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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

PEDRO JOAQUIN AVILES-MENA, Petitioner, v. POLLY KAISER, *et al.*, Respondents.	Case No. 3:25-cv-06783 **RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States "[has] often been described as 'a nation of immigrants.'" *Foley v. Connelie*, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978). "As a Nation we exhibit extraordinary hospitality to those who come to our country," and "[i]ndeed, aliens lawfully residing in this society have many rights which are accorded to noncitizens by few other countries." *Id.* Immigrants "have in turn richly contributed to our country's success." *Coal. for TJ v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd.*, 218 L. Ed. 2d 71 (Feb. 20, 2024) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Yet Congress has also identified a "crisis at the land border" that involves "hundreds of thousands" of noncitizens entering the country illegally each year, H.R. Rep. 104-469 at 107, and the resulting need "to expedite the removal from the United States of aliens who indisputably have no authorization to be admitted," H.R. Rep. 104-828 at 209.

For these reasons, "[t]he decisions of [the Supreme] Court with regard to the rights of aliens living in our society" — including the "restraints imposed" upon them — "have reflected fine, and often difficult, questions of values." *Foley*, 435 U.S. at 294. Mindful of these values, Congress has created — and courts have upheld — procedures unique to noncitizens subject to expedited removal that are "coextensive" with due process. *Guerrier v. Garland*, 18 F.4th 304, 310 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that "in the expedited removal context, a petitioner's due process rights are coextensive with the statutory rights Congress provides") (citing *Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 138 (2020)). These procedures include the right to a non-adversarial interview before a trained asylum officer, administrative review before an immigration judge, and limited judicial review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30, 235.3, 1208.30. But they do not permit noncitizens to challenge their mandatory detention or entitle them to pre-detention hearings. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); (b)(2)(A).

Due process thus does not require that the Court enjoin Petitioner's re-detention absent a hearing. *See* ECF No. 6 ("Mot.") at 9. Petitioner entered the United States and was issued a notice and order for expedited removal pursuant to § 1225(b)(1) one day later. Nothing has changed to alter the fact that he is subject to such an order. Where, as here, the government properly exercises its authority to pursue expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b), those procedures fully satisfy due process and preclude Petitioner from clearing the high bar for a preliminary injunction requiring additional process. Under the plain text of § 1225, Petitioner cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits, establish

irreparable harm, or countervail the government's compelling interest in enforcing mandatory detention pending expedited removal for the narrow category of noncitizens to which he belongs.

II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

A. Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225

Congress established the expedited removal process in 8 U.S.C. § 1225 to ensure that the Executive could "expedite removal of aliens lacking a legal basis to remain in the United States." *Kucana v. Holder*, 558 U.S. 233, 249 (2010); *see also Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 106 ("[Congress] crafted a system for weeding out patently meritless claims and expeditiously removing the aliens making such claims from the country."). Section 1225 applies to "applicants for admission" to the United States, who are defined as "alien[s] present in the United States who [have] not been admitted" or noncitizens "who arrive[ ] in the United States," whether or not at a designated port of arrival. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission "fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2)," both of which are subject to mandatory detention. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) ("[R]ead most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention for applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.").

1. Section 1225(b)(1)

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to "arriving aliens" and "certain other" noncitizens "initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation." *Id.*; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii). Section 1225(b)(1) allows for the expedited removal of any noncitizen "described in" § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II), as designated by the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security — that is, any noncitizen not "admitted or paroled into the United States" and "physically present" fewer than two years — who is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) at the time of "inspection." *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (categorizing as inadmissible noncitizens without valid entry documents). Whether that happens at a port of entry or after illegal entry is not relevant; what matters is whether, when an officer inspects a noncitizen for admission under § 1225(a)(3), that noncitizen lacks entry documents and so is subject to §1182(a)(7). The Attorney General's or Secretary's authority to "designate" classes of noncitizens as subject to expedited removal is subject to his or her "sole and unreviewable discretion." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii); *see also American Immigration Lawyers Ass'n*

v. Reno, 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding the expedited removal statute).

The Secretary (and earlier, the Attorney General) has designated categories of noncitizens for expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) on five occasions; most recently, restoring the expedited removal scope to "the fullest extent authorized by Congress." *Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal*, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025). The notice thus enables the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") "to place in expedited removal, with limited exceptions, aliens determined to be inadmissible under [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) or (a)(7)] who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that they have been physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year period immediately preceding the date of the determination of inadmissibility," who were not otherwise covered by prior designations. *Id.* at 8139–40.

Expedited removal proceedings under § 1225(b)(1) include additional procedures if a noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum[1] or expresses a fear of persecution, torture, or return to the noncitizen's country. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4). In that situation, the noncitizen is given a non-adversarial interview with an asylum officer, who determines whether the noncitizen has a "credible fear of persecution" or torture. *Id.* §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B)(iii)(II), (b)(1)(B)(iv), (v); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 208.30; *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 109–11 (describing the credible fear process). The noncitizen may also pursue *de novo* review of that determination by an immigration judge. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.42(d), 1208.30(g). During the credible fear process, a noncitizen may consult with an attorney or representative and engage an interpreter. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(4), (5). However, a noncitizen subject to these procedures "shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).

If the asylum officer or immigration judge does not find a credible fear, the noncitizen is "removed from the United States without further hearing or review." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I),

[1] Noncitizens must apply for asylum within one year of arriving in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1558(a)(2)(B), except if the noncitizen can demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" that justify moving that deadline. *Id.* § 1558(a)(2)(D).

(b)(1)(C); 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii), (e)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.42(f), 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A). If the asylum officer or immigration judge finds a credible fear, the noncitizen is generally placed in full removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, but remains subject to mandatory detention. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).

Expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1) is a distinct statutory procedure from removal under § 1229a. Section 1229(a) governs full removal proceedings initiated by a notice to appear and conducted before an immigration judge, during which the noncitizen may apply for relief or protection. By contrast, expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1) applies in narrower, statutorily defined circumstances — typically to individuals apprehended at or near the border who lack valid entry documents or commit fraud upon entry — and allows for their removal without a hearing before an immigration judge, subject to limited exceptions. For these noncitizens, DHS has discretion to pursue expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1) or § 1229a. *Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-*, 25 I&N Dec. 520, 524 (BIA 2011).

2. Section 1225(b)(2)

Section 1225(b)(2) is "broader" and "serves as a catchall provision." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. It "applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1)." *Id.* Under § 1225(b)(2), a noncitizen "who is an applicant for admission" is subject to mandatory detention pending full removal proceedings "if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (requiring that such noncitizens "be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title"); *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 68 (BIA 2025) (explaining that proceedings under section 1229a are "full removal proceedings under section 240 of the INA"); *see also id.* ("[F]or aliens arriving in and seeking admission into the United States who are placed directly in full removal proceedings, section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), mandates detention 'until removal proceedings have concluded.'") (citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 299). Still, DHS has the sole discretionary authority to temporarily release on parole "any alien applying for admission to the United States" on a "case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." *Id.* § 1182(d)(5)(A); *see Biden v. Texas*, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022).

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III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nicaragua who entered the United States without inspection, admission or parole on May 16, 2022. Declaration of Thomas Auer ("Auer Decl.") at ¶ 5, Exh. 1. DHS Border Patrol encountered Petitioner at El Paso, Texas, as he attempted to enter the United States via the border separating Mexico from the States of Texas. *Id.* On May 17, 2022, Petitioner was issued a Notice and Order of Expedited Removal as an immigrant not in possession of a valid entry document. *Id.* at ¶ 6, Exh. 2. On May 30, 2022, Petitioner claimed fear of returning to his country of origin and his case was referred to asylum officers in order to conduct a Credible Fear Interview. *Id.* at ¶ 7. Plaintiff was released on conditional parole on May 31, 2022. *Id.* at ¶ 8.

Petitioner filed an I-589 Application for Aylum and Withholding, which was received by DHS on May 22, 2023. *Id.* at ¶ 9. On June 5, 2025, Petitioner was informed that his asylum application was dismissed because he had previously been placed in expediated removal. *Id.* at ¶ 10. The notice of dismissal stated that Petitioner's claim of fear would be considered by an asylum officer through the credible fear screening process pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 208.30. *Id;* ECF. No. 1-1 at 2.

On August 8, 2025, Petitioner reported to the San Francisco Regional Field Office of ICE pursuant to an appointment letter. There, a Deportation Officer and Detention and Deportation Officer identified themselves as officers with ICE and conducted an interview with Petitioner. Petitioner was taken into custody due to his order for expedited removal. Auer Decl. at ¶ 11, and Exh. 3.

Petitioner is currently subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). *Id.* at ¶ 6; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). Under § 1225(b)(1), a noncitizen in expedited removal proceedings that expresses a fear of returning to their country of origin, "shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).

IV. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner commenced this action on August 11, 2025, by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, and moving this Court *ex parte* for a TRO, ECF No. 2. On August 12, 2025, the Court granted Petitioner's *ex parte* TRO pending further briefing and a hearing on this matter, including the government's response to Petitioner's motion. ECF No. 9. The Court ordered the government "to

immediately release Petitioner-Plaintiff from Respondents-Defendants' custody," and enjoined and restrained the government "from re-detaining Petitioner-Plaintiff without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and from removing him from the United States." *Id.* at 8. Petitioner was released from custody that afternoon. ECF No. 10.

The Court has scheduled an in-person hearing on August 21, 2025, for the government to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue and extended the TRO August 26, 2025. ECF No. 9.

V. ARGUMENT

A. Legal Standard

A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." *Lopez v. Brewer*, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012). To obtain relief, the moving party must show that "he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." *Winter v. NRDC*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

B. Petitioner Fails to Meet the High Bar for Injunctive Relief

1. Petitioner Cannot Show a Likelihood of Success on the Merits

a. Under the Plain Text of § 1225, Petitioner Must Be Detained Pending the Outcome of His Removal Proceeding

Petitioner cannot show a likelihood of success on his claim that he is entitled to a custody hearing prior to re-detention. This is because Petitioner is a noncitizen subject to expedited removal due to his status as a noncitizen who is not "admitted or paroled into the United States" and was "physically present" fewer than two years when he was found to be inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) at the time of "inspection." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). Petitioner entered the United States without valid documentation and was apprehended within 14 days of his entry and less than 100 miles of the border. Auer Decl. ¶ 6, Exs. 1 and 2. He was, therefore, issued a Notice and Order of Expedited Removal the day after his entry into the United States. *Id.*

For such noncitizens who express a fear of returning to their country of origin, the noncitizen is

given a non-adversarial interview with an asylum officer, who determines whether the noncitizen has a "credible fear of persecution" or torture. *Id.* §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B)(iii)(II), (b)(1)(B)(iv), (v); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 208.30; *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 109–11 (describing the credible fear process). However, a noncitizen subject to these procedures "shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). As such, Petitioner is not entitled to a custody redetermination hearing by an immigration judge or a pre-deprivation hearing before re-detention. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297 ("[R]ead most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention for applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded."); *see also Matter of Q. Li,* 29 I & N. Dec. at 69 ("[A]n applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).").

Petitioner is subject to the expedited removal procedures under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) and cannot challenge his mandatory detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) ("Any alien subject to the procedures under this clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed."). However, as noted above, if an asylum officer or immigration judge determines that he has a credible fear of persecution or torture, Petitioner may be placed in full removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f), although he will remain subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Petitioner's argument that he is not subject to expedited removal because he was released on conditional parole and has been in the United States for over two years is mistaken. As an initial matter, even if Petitioner did not meet the requirements for expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1), the government can use its discretion to detain him under § 1225(b)(2). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 (§ 1225(b)(2) "serves as a catchall provision" and "applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).") However, that is unnecessary here, where Petitioner was placed in expedited removal immediately after entering the United States. *See* Auer Decl. at ¶ 6. Under the statute, Petitioner must show he was physically present in the United States for the two-year period *immediately prior* to the

date of determination of inadmissibility in order to exempt himself from § 1225(b)(1). 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). Here, that determination was made the day after Petitioner's arrival in the United States, at which time he was issued the order for expedited removal. Therefore, he cannot show that he was present in the United States for two years prior to that determination. Furthermore, Petitioner's subsequent release on conditional parole occurred after, and was pursuant to, the order for expedited removal. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288 ("Such parole [under § 1225(b)], however, 'shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien.'"); *Matter of Q. Li.* 29 I & N. Dec. at 68 (petitioner released on parole and subject to periodic reporting still permitted to be taken into mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225(b) two and a half years later because she remained an arriving noncitizen throughout the time she was released).

Thus, because § 1225(b) mandates the detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal, including Petitioner, he cannot succeed on his claim that he is entitled to a pre-detention hearing.

b. The *Mathews* Factors Do Not Apply

The Supreme Court has never utilized the multi-factor "balancing test" of *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), in addressing due process claims raised by noncitizens held in civil immigration detention, despite multiple opportunities to do so since *Mathews* was decided in 1976. *See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022) ("[T]he Supreme Court when confronted with constitutional challenges to immigration detention has not resolved them through express application of *Mathews*.") (citations omitted); *id.* at 1214 ("In resolving familiar immigration-detention challenges, the Supreme Court has not relied on the *Mathews* framework.") (Bumatay, J., concurring). Nor has the Ninth Circuit embraced the *Mathews* test. While leaving open the question of whether the *Mathews* test applies to a constitutional challenge to immigration detention, *see Rodriguez Diaz*, 53 F.4th at 1207, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that "*Mathews* remains a flexible test that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the immigration detention context." *Id.* at 1206.

In any event, given his status as a noncitizen subject to expedited removal, Petitioner's reliance on *Mathews* in asserting that he should be prohibited from re-detention absent a custody hearing, Mot. 7, is misplaced. In *Mathews*, the Supreme Court explained that "[p]rocedural due process imposes

constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment." 424 U.S. at 332. Yet noncitizens subject to expedited removal like Petitioner, who were not admitted or paroled into the country, nor physically present for at least two years on the date of inspection — as a class — lack any liberty interest in avoiding removal or to certain additional procedures. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). As to such noncitizens, "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress . . . is due process." *United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); *accord Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 138–139 ("This rule would be meaningless if it became inoperative as soon as an arriving alien set foot on U.S. soil."); *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("[A]n alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative"); *Knauff*, 338 U.S. at 542 ("At the outset we wish to point out that an alien who seeks admission to this country may not do so under any claim of right.").

Thus, noncitizens subject to expedited removal cannot assert a protected property or liberty interest in additional procedures not provided by the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225. *See Dave v. Ashcroft*, 363 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2004). Instead, those noncitizens — including Petitioner — have "only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute." *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 140. Petitioner is entitled only to the protections set forth by statute, and "the Due Process Clause provides nothing more." *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 140.

The Supreme Court's holding in *Thuraissigiam* is consistent with its earlier holding in *Landon*. In *Landon*, the Court observed that only "once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence [does] his constitutional status change[]." 459 U.S. at 32. In *Thuraissigiam*, the Court reiterated that "established connections" contemplate "an alien's lawful entry into this country." 591 U.S. at 106–07. Petitioner here was neither admitted nor paroled, nor lawfully present in this country as required by *Landon* and *Thuraissigiam* to claim due process rights beyond what § 1225(b)(1) provides. Accordingly, he remains within the category of noncitizens who are owed only what the statute provides.

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c. Congress Did Not Intend to Treat Individuals Who Unlawfully Enter the Country Better than Those Who Appear at a Port of Entry

When the plain text of a statute is clear, "that meaning is controlling" and courts "need not examine legislative history." *Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp.*, 659 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2011). But to the extent legislative history is relevant here, nothing "refutes the plain language" of § 1225. *Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 671 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2011). Congress passed IIRIRA to correct "an anomaly whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the United States were in a worse position than persons who had crossed the border unlawfully." *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), *declined to extend by, United States v. Gambino-Ruiz*, 91 F.4th 981 (9th Cir. 2024). It "intended to replace certain aspects of the [then] current 'entry doctrine,' under which illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry." *Id.* (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225). For that reason, Petitioner — who entered the United States without inspection, miles from the nearest port of entry, and was processed and released outside of a port of entry, Auer Decl. ¶¶ 5–6 — should be treated no differently than noncitizens who present at a port of entry and are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, including pending further consideration of their applications for asylum. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).

2. Petitioner Cannot Establish Irreparable Harm

In addition to his failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits, Petitioner does not meet his burden of establishing that he will be irreparably harmed absent a preliminary injunction. First, Petitioner's reference to conditions in Nicaragua are irrelevant to the analysis of whether harm will result from detention. Under § 1225(b)(1), Petitioner will be referred to a credible fear determination, at which such concerns will be addressed. Petitioner points to no other irreparable harm other than to argue that detention itself is a paradigmatic harm. However, such harm cannot weigh strongly in favor of Petitioner. *See Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar*, No 18-cv-07429-SK, 2018 WL 7474861 at *10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2018) ("Because this type of irreparable harm is essentially inherent in detention, the Court cannot weigh this strongly in favor of Petitioner"). It is also countervailed by authority mandating — and upholding — his categorical detention as lawful. *See supra* Part V.B.1. Indeed, the alleged

infringement of constitutional rights is insufficient where, as here, a petitioner fails to demonstrate "'a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of [her] constitutional claims to warrant the grant of a preliminary injunction.'" *Marin All. For Med. Marijuana v. Holder*, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting *Assoc'd Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coal for Econ. Equity*, 950 F.2d 1401, 1412 (9th Cir. 1991)); *see also Meneses v. Jennings*, No. 21-cv-07193-JD, 2021 WL 4804293, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2021) (denying TRO where petitioner "assume[d] a deprivation to assert the resulting harm"). Further, any alleged harm from the fact of detention alone is insufficient because "detention during deportation proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process." *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003); *see also Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952). Accordingly, given his status as a noncitizen subject to expedited removal, Petitioner cannot establish that his lawfully authorized mandatory detention would cause him irreparable harm.

3. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Do Not Favor an Injunction

When the government is a party, the balance of equities and public interest merge. *Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell*, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). Further, where a moving party only raises "serious questions going to the merits," the balance of hardships must "tip sharply" in his favor. *All. for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting *The Lands Council v. McNair*, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008)).

Here, the government has a compelling interest in the steady enforcement of its immigration laws. *See, e.g., Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523; *Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky*, 586 F.3d 1109, 1140 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the court "should give due weight to the serious consideration of the public interest" in enacted laws); *see also Ubiquity Press Inc. v. Baran*, No 8:20-cv-01809-JLS-DFM, 2020 WL 8172983, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2020) (explaining that "the public interest in the United States' enforcement of its immigration laws is high"); *United States v. Arango*, CV 09-178 TUC DCB, 2015 WL 11120855, at 2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 7, 2015) (finding that "the Government's interest in enforcing immigration laws is enormous"). Indeed, the government "suffers a form of irreparable injury" "[a]ny time [it] is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people." *Maryland v. King*, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (citation omitted).

Petitioner's claimed harm cannot outweigh this public interest in the application of the law, particularly since courts "should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction." *Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo*, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (citation omitted). Recognizing the availability of a preliminary injunction under these circumstances would permit any noncitizen subject to expedited removal to obtain additional review, circumventing the comprehensive statutory scheme that Congress enacted. That statutory scheme — and judicial authority upholding it — likewise favors the government. While it is "always in the public interest to protect constitutional rights," if, as here, a petitioner has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim, that public interest does not outweigh the competing public interest in enforcement of existing laws. *See Preminger v. Principi*, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005). The public and governmental interest in applying the established procedures for noncitizens subject to expedited removal, including their lawful, mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297, is significant.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the government respectfully requests that the Court deny Petitioner's motion for preliminary injunction.

Dated: August 15, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

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