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Attorney for Petitioner

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

ALVARADO GONZALEZ, Eduardo

Petitioner,

v.

John Mattos, Warden of the NV Southern Detention
Center

Jason Knight, Director of the Salt Lake City
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Field Office;

Kristi Noem, Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; and

Pam Bondi,

Attorney General of the United States,
in their official capacities,

Respondents.

Case No.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner, Eduardo Alvarado Gonzalez, is present in the United States without lawful immigration status. He has a pending Form I-485, Application to Register

Permanent Residence or Adjust Status with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service and hereby petitions this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

2. On August 8, 2025, despite being released on his own recognizance by the Canyon County District Court, Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez was detained by agents with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Currently, the Canyon County District Court has dismissed these charges.
3. Since then he has been transferred from Caldwell, Idaho to Emmett, Idaho and then to Las Vegas, Nevada. His transfers, alone, far from family, friends, and acquaintances, have severely crippled Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez's ability to exercise his right to counsel. To date, present counsel has been unable to contact Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez on account of ICE's action and inaction.
4. Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez is eligible for adjustment of status to U.S. Lawful Permanent Resident pursuant to INA §245(i). His derivative application was filed with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on March 7, 2025. That application is currently pending. In the meantime, and based on this pending application, Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez has been granted employment authorization until April 29, 2030. This document gives him the legal authorization to work in the United States while his application for adjustment of status is pending.
5. With the exception of minor traffic violations, Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez has no other criminal convictions.
6. Despite the above stated facts, U.S. ICE detained Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez and denied bond. Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez is eligible for bond and release. He was released on his own recognizance by the Canyon County District Court; he is not a

flight risk nor a danger to the community.

7. Accordingly, to vindicate Petitioner's statutory and constitutional rights, this Court should grant the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
8. Petitioner also asks the Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus by determining that his detention is not justified because the government has not established by clear and convincing evidence that he presents a risk of flight or danger in light of available alternatives to detention, and order his release. Important to note, is that Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez was released on his own recognizance by the Canyon Country District Court on similar grounds.
9. In the alternative, Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez asks the Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus and order his release within 20 days unless Respondents schedule a bond hearing before an immigration judge, wherein they will bear the burden to demonstrate that he is a danger to the community or a flight risk to justify continued detention. Without a showing of these factors the DHS is in violation of Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez's due process rights.
10. Petitioner asks this Court to find that his apprehension, inability to contact counsel, and detention without an opportunity for bond is unconstitutional, and to order his release.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

11. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*
12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause).

13. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 *et seq.*, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
14. Venue is proper because Petitioner is detained at the Nevada Southern Detention Center in Las Vegas, Nevada, which is within the jurisdiction of this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); *Palma v. Holder*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175721 (9th Cir. 2014).

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

15. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause (OSC) to the respondents “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Court must require respondents to file a return “within *three days* unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.* (emphasis added).
16. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The Great Writ has been referred to as “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added).

PARTIES

17. Petitioner is a national of Mexico who has lived in the United States since 2003. Petitioner is currently detained at the Nevada Southern Detention Center in Las Vegas, Nevada and is a resident of Caldwell, Idaho. He is in the custody, and under the direct control, of Respondents and their agents.

18. Respondent, John Mattos is the Warden of the NV Southern Detention Center and he has immediate physical custody of Petitioner pursuant to the detention facility's contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
19. Respondent, Jason Knight, is sued in his official capacity as the Director of the Salt Lake City Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Respondent is a legal custodian of Petitioner and has authority to release him.
20. Respondent Kristi Noem is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In this capacity, Respondent Noem is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and oversees U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the component agency responsible for Petitioner's detention. Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Petitioner.
21. Respondent Pam Bondi is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). In that capacity, she has the authority to adjudicate removal cases and to oversee the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which administers the immigration courts and the BIA. Respondent Bondi is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

22. The Supreme Court has stated that it "'is well established the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.'" *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (quoting *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty" that the Due Process

Clause protects. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); *see also id.* at 718 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Liberty under the Due Process Clause includes protection against unlawful or arbitrary personal restraint or detention.”). This fundamental due process protection applies to all noncitizens, including both removable and inadmissible noncitizens. *See id.* at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“both removable and inadmissible aliens are entitled to be free from detention that is arbitrary or capricious”).

23. Due process therefore requires “adequate procedural protections” to ensure that the government’s asserted justification for physical confinement “outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” *Id.* at 690 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the immigration context, the Supreme Court has recognized only two valid purposes for civil detention—to mitigate the risks of danger to the community and to prevent flight. *Id.*; *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 528.
24. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for noncitizens in removal proceedings.
25. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard non-expedited removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
26. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking

admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

27. Last, the Act also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been previously ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)-(b).
28. This case concerns detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).
29. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104—208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).
30. Following enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).
31. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection—unless they were subject to some other detention authority—received bond hearings. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see* also H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).
32. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that

rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

33. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,” claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be deemed “applicants for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and therefore are subject to mandatory detention provisions under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.
34. ICE and the Executive Office of Immigration Review have adopted this position even though federal courts have rejected this exact conclusion. The plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.
35. In a recent BIA decision, *Matter of Akhmedov*, 29 I&N Dec. 166 (BIA 2025), the BIA entertained the noncitizen’s request for bond and considered flight risk and his threat to national security regardless of his entry without inspection in January 2022. *Matter of Akhmedov*, 29 I&N Dec. 166 (BIA 2025).
36. Similarly, federal courts also align with *Matter of Akmedov*. *Id.* For example after the Tacoma, Washington, Immigration Court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here, the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, ---F. Supp 3d --- 2025 WL 1193850 (W.D. Wash.

Apr. 24, 2025); *see also* *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) (granting habeas petition based on same conclusion).

37. DHS's and DOJ's interpretation defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner. *Rodriguez Vazquez*, ---F. Supp 3d --- 2025 WL 1193850 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2025).
38. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, which "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."
39. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.
40. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

41. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who had resided within the United States since 2003.
42. Therefore, detaining Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez violates the Due Process Clause.
43. The Constitutional right to counsel is establish by the Fifth Amendment and pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1362. Since his detention, Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez has been denied the opportunity to contact present counsel in violation of his constitutional rights.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

44. Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez is a 43 year-old citizen of Mexico. He is married to Antonia Sanchez Giron. They have four U.S. born children. Antonia's U.S. Citizen sister filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative for her on March 19, 2001 (Receipt #: WAC-011-435-1249). It is on the basis of this petition that Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez is eligible for adjustment of Status to U.S. Lawful Permanent Resident pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1255(i).
45. On March 7, 2025, Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez filed Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. On May 1, 2025, USCIS granted Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez an employment authorization document valid from April 30, 2025 until April 29, 2030. Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez's application for adjustment of status remains pending with USCIS.
46. Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. He has established a life in the United States. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in 2003. His youngest child is only eight years old. He is married with four U.S. born children. He has been employed by Table Rock Sandstone since 2004. With the exception of minor traffic violations Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez has no

other criminal convictions.

47. On July 27, 2025, Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez was charged with domestic violence pursuant to I.C. 18-918(2). On Friday, August 8, 2025 Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez's no contact order was terminated, and he was released on his own recognizance with standard reporting conditions. These charges have been dismissed.
48. On August 8, 2025, despite being released on his own recognizance by the Canyon County District Court, Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez was detained by agents with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). At that time, no information showing his location was provided by ICE nor available on the U.S. ICE Online Detainee Locator System at: <https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search>.
49. In an attempt to make contact with Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez, present counsel again contacted ICE. In response to an e-mail inquiry to current counsel, ICE Officer Rocky Roman stated that he could not approve a local bond and that they would purposefully "...prolong [Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez's] detention" before transferring him to Las Vegas. Said officer also refused to provide details regarding his location and dates and times of his transfer, which has hindered counsel's ability to make contact with Petitioner.
50. On Monday, August 11, 2025, after ICE Officers indicated that Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez was being held in Elmore County, present counsel called Elmore County Jail to verify his location and contact Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez. At that time, Elmore County staff indicated that he had been transported to another facility. The online U.S. ICE Online Detainee Locator System showed him as at the Elmore County Jail.
51. That day, in an effort, to contact and speak to Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez, present

counsel contacted ICE Officer Jared Callahan at the ICE Boise Field Office. Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez was originally detained under their authority. Officer Callahan indicated that he had been moved to the Nevada Southern Detention Center and stated, "...his custody is considered mandatory."

52. On Tuesday, August 12, 2025 the U.S. ICE Online Detainee Locator System finally showed an accurate location. On that day, present counsel's staff called the Nevada Southern Detention Center. Contact was made with Officer Tuck at the Nevada Southern Detention Center. Officer Tuck instructed our office to email the Detention Center a completed Form G-28, Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney, and dates of availability to set up a visit between Ms. Derden and Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez. Immediately, after the call counsel's staff emailed all necessary information to the Nevada Southern Detention Center.
53. On that same day, in an attempt to make contact with Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez via his spouse, present counsel attempted to deposit funds into Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez's trust account so that he could make outbound calls, but his account was blocked. It took two days and several calls with technical support to get his account unblocked by the Detention Center's trust account system.
54. On August 14, 2025, after still no contact with Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez, Ms. Derden's staff again called the Nevada Southern Detention Center to confirm receipt of Form G-28 and offered additional proposed dates for a meeting with Petitioner. The answering officer indicated that they had hundreds of emails sitting in their email inbox and would process the request in the order it was received.
55. On August 18, 2025, present counsel finally received a response from the Nevada Southern Detention Center regarding the request to set up a call between Mr.

Alvarado Gonzalez and present counsel. Officer Tuck requested Ms. Derden's driver's license, bar card, and another Form G-28 with Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez's A number written on page 3 of the previously submitted form. These documents and additional information were immediately submitted.

56. Despite the days and countless attempts to make contact with Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez, no contact has been made to date.
57. However, on Monday, August 25, 2025, current counsel was forced to retain local counsel and was able to make contact.
58. Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez is currently being held without bond at the Nevada Southern Detention Center.
59. His transfers, alone, far from family, friends, and acquaintances, have severely crippled Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez's ability to exercise his right to counsel.
60. As noted above, Mr. Alvarao Gonzalez has been granted employment authorization until April 29, 2030. This document gives him the legal authorization to work in the United States while his application for adjustment of status is pending.
61. Despite the above stated facts, U.S. ICE detained Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez and denied bond. Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez is eligible for bond and release as evidence by his release on his own recognizance from the Canyon County Jail based on substantially similar factors showing no flight risk and no danger to the community.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Constitutional Claim, Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process

62. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.
63. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001).

64. Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez is entitled to due process protections. *See Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); *United States v. Mendoza-Lopez*, 481 U.S. 828 (1987). Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.
65. A wrongful detention can ripen into a due process violation if “it was or should have been known [by the Respondents] that the [Petitioner] was entitled to release.” *Cannon v. Macon County*, 1 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1993).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
67. The Ninth Circuit has previously found in cases before habeas courts where a “substantial liberty interest” is at stake, “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is justified.” *Singh v. Holder*, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203-1204 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing *Casas-Castrillim v. Department of Homeland Security*, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008)).
68. ICE’s choice to detain Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez without bond and action or inaction that has prevented Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez from contacting present counsel is a violation of his Constitutional rights and is sufficient to show that they knowingly

violated his Constitutional rights and should understand he should be released.

69. Therefore, Petitioner's detention violates his right to substantive and procedural due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

COUNT II
Violation of 8 U.S.C. 1226(a)

70. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.
71. Petitioner's statutory rights were violated by ICE's erroneous rejection to set bond.
72. United States Code provides that, "[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States . . . [and] the Attorney General (2) may release the alien on – (B) bond of at least \$1,500." 8 U.S.C. §1226(a)(2).
73. ICE has maintained that Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez is ineligible for bond and have refused to release him even though he is not a flight risk nor a danger to the community. A finding of no flight risk and no danger to community has already been made by the Canyon County Third Judicial District Court. Additionally, Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez is eligible for U.S. Lawful Immigration Status and has a pending application with USCIS.
74. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility because they previously entered the country without being admitted. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to another detention provision, such as § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231. Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez is not subject to any of these provisions.
75. Therefore, the application of § 1225(b)(2) to Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez violates the

Immigration and Nationality Act.

COUNT III

Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, Unlawful Denial of Bond

76. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.
77. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility because they originally entered the United States without inspection. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to another detention provision, such as § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c) or § 1231.
78. Nonetheless, Petitioner has been subject to mandatory detention under that statute.
79. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the following:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days.
- (3) Declare that Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez's ongoing detention without a bond hearing, violated the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution;
- (4) Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution;
- (5) Declare that denial of Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez's request for bond and ICE subjecting him to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), denied him his statutory rights under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

- (6) Issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to release Mr. Alvarado Gonzalez immediately; or, in the alternative, issue an order requiring Respondents to schedule a bond hearing within 20 days, wherein they will bear the burden to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he is a danger to the community or a flight risk, to justify his continued and currently unjustified detention.
- (1) Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- (2) Grant any further relief this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 27 August 2025

/s/Hardeep Sull

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/s/ Nicole R. Derden

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