CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS				DEFENDANTS						
MEHDI ROKHFIROOZ				CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE; JOSEPH FREDEN; TODD M. LYONS; KRISTI NOEM; and PAM BONDI						
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff				County of Residence of First Listed Defendant						
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)				(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)						
				NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.						
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name,)			Attorneys (If Known)							
Joshua A. Altman (CA Bar No. 259565); ALTMAN IMMIGRATION LAW, P 6755 Mira Mesa Boulevard, Suite 123105, San Diego, CA 92121; Tel: (858) 251-0858; Fax: (858) 221-0175				'25 CV2053 RSH VET						
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1 2 3 4 5 6	ADAM GORDON United States Attorney SAMUEL W. BETTWY, SBN 94918 ERIN M. DIMBLEBY, SBN 323359 Assistant U.S. Attorneys Office of the U.S. Attorney 880 Front Street, Room 6293 San Diego, CA 92101-8893 619-546-7125/6987 / 619-546-7751 (fax)								
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9	SOUTHEDN DISTRICT OF CALLEODNIA									
10	SOCIIIEM DIS	INICI OF CALIFORNIA								
11	MEHDI ROKHFIROOZ,	Case No. 25cv2053 RSH VET								
12	Petitioner,									
13		DATE: September 3, 2025								
14	VS.	TIME: 2:00 p.m. CTRM: 3B (Schwartz)								
15	CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center,	Hon. Robert S. Huie								
16	al.,									
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I. INTRODUCTION

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Petitioner claims that he has been unlawfully re-detained to execute a warrant of removal for his resettlement to a third country. Petitioner's first claim is under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), but APA review is not available in habeas proceedings, which concern only the legality and duration of custody. Petitioner's second claim is that the revocation of his Order of Supervision was unlawful under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2), alleging that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has not notified him "of the reason for his re-detention" and has not "provided him with an initial interview at which he can respond to the purported reasons for revocation." Pet., para. 52. Those allegations are not accurate and, regardless, the appropriate remedy would not be release from custody. Petitioner's third claim is that his re-detention is unconstitutional under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), but Zadydas holds that detention beyond the removal period is presumptively reasonable for six months and, in recent similar cases, courts have confirmed that the same presumption applies after re-detention. Petitioner has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness, and it has been widely reported that the U.S. government has made arrangements with several countries to resettle noncitizens like Petitioner under ICE's unprecedented resettlement program. Petitioner's fourth claim is that he is entitled to a bond hearing under Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), but Singh concerned bond hearings in a completely different context. The only potential relief in a case like this would be release and, if such relief were granted, ICE would have authority to set reasonable conditions of release.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner Rokhfirooz is a native and citizen of Iran. Pet., para. 22.

On August 1, 2000, he entered the United States unlawfully at or near San Ysidro, California. Ceja Declaration, para. 6.

On December 23, 2003, DHS apprehended Petitioner and placed him in removal proceedings. *Id.*, para. 7. On June 17, 2004, an Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed from the United States to Iran and granted his application for Withholding of

Removal to Iran. Id., para. 8. On October 17, 2005, Petitioner was released from custody on an Order of Supervision. Id., para. 9; Pet., para. 3; ECF No. 1-2 at 11.

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¹ See United States v. Bahador, et al., 12-cr-5229 JAH (S.D. Cal.) (dismissal without prejudice in June 2014). 2

25cv2053 RSH VET

On January 3, 2011, Petitioner was arrested by the San Diego Police Department for violating Cal. Pen. Code § 243(E)(1), Battery of a Spouse. ICE issued an Immigration Detainer for Petitioner based on the arrest. Ceja Declaration, para. 10. Criminal charges were never filed, and Petitioner was transferred to ICE custody on January 5, 2011. pursuant to the Immigration Detainer. Id., para. 11. On January 5, 2011, the San Diego filed office of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) declined to seek an alternate country of removal and released Petitioner on an Order of Supervision. Id., para.

On December 5, 2012, Petitioner was arrested by officers of the Internal Revenue Service for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, Conspiracy to Structure Currency Deposits and 21 U.S.C. § 5324, Structuring Currency Deposits. Criminal charges were filed with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. Id., para. 13. On December 20, 2012, Petitioner was released from Federal criminal custody on a \$30,000 bond and was transferred to DHS custody pursuant to an Immigration Detainer. He was released from DHS custody on an Order of Supervision the same day after ERO declined to seek an alternate country for removal. Id., para. 14.

On January 20, 2025, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 14165, Securing Our Borders, 90 Fed. Reg. 8467 (Jan. 20, 2025), directing the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to "take all appropriate action to facilitate additional international cooperation and agreement . . . based upon the provisions of . . . 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(A)." Section 1158(a)(2)(A) provides authority to remove and resettle noncitizens in third countries.

On April 18, 2025, in the case of *D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, the district court certified a nationwide class, and Petitioner appears to be a member of the class. *See D.V.D. v. DHS*, No. CV 25-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1142968, at *11 (D. Mass. Apr. 18, 2025), *opinion clarified*, No. CV 25-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1323697 (D. Mass. May 7, 2025), *and opinion clarified*, No. CV 25-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1453640 (D. Mass. May 21, 2025), *reconsideration denied sub nom. D.V.D v. DHS*, No. CV 25-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1495517 (D. Mass. May 26, 2025) ("All individuals who have a final removal order issued in proceedings under Section 240, 241(a)(5), or 238(b) of the INA (including withholding-only proceedings) whom DHS has deported or will deport on or after February 18, 2025, to a country (a) not previously designated as the country or alternative country of removal, and (b) not identified in writing in the prior proceedings as a country to which the individual would be removed.").

The district court also issued a preliminary injunction, *see id.* at *24, and on June 23, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the injunction pending review by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. *See DHS v. D.V.D.*, 145 S. Ct. 2153 (2025) ("The April 18, 2025, preliminary injunction of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, case No. 25–cv–10676, is stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically."). The district court attempted to circumvent the Supreme Court's stay, and upon further review, the Supreme Court clarified: "Our June 23 order stayed the April 18 preliminary injunction in full." *Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. D.V.D.*, -- S. Ct. --, No. 24A1153, 2025 WL 1832186, at *1 (U.S. July 3, 2025)).

On June 23, 2025, ERO determined that there is a significant likelihood of Petitioner's removal and resettlement in a third country in the reasonably foreseeable future and re-detained him to execute his warrant of removal. Ceja Declaration, para. 15; Ex. 4 (warrant). At the time of apprehension, Deportation Officer De La Cruz explained the reason for re-detention. Ex. 2. Petitioner's counsel has been afforded an opportunity to

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communicate with ICE about the specifics of resettlement efforts. ECF No. 1-2 at 22-34 ("negative travel response from Canada . . . still awaiting travel responses from the UK and Ireland").

On July 3, 2025, ERO sent a request for travel documents to several third countries. Requests remain pending. Ceja Declaration, para. 16.

On August 11, 2025, Petitioner commenced this action. ECF No. 1.

On August 15, 2025, Deportation Officer Bergman served Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release, explaining to Petitioner verbally and in writing the reasons for the revocation and inviting Petitioner to "submit any evidence or information you wish to be reviewed in support of your release." Ex. 7. ERO informed the undersigned today that Petitioner has not submitted any such information or evidence.

On August 21, 2025, ERO Headquarters, Removal and International Operations (RIO), confirmed that Petitioner should remain in ICE custody, because resettlement in a third country remains significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Ceja Declaration, para. 17. Resettlement efforts continue with the Detention and Deportation Officer (DDO) assigned to Iran cases within RIO. *Id.*, para. 18.

III. ARGUMENT

A. ICE'S RE-DETENTION AUTHORITY

ICE's authority to detain, release, and re-detain noncitizens who are subject to a final order of removal is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which provides that "the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days," and "[i]f the alien does not leave or is not removed within the removal period, the alien, pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)(A), 1231(a)(3). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).

An Order of Supervision may be issued under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, and the order may be revoked under section 241.4(l)(2)(iii) where "appropriate to enforce a removal order or to commence removal proceedings against an alien." *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (Conditions of release after removal period). It is also provided in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) that the Order

of Supervision may be revoked to effect a removal due to changed circumstances, particularly where ICE has determined that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

It is undisputed that ICE revoked Petitioner's Order of Supervision for the purpose of executing his warrant of removal, and it is undisputed that ICE has authority to remove and resettle Petitioner. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E).

B. FIRST CLAIM: NO APA REVIEW OF OSUP REVOCATION

Petitioner seeks judicial review of ICE's decision to revoke his Order of Supervision, claiming that it was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to law" under 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(2)(A). Pet., para. 50. Habeas relief is available to challenge only the legality or duration of confinement. *Pinson v. Carvajal*, 69 F.4th 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2023); *see also Flores-Miramontes v. INS.*, 212 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) ("For purposes of immigration law, at least, "judicial review" refers to petitions for review of agency actions, which are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, while habeas corpus refers to habeas petitions brought directly in district court to challenge illegal confinement.").

Petitioner specifically contends that, under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2), ICE may not redetain him unless his removal is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Pet., para. 48. Petitioner is conflating the requirements of the regulation with the decision itself. ICE complied with the regulation by making the determination before re-detaining Petitioner. See Ceja Declaration, para. 15. By asking this Court to review the determination that was made, Petitioner's claim really overlaps with his third claim in which he invokes the Zadvydas analysis.

In this claim, Petitioner is indirectly challenging the authority of ICE to resettle noncitizens by contending that it cannot re-detain them without first obtaining travel documents. The Court should therefore consider whether he is inappropriately litigating matters that are being litigated in *D.V.D. v. DHS. See Crawford v. Bell*, 599 F.2d 890, 892–93 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that a member of a pending class action for equitable relief may

not maintain a separate, individual suit for relief that is also sought by the class but may pursue only equitable relief that "goes beyond" the class action); see also McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1165 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) ("Individual suits for injunctive and equitable relief from alleged unconstitutional prison conditions cannot be brought where there is an existing class action."); Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("Individual members of the class and other prisoners may assert any equitable or declaratory claims they have, but they must do so by urging further action through the class representative and attorney, including contempt proceedings, or by intervention in the class action."). The Court should consider whether to direct Petitioner to maintain this claim through the class representatives in the D.V.D. v. DHS case. Since all efforts to effect Petitioner's resettlement are being directed and controlled by ICE Headquarters in Washington, D.C., there is no need for auxiliary local control.

C. SECOND CLAIM: COMPLIANCE WITH 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)

Petitioner claims that ICE has not complied with procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2), alleging that ICE has not notified him "of the reason for his re-detention" and has not "provided him with an initial interview at which he can respond to the purported reasons for revocation." *Id.*, para. 52. Apart from the inaccuracy of Petitioner's allegations, the appropriate remedy would be to provide the reasons and the interview, not to release Petitioner from custody. *See Guselnikov v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-1971-BTM-KSC, 2025 WL 2300873, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025) (finding petitioners' claims did not arise under § 2241 because they were not arguing they were unlawfully in custody and receiving the requested relief would not entitle them to release). Petitioner's second claim therefore does not relate to the legality or duration of his custody, which is the narrow scope of habeas jurisdiction. *See, e.g., Ferguson v. Noonan*, No. 23cv498 RBM BLM, 2023 WL 4054697, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2023) ("Absent any challenge to the legality or duration

² Deportation Officer De La Cruz explained to Petitioner the reason for his redetention, Deportation Officer Bergman and Petitioner's counsel have communicated about ongoing resettlement efforts, and Officer Bergman served Petitioner with notice and gave him an opportunity to provide information or evidence in support of his release.

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of Petitioner's confinement, the Petition fails to state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief."). The Court should therefore reject Petitioner's second claim.

D. THIRD CLAIM: ZADVYDAS

Petitioner claims that he should be released from custody, because his resettlement is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). His only argument is that ICE did not obtain travel documents before it re-detained him, but that argument is not evidence of unlikelihood, and Zadvydas does not impose such a requirement. On the contrary, the Supreme Court held that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) and 1231(a)(6), detention is presumptively reasonable for six months to allow time to obtain travel documents. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.

In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that "the habeas court must ask whether the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute's basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien's presence at the moment of removal." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 699 (emphasis added). The Court in Zadvydas therefore recognized that detention is presumptively reasonable pending efforts to obtain travel documents, because the noncitizen's assistance is needed to obtain the travel documents, and a noncitizen who is subject to an imminent, executable warrant of removal becomes a significant flight risk, especially if he or she is aware that it is imminent.

The Court in Zadvydas also held that the detention could exceed six months: "This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." Id. at 701. "After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing and that the noncitizen has the initial burden of proving that removal is not significantly likely." Id.

In recent similar cases involving re-detention to effect resettlement, courts have recognized that ICE has a presumptively reasonable period of six months to obtain travel documents. See Ghamelian v. Baker, No. SAG-25-02106, 2025 WL 2049981, at *4 (D. Md. July 22, 2025) ("The government is entitled to its six-month presumptive period before Petitioner's continued § 1231(a)(6) detention poses a constitutional issue"); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) ("The Court finds that the Petition is premature because Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months. Petitioner has been in detention since May 29, 2025; therefore, his two-month detention is lawful under Zadvydas."); Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025) ("Because Grigorian has been in custody for fifteen days, his detention does not violate the implicit six-month period read into the post-removal-period detention statute under Zadvydas."). Cf. Nhean v. Brott, No. CV 17-28 (PAM/FLN), 2017 WL 2437268, at *2 (D. Minn. May 2, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 17-28 (PAM/FLN), 2017 WL 2437246 (D. Minn. June 5, 2017) ("Nhean's 90-day removal period began to run on October 12, 2010, when his removal order became final, and he was released after 91 days of custody to supervised release on January 11, 2011. Nhean was transferred back into ICE custody on August 26, 2016. Nhean's detention was presumptively reasonable for an additional 90 days (six months in total)"), cited in Sied v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-06785-LB, 2018 WL 1876907, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018); Farah v. INS, No. Civ. 02-4725(DSD/RLE), 2003 WL 221809, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2013) (holding that when the government releases a noncitizen and then revokes the release based on changed circumstances, "the revocation would merely restart the 90-day removal period, not necessarily the presumptively reasonable six-month detention period under Zadvydas").

Petitioner has not met his burden of rebutting the presumption of reasonableness, and ICE's optimism about the likelihood of resettling Petitioner is based on a new policy that has met with proven success. According to a recent CBS report: "At least a dozen countries have already accepted or agreed to accept deportees from other nations since the

second Trump administration took office, and U.S. officials have been aggressively 1 courting other governments." CBS, U.S. broadens search for deportation agreements, 2 striking deals with Honduras and Uganda, documents show, Aug. 21, 2025, 3 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-deportation-agreements-honduras-uganda/; see also 4 CNN, Rwanda agrees to take in up to 250 migrants deported from the US, Aug. 5, 2025, 5 6 https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/05/africa/us-rwanda-migrants-deal-intl; Associated Press, Rwanda agrees to take deportees from the US after a previous migrant deal with the UK 7 collapsed, Aug. 5, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/trump-immigrants-deportees-rwanda-8 us-bb5edea43bb470e76af3ecee5ddad10c ("Government spokesperson Makolo said the agreement with the U.S. was Rwanda doing its part to help with international migration 10 11 issues because 'our societal values are founded on reintegration and rehabilitation.""); see also Associated Press, US completes deportation of 8 men to South Sudan after weeks of 12 legal wrangling, July 5, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/trump-south-sudan-djibouti-13 14 deport-supreme-court-50f9162cff680b5c8729873e11d514e9 ("The immigrants from 15 Cuba, Laos, Mexico, Myanmar, Vietnam and South Sudan arrived in South Sudan on Friday after a federal judge cleared the way for the Trump administration to relocate them 17 in a case that had gone to the Supreme Court."). The Court should therefore reject Petitioner's third claim. 18

E. FOURTH CLAIM: BOND HEARING

Petitioner claims that he is entitled to a bond hearing under *Singh v. Holder*, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), but there is no such holding in *Singh*, which concerns judicial review of bond hearings that are convened pending a petition for review in removal proceedings and, even in that context, there would be no right to a bond hearing after only two months. *See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. 573, 581 (2022) ("On its face, the statute says nothing about bond hearings before immigration judges or burdens of proof, nor does it provide any other indication that such procedures are required.").

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More importantly, the only potential remedy in a case like this one³ is release and, even then, ICE has authority to impose conditions of release. See Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 2002) ("We therefore conclude that there is no merit to appellant's contention that because a bond is not expressly listed as a condition in the statute, imposition of any bond as a condition of supervised release is unlawful."). The Court should therefore reject Petitioner's fourth claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

Respondents respectfully request that the Court deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner's first two claims are beyond the scope of habeas jurisdiction, ICE has authority to re-detain Petitioner to execute the warrant of removal for resettlement, redetention is presumptively reasonable, and Petitioner has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness.

DATED: August 27, 2025

ADAM GORDON United States Attorney

s/Samuel W. Bettwy SAMUEL W. BETTWY

ERIN M. DIMBLEBY

Assistant U.S. Attorneys

Attorneys for Respondents

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³ Some courts have afforded a bond hearing to a noncitizen who has been detained for a prolonged period of time under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) during withholding-only proceedings, after reinstatement of an order of removal. See, e.g., Hilario M.R. v. Warden, Mesa Verde Det. Ctr., No. 24-CV-00998-EPG-HC, 2025 WL 1158841, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2025) (citing Juarez v. Choate, No. 24-cv-00419-CNS, 2024 WL 1012912 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2024)).

MEHDI ROKHFIROOZ,

Case No. 25-cv-02053 RSH VET

Petitioner,

v.

CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al.,

OF MARIELLE CEJA

DECLARATION

15 Respondents.

I, Marielle Ceja, declare the following under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and state that under the penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief:

- 1. I am currently employed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), as a Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer (SDDO) assigned to the Otay Mesa suboffice of the ICE ERO San Diego Field Office.
- 2. I have been employed by ICE as a law enforcement officer since February 2, 2020.
- 3. As an SDDO, I am responsible for, among other things, supervising the daily operations of ICE ERO deportation officers assigned to the Otay Mesa

Detention Center (OMDC) in Otay Mesa, California, and ensuring that those officers comply with all relevant laws, regulations, and policies. The officers assigned to the OMDC are also responsible for managing the cases and detainees housed at the San Luis Regional Detention Facility (SLRDF).

- 4. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge and experience as a law enforcement officer and information provided to me in my official capacity as an SDDO for the Otay Mesa suboffice of the ICE ERO San Diego Field Office.
- 5. I am familiar with the case of Mehdi Rokhfirooz (A), a native and citizen of Iran.
- 6. Petitioner entered the United States unlawfully on August 1, 2000, at or near San Ysidro, California.
- 7. On December 23, 2003, ICE apprehended the Petitioner, served him with a Notice to Appear (NTA), and placed him in removal proceedings.
- 8. On June 17, 2004, an Immigration Judge ordered the Petitioner removed to Iran and granted his application for Withholding of Removal.
- 9. On October 17, 2005, Petitioner was released from ICE custody on an Order of Supervision.
- 10. On January 3, 2011, Petitioner was arrested by the San Diego Police Department for violating Cal. Pen. Code § 243(E)(1), Battery of a Spouse. DHS issued an Immigration Detainer for the Petitioner based on the arrest.
- 11. Criminal charges were never filed, and the Petitioner was transferred to DHS custody on January 5, 2011. pursuant to the Immigration Detainer.
- 12. On January 5, 2011, the ERO San Diego field office declined to seek an alternate country of removal and released the Petitioner on an Order of Supervision.
- 13. On December 5, 2012, Petitioner was arrested by Federal Law Enforcement Officers with the Internal Revenue Service for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, Conspiracy to Structure Currency Deposits and 21 U.S.C. § 5324, Structuring

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Currency Deposits. Criminal charges were filed with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.

- 14. On December 20, 2012, Petitioner was released from Federal criminal custody on a \$30,000 bond and was transferred to DHS custody pursuant to an Immigration Detainer. He was released from DHS custody on an Order of Supervision the same day after ERO declined to seek an alternative country for removal.
- 15. On June 23, 2025, ERO determined that there is a significant likelihood of removal and resettlement in a third country in the reasonably foreseeable future and re-detained Petitioner to execute his warrant of removal.
- On July 3, 2025, a request for acceptance and travel documents was sent to several third countries. Requests remain pending.
- On August 21, 2025, after further consideration, ERO Headquarters, Removal and International Operations (RIO), determined that Petitioner should remain in ICE custody, because resettlement in a third country remained likely in the foreseeable future.
- 18. Resettlement efforts continue with the Detention and Deportation Officer (DDO) assigned to Iran cases within RIO.
- 19. At this time, requests for a third country resettlement remain pending, and based on the undersigned's experience, it is anticipated that resettlement will be accomplished in the near future.

I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, belief, and reasonable inquiry in the above captioned case.

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Executed on this 26th day of August 2025.

MARIELLE CEJA CEJA Date: 2025.08.26 12:08:56 -07'00'

Marielle Ceja

Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer San Diego Field Office, Otay Mesa Suboffice Enforcement and Removal Operations

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement U.S. Department of Homeland Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MEHDI ROKHFIROOZ, Case No. 25cv2053 RSH VET Petitioner, VS. **EXHIBITS** CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, Respondents. 6/23/25 Form I-213 (Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien) 1-3 6/23/25 Form I-200 (Warrant for Arrest of Alien) 6/23/25 Form 1-286 (Notice of Custody Determination) 8/15/25 Notice of Revocation of Release 6-7