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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

JORGE LUIS GALINDO ARZATE,

Petitioner

v.

Case No. _____

TONYA ANDREWS, in her official capacity,
Facility Administrator of Golden State Annex;

POLLY KAISER, in her official capacity, Acting
San Francisco Field Office Director, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

TODD M. LYONS, in his official capacity, Acting
Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement;

KRISTI NOEM, in her official Capacity, Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and

PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity,
Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent

**MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER; POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION**

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NOTICE OF MOTION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Pursuant to Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 231 of the Local Rules of this Court, Petitioner Jorge Luis Galindo Arzate ("Mr. Galindo") hereby moves this Court for a Temporary Restraining Order directing Respondents to immediately release him from civil incarceration. Further Mr. Galindo moves this Court to enjoin Respondents from re-arresting him pending further order of this Court. This motion is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, by his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and supporting exhibits.

As set forth in the Points and Authorities in support of this Motion, Mr. Galindo asserts that he warrants a temporary restraining order, issued ex parte, due to his weighty liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Respondents' gross violation of his rights in arresting him without notice and a hearing and pursuant to a ruse. And their insistence that the only way to obtain Mr. Galindo's release was to go to federal court. *See* Declaration of Amalia Wille ("Wille Decl."). As both Mr. Galindo's and Ms. Suarez's (his spouse) attached declarations clearly establish, he, his wife and their children have already suffered irreparable harm as a result of Respondent's illegal arrest and detention, and that will continue absent immediate action from this Court.

Undersigned counsel hereby declares and certifies that on August 1, 2025, immediately after filing this motion with the Court, he emailed Civil Division Chief Edward Olsen at the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of California to advise him that Petitioner filed this motion for a temporary restraining order and requested ex parte relief. That email also contained copies of (1) the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2) Motion for Temporary Restraining

1 Order, (3) Exhibits in Support of Petition and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, (4)
2 Proposed Order on Motion for TRO.
3

4 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

5 **I. INTRODUCTION**

6 Petitioner, Mr. Galindo, brings the accompanying motion for a temporary restraining
7 order ("TRO") to enjoin Respondents U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"),
8 from continuing his detention while he proceeds with his claims before this Court.
9

10 **II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE**

11 Mr. Galindo is currently detained at Golden State Annex in McFarland, California. He is
12 forty-two years old and was born in Mexico. He resides in Fresno, California with his U.S.
13 citizen wife of many years, Araceli Suarez. He and his wife have five U.S. citizen children, and
14 five U.S. citizen grandchildren. He has an extensive network of friends, extended family, church
15 community, and work colleagues in the Fresno area who support him, and to whom he is
16 accountable. *See* Declaration of Jorge Galindo Arzate ("Galindo Decl."); Declaration of Araceli
17 Suarez ("Suarez Decl."); Declaration of Amalia Wille ("Wille Decl."), Exh. A at Tabs H-F.
18

19 Mr. Galindo was first brought to the United States as a 9-year-old child. He attended
20 elementary school and high school in the United States. *See* Wille Decl., Exh. A, Tab X (school
21 records).
22

23 Mr. Galindo has a single criminal conviction, from 2002, which stemmed from when he
24 was 18 years old and a senior in high school in Fresno. Mr. Galindo had begun hanging out with
25 another young man who turned out to be involved in drugs. That person asked Mr. Galindo to
26 sign for a package, which he did, and the package contained drugs. Mr. Galindo was
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1 immediately arrested, as law enforcement had been tracking the package. *See* Wille Decl., Exh.
2 A, Tab A (2023 Galindo declaration). He pled guilty to and was convicted of a single count of
3 misprision of a felony, in violation of 18 USC § 4. He was sentenced to 21 months
4 imprisonment, which he served. *See* Wille Decl., Exh. A, Tab Y (court judgment for Case No.
5 1:01CR05427-001). Mr. Galindo accepts responsibility for his poor judgment that led to his
6 arrest and conviction. By all accounts, this behavior was out of character for him at the time, as
7 he was a well-liked, responsible high school student, who did well in school. *See* Wille Decl.,
8 Exh. A, Tab Z (2002 letters from his high school teacher and guidance counselor). Nevertheless
9 Mr. Galindo acknowledges his poor decision-making and feels genuine remorse. *See* Wille
10 Decl., Exh. A, Tab A.
11

12
13 Mr. Galindo was deported in 2003 following his criminal conviction, and re-entered
14 illegally later in 2003, when he was about 20 years old. At that time, he explains that he was
15 young and immature. *See* Wille Decl., Exh. A, Tab A.
16

17 After his return to the United States, he started a family and dedicated himself as a
18 husband and father. Since 2003, he has been a loving and caring partner to his U.S. citizen wife,
19 Ms. Suarez. As Ms. Suarez explains, Mr. Galindo supported her after she experienced horrific
20 domestic violence in a prior relationship, and he raised her two young daughters as his own. *See*
21 Wille Decl., Exh. A, Tab B (2023 Magana Declaration). Mr. Galindo and Ms. Suarez also have
22 three biological children together—all U.S. citizens. He is a devoted father who is adored by his
23 children *See* Wille Decl., Exh. A, Tabs B-S. He is a role model for his children and is totally
24 dedicated to their well-being. He is also now a grandfather, and one of his grandchildren suffers
25 from a congenital disorder called Koolen-de Vries syndrome, which entails developmental
26 delay and intellectual disability. As one example of Mr. Galindo's character, his daughter,
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1 Priscila, describes how supportive he is of her disabled son's medical needs – including acting
2 as her emotional support when she needs to take her son to the doctor for seizures, providing
3 financial support, and bringing her food. *See* Wille Decl., Exh. A, Tab C (Letter from Priscila
4 Gonzalez).

5 In 2020, Mr. Galindo was arrested by immigration authorities and deported to Mexico.
6 He and his family accepted his deportation and came together to support him in starting a life in
7 Mexico. However, shortly after settling in Sinaloa, Mr. Galindo's brother-in-law, with whom he
8 lived, was murdered at point-blank range, right in front of Mr. Galindo while the two were
9 having breakfast together at a restaurant. The gunman then turned the gun on Mr. Galindo and
10 told him he was next. Terrified for his life, Mr. Galindo returned to the United States to avoid
11 being murdered. *See* Wille Decl., Exh. A, Tab A.

12 In February 2023, ICE arrested Mr. Galindo and reinstated his prior removal order. Mr.
13 Galindo expressed a fear of being removed to Mexico. *See* Wille Decl., Exh. A, Tab A. He
14 passed a reasonable fear screening interview conducted by the DHS's Asylum Office and was
15 placed in withholding-only proceedings before the Immigration Court. He applied for relief
16 from removal in the form of applications for withholding of removal and protection under the
17 Convention Against Torture, based on the murder of Mr. Galindo's brother-in-law and the
18 threats against Mr. Galindo. *Id.* On June 12, 2023, the Immigration Judge denied Mr. Galindo's
19 applications for relief. *See* Wille Decl., Exh. A, Tab AA (IJ Order). After that hearing, he
20 retained undersigned counsel's office to represent him in his immigration matters, and he timely
21 appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. *Id.* at Tabs A, BB.

22 On August 3, 2023, after having spent six months in immigration custody, Mr. Galindo
23 appeared before the IJ for an *Aleman Gonzalez* bond hearing. *See Aleman Gonzalez v. Sessions*,
24

1 325 F.R.D. 616 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2018)¹, *aff'd Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr*, 955 F.3d 762, 766
2 (9th Cir. 2020), *rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez*,
3 596 U.S. 543 (2022). Mr. Galindo filed extensive evidence with the Immigration Court setting
4 forth that he was neither a danger to the community, nor a flight risk. *See* Wille Decl., Exh. A,
5 Tabs A-BB. At the conclusion of the hearing, after considering all of the evidence, including
6 that Mr. Galindo's withholding of removal and CAT applications had been denied by the IJ and
7 were on appeal, the IJ concluded that the government had not demonstrated that Mr. Galindo
8 was a danger to the community nor such a flight risk that he could be held in continued
9 detention without bond.² *See* Wille Decl., Exh. B (IJ Bond Order). The IJ ordered that Mr.
10 Galindo be released from custody upon the posting of a bond in the amount of \$5,000. The IJ
11 specified in her order that "the Court grants discretion to the Department [of Homeland
12 Security] to utilize Alternatives to Detention, EXCLUDING the use of electronic ankle
13 monitoring." *Id.* The DHS did not appeal the IJ's bond order to the BIA. Wille Decl.
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16 On August 4, 2023, upon the posting of bond, Mr. Galindo was released from
17 immigration custody and re-united with his family. *See* Galindo Decl. He has been living in the
18 community in Fresno, California since. *See id.* Upon release from custody, the DHS continued
19 to monitor Mr. Galindo. On August 4, 2023, ICE issued an Order of Supervision, Form I-220B,
20 requiring Mr. Galindo to periodically report to the ICE Fresno Field Office. Wille Decl., Exh. C
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26 ¹ The District Court injunction currently remains in place. *See Aleman Gonzalez v. Whitaker*, No.
27 3:18-cv-01869 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2025) (order continuing case management conference).

28 ² The IJ mistakenly noted that the bond hearing was being held pursuant to 8 CFR § 1236. *See*
Wille Decl., Exh. B

1 (Order of Supervision). In accordance with the order, Mr. Galindo appeared at the ICE Fresno
2 Field Office on August 8, 2023, where he was ordered to appear again on November 8, 2023.

3 *Id.* When he appeared on November 8, ICE informed him that his future monitoring would be
4 through the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (“ISAP”). Galindo Decl.

5
6 For the nearly two years between being placed on the ISAP program—from November
7 2023 until his sudden ICE detention on July 28, 2025—Mr. Galindo complied with all reporting
8 requirements from ISAP and DHS. *See* Galindo Decl. Mr. Galindo reported every Thursday to
9 ISAP via a phone app, SmartLINK. In addition to the weekly phone check-ins, he was subject to
10 random home visits, as well as random “office video calls” where he would be instructed to
11 appear on a live video with the ISAP officer and answer questions about where he was and who
12 he was with. Mr. Galindo never missed an appointment. *See* Galindo Decl.

13
14 During the past two years since his release from ICE custody, Mr. Galindo has
15 maintained employment in the solar industry. *See* Galindo Decl.; Suarez Decl. U.S. Citizenship
16 and Immigration Services (USCIS), a division of the Department of Homeland Security, has
17 twice granted Mr. Galindo an employment authorization document. As part of the work permit
18 application process, Mr. Galindo has undergone biometrics and fingerprint processing. *See*
19 Wille Decl. In addition, in connection with his work permit applications, ICE has twice issued
20 letters confirming that Mr. Galindo is compliant with the terms of his Order of Supervision – on
21 December 8, 2023, and on November 20, 2024. Wille Decl., Exhs. D, E.

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24 Meanwhile, Mr. Galindo has further maintained and deepened his ties with his
25 community in Fresno. *See* Galindo Decl.; Suarez Decl. In addition to continuing his
26 employment, supporting his wife, and caring for his children and grandchildren, Mr. Galindo is
27 “very involved in the community. He volunteers for the UFW Foundation, and [his] church, St.
28

James Episcopal Cathedral. He also volunteers as an assistant Soccer Coach for the Jensen sports complex U7 team. He is very dedicated to his community.” Suarez Decl.

Mr. Galindo’s appeal of the denial of his withholding and CAT applications remains pending at the BIA. Wille Decl., Exh. G.

On Thursday, July 24, 2025, ISAP informed Mr. Galindo that he would need to participate in a video “office visit” on Friday, July 25, 2025, and that on Monday, July 28, 2025, he would need to report in-person to the ISAP office in Fresno. ISAP informed Mr. Galindo that the purpose of the in-person appointment was to discuss his passport. *See* Galindo Decl. ISAP asked Mr. Galindo whether he had a currently valid passport, and if not, why not. Mr. Galindo informed ISAP that he did not have a passport and had not understood that to be a requirement. However, he informed ISAP that he would comply. He and his wife then made arrangements for a passport application appointment to take place on August 4, 2025. *See* Galindo Decl.; Suarez Decl. He informed ISAP of the passport appointment and asked whether he still needed to report in person on Monday, July 28. ISAP told him that he was still required to report in person related to the passport, between 7:00am and 7:30am. *Id.*; *See also* Wille Decl. Exh F (text messages between Mr. Galindo and ISAP regarding the purpose of the in-person appointment).

On Monday, Mr. Galindo and his wife traveled together to the Fresno ISAP office and arrived in the morning at the appointed time. While Mr. Galindo’s wife waited, an ISAP case worker called Mr. Galindo, and directed him to proceed alone to an office. Inside the office, two officials were waiting for Mr. Galindo with handcuffs. The officers took him out the back door of the ISAP office and placed him in a van. They handcuffed Mr. Galindo and drove him to the Fresno ICE Field Office where they placed him in a holding cell. ICE officers took his fingerprints, asked him biographic information, and confirmed that his case was still pending at

1 the Board of Immigration Appeals. Mr. Galindo informed the officers that he understood from
2 his attorney that it was illegal for ICE to re-detain him. The officers did not inform Mr. Galindo
3 why they were arresting him. *See Galindo Decl.*

4 Meanwhile, Mr. Galindo's wife had driven herself to the ICE Fresno Field Office to
5 inquire about what was happening. At the ISAP office, Ms. Suarez had seen her husband be
6 called into an office around 7:30am, and he never emerged. Ms. Suarez asked the ISAP case
7 specialist if everything was okay, and if he was being detained. The ISAP case worker simply
8 told Ms. Suarez that her husband had been taken to the ICE Field Office for "questioning."

9 When Ms. Suarez arrived at the ICE Field Office, ICE staff told her to return at 10:00am. She
10 asked ICE staff multiple times if he was being detained, and they told her they did not know.
11 They allowed her a 10-minute visit with her husband, who told her he did not understand what
12 was happening. *See Suarez Decl.*

13 Eventually, Ms. Suarez was permitted to speak with her husband's assigned deportation
14 officer, who stated that ICE was detaining Mr. Galindo and would house him at the Golden
15 State Annex facility. She asked the officer why he was being detained when the ISAP officer
16 had informed him that the appointment was related to a passport. The officer told Ms. Suarez
17 that ICE had asked ISAP to schedule Mr. Galindo to come in so ICE could detain him. Ms.
18 Suarez emphasized that she did not think it was proper for her husband to be detained because
19 he had followed the law and his reporting requirements, and his case was still pending. The ICE
20 officer informed Ms. Suarez that they were detaining Mr. Galindo because he had been arrested
21 in Las Vegas, Nevada in July 2024. *See Suarez Decl.*

22 The incident the ICE officer was referring to occurred on July 29, 2024. Mr. Galindo,
23 along with his wife and some friends, were dining at a restaurant in Las Vegas. At some point
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1 during their dinner, two women approached Mr. Galindo's table and accused him of touching
2 one of them in her buttocks earlier that evening. Neither Mr. Galindo nor his wife had any idea
3 why they these women were leveling these baseless accusations, and neither of them had seen
4 these women before. Mr. Galindo and his wife contacted the restaurant staff to let them know
5 what was happening. Hotel security showed up who questioned Jorge. While everyone was
6 standing around with security, the women indicated that they did not plan to press charges and
7 Mr. Galindo and his wife believed everything was resolved. But the hotel security informed Mr.
8 Galindo and his wife that they had contacted the Las Vegas Police Department who indicated
9 there was an immigration warrant for Mr. Galindo's arrest. *See Galindo Decl.; Suarez Decl.*
10

11 Mr. Galindo was taken to the police station where he was held for several hours and
12 ultimately released. It was Mr. Galindo's understanding that there would be no criminal case
13 filed and that he simply needed to return to court for the final paperwork showing as much,
14 which he later did. *See Galindo Decl.; Suarez Decl.*
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16 On July 28, 2025, after Ms. Suarez explained the circumstances of the arrest, the lack of
17 any charges, and Mr. Galindo's innocence, the ICE officer informed Ms. Suarez that the order
18 was coming from Washington, and that Mr. Galindo's lawyer would have to take it up with a
19 federal judge, because ICE would not be releasing him. *See Suarez Decl.*
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21 Simultaneously on Monday, July 28, 2025, Mr. Galindo's counsel attempted to reach the
22 ICE Fresno Field Office to ascertain what was happening and why. At 8:18 am, undersigned
23 counsel Ms. Wille emailed ICE to request confirmation that Mr. Galindo was not being
24 detained. The email stated that Mr. Galindo's case remained pending at the BIA, and that he had
25 previously been ordered released by an Immigration Judge, so could not be re-detained
26 unilaterally by ICE. *See Wille Decl., Exh. H.* ICE never responded to the email. *See Wille Decl.*
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1 Ms. Wille then called the ICE Field Office at 8:41am and was told that nobody was available to
2 discuss the case, and that someone would call her back. ICE never called. *Id.*

3 Around 12:30pm, Ms. Wille again called and was able to speak directly with ICE Agent
4 Moradi, who confirmed that Mr. Galindo was being detained based on his 2024 arrest in Las
5 Vegas. Undersigned counsel explained to Agent Moradi that Mr. Galindo was never convicted
6 of, or even charged with, a crime, and that he has maintained his innocence the entire time, and
7 to her knowledge there was no evidence that he committed a crime.

8 Agent Moradi stated that the fact of the arrest alone meant he had violated the terms of
9 his bond, according to new ICE guidance from headquarters. Mr. Galindo's counsel explained
10 that an arrest alone does not equate to a commission of a crime, and Agent Moradi responded
11 something to the effect of: "you can take that to federal court." Agent Moradi's Supervisor,
12 Moises Becerra, reiterated Agent Moradi's position. *See Wille Decl.*

13 14 15 16 **III. ARGUMENT**

17 The standard for issuing a TRO is the same as the standard for issuing a preliminary
18 injunction. *See Stuhlberg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.*, 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir.
19 2001). To obtain a TRO, Mr. Galindo must demonstrate that (1) he is likely to succeed on the
20 merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the
21 balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. *Winter v.*
22 *Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); *Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. City of Los*
23 *Angeles*, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). Even if he does not show a likelihood of success
24 on the merits, the Court may still grant a TRO if Mr. Galindo raises "serious questions" as to the
25 merits of his claims, the balance of hardships tips "sharply" in his favor, and the remaining
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equitable factors are satisfied. *Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011).

A. MR. GALINDO IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF HIS CLAIM THAT HE MUST BE IMMEDIATELY RELEASED AND AFFORDED NOTICE AND A HEARING PRIOR TO ANY SUBSEQUENT RE-ARREST

In Mr. Galindo's particular circumstances, the Due Process Clause of the Constitution makes it unlawful for Respondents to re-arrest him without first providing a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral adjudicator to determine whether circumstances have materially changed since his release on bond in August 2023, such that some alteration in the terms of his conditional release would now be warranted.

Federal district courts in California have repeatedly recognized that due process requires a hearing for a noncitizen released on bond, like Mr. Galindo, *before* ICE can possibly re-detain him. *See, e.g., Meza v. Bonmar*, 2018 WL 2554572 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2018); *Ortega v. Bonmar*, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963 (N.D. Cal. 2019); *Vargas v. Jennings*, 2020 WL 5074312, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020); *Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson*, 2021 WL 783561, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021); *Garcia v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 1676855, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025); *Diaz v. Kaiser*, 2025 WL 1676854, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025); *Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser*, --- F. Supp. 3d --- 2025 WL 1983677, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jul 17, 2025); *Ortega v. Kaiser*, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases); *Garcia v. Andrews*, 2025 WL 1927596, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025); *Singh v. Andrews*, 2025 WL 1918679, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025) (collecting cases)

a. Mr. Galindo Has a Protected Liberty Interest in His Conditional Release

Mr. Galindo's liberty from immigration custody is protected by the Due Process Clause:

1 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
2 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v.*
3 *Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

4 For two years preceding his re-detention on July 28, 2025, Mr. Galindo exercised that
5 freedom under the IJ’s 2023 order granting him release on a low \$5,00 bond and release
6 conditions. *See* Wille Decl, Exh. B. Although Mr. Galindo was released on bond (and thus under
7 government custody), he retained a weighty liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the
8 Fifth Amendment in avoiding re-incarceration. *See Young v. Harper*, 520 U.S. 143, 146-47
9 (1997); *Gagnon v. Scarpelli*, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973); *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471,
10 482-483 (1972).
11

12 In *Morrissey*, the Supreme Court examined the “nature of the interest” that a parolee has
13 in “his continued liberty.” 408 U.S. at 481-82. The Court noted that, “subject to the conditions of
14 his parole, [a parolee] can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to
15 form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” *Id.* at 482. The Court further noted that “the
16 parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to
17 live up to the parole conditions.” *Id.* The Court explained that “the liberty of a parolee, although
18 indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts
19 a grievous loss on the parolee and often others.” *Id.* In turn, “[b]y whatever name, the liberty is
20 valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the [Fifth] Amendment.” *Morrissey*, 408
21 U.S. at 482.
22

23 This basic principle—that individuals have a liberty interest in their conditional release—
24 has been reinforced by both the Supreme Court and the circuit courts on numerous occasions.
25 *See, e.g., Young*, 520 U.S. at 152 (holding that individuals placed in a pre-parole program created
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1 to reduce prison overcrowding have a protected liberty interest requiring pre-deprivation
 2 process); *Gagnon*, 411 U.S. at 781-82 (holding that individuals released on felony probation
 3 have a protected liberty interest requiring pre-deprivation process). As the First Circuit has
 4 explained, when analyzing the issue of whether a specific conditional release rises to the level of
 5 a protected liberty interest, “[c]ourts have resolved the issue by comparing the specific
 6 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by
 7 *Morrissey*.” *Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina*, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
 8 marks and citation omitted). *See also, e.g., Hurd v. District of Columbia*, 864 F.3d 671, 683
 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“a person who is in fact free of physical confinement—even if that freedom is
 10 lawfully revocable—has a liberty interest that entitles him to constitutional due process before he
 11 is re-incarcerated”) (citing *Young*, 520 U.S. at 152, *Gagnon*, 411 U.S. at 782, and *Morrissey*, 408
 12 U.S. at 482).

15 In fact, it is well-established that an individual maintains a protectable liberty interest
 16 even where the individual obtains liberty through a mistake of law or fact. *See id.*; *Gonzalez-*
 17 *Fuentes*, 607 F.3d at 887; *Johnson v. Williford*, 682 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that
 18 due process considerations support the notion that an inmate released on parole by mistake,
 19 because he was serving a sentence that did not carry a possibility of parole, could not be re-
 20 incarcerated because the mistaken release was not his fault, and he had appropriately adjusted to
 21 society, so it “would be inconsistent with fundamental principles of liberty and justice” to return
 22 him to prison) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

25 Here, when this Court “‘compar[es] the specific conditional release in [Petitioner’s case],
 26 with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by *Morrissey*,’” it is clear that they are
 27 strikingly similar. *See Gonzalez-Fuentes*, 607 F.3d at 887. Just as in *Morrissey*, Mr. Galindo’s
 28

1 release “enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons” who have never been in
 2 custody or convicted of any crime, including to live at home, work, and “be with family and
 3 friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” *Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 482;
 4 *see also* Suarez Decl. (describing how Mr. Galindo supports her and their children financially,
 5 socially and emotionally, and volunteers with his community, including with his church.)
 6

7 Noncitizens released on a bond have a similar liberty interest. *See e.g., Ortega*, 415 F.
 8 Supp. 3d at 969-970; *Ortega*, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (collecting cases finding that noncitizens
 9 out on bond have a strong liberty interest); *Garcia*, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (finding that
 10 Petitioner, whose detention was pursuant to 8 U.S.C § 1231(a)(6) has established a strong
 11 likelihood of success in showing that he has a liberty interest); *Diaz*, 2025 WL 1676854, at *2
 12 (“Courts have previously found that individuals released from immigration custody on bond have
 13 a protectable liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”); *see also Jorge M.F.*, 2021
 14 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 1, 2021) (holding that a Mexican citizen with pending
 15 removal proceedings who had been released on bond had “a substantial private interest in
 16 remaining on bond”).
 17
 18

19 It is of no moment that Mr. Galindo’s current, and prior, detention is pursuant to 8 U.S.C
 20 § 1231(a)(6) as he is subject to a final order of removal. As Judge Lin in the Northern District of
 21 California recently explained,
 22

23 The Ninth Circuit has rejected [the notion that individuals being held pursuant to
 24 8 USC 1231(a)(6) have a diminished liberty interest], “holding that the ‘liberty
 25 interests of persons detained under § 1231(a)(6) are comparable to those of
 26 persons detained under § 1226(a).’ *Diouf v. Napolitano*, 634 F.3d 1081, 1086–87
 27 (9th Cir. 2011) (“*Diouf II*”) (noting that any difference would be “at the
 margin”). The court reasoned that both groups could be subject to prolonged
 detention, and that individuals subject to 1231(a)(6) may still seek to challenge or
 delay their removal, which augments their liberty interest.

28 *Guillermo M.R.*, 2025 WL 1983677, at *5. And, here, of course, Mr. Galindo is

1 challenging his removal via his application for withholding of removal and protection
 2 under the CAT. *See* Wille Decl., Exh G. The Chief Judge of this District agrees with
 3 Judge Lin, finding an individual released on bond but re-detained under 8 U.S.C
 4 § 1231(a)(6) has a liberty interest in his conditional release. *Garcia*, 2025 WL 1927596,
 5 at *3 (specifically rejecting the government’s argument “that because § 1231(a)(6) — the
 6 statute governing detention and removal of noncitizens ordered removed — does not
 7 require a bond hearing before an immigration judge after six months of detention,
 8 Petitioner has no liberty interest in his continued release on bond.)

10 “Furthermore, because Petitioner has had an individualized determination from an IJ,” he
 11 is differently situated than individuals detained under Section 1231 in the first instance. *See*
 12 *Guillermo M.R.*, 2025 WL 1983677, at *6. Because “a neutral adjudicator has performed an
 13 individualized assessment and found no flight risk or danger and determined that removal is not
 14 imminent” Mr. Galindo has the same due process right as anyone—citizen or noncitizen—who is
 15 out of incarceration on a conditional release. *See id.* As Judge Lin explained, there is simply “no
 16 principled reason for why Petitioner’s liberty interest should be less than that of a U.S. citizen
 17 parolee or probationer.” *See id.*

20 Since his release in August 2023, Mr. Galindo has returned to living with his wife and
 21 children and maintained steady employment. Galindo Decl.; Suarez Decl. While released, he was
 22 able to participate in the “attachments of normal life,” *Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 482, and as such,
 23 he has a protected liberty interest and his continued detention without adequate process violates
 24 his due process rights.

26 **b. Mr. Galindo’s Liberty Interest Mandates a Hearing *Before* any Re-Arrest**
 27 **and Revocation of Bond**

28 Mr. Galindo asserts that, here, (1) where his detention is civil, (2) he has diligently

1 complied with ICE's reporting requirements over a two year period, (3) he has an appeal pending
2 before the Board of Immigration Appeals, (4) the only change in circumstances that ICE could
3 possibly argue is a year old arrest that did not lead to any charges, (5) ICE has not otherwise
4 indicated that the bond has been breached or provided any evidence that would support Mr.
5 Galindo's re-detention, due process mandates that he was required to receive notice and a
6 hearing before a neutral adjudicator prior to any re-arrest or revocation of a bond.
7

8 "Adequate, or due, process depends upon the nature of the interest affected. The more
9 important the interest and the greater the effect of its impairment, the greater the procedural
10 safeguards the [government] must provide to satisfy due process." *Haygood v. Younger*, 769
11 F.2d 1350, 1355-56 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (citing *Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 481-82). This Court
12 must "balance [Mr. Galindo's] liberty interest against the [government's] interest in the efficient
13 administration of" its immigration laws to determine what process he is owed to ensure that ICE
14 does not unconstitutionally deprive him of his liberty. *Id.* at 1357. Under the test set forth in
15 *Mathews v. Eldridge*, this Court must consider three factors in conducting its balancing test:
16 "first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
17 erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probative value, if
18 any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally the government's interest,
19 including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
20 substitute procedural requirements would entail." *Haygood*, 769 F.2d at 1357 (citing *Mathews v.*
21 *Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
22
23
24

25 The Supreme Court "usually has held that the Constitution requires some kind of a
26 hearing *before* the State deprives a person of liberty or property." *Zinermon v. Burch*, 494 U.S.
27 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). Only in a "special case" where post-deprivation remedies
28

1 are “the only remedies the State could be expected to provide” can post-deprivation process
2 satisfy the requirements of due process. *Zinermon*, 494 U.S. at 985. Moreover, only where “one
3 of the variables in the *Mathews* equation—the value of predeprivation safeguards—is negligible
4 in preventing the kind of deprivation at issue” such that “the State cannot be required
5 constitutionally to do the impossible by providing predeprivation process,” can the government
6 avoid providing pre-deprivation process. *Id.*

7
8 Because, in this case, the provision of a pre-deprivation hearing was both possible and
9 valuable in preventing an erroneous deprivation of liberty, ICE was required to provide Mr.
10 Galindo with notice and a hearing *prior* to any re-incarceration. *See Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 481-
11 82; *Haygood*, 769 F.2d at 1355-56; *Zinermon*, 494 U.S. at 985; *see also Youngberg v. Romeo*,
12 457 U.S. 307, 321-24 (1982); *Lynch v. Baxley*, 744 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that
13 individuals awaiting involuntary civil commitment proceedings may not constitutionally be held
14 in jail pending the determination as to whether they can ultimately be recommitted). Under
15 *Mathews*, “the balance weighs heavily in favor of [Mr. Galindo’s] liberty” and required a pre-
16 deprivation hearing before a neutral adjudicator, which ICE failed to provide.

17
18
19 **i. Mr. Galindo’s Private Interest in His Liberty is Profound**

20 Under *Morrissey* and its progeny, individuals conditionally released from serving a
21 criminal sentence have a liberty interest that is “valuable.” *Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 482. In
22 addition, the principles espoused in *Hurd* and *Johnson*—that a person who is in fact free of
23 physical confinement, even if that freedom is lawfully revocable, has a liberty interest that
24 entitles him to constitutional due process before he is re-incarcerated—apply with even greater
25 force to individuals like Mr. Galindo, who have been released pending civil removal
26 proceedings, rather than parolees or probationers who are subject to incarceration as part of a
27
28

1 sentence for a criminal conviction.

2 Parolees and probationers have a diminished liberty interest given their underlying
3 convictions. *See, e.g., U.S. v. Knights*, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001); *Griffin v. Wisconsin*, 483 U.S.
4 868, 874 (1987). Nonetheless, even in the criminal parolee context, the courts have held that the
5 parolee cannot be re-arrested without a due process hearing in which they can raise any claims
6 they may have regarding why their re-incarceration would be unlawful. *See Gonzalez-Fuentes*,
7 607 F.3d at 891-92; *Hurd*, 864 F.3d at 683. Thus, Mr. Galindo retains a truly weighty liberty
8 interest even though he was under conditional release prior to his re-arrest.
9

10 What is at stake in this case for Mr. Galindo is his freedom: one of the most profound
11 individual interests recognized by our constitution and, more plainly, by virtue of being human.
12 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
13 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” *Zadvydas*, 533
14 U.S. T 690; *see also Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). Thus, it is clear there is a
15 profound private interest at stake in this case, which must be weighed heavily when determining
16 what process Mr. Galindo is owed under the Constitution. *See Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 334-35; *see*
17 *also e.g., Pham v. Becerra*, 717 F.Supp.3d 877, 886 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (stating that a person’s
18 “liberty interest persists no matter the length of detention.”).
19
20

21 **ii. The Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation is High for Mr. Galindo While**
22 **the Probable Value of Mr. Galindo’s Release and a Hearing Prior to**
23 **Any Re-Detentions Is Substantial.**

24 Here, without notice, the Government ripped Mr. Galindo from his family and
25 community because of a year-old arrest that resulted in no charges. *See Wille Decl., Exh. I* (Las
26 Vegas Court Docket confirming DA declined charges). In other words, despite being free from
27 physical restraint pursuant to a bond order by an immigration judge, and living peacefully and
28

1 productively for nearly two years, the government re-arrested and detained Mr. Galindo without
2 any notice or process. *See* Galindo Decl.,; Suarez Decl. As such the risk of an erroneous
3 deprivation is high. *See e.g., Singh*, 2025 WL 1918679, at *7; *see also Garcia*, 2025 WL
4 1927596, at * 5 (finding the risk of erroneous deprivation considerable on substantially similar
5 facts).

6
7 Correspondingly, the process Mr. Galindo seeks—a hearing before a neutral arbiter—
8 would add serious value. As an initial matter, Mr. Galindo is not statutory eligible for a bond
9 hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). *See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. 573 (2022).
10 And the existing procedures under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 are not adequate to avoid an erroneous
11 deprivation of Mr. Galindo’s liberty. The regulations provide for a custody review only after a
12 minimum of three months of detention, and even then, “do not afford adequate procedural
13 safeguards because they do not provide for an in-person hearing, they place the burden on the
14 [noncitizen] rather than the government and they do not provide for a decision by a neutral
15 arbiter.” *Diouf v. Napolitano*, 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (abrogated on other grounds).
16

17
18 Moreover, here, ICE has already made clear that it will not change its custody
19 determination regarding Mr. Galindo, regardless of any evidence put before it. ICE already
20 informed Mr. Galindo’s counsel that they believe the fact of the 2024 arrest *alone*³—regardless
21 of whether it resulted in a conviction, and regardless of whether there exists credible evidence
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24
25 ³ As this Court is aware, an arrest, without more, is proof of nothing. This derives from the
26 presumption of innocence, where one is “to judge an accused’s guilt or innocence solely on the
27 evidence adduced at trial and not on the basis of suspicions that may arise from the fact of his
28 arrest, indictment, or custody, or from other matters not introduced as proof at trial.” *Bell v.*
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979); *see also Matter of Arreguin De Rodriguez*, 21 I&N Dec. 38,
42 (BIA 1995).

1 that Mr. Galindo committed a crime—warrants Mr. Galindo’s mandatory detention. *See* Wille
2 Decl.; *see also* Suarez Decl. ICE specifically told Mr. Galindo’s wife and his counsel that the
3 only thing that could result in his release is a federal court order. *See id.*

4 Given that Petitioner was previously found to not be a danger or risk of flight, and that
5 his conduct over two years has bolstered that conclusion, the value in granting Petitioner a
6 procedural safeguard in the form of notice and hearing before a neutral adjudicator is readily
7 apparent. *See e.g., Singh*, 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (“the probable value of additional procedural
8 safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high.”); *see also Ortega*, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (the safeguard
9 [petitioner] proposes—a decision from a neutral adjudicator—could provide substantial value).

10
11 This is particularly true here as a hearing will allow a neutral arbiter to consider the
12 government’s contention that a single arrest from a year ago that did not result in charges
13 somehow affects the IJ’s prior bond determination. *See Ortega*, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (noting
14 the second factor weighs in favor of petitioner where the government asserted a material change
15 had occurred and that it had the unilateral right to determine that); *see also e.g., Guillermo M.R.*,
16 2025 WL 1983677, at *8 (“allowing a neutral arbiter to review the facts would significantly
17 reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation.”).

18
19
20 **iii. The Government’s Interest in Keeping Mr. Galindo Detained without**
21 **a Neutral Arbiter reviewing that Detention is Low**

22 The government’s interest in detaining Mr. Galindo without process is low.

23 First, as immigration detention is civil, it can serve no punitive purpose. The
24 government’s only interest in holding an individual in immigration detention can be to prevent
25 danger to the community or to ensure a noncitizen’s appearance at immigration proceedings. *See*
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1 *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.⁴ In this case, the government cannot plausibly assert that it had a
2 sudden interest in detaining Mr. Galindo in July 2025 due to an arrest that occurred over a year
3 ago and resulted in no criminal charges being brought against Mr. Galindo. *See, e.g., Guillermo*
4 *M.R. v. Kaiser*, 2025 WL 1810076, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2025) (noting the government
5 waiting *six weeks* to arrest petitioner “demonstrates their lack of urgency.”)
6

7 As Mr. Galindo and Ms. Suarez both explain, they understood that the matter in Las
8 Vegas was resolved the day that it occurred. *See* Galindo Decl.; Suarez Decl. And in addition,
9 since the arrest, the government has run Mr. Galindo’s fingerprints at least twice when it
10 processed his employment authorization, the last one being submitted in September 2024 and
11 approved in February 2025—i.e., after Mr. Galindo’s arrest. *See* Wille Decl.; *see also Guillermo*
12 *M.R.*, 2025 WL 1983677, at *8 (noting that two months had passed since petitioner’s criminal
13 arrest and the government had failed to take any action). Publicly-available court records confirm
14 that no charges were filed in the case. *See* Wille Decl., Exh I. Certainly ICE could have accessed
15 this information, and Mr. Galindo’s wife and his counsel specifically informed ICE on Monday
16 that no charges had been filed. *See* Wille Decl.; Suarez Decl.
17
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19 Moreover, if ICE is so confident that a single arrest from a year ago that did not result in
20 any charges warrants the revocation of Mr. Galindo’s bond, it should have no problem
21 establishing that before a neutral adjudicator.
22

23 Finally, the “fiscal and administrative burdens” that release from custody, unless and
24 until a pre-deprivation bond hearing is provided, would impose are nonexistent in this case. *See*
25

26
27 ⁴ Mr. Galindo acknowledges that, in some instances, detention may be lawful for a brief period
28 to effectuate removal.

1 *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 334-35; *see e.g., Garcia*, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5. Mr. Galindo does not
 2 seek a unique or expensive form of process, but rather his release from custody until a routine
 3 hearing regarding whether his bond should be revoked or modified in any way.

4 Release from custody until ICE (1) moves for a bond re-determination before a neutral
 5 adjudicator and (2) demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that there has been a change
 6 in circumstances that warrants altering the conditions of Mr. Galindo's release is far *less* costly
 7 and burdensome for the government than keeping him detained. As the Ninth Circuit noted in
 8 2017, "[t]he costs to the public of immigration detention are 'staggering': \$158 each day per
 9 detainee, amounting to a total daily cost of \$6.5 million." *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976,
 10 996 (9th Cir. 2017).

11
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 13 **B. MR. GALINDO WILL SUFFER IRREPERABLE HARM ABSENT INJUNCTIVE
 14 RELIEF**

15 Mr. Galindo's current suffering irreparable harm due to his detention and thus, a TRO
 16 ordering his immediate release is necessary to prevent more irreparable harm.

17 First, Mr. Galindo's re-detention has cause Mr. Galindo irreparable harm because "any
 18 "loss of liberty is fundamental and substantial." *Perera v. Jennings*, 2021 WL 2400981, at *5
 19 (N.D. Cal. 2021). The harm is particularly clear here, as Mr. Galindo has already been through
 20 six months of civil incarceration by the DHS. *See Galindo Decl.* As Mr. Galindo describes,
 21 "being in this jail is as awful as it was the first time around." *Galindo Decl.* He notes that that the
 22 food is not good, he was not provided with his inhaler or a way to make calls when he first
 23 arrived. *See Galindo Decl.* As MR. Galindo explains, "[b]ut the worst part is being separated
 24 from my family. It was so difficult on my family the first time I was detained by ICE" and "it
 25 feels so unfair to be separated from them based on false accusation from a year ago. Galindo
 26
 27
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1 Decl. As the Ninth Circuit has held—after noting the subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE
2 detention facilities, as well as the abuse of detainees at the hands of guards—anyone subject to
3 immigration detention suffers “irreparable harm.” *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th
4 Cir. 2017).

5
6 Second, Mr. Galindo’s wife and children are already suffering, and any further detention
7 will cause further economic, emotional, and psychological harm on them. As the Supreme Court
8 has recognized, incarceration “has a detrimental impact on the individual” because “it often
9 means loss of a job” and “disrupts family life.” *Barker v. Wingo*, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972).
10 And as the Ninth Circuit has further explained, the “irreparable harms” of immigration detention
11 include the “economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of detention.”
12 *Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 995. As Mr. Galindo’s wife, Araceli explain, if her husband stays
13 detained, she will “probably end up defaulting on [her] mortgage, car payment, or the kids’
14 school and medical bills.” Suarez Decl. Moreover, she describes how much her children are
15 struggling emotionally right now as a result of Mr. Galindo’s detention—her son “cries all day
16 and does not want to play” and one of her daughters is “always crying and asking why does this
17 always happen to [them] when all their dad does is work, care for his family and love [them].
18 Suarez Decl. *See also Jorge M.F.*, 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (recognizing the severe economic
19 hardship and psychological harm family members of detainees can face).
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23 Third, “[t]he deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable
24 injury.’” *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Elrod v. Burns*, 427
25 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). As detailed above, Mr. Galindo is likely to succeed on his claim that his
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1 re-arrest would violate his due process rights under the Constitution. As such, he has “carried
2 [his] burden as to irreparable harm.” *Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 995.

3 **C. THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST FAVOR** 4 **GRANTING A TRO**

5 Where the government is the opposing party, balancing the equities and the public
6 interest merge. *See Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Here, the balance of equities
7 weighs strongly in favor of Mr. Galindo. Mr. Galindo faces grave hardships absent a TRO.
8 Absent injunctive relief, he faces detention in violation of his constitutional rights, separation
9 from his wife, family, and community, and severe psychological harm, as well as economic
10 hardship, among other things. *See Galindo Decl.*, *Suarez Decl.*, *Wille Decl.*, *Exh A*, *Tab. A-X*.
11 Faced with “preventable human suffering, [the Ninth Circuit has] little difficulty concluding that
12 the balance of hardships tips decidedly in plaintiffs’ favor.” *Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 996
13 (quoting *Lopez v. Heckler*, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983)). This Court should find the
14 same.
15

16
17 The public likewise has a strong interest in ensuring that Mr. Galindo is not re-detained
18 as “it would not be equitable or in the public’s interest to allow [a party] . . . to violate the
19 requirements of federal law, especially when there are no adequate remedies available.” *Ariz.*
20 *Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer*, 757 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Valle del Sol Inc. v.*
21 *Whiting*, 732 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir. 2013)). Without an injunction, the government’s
22 egregious conduct in violation of the Constitution would be sanctioned. Like all other
23 individuals, the government is not simply free to ignore the law.
24

25
26 Moreover, a TRO serves the public interest by avoiding “indirect hardship to [Mr.
27 Galindo’s] family members,” which here would be substantial. *See also Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n*
28

1 v. *City & Cty. of San Francisco*, 512 F.3d 1112, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that courts may
2 consider hardship to families when determining public interest). Galindo Decl.; Suarez Decl.;
3 Wille Decl., Exh. A, Tabs A-S.
4

5 In addition, a TRO favors the public interest because it allows Mr. Galindo to continue
6 contributing productively to his community. Mr. Galindo is a foreman for a solar company who
7 regularly volunteers in his community. Galindo Decl; Suarez Decl. The public therefore has a
8 strong interest in Mr. Galindo continuing to perform his employment and volunteer work. *Cf.*
9 *Hurd v. District of Columbia*, 864 F.3d 671, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing *Morrissey v Brewer*, 408
10 U.S. 471, 484 (1972)) (finding that for released prisoners and parolees, “society has a stake in
11 whatever may be the chance of restoring the individual to normal and useful life” and that
12 society thus “has an interest in not having parole revoked” erroneously (internal brackets
13 omitted)).
14
15

16 The government, on the other hand, cannot suffer harm from an injunction that simply
17 requires it to follow the law. *See Zepeda v. I.N.S.*, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he INS
18 cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from
19 constitutional violations.”). Here, specifically, the government cannot claim harm from a TRO
20 that enjoins it from re-arresting Mr. Galindo and orders the Constitution be complied with. *See*
21 *supra*, Section III(A) *supra* (explaining why Mr. Galindo’s detention violate due process).
22

23 **IV. CONCLUSION**

24 For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Galindo respectfully requests that the Court enter a TRO
25 ordering ICE to immediately release him from civil detention, reinstate his bond, and enjoin ICE
26 from re-arresting him pending further order of this Court.
27
28

1 Dated: August 1, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

2 s/Judah Lakin

3 Judah Lakin

4 s/Amalia Wille (authorized on August 1,
5 2025)

6 Amalia Wille

7 LAKIN & WILLE LLP

8 *Attorneys for Petitioner*