removal in 2011, Mr. Samadov has been released on an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”). On information and belief this OSUP was issued pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, which requires the release of individuals whose removal is not reasonably foreseeable. The OSUP states that Mr. Samadov was being released because the government had not been able to effectuate his removal within the period prescribed by law. It required him to cooperate with efforts to obtain a travel document to a country that would accept him for removal, to report as required, and to comply with other conditions of supervision. This includes requiring him to periodically appear at ICE “check-ins,” which he has done consistently since 2011. He has never missed a scheduled check-in.

24. In addition, over the past 14 years, Mr. Samadov has made outreach to numerous countries to see if they would accept him for removal, as required under his OSUP. He has received no positive responses.

25. Mr. Samadov appeared for his regularly scheduled check-in on July 26, 2025. Mr. Samadov was scheduled for his next check-in on September 17, 2025, and told to bring evidence that he had made additional outreach to third countries about their willingness to accept him.

26. Before that scheduled check-in, on August 28, 2025, Mr. Samadov was detained by ICE officers who were waiting outside his home.

27. Mr. Samadov was then brought to the Chantilly Field Office. The ICE supervisor who was responsible for processing him at the Field Office was unable to tell him why he had been detained. And after spending several hours in ICE custody, Mr. Samadov was released.

28. The next day, on August 29, 2025, Mr. Samadov was again detained, despite having received no notification of any change in his OSUP, by individuals who he believes may have been civilian contractors of CBP.

29. Mr. Samadov was again taken to the ICE Washington Field Office in Chantilly, VA, and was later moved to the Caroline Detention Facility in Bowling Green, VA, where he is currently detained.

30. At no time prior to or following Petitioner's arrest did ICE provide notice or any explanation for why it revoked Petitioner's OSUP. Nor did it provide him with an interview or any other opportunity to respond to the reasons for the OSUP's revocation.

31. At the time ICE revoked Petitioner's order of supervision, the agency had not secured travel documents necessary for removal from the United States. Nor have they acquired such documents during the time he has been detained.

32. On September 25, 2025, the Government filed a status report in this matter indicating that "Immigration and Customs Enforcement is in the process of making requests to third countries to accept Petitioner's removal." ECF No. 7, at 2. This means Mr. Samadov's removal was not reasonably foreseeable when the government arrested and detained him, nor is it foreseeable now since the government has not obtained the consent of any country to accept him.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Statutory and Regulatory Framework Governing the Revocation of an Order of Supervision

33. A non-citizen with a final order of removal "who is not removed within the [90-day] removal period . . . shall be subject to [an order of] supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General." 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (titled "Supervision after 90-day period").

34. The statute provides for detention beyond the 90-day removal period in various circumstances. *Id.* § 1231(a)(6). However, even then, continued detention is authorized only insofar as removal is "reasonably foreseeable." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 699–700. If removal is *not* reasonably foreseeable, the government must release the noncitizen on supervision, as detention

has become unreasonable and is no longer authorized by the statute. *Id.* at 695. In that case, the individual’s release may be subject to conditions appropriate in the circumstances. *Id.*¹

35. Regulations promulgated to implement *Zadvydas* establish “special review procedures” for noncitizens who have “provided good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal to the country to which he or she was ordered removed, or to a third country, in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a). These regulations require an individual to be released under an order of supervision upon a finding that “there is no significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.* § 241.13(c).²

36. When an individual is released under an order of supervision pursuant to the “special review procedures” set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13—as occurred with Mr. Samadov in 2011—the order of supervision can only be revoked in two circumstances and pursuant to certain procedures: The first circumstance is if a non-citizen “violates any of the conditions of release. *Id.* § 241.13(i)(1). The second is “if, on account of changed circumstances, the [government]

¹ The only exception to release on supervision is where “special circumstances justify[] continued detention.” *Id.* § 241.13(g)(1). These “special circumstances” include mental illness that renders an individual specially dangerous, “serious adverse foreign policy consequences” that would arise from release, and “security or terrorism concerns.” *Id.* §§ 241.14(c), (f). The “special circumstances” exception can only be invoked after providing written notice to the individual and pursuant to procedures under § 241.14.

² Separate regulations govern the detention and release of noncitizens under a final order of removal where the government has *not* made a determination that “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.4.13(b)(1). Under these regulations, the government may release an individual under an order of supervision “if it determines that the [individual] would not pose a danger to the public or a risk of flight, without regard to the likelihood of the alien’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.* These are not the regulations which governed Mr. Samadov’s release under an order of supervision, since in his case the grant of withholding of removal to Uzbekistan meant his removal was not reasonably foreseeable.

determines that there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.* § 241.13(i)(2).

37. The government must follow specific procedures—advance notice and a prompt interview—when revoking an order of supervision issued under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3):

Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release. [ICE] will conduct an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification. The alien may submit any evidence or information that he or she believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or she has not violated the order of supervision. The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.

38. If the noncitizen is not released from custody following the informal interview provided for in § 241.13(i)(3), “the provisions of § 241.4 shall govern the alien’s continued detention pending removal.” *Id.* § 241.13(i)(2).

The *Accardi* Doctrine Requires Agencies to Follow Internal Rules

39. Under the *Accardi* doctrine, a foundational principle of administrative law, agencies must follow their own procedures, rules, and instructions. *See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (setting aside an order of deportation where the BIA failed to follow procedures governing deportation proceedings); *see also Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (“Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . . . even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.”).

40. *Accardi* is not “limited to rules attaining the status of formal regulations.” *Montilla v. INS*, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). Courts must also reverse agency action for violation of

unpublished rules and instructions to agency officials. *See Morton*, 415 U.S. at 235 (affirming reversal of agency denial of public assistance made in violation of internal agency manual); *United States v. Heffner*, 420 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1969) (under *Accardi*, reversing decision to admit evidence obtained by IRS agents for violating instructions on investigating tax fraud).

Decisions to Revoke an Order of Supervision Must Satisfy the Due Process Clause

41. “The Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 693 (cleaned up). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” *Id.* at 690.

42. Under the substantive due process doctrine, a restraint on liberty like revocation of a non-citizen’s order of supervision is only permissible if it serves a “legitimate nonpunitive objective.” *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997). The Supreme Court has only recognized two legitimate objectives of immigration detention: preventing danger to the community or preventing flight prior to removal. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690–92 (discussing constitutional limitations on civil detention).

43. “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty,” *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (cleaned up), like the decision to revoke a non-citizen’s order of supervision. “The fundamental requirement of [procedural] due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” *Id.* at 333 (cleaned up).

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

FIRST CLAIM

Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(3), 1253(h)(1), and Implementing Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13

44. Petitioner repeats and realleges the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint-Petition as if fully set forth herein.

45. Mr. Samadov's detention violates the INA because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable.

46. The INA does not authorize detention of individuals, like Mr. Samadov, whose final orders of removal cannot be effectuated. Instead, it requires that the government release such individuals under orders of supervision. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 695; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (providing that an individual who is not removed within the statutory removal period "*shall* be subject to supervision" (emphasis added)).

47. Mr. Samadov's removal is not reasonably foreseeable. In 2011 he was granted withholding of removal to Uzbekistan because of the persecution and torture he would face if returned there. This means he cannot be removed to Uzbekistan. Nor has the government identified another country that will take him.

48. For this reason, in 2011, the government released him on an Order of Supervision as it was required to do under its regulations. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g)(1) (upon a determination that there is "no significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future" the government must "promptly make arrangements for . . . release" from detention).

49. The government's re-detention of Mr. Samadov also violated the regulations implementing the statute. These regulations permit revocation of release under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13

in only two circumstances: when an individual violates their conditions of supervision, or when removal becomes foreseeable. *See id.* §§ 241.13(g), (h). The regulations also require the government to provide advance notice of the reasons for revocation of release as well as a prompt interview where the individual has an opportunity to respond to these reasons. *See id.* § 241.13.

50. The government violated all of these requirements. It revoked Mr. Samadov's order of supervision without any notice or opportunity for him to respond, even though (1) he was fully compliant with his conditions of release, and (2) even though the government remains unable to effectuate his removal order.

SECOND CLAIM

Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (B)

51. Petitioner repeats and realleges the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint-Petition as if fully set forth herein.

52. Under the APA, "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 704. The reviewing Court "shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . not in accordance with law," or "contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity." *Id.* §§ 706(2)(A), (B).

53. The decision to detain Mr. Samadov, who (1) had previously been released on an OSUP for over a decade, (2) had neither violated nor failed to comply with the OSUP, and (3) is not subject to removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." *Id.* §§ 706(2)(A). Absent this Court's intervention, Mr. Samadov does not have any "remedy" to challenge Respondents' decision.

54. Respondents have thus far failed to provide Petitioner notice of the reasons for revocation and opportunity to be heard. Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), Petitioner has, at minimum,

a regulatory right to a detailed explanation for the reasons of revocation as well as an interview to contest the basis for the revocation.

55. The revocation should therefore be held unlawful and set aside because it was arbitrary and capricious, not in accordance with the INA and its implementing regulations, and in violation of Mr. Samadov's due process rights

THIRD CLAIM
Violation of the *Accardi* Doctrine

56. Petitioner repeats and realleges the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint-Petition as if fully set forth herein.

57. Under the *Accardi* doctrine, Petitioner has a right to set aside agency action that violated agency procedures, rules, or instructions. *See Accardi*, 347 U.S. at 260 (“If petitioner can prove the allegation [that agency failed to follow its rules in a hearing] he should receive a new hearing”).

58. At a minimum, ICE has a duty to follow its own regulations. *See Accardi*, 347 U.S. at 266 (holding that BIA must follow its own regulations in its exercise of discretion); *Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. at 235 (“Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . . . even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.”).

59. Respondent violated the requirements under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) to provide notice and a detailed explanation of the reasons for revocation as well as an interview to contest the basis for the revocation.

60. Under *Accardi*, Respondents' revocation of the order of supervision and decision to ignore instructions in the release notification should be set aside for violating agency procedures, rules, or instructions.

FOURTH CLAIM
**Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution
Substantive and Procedural Due Process**

61. Petitioner repeats and realleges the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint-Petition as if fully set forth herein.

62. The Constitution establishes due process rights for all persons within the United States, regardless of lawful status. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 693.

63. Freedom from physical restraint is at the core of the liberty protected by the due process clause. *Id.* at 690.

64. The government's detention of Mr. Samadov violates his right to substantive due process because it bears no reasonable relationship to a legitimate purpose. It also violates his right to procedural due process because he was detained without any of the procedural safeguards that such a deprivation of liberty requires.

65. The purpose of post-final order detention is to effectuate removal. If removal cannot be effectuated—as is the case here—then detention serves no legitimate purpose.

66. The government has not demonstrated that Mr. Samadov's removal is reasonably foreseeable, or even possible. The government is prohibited from removing him to Uzbekistan because of the persecution and torture he would face there. But the government has not identified any other country to which Mr. Samadov can be lawfully removed.

67. Nor is there any other basis for Mr. Samadov's detention. He does not pose a danger or flight risk, and he fully complied with the conditions placed on him under his Order of Supervision

68. Mr. Samadov's detention also violates his procedural due process rights. *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 333, instructs courts to balance three factors to determine whether procedural due

process is satisfied: (1) the private interest at issue; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements entail.

69. The first factor, the private interest at issue, favors Mr. Samadov. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause [of the Fifth Amendment] protects." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

70. The second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty and the probable value of procedural safeguards, also favors Mr. Samadov. Mr. Samadov's detention was not accompanied by the procedural protections that such a significant deprivation of liberty requires under the Due Process Clause. *See Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 332. He received no notice of the reasons for the revocation and no opportunity to respond to whatever those reasons were. Both of these safeguards are essential for protecting against the erroneous deprivation of liberty.

71. The third factor, the government's interest, also favors Petitioner. Its failure to provide the most basic procedural safeguards—notice and an opportunity to respond—makes it more likely to waste limited financial and administrative resources on unnecessary detention of people who are neither flight risks nor dangerous, and whose removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Requiring Respondents to provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond prior to revoking an order of supervision would reduce fiscal and administrative burdens on the government.

72. For these reasons, revoking Petitioner's order of supervision without providing notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond violated procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
2. Issue a writ of habeas corpus within three days of the filing of this petition, requiring that Respondents show cause why the relief Petitioner seeks should not be granted, and, should the Court require a hearing, set a hearing on this matter within five days of Respondents' return on the order to show cause, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244;
3. Enjoin Respondents from transferring the Petitioner from the jurisdiction of this District pending these proceedings;
4. Enjoin Respondents from removing Petitioner from the United States;
5. Order the immediate release of Petitioner;
6. Declare that Respondents' actions to arrest and detain Petitioner violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act; and/or the *Accardi* doctrine;
7. Award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for this action; and
8. Grant such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: October 7, 2025

/s/Sophia Leticia Gregg
Sophia Leticia Gregg (VA Bar No. 91582)
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**Pro Hac Vice applications forthcoming*

VERIFICATION BY SOMEONE ACTING ON PETITIONER'S BEHALF
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I am submitting this verification on behalf of Petitioner because I am the attorney for Petitioner. I or my co-counsel have discussed with the Petitioner the events described in this Petition. Based on those discussions, I hereby verify that the statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated: October 7, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Sophia Leticia Gregg

Sophia Leticia Gregg, (VA Bar No. 91582)

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, undersigned counsel, hereby certify that on this date, I filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and all attachments using the CM/ECF system. I will furthermore mail a copy by USPS Certified Priority Mail with Return Receipts to each of the following individuals:

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Dated: October 7, 2025

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