Salazar"), by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby petitions this

Honorable Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to release him on bond from
his continued detention in the custody of the United States Department of

Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("DHS-ICE") as
his continued detention is a violation of due process, and constitutes an
unlawful detention. In support of this petition, petitioner states by and through
counsel as follows:

JURISDICTION

- 2. This action arises under the Constitution, the Immigration & Nationality Act of 1990, as amended ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. §1101 et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §701 et seq. This Court has habeas jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241, Art. 1, §9, Cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (the "Suspension Clause"); and the common law. This Court may also exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 and may grant relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201 et seq., and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651.
- On May 11, 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231. The REAL ID Act divested federal district courts of jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation, exclusion and/or removal.

 However, federal district courts still retain jurisdiction through habeas corpus over the detention of aliens.

VENUE

4. Venue lies in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the judicial district of confinement, as the petitioner is physically being held in custody at the Otay Mesa Detention Facility located in Otay Mesa, CA. This is in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2725 (2004) ("Whenever a §2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical custody within the United States, he should name his warden as respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement").

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

- 5. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause (OSC) to the respondents "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Court must require respondents to file a return "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed." Id. (emphasis added).
- 6. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The Great Writ has been referred to as

"perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added).

PARTIES

- 7. Petitioner, Ivan Salazar Arroyo, is a native and citizen of Mexico who has been held in continuing detention by DHS-ICE since June 19, 2025. He is currently detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in Otay Mesa, CA.
- 8. Respondent, Christopher J. Larose is sued in his official capacity as the Warden of the Otay Mesa Detention Center in Otay Mesa, CA. The warden has chief executive authority over the administration of the Otay Mesa Detention Facility. In this capacity, he has direct responsibility over the confinement of Ivan Salazar Arroyo.
- 9. Respondent, Gregory J. Archambeault, is sued in his official capacity as the Director of the San Diego Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Respondent Archambeault is a legal custodian of Petitioner and has authority to release him.
- 10.Respondent, Todd M. Lyons, is sued in his official capacity as the Acting

 Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Respondent Lyons is
 a legal custodian of Petitioner and has authority to release him.

- 11.Respondent, Kristi Noem, is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In this capacity, Respondent Noem is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and oversees U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement the component agency responsible for Petitioner's continued detention. Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Petitioner.
- 12.Respondent, Pam Bondi, is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). In that capacity, she has the authority to adjudicate removal cases and to oversee the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which administers the immigration courts and the BIA. Respondent Bondi is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

- 13. This case revolves around DHS's <u>continued detention</u> of individuals post an individualized bond hearing granting bond by the Immigration Judge. 8 CFR § 1003.6 allows DHS to invoke a regulatory automatic stay single handedly **overruling** an Immigration Judge's order on bond. 8 CFR § 1003.6 provides:
 - "Automatic stay in certain cases. In any case in which [the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS")] has determined that an alien should not be released or has set a bond of \$10,000 or more, any order of the immigration judge authorizing release (on bond or otherwise) shall be stayed upon DHS's filing of a notice of intent to

appeal the custody redetermination (Form EOIR-43) with the immigration court within one business day of the order, and, except as otherwise provided in 8 CFR 1003.6(c), shall remain in abeyance pending decision of the appeal by the Board. The decision whether or not to file Form EOIR-43 is subject to the discretion of the Secretary."

14. Some background to the automatic stay provision is helpful. Following an iterative process and consideration of criticism that the automatic stay provision (in its interim rule form) would be invoked absent factual foundation or appropriate individualized case review, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued its final rule, as quoted above. Speaking to these concerns, the Federal Register at 71 Fed. Reg. 57874, 57878 (Oct. 2, 2006) states:

"To preserve the automatic stay, the attorney for DHS shall file with the notice of appeal a certification by a <u>senior legal official</u> that— (i) The <u>official has approved</u> the filing of the notice of appeal according to review procedures established by DHS; and (ii) The <u>official is satisfied</u> that the contentions justifying the continued detention of the alien have evidentiary support, and the legal arguments are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing precedent or the establishment of new precedent."

¹ On October 2, 2006, DOJ published the final rule in the Federal Register (Vol. 71, No. 190) and set forth the following context for changes implemented to the final rule following public comment on the interim rule: First, in order to allay possible concerns that in some cases the automatic stay might be invoked by low-level employees of DHS without supervisory review, or might be invoked without an adequate factual or legal basis, this rule makes two changes in the process for invoking the automatic stay. The final rule provides that the decision to file the Form EOIR–43 (which must be done within one business day of the immigration judge's custody decision) will be subject to the discretion of the Secretary. Under the provisions of the automatic stay rule which are not changed by this final rule, the automatic stay will lapse 10 business days after the issuance of the immigration judge's decision unless DHS files within that time a notice of appeal with the Board presenting DHS's arguments for reversal or modification of the immigration judge's custody decision. This rule adds a new requirement that, in order to preserve the automatic stay, a senior legal official of DHS must certify that the official has approved the filing of the notice of appeal to the Board and that there is factual and legal support justifying the continued detention of the alien.

16.Lastly, the Government issued a memorandum on July 8, 2025, to all ICE employees, titled "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for Admission." In the memo, the Government provides in relevant part:

"Effective immediately, it is the position of DHS that [applicants for admission under section 235(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act] are subject to detention under INA § 212(b) and may not be released from ICE custody except by INA § 212(d)(4) parole. These aliens are also ineligible for a custody redetermination hearing ("bond hearing") before an immigration judge and may not be released for the duration of their removal proceedings absent a parole by DHS. For custody purposes, these aliens are not treated in the same manner that "arriving aliens" have historically been treated."

17. This memorandum appears to explain DHS's position regarding refusing to release individuals granted a bond.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

- 18.Ivan Salazar Arroyo is a 42 year-old, native and citizen of Mexico, and initially entered this country in or about 2004; over 21 years ago. He was never apprehended by border agents and entered the U.S. without inspection.
- 19. Having resided in the U.S. for over 21 years; he has extensive family ties including his U.S. Citizen wife; Yoanna Yajaira Salazar, and his U.S. Citizen children: Eddy Mayorga (step-son), Miguel Bautista (step-son), Briseida Bautista (step-daughter), and Ivan Salazar Jr. (son). He has worked in construction for many years.
- 20.He was encountered by agents of ICE during a Los Angeles-area operation at Home Depot on June 19, 2025 aka "the Los Angeles ICE Raids". Mr. Salazar currently has pending removal proceedings pursuant to 8 CFR §1240.
- 21. While his removal proceedings are pending, the Immigration Judge ("IJ") granted a bond of \$7,500 pursuant to 8 USC §1226(a)(2)(A). See Order of Immigration Judge, Exhibit A On July 21, 2025, The Department of Homeland Security filed a form EOIR-43: Notice of ICE intent to Appeal Custody Redetermination; effectively automatically staying the Immigration Judge's decision pursuant to 8 CFR § 1003.6 signed by Saida K Ulle Assistant Chief Counsel; notably without certification by a senior legal official. See EOIR-43, Exhibit A. As detailed supra, this provides a stay of the Immigration Judge's bond order that lasts through appeal to the Board of

 Immigration Appeals that lapses should no appeal be filed within 10 business days. See 8 CFR § 1003.6.

- 22. Under this administration, it appears the use of an EOIR-43 and appealing the Immigration Judge is intended to keep the alien detained until their deportation or they give up and sign their removal given these were rarely invoked; according to the 2005 statistics listed in the federal register.
- 23.On July 29, 2025, Petitioner was notified an appeal was filed on July 28, 2025.
 See BIA Receipt and IJ Bond Memorandum, Exhibit A. To this date, Mr.
 Salazar has been detained for over 70 days pending removal proceedings. His next hearing before the Immigration Judge is scheduled for September 10, 2025.
- 24.If released, Mr. Salazar would return to his home in Los Angeles, CA and reside with his family; who have promised to provide shelter and take him to all of his future hearing dates.

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

25. There is no statutory exhaustion requirement in 28 U.S.C § 2241. However, the Court may require prudential exhaustion. Courts may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if "administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void."

Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting S.E.C. v. G.C. George Sec., Inc., 637 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1981). In detention cases, appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) can take months or years. Thus, requiring habeas petitioners to appeal to the BIA to prudentially exhaust is not efficient, would cause irreparable harm by continuing to deprive a person of their liberty, and/or would be futile.

- 26.Petitioner, Ivan Salazar Arroyo, has exhausted his administrative remedies to the extent required by law, and his only remedy is by way of this judicial action. Despite the fact that Mr. Salazar was granted a bond, the Department of Homeland Security has automatically stayed the Immigration Judge's decision without due process to the Petitioner. Given an appeal before the BIA is likely to exhaust months where Mr. Salazar will continue to be deprived of his life and liberty; requiring waiting for DHS to brief the issue and waiting for the BIA to decide on the appeal causes irreparable harm to Mr. Salazar.
- 27. Additionally, while Mr. Salazar is detained, his removal proceedings continue in an expedited manner intended on ordering deportation before release; such that he is no longer eligible for a bond post-removal order.
- 28. Further, wherefore any efforts to obtain release from custody from the

 Department of Homeland Security or from the Board of Immigration Appeals

 would be futile.

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27 28 29. Lastly, Mr. Salazar is currently in removal proceedings, so there is no possibility of removal in the near future until proceedings are completed. The federal district court retains authority to grant release on bond or any other condition of release.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process

30. Continued detention, despite a favorable bond ruling, constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires that immigration detention and bond proceedings adhere to fundamental principles of fairness and procedural protections. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78, 96 S. Ct. 1883, 48 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1976); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (civil detention violates due process unless special, nonpunitive circumstances outweigh an individual's interest in avoiding restraint); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) (due process is flexible, and the protections depend on the situation, considering the private interest at issue, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the Government's interest). These protections extend to deportation proceedings. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1993).

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- 31. Although the Immigration Judge had ordered Petitioner to be released on bond, by filing an EOIR-43, the Government stayed that order without making any showing of dangerousness, flight risk, or any other factor justifying detention. "Simply by fiat—without introducing any proof and without immediate judicial review—the Government effectively overruled the bond decision and kept Petitioner detained." Mohammed H. v. Trump, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117197. Similarly here, the Government has given Petitioner no chance to contest the Government's case for detention. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348-49 ("The essence of due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.") The government's invocation of the automatic stay here contorts 8 CFR § 1003.6 into an unfair procedure. Cf. Bridges, 326 U.S. 135, 152-53, 65 S. Ct. 1443, 89 L. Ed. 2103 (administrative rules are designed to afford due process and to serve as "safeguards against essentially unfair procedures").
- 32.Here, DHS's application of the automatic stay violates substantive and procedural due process rights by allowing DHS to unilaterally override an immigration judge's bond decision; 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(2) depriving individuals of a meaningful opportunity to challenge their detention.
- 33.Under the circumstances of this case, invoking the automatic stay violated

 Petitioner's substantive and procedural due process rights. Mr. Salazar has been

granted a legal pathway to release by a neutral adjudicator (the IJ). The IJ took into account the entirety of the evidence submitted, and decided that Petitioner was not a risk of flight nor a danger to society. ICE's unilateral refusal to honor that order is arbitrary and unjust, and renders the IJ's order meaningless.

34. For those reasons, petitioner's continued detention is a violation of his 5th Amendment due process rights.

COUNT TWO

The Government failed to comply with the requirements set out under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(1) and the automatic stay should have lapsed

- 35. As addressed supra, DHS must file with the notice of appeal a certification by a senior legal official that— (i) The official has approved the filing of the notice of appeal according to review procedures established by DHS; and (ii) The official is satisfied that the contentions justifying the continued detention of the alien have evidentiary support, and the legal arguments are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing precedent or the establishment of new precedent. 71 Fed. Reg. 57874, 57878 (Oct. 2, 2006). The addition of this requirement according to the Federal Register is to avoid the abuse of this section by a lower-level officer.
- 36. Here, in its haste to deny release to all individuals granted a bond, DHS in this case has not made any individualized determination as to whether to invoke the

automatic stay provision as articulated by § 1003.6(c)(1). Additionally, DHS's notice has failed to comply with its own standards and lacks the certification required by a supervising legal official pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(1).

37. Accordingly, DHS should accept the bond and release the petitioner.

COUNT THREE

The Government's application of the automatic stay is ultra vires, exceeding authority conferred by Congress.

38. Under the principle of ultra vires, an agency regulation is invalid if it exceeds the authority granted to the agency by Congress. The statutory framework of the INA, specifically 8 USC § 1226, grants immigration judges discretionary authority to determine whether an individual may be released on bond.

However, 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(2) allows DHS to impose an automatic stay on an immigration judge's bond decision, effectively nullifying the judge's discretion. This regulation transforms a discretionary decision into a mandatory detention imposed by DHS, which is contrary to the express intent of Congress. Courts have similarly held that 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(2) exceeds the statutory authority granted to the Attorney General under the INA because it undermined the discretionary authority of immigration judges. Anicasio v. Kramer, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157236. Similarly, another court found the regulation ultra vires because it eliminated the discretionary authority of immigration judges, thereby

exceeding the authority granted to DHS under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a). Zabadi v. Chertoff, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50670.

- 39. Similar to the petitioners in <u>Anicasio</u> and <u>Zabadi</u>, this court should find that DHS's imposition of the automatic stay invalidates an Immigration Judge's decision without any justification. DHS is showing its willingness to abuse this statute without even following the regulations set out in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(1) thus allowing deprivation of liberty without factual foundation or appropriate individualized case review.
- 40. Finally, the automatic stay provision does not impose strict time limits for the resolution of the appeal by the BIA, which can result in prolonged detention without a final decision. This creates a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty, as detainees remain in custody based solely on ICE's invocation of the stay, often without any substantive review of the underlying bond decision.
 Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446, Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662, Mohammed H. v. Trump, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88471.
- 41. While ICE has the right to appeal the IJ's bond decision to the BIA, such an appeal should not automatically stay the IJ's order. The Attorney General's discretionary authority over bond decisions is not absolute and is subject to judicial review for constitutional claims and legal errors. Perez v. Napolitano, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, 8 USCS § 1226. In this case, even if the Bond

 were appealed and sustained, the case would return back to the Immigration Judge to enter a new decision based on the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision.

- 42. At that point, Mr. Salazar would retain the right to pursue all legal remedies available to him, which could eventually take him back to the Board of Immigration Appeals, or the Ninth Circuit. Keeping him in detention at the Otay Mesa Detention facility during this entire time would "effectively punish Mr. Salazar for pursuing applicable legal remedies." Leslie v. Attorney General of the United States, 678 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2012).
- 43. Here, ICEs continued detention of Petitioner without bond, despite the IJs determination, constitutes an unlawful deprivation of liberty and creates the risk of unlawful prolonged detention.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the following:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within *three* days.
- (3) Declare that Mr. Salazar is being detained pursuant to 8 USC § 1226(a) per order of the Immigration Judge;

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VERIFICATION OF COMPLAINT

I, Mitchell H. Shen, Esq., state under penalty of perjury that I am the attorney for the petitioner Ivan Salazar Arroyo in the foregoing petition, and declare the facts alleged here to be true, except those made on information and belief, which I believe to be true, and further state that the sources of my information and belief are documents and information provided to me by the petitioner and his associates and family members.

Los Angeles, CA

Signed: /s/ Mitchell H. Shen

Dated: 09/08/2025

MITCHELL H. SHEN, ESQ. Attorney for Petitioner Law Office of Mitchell H. Shen & Associates 617 S. Olive St., Ste. 810 Los Angeles, CA 90014 Tel. (213) 878-0333; Fax (213) 402-2169

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1		
2	Exhibit	Document Page(s)
3	A 1. Order of the Immigration Judge Granting Bond1-2	
4		2. EOIR-43: Notice of Intent to Appeal
5	4. Bond Memorandum of the Immigration Judge7-10	
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27	Ivan Salazar	Writ of Habeas Corpus r Arroyo 25-cv-02190-LL-MMP
28	Case 140. 3.	#2-64-0WY\0-1717-14114II