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9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
10	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
11	REY DENZO KAZEMI,	Case No.: 3:25-cv-01926-DMS-DEB		
12	RET DENZO KAZEWII,	Case No.: 5.25-cv-01920-DIVIS-DEB		
13	Petitioner,	PETITIONER REY DENZO		
14	vs.	KAZEMI'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION FOR (1)		
15	JEREMY CASEY, in his official capacity	TEMPORARY RESTRAINING		
16	as Warden of the Imperial Regional	ORDER AND (2) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY		
17	Detention Facility; et al.	INJUNCTION		
18	Respondents.			
19		Judicial Officer: Hon. Dana M. Sabraw Courtroom number: 13A		
20		Hearing Date/Time: August 6, 2025 at		
21		2:30 p.m.		
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28	PETITIONER'S REPLY ISO MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION			

I. Preliminary Statement

For the past seventeen years, Mr. Kazemi has lived and worked under an Order of Supervision 1) because Respondents determined that he could not be deported to Iran under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT") and 2) because "there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001); Kazemi Decl. (Dkt. 2-2) ¶ 6. Those facts were true each time Mr. Kazemi appeared for his annual check-in with ICE under the Order of Supervision. Kazemi Decl. (Dkt. 2-2) ¶ 8. And those facts remain true — and uncontested — today.

Respondents contend Mr. Kazemi's re-detention is lawful under the President's recent instruction to the Secretary of State to "take all appropriate action to facilitate additional international cooperation" in carrying out third-country removals and a new ICE policy directing officials to "review [the cases of non-detained non-citizens] to determine the viability of removal to a third country and accordingly whether the alien should be re-detained." Resp. (Dkt 12) at 4-5. But neither the President's executive order, nor ICE's directive, mandate that individuals be re-detained *before* their removal to a third country becomes viable. Detention is, by definition, "arbitrary" and "indefinite" if its nature and duration are contingent upon something Respondents might or might not try to do over an unspecified period of time.

Crucially, even now, Respondents cannot represent that Mr. Kazemi's removal is viable. To the contrary, when ICE finally met with Mr. Kazemi nearly a month after his arrest (and only *after* Respondents were on notice of this litigation), ICE informed him that it has nowhere to send him and has, in fact, failed to find removal options for over 80% of similarly situated Iranians. Second Kazemi Decl. ¶¶ 3-7. If "significant likelihood" and "reasonably foreseeable" have any meaning, they must mean better odds than rolling doubles. And under Respondents own regulations, re-

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detention "to enforce a removal order" is not proper if removal is entirely speculative. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(1)(2)(iii).

More damning than what Mr. Kazemi knew at the time he filed his habeas petition is what ICE told him after it got around to contacting him last week. Not only is there a less than 1-in-5 chance ICE can find a country willing to accept Mr. Kazemi, ICE's policy is to arrest non-citizens protected under the Convention Against Torture and hold them for six months regardless of whether removal is possible, and only then, after six months, to seek release authority from ICE headquarters in Washington. At its core, Respondents' position is that ICE can detain individuals for six months on the pretext that it *might* find a third country to which it *might* remove them, and if it does not, it will *possibly* release them, all while reserving the right to re-arrest them upon release to endure the entire Kafka-esq process again.

Mr. Kazemi is likely to prevail on the merits because such an arbitrary abuse of ICE's detention authority violates its own regulations, statutes, and fundamental due process. And Respondents, for their part, do not even attempt to address the authorities cited in Mr. Kazemi's briefing or explain why this Court should break new ground in its favor. Instead, Respondents repackage template arguments that respond to claims Mr. Kazemi is not making.

Lest there be any doubt, Mr. Kazemi is making a single argument. His release from detention is compelled because: 1) ICE has no authority to re-detain an individual who has been released on an Order of Supervision unless doing so is "appropriate to *enforce* a removal order" 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2)(iii); 2) for such detention to be "appropriate," there must be a "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future," *Zadvaydas*, 533 U.S. at 701; and 3) to lawfully enforce such a removal order, ICE must comply with its own procedural regulations. *United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954).

Respondents do not dispute these basic principles. Instead, they openly flout them and twist Zadvydas' default presumption that more than six-months of detention is presumptively unreasonable into the reason Mr. Kazemi's re-detention for at least six months is proper. Under the purported cover of Zadvydas, ICE intends to keep Mr. Kazemi detained for as long as possible even though it currently has no ability to remove him and no indication of an imminent ability to remove him.

The arbitrariness and illegality of Mr. Kazemi's detention is indisputable. This Court should grant Mr. Kazemi's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 2). As set forth in the Memorandum of Law in support of the Motion (Dkt. 2-1), Mr. Kazemi is certain to prevail on the merits, he will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is denied, and the public interest strongly favors his immediate release.

II. Factual developments regarding Mr. Kazemi's detention

A. Executive Order 14165 and subsequent ICE Directive

Respondents point to Executive Order 14165, issued on January 20, 2025, and a subsequent ICE directive as the moving force behind Mr. Kazemi's sudden detention despite no imminent potential for removal. Together, Respondents say, these documents "encourag[e] the increased use of third-country removals against individuals granted CAT protection" and instruct ICE officers that they "should review the case to determine the viability of removal to a third country and accordingly whether the alien should be re-detained." Resp. (Dkt 12) at 5. Respondents specify — for the first time since detaining Mr. Kazemi nearly a month ago — that, pursuant to these policies, the reason for Mr. Kazemi's re-detention is solely "to execute the removal order by resettling [him] in a third country." *Id.* at 13. Nowhere, however, do Respondents identify any third country or suggest any prospect of identifying a third country.

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ICE officer Gonzalez spoke with Mr. Kazemi on July 30, the day Mr. Kazemi filed his habeas petition and Motion. Second Kazemi Decl. ¶ 2. During their brief meeting, Officer Gonzalez asked Mr. Kazemi about his background and informed 4 him that ICE has been unable to find third-country placement for over 80% of 5 Iranians with CAT protection. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7. Officer Gonzalez also advised that ICE 6 intends to detain Mr. Kazemi for 90-days while it tries to find a country that will take 7 him and that, if unsuccessful, ICE will detain him for another 90 days. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. At 8 that point, if still unsuccessful, ICE's field office can request authority to release 9 from ICE headquarters in Washington, D.C., which has generally not been eager to 10 grant release requests. Id. ¶ 5. Respondents brief confirms this conversation, stating 11 Officer Gonzalez "verbally described the entire process to" Mr. Kazemi, "obtained 12 information . . . for the purpose of obtaining travel documents . . . and informed [Mr. 13 Kazemi] that ICE is not seeking to remove him to Iran." Resp. (Dkt. 12) at 2. 14

Argument III.

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Respondents do not dispute that they violated their own regulations. Α.

Respondents failed to comply with three discrete safeguards their own regulations require: 1) provide the non-citizen "noti[ce] of the reasons for revocation"; 2) provide the non-citizen "an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody"; and 3) "afford the [non-citizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation." 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(1)(1); Kazemi Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 9-12. Respondents do not address any of these failures. See Resp. (Dkt. 12) at 8-14. Their only contention even remotely related to them is the argument Mr. Kazemi was not entitled to notice "prior" to revocation of his Order of Supervision. Id. at 2, 12. Prior notice, however, is not Mr. Kazemi's argument. As the omissions in Respondents brief confirm, Respondents violated — and continue to violate — all three requirements of their own regulations.

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First, Mr. Kazemi has not received proper notice "of the reasons for revocation," including the specific basis for revocation and the "specific . . . circumstances to support the[] assertions." Perez-Escobar v. Moniz, No. 25-cv-11781-PBS, 2025 WL 2084102 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); Kazemi Memo. (Dkt. 2-1) at 10. Respondents do not address this omission or attempt to explain themselves. Instead, they say, "Petitioner and his counsel are [] well aware of the reason for Petitioner's re-detention, namely to execute the removal order by resettling [him] in a third country." Resp. (Dkt. 12) at 13 (emphasis added).

Contrary to Respondents' representation, until counsel received a copy of their brief over the weekend, Petitioner and his counsel could only speculate as to why Mr. Kazemi's release was suddenly revoked after almost 20 years. What is more, even now, Respondents fail to explain their authority, citing only in passing the provision of § 241.4(l)(2) that authorizes re-detention when "appropriate to enforce a removal order." Resp. (Dkt. 12) at 8. Even with such an eleventh-hour rationale in this Court, though, Respondents still provide no specifics as to how they are "enforcing" the order of removal, because as Respondents themselves recognize, Mr. Kazemi does not have travel documents. Nor do Respondents contend that they have anywhere to send him. Second Kazemi Decl. ¶¶ 3-8. Nowhere do Respondents explain how it is "appropriate" to detain Mr. Kazemi pending something they might or might not try to do in the indefinite future.

<u>Second</u>, Respondents have still not provided Mr. Kazemi with the "initial informal interview" the regulations require "promptly" upon re-detention. § 241.4(l)(1). Incredibly, Respondents note that the ICE directive under which they detained Mr. Kazemi instructs them to provide this interview within two days of redetention. Resp. (Dkt. 12) at 5. On July 30 — some three weeks after Mr. Kazemi was detained and only after he filed suit in this Court — ICE finally dispatched Officer Gonzalez to speak with Mr. Kazemi. See Second Kazemi Decl.; see also

Resp. (Dkt. 12) at 2, 7, 12-14. Far from conducting the § 241.4 interview, Officer Gonzalez merely asked Mr. Kazemi about his background and informed him that ICE intended to detain him until it could find a third county for removal. Second Kazemi Decl. ¶¶ 3-8. Respondents acknowledge Officer Gonzalez's interaction with Mr. Kazemi, but they do not offer any explanation for how it satisfied § 241.4. Resp. (Dkt. 12) at 2, 7, 12-14.

Third, Respondents have not given Mr. Kazemi "an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation." § 241.4(l)(1). The minimum due process requires is an "opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" in which the non-citizen can "present pertinent information." Villa-Anguina v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2013). ICE's own regulations require this opportunity to happen "promptly," which again, ICE's directive characterizes as within two days of re-detention. § 241.4(l)(1); Resp. (Dkt. 12) at 5. Nowhere in their brief, not even while explaining the conversation with Officer Gonzalez, do Respondents assert Mr. Kazemi has had an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation. After having spent nearly a month in ICE detention, Mr. Kazemi has still had no opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation.

B. Mr. Kazemi's detention violates the Supreme Court's clear directive that immigration detainees may only be held for "a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien's removal."

In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (ICE's authority for holding Mr. Kazemi) "limits an alien's . . . detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal. . . . It does not permit indefinite detention." 533 U.S. at 689. Where "there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future," detention is unlawful. *Id*.

Respondents invert Zadvydas' default presumption that more than six-months of detention following an order of removal is presumptively unreasonable into the

reason Mr. Kazemi's re-detention is proper. Resp. (Dkt. 12) at 12-13. Zadvydas held, however, that six-months of detention with no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future is a presumptive ceiling, not a floor. And indefinite, arbitrary detention past an initial 90-day removal period (which expired long ago in Mr. Kazemi's case) is not reasonable if there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.

Respondents are not entitled to a six-month judicial-review-free detention period each time they re-arrest an individual. To hold otherwise would be to create a truly absurd and Kafka-esq process of indefinite detention, under which Respondents may hold an individual for six months, release them for a day, and then re-detain them for another six months. *See also Sied v. Nielsen*, No. 17-cv-06785, 2018 WL 1876907, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) (noting courts around the country "have held that the six-month period does not reset when the government detains an alien . . releases him from detention, and then re-detains him again."). Not only would that be precisely the kind of "indefinite" detention *Zadvydas* condemned, but it would also violate the core principle that the law should not be interpreted to "lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence." *United States v. Kirby*, 74 U.S. 482, 486 (1868).

As Officer Gonzalez explained to Mr. Kazemi, ICE apparently intends to keep him for up to 180 days although it has nowhere to send him and cannot find third-country removal options for 80% of Iranians protected by CAT. Second Kazemi Decl. ¶¶ 3-8. Respondents' brief echoes this, noting "detention is presumptively reasonable up to six months . . . ICE has lawfully re-detained [Mr. Kazemi] . . . and that re-detention occurred less than one month ago." Resp. (Dkt. 12) at 13. In other words, using the purported cover of the six-month rule, ICE intends to keep Mr. Kazemi detained for as long as possible even though it currently has no ability to remove him, no indication of an imminent ability to remove him, and affirmative

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knowledge that it will never be able to remove some 80% of similarly situated individuals. Detaining Mr. Kazemi in these conditions is the definition of arbitrary detention that violates § 1231 and due process.

Respondents' tortured reading of Zadvydas conflicts with their own regulations. The Supreme Court set down Zadvydas' six-month rule "for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. As one federal district court put it, the rule is simply "a tool to 'guide lower court[s]." Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, No. 25-2258, 2025 WL 1750346, at *6 (D.N.J. June 24, 2025) (alteration in original). "To hold otherwise would condone detention in cases where removal is not reasonably foreseeable or even functionally impossible, as long as it did not exceed six months." Id. That is exactly what Respondents claim an entitlement to do here.

Additionally, when a non-citizen is released due to no significant likelihood of removal, ICE regulations only permit re-detention when there are "changed circumstances" making removal imminent. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). That is, in normal circumstances, ICE's own reading of *Zadvydas* does not give it carte blanche to detain non-citizens when removal is not likely. And Respondents have pointed to no "changed circumstances" here other than an executive order and ICE directive that generally seek to rally ICE to try harder in pursuing third-country removals.

C. Respondents' contention that Mr. Kazemi will not suffer irreparable harm because he was previously imprisoned is absurd.

While detained, Mr. Kazemi's business continues to deteriorate, and he is unable to care for his elderly mother, who recently suffered a stroke and lives with and is cared for by Mr. Kazemi. Respondents do not challenge that these are, in fact, significant harms inflicted upon Mr. Kazemi and his family due to his detention. Instead, Respondents suggest this Court should entirely discount such harms, arguing that, though "Petitioner . . . contends that detention adversely impacts his ability to

work and care for his mother," such harms do not matter because they are "the same hardships that he suffered when he served time for his various criminal offenses. 2 Resp. (Dkt. 12) at 15. Not only do Respondents fail to cite authority for their 3 proposition that endured past harms justifies the imposition of current harms, their 4 position defies common sense. Simply because Mr. Kazemi was incarcerated years 5 ago does not mean he suffers no irreparable harm from incarceration now. 6 IV. Conclusion 7 Mr. Kazemi is likely to prevail on the merits, and as set forth in the 8 Memorandum of Law in support of his Motion (Dkt. 2-1), he will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is denied, and the public interest strongly favors his 10 immediate release. This Court should grant his Motion without delay. 11 12 STEPTOE LLP 13 Dated: August 4, 2025 14 /s/Michelle S. Kallen Michelle S. Kallen 15 Michel Paradis Jason Wright 16

Patrick Fields

Attorneys for Petitioner Rey Denzo Kazemi

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9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
10	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
11	REY DENZO KAZEMI,	Case No.: 3:25-cv-01926-DMS-DEB		
12	Petitioner,	PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT IN		
13	i chilonel,	SUPPORT OF REPLY IN SUPPORT		
14	VS.	OF HIS MOTION FOR (1) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING		
16	JEREMY CASEY, in his official capacity	ORDER AND (2) ORDER TO SHOW		
17	as Warden of the Imperial Regional Detention Facility; et al.	CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION		
18	Respondents.			
19	•	Judicial Officer: Hon. Dana M. Sabraw		
20		Courtroom number: 13A Hearing Date/Time: August 6, 2025 at		
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Second Declaration of Rey Denzo Kazemi	1

1	STEPTOE LLP Michelle S. Kallen (CA. SBN 271322)			
2	Michelle S. Kallen (CA SBN 271322) mkallen@steptoe.com			
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	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
11				
12	REY DENZO KAZEMI,	Case No.: 3:25-cv-01926-DMS-DEB		
13	Petitioner,	SECOND DECLARATION OF REY DENZO KAZEMI IN SUPPORT OF		
14	vs.	MOTIONS FOR A TEMPORARY		
15	JEREMY CASEY, in his official capacity	RESTRAINING ORDER AND A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION		
16	as Warden of the Imperial Regional Detention Facility; et al.	Judicial Officer: Hon. Dana M. Sabraw		
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22	- 2 - SECOND DECLARATION OF REY DENZO KAZEMI			
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I, Rey Denzo Kazemi, hereby declare as follows:

- 1. My name is Rey Denzo Kazemi (f/k/a Reza Zanjani Kazemi). I am over the age of 21, of sound mind, capable of making this Declaration, and personally acquainted with the facts herein stated.
- 2. On July 30, 2025, Officer Adrian Gonzalez, an ICE officer stationed at the San Diego Field Office, Calexico Sub Office, spoke with me regarding my detention and ICE's efforts to remove me from the United States.
- 3. Officer Gonzalez asked me about my background and family connections to Iran. He also informed me that ICE does not intend to remove me to Iran and is currently trying to find a third country to which it can remove me.
- 4. Officer Gonzalez explained that, under ICE policy, ICE will seek to remove me to a third country for 90 days and detain me during these 90 days. If ICE is unable to remove me within 90 days, the ICE field office can request authority from ICE headquarters in Washington D.C. to release me.
- 5. Officer Gonzalez, however, stated that authority to release after 90 days has not been forthcoming from ICE headquarters and that detentions are being extended for another 90 days. In such a case, if ICE cannot find a third country to take me within 90 days, my detention would continue for another 90 days.
- 6. If ICE cannot remove me to a third country within 180 days, Officer Gonzalez explained, the field office will recommend release to ICE headquarters.

- 7. I asked Officer Gonzalez about ICE's history in securing third countries to accept Iranians. Officer Gonzalez responded that ICE is not able to find a third country for over 80% of Iranians protected by CAT because third countries refuse to take Iranians.
- 8. At this time, I have no indication of being removed or released within 180 days from my re-detention on July 10, 2025. As Officer Gonzalez explained, ICE currently has nowhere to send me, and given its history of Iranians protected by CAT, ICE will likely never find anywhere to send me. Despite this, it appears ICE intends to keep me detained for at least 180 days while it seeks a third country to which it can remove me.
- 9. I was previously in ICE custody for approximately two months prior to being released under the 2008 Order of Supervision.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 44 day of August 2025.

REY DENZO KAZEMI