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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVIER CEJA GONZALEZ, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; et. al,

Respondents.

No. 5:25-cv-02054-ODW-ADS

RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S *EX PARTE* APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Honorable Otis D. Wright, II
United States District Judge

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Petitioners have filed a notice of related case [Dkt. 4] in this action, identifying 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM as a related case. Consistent with that notice and that case, the government's position stated in opposition to the *ex parte* application in *Bautista*, which the government filed on July 24, 2025 as Docket no. 8, is reiterated below.[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioners' *Ex Parte* Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause (the "*Ex Parte* TRO Application") [Dkt. 5] should be denied.

First, numerous provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 deprive this Court of jurisdiction to review the Petitioners' claims and preclude this Court from granting the relief they seek. Congress has unambiguously stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over challenges to the commencement of removal proceedings, including detention pending removal proceedings. Congress further directed that any challenges arising from any removal-related activity—including detention pending removal proceedings—must be brought before the appropriate federal court of appeals, not a district court.

Second, assuming jurisdiction, Petitioners nonetheless fail to demonstrate they are entitled to temporary injunctive relief. Petitioners cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits because they seek to circumvent the detention statute under which they are rightfully detained to secure bond hearings that they are not entitled to. Petitioners fall precisely within the statutory definition of aliens subject to mandatory detention without bond found in § 1225(b)(2). Additionally, Petitioners are required to exhaust their administrative remedies before petitioning this Court for the impermissible relief they seek here. Petitioners have failed to do so, and their attempts to avail themselves of the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are unpersuasive.

For these reasons, and those set forth below, the Court should deny Petitioners' request for relief and dismiss this action in its entirety.

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[1] The District Court granted the *ex parte* TRO application in *Bautista* via order issued on July 28, 2025 [Dkt. 14]. Shortly thereafter, an amended complaint asserting putative class claims for similarly situated petitioners was filed in *Bautista* [Dkt. 15].

II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

A. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225

Section 1225 applies to "applicants for admission," who are defined as "alien[s] present in the United States who [have] not been admitted" or "who arrive[] in the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission "fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2)." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to arriving aliens and "certain other" aliens "initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation." *Id.*; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii). These aliens are generally subject to expedited removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if the alien "indicates an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution," immigration officers will refer the alien for a credible fear interview. *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). An alien "with a credible fear of persecution" is "detained for further consideration of the application for asylum." Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the alien does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of persecution, or is "found not to have such a fear," he is detained until removed. *Id.* §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV).

Section 1225(b)(2) is "broader" and "serves as a catchall provision." Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. It "applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1)." *Id.* Under § 1225(b)(2), an alien "who is an applicant for admission" shall be detained for a removal proceeding "if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 68 (BIA 2025) ("for aliens arriving in and seeking admission into the United States who are placed directly in full removal proceedings, section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), mandates detention 'until removal proceedings have concluded.'") (citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 299). Still, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") has the sole discretionary authority to temporarily release on parole "any alien applying for

admission to the United States" on a "case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." *Id.* § 1182(d)(5)(A); *see Biden v. Texas*, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022).

B. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

Section 1226 provides for arrest and detention "pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under § 1226(a), the government may detain an alien during his removal proceedings, release him on bond, or release him on conditional parole.[2] By regulation, immigration officers can release aliens if the alien demonstrates that he "would not pose a danger to property or persons" and "is likely to appear for any future proceeding." 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). An alien can also request a custody redetermination (i.e., a bond hearing) by an immigration judge ("IJ") at any time before a final order of removal is issued. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1), 1003.19.

At a custody redetermination, the IJ may continue detention or release the alien on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1). IJs have broad discretion in deciding whether to release an alien on bond. *In re Guerra*, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 39–40 (BIA 2006) (listing nine factors for IJs to consider). But regardless of the factors IJs consider, an alien "who presents a danger to persons or property should not be released during the pendency of removal proceedings." *Id.* at 38.

C. Review at the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")

The BIA is an appellate body within the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"). *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). Members of the BIA possess delegated authority from the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1). The BIA is "charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the [INA] that the Attorney General

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[2] Being "conditionally paroled under the authority of § 1226(a)" is distinct from being "paroled into the United States under the authority of § 1182(d)(5)(A)." *Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales*, 501 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that because release on "conditional parole" under § 1226(a) is not a parole, the alien was not eligible for adjustment of status under § 1255(a)).

may by regulation assign to it," including IJ custody determinations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1), 236.1; 1236.1. The BIA not only resolves particular disputes before it, but also "through precedent decisions, [it] shall provide clear and uniform guidance to DHS, the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the [INA] and its implementing regulations." *Id.* § 1003.1(d)(1). "The decision of the [BIA] shall be final except in those cases reviewed by the Attorney General." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7).

III. STANDARD FOR *EX PARTE* TRO APPLICATION

The well-recognized standard for reviewing *ex parte* applications in this District is *Mission Power Engineering Co. v. Continental Cas. Co.*, 883 F. Supp. 488 (C.D. Cal. 1995), which has been summarized as follows:

> *Ex parte* applications are "rarely justified." The abbreviated procedures allowed by the granting of an *ex parte* application circumvent the "safeguards that have evolved over many decades [ ] built into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules." These safeguards include the timelines for "submission of responding papers and for the setting of hearings [ ] intended to provide a framework for the fair, orderly, and efficient resolution of disputes."

Paige, LLC v. Shop Paige LLC, No. 2:22-CV-07800-HDV, 2024 WL 4436899, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2024) (denying *ex parte* application to shorten time); *See also Arredondo v. Univ. of La Verne*, 618 F. Supp. 3d 937, 943 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2022) ("Ex parte applications are solely for extraordinary relief and are rarely justified."); *Est. of Wuxi Chenhwat Almatech Co. v. Prestige Autotech Corp.*, 2022 WL 17363058, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2022) ("Ex parte applications are nearly always improper, and the opportunities for legitimate ones are extremely limited"); *MAG Aerospace Indus., LLC v. Precise Aerospace Mfg., Inc.*, 2019 WL 1427272, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2019) ("[a]n ex parte application … is appropriate in only rare circumstances").

IV. ARGUMENT

A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Entertain Petitioners' Action under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

As a threshold matter, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and (b)(9) preclude review of Petitioners' claims. Accordingly, Petitioners are unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits.

First, Section 1252(g) specifically deprives courts of jurisdiction, including habeas corpus jurisdiction, to review "any cause or claim by or on behalf of an alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to [1] *commence proceedings*, [2] adjudicate cases, or [3] execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter."[3] 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added). Section 1252(g) eliminates jurisdiction "[e]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title."[4] Except as provided in § 1252, courts "cannot entertain challenges to the enumerated executive branch decisions or actions." *E.F.L. v. Prim*, 986 F.3d 959, 964–65 (7th Cir. 2021).

Section 1252(g) also bars district courts from hearing challenges to the *method* by which the Secretary of Homeland Security chooses to commence removal proceedings, including the decision to detain an alien pending removal. *See Alvarez v. ICE*, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016) ("By its plain terms, [§ 1252(g)] bars us from questioning ICE's discretionary decisions to commence removal" and also to review "ICE's decision to take [plaintiff] into custody and to detain him during removal proceedings").

Petitioners' claims stem from their detention during removal proceedings. That

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[3] Much of the Attorney General's authority has been transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security and many references to the Attorney General are understood to refer to the Secretary. *See Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 374 n.1 (2005)

[4] Congress initially passed § 1252(g) in the IIRIRA, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. In 2005, Congress amended § 1252(g) by adding "(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title" after "notwithstanding any other provision of law." REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 231, 311.

detention arises from the decision to commence such proceedings against them. *See, e.g.*, *Valencia-Mejia v. United States*, No. CV 08–2943 CAS (PJWx), 2008 WL 4286979, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2008) ("The decision to detain plaintiff until his hearing before the Immigration Judge arose from this decision to commence proceedings[.]"); *Wang v. United States*, No. CV 10-0389 SVW (RCx), 2010 WL 11463156, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2010); *Tazu v. Att'y Gen. U.S.*, 975 F.3d 292, 298–99 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and (b)(9) deprive district court of jurisdiction to review action to execute removal order).

As other courts have held, "[f]or the purposes of § 1252, the Attorney General commences proceedings against an alien when the alien is issued a Notice to Appear before an immigration court." *Herrera-Correra v. United States*, No. CV 08-2941 DSF (JCx), 2008 WL 11336833, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008). "The Attorney General may arrest the alien against whom proceedings are commenced and detain that individual until the conclusion of those proceedings." *Id.* at *3. "Thus, an alien's detention throughout this process arises from the Attorney General's decision to commence proceedings" and review of claims arising from such detention is barred under § 1252(g). *Id.* (citing *Sissoko v. Rocha*, 509 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2007)); *Wang*, 2010 WL 11463156, at *6; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). As such, judicial review of the Bond Denial Claims is barred by § 1252(g). The Court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Second, under § 1252(b)(9), "judicial review of all questions of law . . . including interpretation and application of statutory provisions . . . arising from any action taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States" is only proper before the appropriate federal court of appeals in the form of a petition for review of a final removal order. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). Section 1252(b)(9) is an "unmistakable 'zipper' clause" that "channels judicial review of all [claims arising from deportation proceedings]" to a court of appeals in the first instance. *Id.*; *see Lopez v. Barr*, No. CV 20-1330 (JRT/BRT), 2021 WL 195523, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 2021) (citing *Nasrallah*

v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 579–80 (2020)).

Moreover, § 1252(a)(5) provides that a petition for review is the exclusive means for judicial review of immigration proceedings:

> Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), . . . a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (e) [concerning aliens not admitted to the United States].

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). "Taken together, § 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9) mean that *any* issue—whether legal or factual—arising from *any* removal-related activity can be reviewed *only* through the [petition-for-review] process." *J.E.F.M. v. Lynch*, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original); *see id.* at 1035 ("§§ 1252(a)(5) and [(b)(9)] channel review of all claims, including policies-and-practices challenges . . . whenever they 'arise from' removal proceedings"); *accord Ruiz v. Mukasey*, 552 F.3d 269, 274 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009) (only when the action is "unrelated to any removal action or proceeding" is it within the district court's jurisdiction); *cf. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 434 F.3d 144, 151 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (a "primary effect" of the REAL ID Act is to "limit all aliens to one bite of the apple" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Critically, "[§] 1252(b)(9) is a judicial channeling provision, not a claim-barring one." *Aguilar v. ICE*, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007). Indeed, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that "[n]othing . . . in any other provision of this chapter . . . shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section." *See also Ajlani v. Chertoff*, 545 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[J]urisdiction to review such claims is vested exclusively in the courts of appeals[.]"). The petition-for-review process before the court of appeals ensures that aliens have a proper forum for claims

arising from their immigration proceedings and "receive their day in court." *J.E.F.M.*, 837 F.3d at 1031–32 (internal quotations omitted); *see also Rosario v. Holder*, 627 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) ("The REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the [INA] to obviate . . . Suspension Clause concerns" by permitting judicial review of "nondiscretionary" BIA determinations and "all constitutional claims or questions of law.").

In evaluating the reach of subsections (a)(5) and (b)(9), the Second Circuit explained that jurisdiction turns on the substance of the relief sought. *Delgado v. Quarantillo*, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011). Those provisions divest district courts of jurisdiction to review both direct and indirect challenges to removal orders, including decisions to detain for purposes of removal or for proceedings. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294–95 (section 1252(b)(9) includes challenges to the "decision to detain [an alien] in the first place or to seek removal[.]"). Here, Petitioners challenge the government's decision and action to detain them, which arises from DHS's decision to commence removal proceedings, and is thus an "action taken . . . to remove [them] from the United States." *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); *see also, e.g.*, *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294–95; *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) did not bar review in that case because the petitioner did not challenge "his initial detention"); *Saadulloev v. Garland*, No. 3:23-CV-00106, 2024 WL 1076106, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2024) (recognizing that there is no judicial review of the threshold detention decision, which flows from the government's decision to "commence proceedings"). As such, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action. The reasoning in *Jennings* outlines why Petitioners' claims are unreviewable here.

While holding that it was unnecessary to comprehensively address the scope of § 1252(b)(9), the Supreme Court in *Jennings* also provided guidance on the types of challenges that may fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 293–94. The Court found that "§1252(b)(9) [did] not present a jurisdictional bar" in situations where "respondents . . . [were] not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place." *Id.* at 294–95. In this case, Petitioners *do* challenge the government's decision to

detain them in the first place. *See, e.g.*, Mot. TRO at 1–2. Though Petitioners may attempt to frame their challenge as one relating to detention authority, rather than a challenge to DHS's decision to detain them in the first instance, such creative framing does not evade the preclusive effect of § 1252(b)(9).

Indeed, the fact that Petitioners are challenging the basis upon which they are detained is enough to trigger § 1252(b)(9) because "detention *is* an 'action taken . . . to remove' an alien." *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. 318, 319 (Thomas, J., concurring); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The Court should dismiss the Bond Denial Claims for lack of jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9). If anything, Petitioners must present their claims before the appropriate federal court of appeals because they challenge the government's decision or action to detain them, which must be raised before a court of appeals, not this Court. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

B. Even Assuming Jurisdiction, Petitioners Fail to Meet the High Bar for Temporary Injunctive Relief.

1. Petitioners are unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits.

a. Under the Plain Text of § 1225, Petitioners Must Be Detained Pending the Outcome of Their Removal Proceedings.

The Court should reject Petitioners' argument that § 1226(a) governs their detention instead of § 1225. *See* Mot. TRO at 13. When there is "an irreconcilable conflict in two legal provisions," then "the specific governs over the general." *Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley LLC*, 862 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017). § 1226(a) "applies to aliens "arrested and detained pending a decision" on removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). In contrast, § 1225 is narrower. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225. It applies only to "applicants for admission"; that is, as relevant here, aliens present in the United States who have not be admitted. *See id.; see also Florida v. United States,* 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2023). Because Petitioners fall within that category, the specific detention authority under § 1225 governs over the general authority found at § 1226(a).

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), an "applicant for admission" is defined as an "alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States." Applicants for admission "fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2)." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. Section 1225(b)(2)—the provision relevant here—is the "broader" of the two. *Id.* It "serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant here)." *Id.* And § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention. *Id.* at 297; *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); *Matter of Q. Li,* 29 I & N. Dec. at 69 ("[A]n applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)."). Section 1225(b) therefore applies because Petitioners are all present in the United States without being admitted.

Petitioners' argument that the phrase "alien seeking admission" limits the scope of § 1225(b)(2)(A) is unpersuasive. *See* Mot. TRO at 9. The BIA has long recognized that "many people who are not *actually* requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless deemed to be 'seeking admission' under the immigration laws." *Matter of Lemus-Losa*, 25 I. & N. Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012). Statutory language "is known by the company it keeps." *Marquez-Reyes v. Garland*, 36 F.4th 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting *McDonnell v. United States*, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016)). The phrase "seeking admission" in § 1225(b)(2)(A) must be read in the context of the definition of "applicant for admission" in § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission are both those individuals present without admission and those who arrive in the United States. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Both are understood to be "seeking admission" under §1225(a)(1). *See Lemus-Losa*, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 743. Congress made that clear in § 1225(a)(3), which requires all aliens "who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission" to be inspected by immigration officers. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). The word "or" here "introduce[s] an appositive–a word or phrase that is

synonymous with what precedes it ('Vienna or Wien,' 'Batman or the Caped Crusader')." *United States v. Woods*, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013).

Petitioners' interpretation also reads "applicant for admission" out of § 1225(b)(2)(A). One of the most basic interpretative canons instructs that a "statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions." *See Corley v. United States*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (cleaned up). Petitioners' interpretation fails that test. It renders the phase "applicant for admission" in § 1225(b)(2)(A) "inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant." *See id.* If Congress did not want § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply to "applicants for admission," then it would not have included that phrase in the subsection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see also Corley*, 556 U.S. at 314.

The court's decision in *Florida v. United States* is instructive here. The district court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) mandates detention of applicants for admission throughout removal proceedings, rejecting the assertion that DHS has discretion to choose to detain an applicant for admission under either section 1225(b) or 1226(a). 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275. The court held that such discretion "would render mandatory detention under § 1225(b) meaningless. Indeed, the 1996 expansion of § 1225(b) to include illegal border crossers would make little sense if DHS retained discretion to apply § 1225(a) and release illegal border crossers whenever the agency saw fit." *Id.* The court pointed to *Demore v. Kim,* 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003), in which the Supreme Court explained that "wholesale failure" by the federal government motivated the 1996 amendments to the INA. *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275. The court also relied on, *Matter of M-S-,* 27 I&N Dec. 509, 516 (A.G. 2019), in which the Attorney General explained "section [1225] (under which detention is mandatory) and section [1226(a)] (under which detention is permissive) can be reconciled only if they apply to different classes of aliens." *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275.

b. Congress did not intend to treat individuals who unlawfully enter the country better than those who appear at a port of entry.

When the plain text of a statute is clear, "that meaning is controlling" and courts "need not examine legislative history." *Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp.*, 659 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2011). But to the extent legislative history is relevant here, nothing "refutes the plain language" of § 1225. *Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 671 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2011). Congress passed IIRIRA to correct "an anomaly whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the United States were in a worse position than persons who had crossed the border unlawfully." *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), *declined to extend by, United States v. Gambino-Ruiz*, 91 F.4th 981 (9th Cir. 2024). It "intended to replace certain aspects of the [then] current 'entry doctrine,' under which illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry." *Id.* (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225). The Court should reject the Petitioners' interpretation because it would put aliens who "crossed the border unlawfully" in a better position than those "who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry." *Id.* Aliens who presented at port of entry would be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, but those who crossed illegally would be eligible for a bond under § 1226(a).

Nothing in the Laken Riley Act ("LRA") changes the analysis. Redundancies in statutory drafting are "common . . . sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure." *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020). The LRA arose after an inadmissible alien "was paroled into this country through a shocking abuse of that power." 171 Cong. Rec. H278 (daily ed. Jan 22, 2025) (statement of Rep. McClintock). Congress passed it out of concern that the executive branch "ignore[d] its fundamental duty under the Constitution to defend its citizens." *Id.* at H269 (statement of Rep. Roy). One member even expressed frustration that "every illegal alien is currently required to be detained by

current law throughout the pendency of their asylum claims." *Id.* at H278 (statement of Rep. McClintock). The LRA reflects a "congressional effort to be doubly sure" that such unlawful aliens are detained. *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 239.

c. Prior agency practices are not entitled to deference under Loper Bright.

The asserted longstanding agency practice carries little, if any, weight under *Loper Bright*. *See* Mot. TRO at 15–16. The weight given to agency interpretations "must always 'depend upon their thoroughness, the validity of their reasoning, the consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give them power to persuade.'" *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 432–33 (2024) (quoting *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (cleaned up)). And here, the agency provided no analysis to support its reasoning. *See* 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323; *see also Maldonado v. Bostock*, No. 2:23-cv-00760-LK-BAT, 2023 WL 5804021, at *3, 4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 8, 2023) (noting the agency provided "no authority" to support its reading of the statute).

To be sure, "when the best reading of the statute is that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency," the Court must "independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress." *Loper Bright*, 603 U.S. at 395 (cleaned up). But "read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention for applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297 (cleaned up). Petitioners thus cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits.

2. The Court should deny the Motion because Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the BIA.

Petitioners have not even appealed their underlying bond denials to the BIA. To excuse this, they argue that such appeal to the BIA would be "futile" or be delayed by too great a timeframe to be "effective." *See* Mot. TRO at 16–19. But when an alien fails to exhaust appellate review at the BIA, courts should "ordinarily" dismiss the habeas petition without prejudice or stay proceedings until he exhausts his appeals. *Leonardo v.*

Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). Bypassing review at the BIA is "improper." *Id.* The Ninth Circuit identifies three reasons to require exhaustion before entertaining a habeas petition. *See Puga v. Chertoff*, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the agency's "expertise" makes its "consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision." *Id.* (quoting *Noriega–Lopez v. Ashcroft*, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). Second, excusing exhaustion encourages "the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme." *Id.* (quoting *Noriega–Lopez*, 335 F.3d at 881). And third, "administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review." *Id.* (quoting *Noriega–Lopez*, 335 F.3d at 881). Each reason applies here. *See Puga*, 488 F.3d at 815.

a. Exhaustion is warranted because agency expertise is needed, excusal will only encourage other detainees to bypass administrative remedies, and appellate review at the BIA may preclude the need for judicial intervention.

Petitioners rely on an administrative agency's "record and longstanding practice" to support a claim that detention under § 1226(a) applies. Mot. TRO. at 15–16. Yet at the same time, they seek to bypass administrative review. *See id.* Before addressing how an agency's "longstanding practice" affects the statutory analysis, the Court would likely benefit from the BIA's expertise. *See Puga*, 488 F.3d at 815. After all, "the BIA is the subject-matter expert in immigration bond decisions." *Aden v. Nielsen*, No. C18-1441RSL, 2019 WL 5802013, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2019). The BIA is well-positioned to assess how agency practice affects the interplay between 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. *See Delgado v. Sessions*, No. C17-1031-RSL-JPD, 2017 WL 4776340, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 2017) (noting a denial of bond to an immigration detainee was "a question well suited for agency expertise"); *Matter of M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. 509, 515-18 (2019) (addressing interplay of §§ 1225(b)(1) and 1226).

Waiving exhaustion would also "encourage other detainees to bypass the BIA and

directly appeal their no-bond determinations from the IJ to federal district court." *Aden*, 2019 WL 5802013, at *2. Individuals, like Petitioners, would have little incentive to seek relief before the BIA if this Court permits review here. And green-lighting Petitioners' skip-the-BIA-and-go-straight-to-federal-court strategy needlessly increases the burden on district courts. *See Bd. of Tr. of Constr. Laborers' Pension Trust for S. Calif. v. M.M. Sundt Constr. Co.*, 37 F.3d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Judicial economy is an important purpose of exhaustion requirements."); *see also Santos-Zacaria v. Garland*, 598 U.S. 411, 418 (2023) (noting "exhaustion promotes efficiency"). If the IJs erred as alleged, this Court should allow the administrative process to correct itself. *See id.*

b. Petitioners' reasons to waive exhaustion would swallow the rule.

First, detention alone is not an irreparable injury. Discretion to waive exhaustion "is not unfettered." *Laing v. Ashcroft*, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioners bear the burden to show that an exception to the exhaustion requirement applies. *Leonardo*, 646 F.3d at 1161; *Aden*, 2019 WL 5802013, at *3. And detention alone is insufficient to excuse exhaustion. *See, e.g.*, *Delgado*, 2017 WL 4776340, at *2. Adopting such a rationale "would essentially mandate the release of all detainees while their appeals were pending, and thereby stand the exhaustion requirement on its head." *Meneses v. Jennings*, No. 21-CV-07193-JD, 2021 WL 4804293, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2021), *abrogated on other grounds by Doe v. Garland,* 109 F.4th 1188 (9th Cir. 2024); *see also Bogle v. DuBois*, 236 F. Supp. 3d 820, 823 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (noting that "continued detention . . . is insufficient to qualify as irreparable injury justifying non-exhaustion") (quotation marks omitted). "[C]ivil detention after the denial of a bond hearing [does not] constitute[] irreparable harm such that prudential exhaustion should be waived." *Reyes v. Wolf*, No. C20-0377JLR, 2021 WL 662659, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 2021), *aff'd sub nom. Diaz Reyes v. Mayorkas*, No. 21-35142, 2021 WL 3082403 (9th Cir. July 21, 2021); *see also Aden*, 2019 WL 5802013, at *3 (Plaintiff "cites no authority for the

position that detention following a bond hearing constitutes irreparable harm sufficient to waive the exhaustion requirement.").

Further, Petitioners "ha[ve] not carried [their] burden" in showing "that prudential exhaustion should be waived." *Aden*, 2019 WL 5802013, at *3. They allege that their detention alone constitutes irreparable harm. *See* Mot. TRO at 19–20. But if Petitioners' proffered standard for irreparable harm is correct, then every single individual who alleges unlawful detention would similarly meet the irreparable-harm-standard. *See, e.g.*, *Delgado*, 2017 WL 4776340, at *2. The exception would swallow the rule. *See id.* ("[b]ecause all immigration habeas petitions could raise the same argument [that detention is irreparable injury], if it were decisive, the prudential exhaustion requirement would always be waived—but it is not.").

Petitioners' argument also "begs the question of whether they have suffered a constitutional deprivation." *Meneses*, 2021 WL 4804293, at *5. They "simply assumes a deprivation to assert the resulting harm. That will not do." *Id.* at *5. Federal courts are "not free to address the underlying merits without first determining the exhaustion requirement has been satisfied or properly waived." *Laing*, 370 F.3d at 998.

Second, Petitioners have not established that appellate review at the BIA would be inadequate or futile. Aside from irreparable harm, exhaustion can be excused only on a showing that review at the BIA is "inadequate or not efficacious" or "would be a futile gesture." *Laing*, 370 F.3d at 1000.

Critically, there has not, and could not, be a delay in Petitioners' cases at the BIA, because they have not filed any appeals to the BIA. Even accepting Petitioners' argument that the "BIA's delays in adjudicating bond appeals warrant excusing any exhaustion requirement, in *Reyes*, the court rejected the claim that "the indefinite timeframe of the BIA's review" constituted irreparable harm. *Reyes*, 2021 WL 662659, at *3. Although the petitioner's BIA appeal in *Reyes* had been pending for around 45 days, she had been detained for over two years. *Id.* at *1. Similarly, in *Chavez*, the petitioner had been detained for a year when the court dismissed for failing to exhaust

his claim. *Chavez*, 2034 WL 1661159, at *1, *3. And in *Delgado*, the petitioner had been detained for around four months and appealed the IJ's to the BIA. *Delgado*, 2017 WL 4776340, at *1. The court believed the situation called "for agency expertise" and was "not persuaded" by "petitioner's claim of irreparable injury due to continued detention." *Id.* at *2. The Court should take a similar approach here.

3. Petitioners have not established irreparable harm because they have an adequate remedy in appealing to the BIA.

Because Petitioners' alleged harm "is essentially inherent in detention, the Court cannot weigh this strongly in favor of" Petitioners. *Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar*, No 18-cv-07429-SK, 2018 WL 747861 at *10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2018); *see infra* § II. A. ii. The Court should deny the motion for a preliminary injunction.

4. The Government has a compelling interest in allowing the BIA to speak on the issue.

Where, as here, the moving party only raises "serious questions going to the merits," the balance of hardships must "tip sharply" in his favor. *All. for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting *The Lands Council v. McNair*, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008)). Petitioners fail to do so here. *See id.* The government has a compelling interest in the steady enforcement of its immigration laws. *See Miranda v. Garland*, 34 F.4th 338, 365–66 (4th Cir. 2022) (vacating an injunction that required a "broad change" in immigration bond procedure); *Ubiquity Press Inc. v. Baran*, No 8:20-cv-01809-JLS-DFM, 2020 WL 8172983, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2020) ("the public interest in the United States' enforcement of its immigration laws is high"); *United States v. Arango*, CV 09-178 TUC DCB, 2015 WL 11120855, at 2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 7, 2015) ("the Government's interest in enforcing immigration laws is enormous."). Judicial intervention would only disrupt the status quo. *See, e.g.*, *Slaughter v. White*, No. C16-1067-RSM-JPD, 2017 WL 7360411, at * 2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 2, 2017) ("[T]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a determination on the merits."). The Court should avoid a path that "inject[s] a degree of uncertainty" in

the process. *USA Farm Labor, Inc. v. Su*, 694 F. Supp. 3d 693, 714 (W.D.N.C. 2023). The BIA exists to resolve disputes like this. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). By regulation it must "provide clear and uniform guidance" "through precedent decisions" to "DHS [and] immigration judges." *Id.* Defendants ask that the Court allow the established process to continue without disruption.

The BIA also has an "institutional interest" to protect its "administrative agency authority." *See McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 145, 146 (1992) *superseded by statute as recognized in Porter v. Nussle*, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). "Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review." *Global Rescue Jets, LLC v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 30 F.4th 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting *Weinberger v. Salfi*, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975)). Indeed, "agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that Congress has charged them to administer." *McCarthy*, 503 U.S. at 145. The Court should allow the BIA the opportunity to weigh in on these issues he raises on appeal—which are the same issues raised in this action. *See id.* The Court should deny the preliminary injunction.

V. CONCLUSION

Respondents respectfully request that the *ex parte* TRO Application be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: August 8, 2025

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH L.R. 11-6.2

The undersigned, counsel of record for the Respondents, certifies that the memorandum of points and authorities contains 6,075 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.

Dated: August 8, 2025

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