

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 25-cv-03035-JWB-LIB

MAYAMU KAMARA,

Petitioner,

v.

PAMELA BONDI, *et. al.*

Respondents.

**RESPONDENTS' RETURN
TO ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE**

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Mayamu Kamara (“Kamara” or “Petitioner”) is an applicant for admission from Libera who entered the United States on February 17, 2024, near Nogales, Arizona without inspection, admission, or the necessary legal documents to enter, pass through, or remain in the United States. United States Border Patrol (USBP) encountered her, arrested her, and the next day February 18, 2024 served her with a Notice to Appear (NTA) in Immigration Court at Fort Snelling, Minnesota on March 19, 2025, charging her under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as an alien present without admission or parole. USBP released Kamara on an Order of Recognizance (OREC). Kamara filed a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal with the Immigration Court on August 9, 2024, but did nothing further to obtain lawful admission to remain in the United States. Then, at an initial Master Calendar hearing on May 28, 2025, the Immigration Court at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, on oral motion by the Government, dismissed the immigration charges against Kamara. Immediately thereafter, officials from U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) exercised their discretion, arrested Kamara, served her with a Form I-860, Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, and placed Kamara in mandatory detention under INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) pending completion of her asylum and removal proceedings. Kamara then appealed the dismissal of the original removal proceedings to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). On June 15, 2025, ICE Enforcement and Removal Officers (ICE ERO) submitted a Credible Fear (CF) packet to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). USCIS accepted the packet and scheduled the initial credible fear interview with Kamara; however, USCIS rescheduled the credible fear interview and ultimately closed the credible fear case pending the outcome of Kamara’s appeal to the BIA. Once the appeal to the BIA has been resolved, the credible fear process can resume, a final decision on Kamara’s asylum claim can be made, and a final resolution can be made with respect to Kamara’s removal. Kamara will remain detained pending the outcome of her BIA appeal, her credible fear/asylum claims, and ultimately the removal proceedings. Assuming continued success on her credible fear/asylum claims, Kamara will have opportunities to seek release on bond or relief from removal altogether from the Immigration Court. Kamara’s continued detention complies with the applicable law and comports with due process. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review these removal and detention procedures, and in any event, ICE’s actions violate neither the statute nor due process. The court should dismiss the habeas petition.

BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Kamara is a citizen and national of Liberia. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 2. On February 17, 2024, United States Border Patrol (USBP) encountered Mayamu Kamara (“Kamara” or “Petitioner”) near Nogales, Arizona. Kamara admitted she did not have the necessary legal documents to enter, pass through, or remain in the United States. USBP arrested and charged Kamara under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as an alien present without admission or parole. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). USBP assigned Kamara with Alien Registration Number 245 827 867. Declaration of James L. Van Der Vaart (“Van Der Vaart Declaration”), ¶ 4.

On February 18, 2024, USBP served Kamara with form I-862, Notice To Appear (NTA) and released her on an Order of Recognizance (OREC), with a court date of March 19, 2025, at Fort Snelling, Minnesota. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶¶ 5-6, Exs. A and B. At that time, KAMARA did not claim a fear of returning to her country of origin.

After her release, Kamara made her way to Minnesota. On August 9, 2024, Kamara filed her Form I-589, Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, with the Immigration Court. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 7.

On March 19, 2025, an Immigration Judge at Fort Snelling, Minnesota reset Kamara’s removal case to May 28, 2025 in order for the court to find a Mandingo interpreter per Kamara’s request. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 8, Ex. C.

At the Immigration Court hearing on May 28, 2025, the DHS, after review of the case, orally moved to dismiss the case on the basis that circumstances after issuance of the Notice to Appear had changed to such an extent that continuation was no longer in the best interest of the government. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1239.2(c), 239.2(a)(7) and (c). The Immigration Judge at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, agreed and dismissed Kamara's removal proceedings, reserving appeal for Kamara. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 9, Ex. D.

Shortly after the dismissal hearing, on May 28, 2025, Officers from U. S. Immigration and Customs (ICE), Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), St. Paul, arrested Kamara and served her a Form I-860, Notice and Order of Expedited Removal. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 10, Ex. E. Kamara indicated a fear of return to her country of origin. After serving Kamara with the Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, ICE ERO placed her in mandatory detention under INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), pending the outcome of her asylum application and removal proceedings. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 11.

On June 5, 2025, KAMARA filed an appeal of the May 28, 2025, dismissal order with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 12, Ex. F. The BIA acknowledged receipt of the appeal by Notice dated June 6, 2025. Declaration of Friedrich A. P. Siekert, ¶ 3, Ex. G. Petitioner's appeal to the BIA remains pending. *See* ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 38-39.

On June 15, 2025, Enforcement and Removal Officers (ERO) submitted a Credible Fear (CF) packet to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). USCIS accepted the packet and scheduled an interview with Kamara. On June 19, 2025, USCIS re-scheduled Kamara's interview due to an interpreter issue. Unfortunately, on July 1, 2025, USCIS closed the CF case due to the pending BIA appeal. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶¶ 13-15.

As of August 29, 2025, the appeal of the dismissal order remains pending before the BIA. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 16. Should the Immigration Judge's dismissal order become final at the conclusion of Kamara's administrative appeal, DHS intends to continue to process Kamara as an expedited removal. As part of that process, once Kamara reiterates her credible fear claim, as expected, ICE ERO will forward the Credible Fear packet to USCIS and request that an asylum officer conduct a credible fear interview. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 17.

Meanwhile, Kamara remains in mandatory immigration detention under INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, pending the outcome of her BIA appeal, her credible fear/asylum proceedings, and her removal proceedings. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 11. Kamara is currently detained in the Sherburne County Jail, Elk River, Minnesota. ECF No. 1, ¶ 41. ICE ERO has not received any reports that the facilities in which Kamara has been housed have not been able to provide access to the medical care Kamara has required. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 18.

On July 28, 2025, Petitioner filed her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 1. Petitioner asserts she remains in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and 1226 pending the outcome her appeal to the BIA; that she is not in expedited removal proceedings as ICE has not served her with notice of expedited removal nor afforded her a credible fear interview; that under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a and 1226(a) she is entitled to custody redetermination by an immigration judge under 1226(a); that *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I & N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025) should not control as that case contravenes the statute and is ultra vires to the statute in several ways; and the Court should not defer to *Matter of Q. Li* under the standards of *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) and *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134 (1944); and that the question of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) applies to Kamara is a legal question for the Court to decide. ECF No. 1 at 15-19. Kamar also alleges violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 (Second Claim); violations of the due process clause of 5th Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment (Third Claim); and violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 1 at 19-23. For relief, Kamara seeks an order requiring ICE to release her immediately or, at a minimum, an order that the immigration court conduct a bond hearing in accordance with *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I & N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006) to determine her eligibility for release on bond.

B. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

For more than a century, the immigration laws have authorized immigration officials to charge noncitizens as removable from the country, arrest noncitizens subject to removal, and detain noncitizens during their removal proceedings. *See Abel v. United States*, 362 U.S. 217, 232–37 (1960). In the INA, Congress enacted a multi-layered statutory scheme for the civil detention of noncitizens pending a decision on removal, during the administrative and judicial review of removal orders, and in preparation for removal. *See generally* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226, 1231. “The rule has been clear for decades: “[d]etention during deportation proceedings [i]s ... constitutionally valid.” *Banyee v. Garland*, 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024), *rehearing by panel and en banc denied*, *Banyee v. Bondi*, No. 22-2252, 2025 WL 837914 (8th Cir. Mar. 18, 2025) (citing *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003)); *see Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523 n.7 (“In fact, prior to 1907 there was no provision permitting bail for *any* aliens during the pendency of their deportation proceedings.”); *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure.”). Indeed, removal proceedings ““would be [in] vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character.”” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523 (quoting *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896)).

a. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225

Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” who are defined as “alien[s] present in the United States who [have] not been admitted” or “who arrive[] in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*,

583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to arriving aliens and “certain other” noncitizens “initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation.” *Id.*; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii). These noncitizens are generally subject to expedited removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if the individual “indicates an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution,” immigration officers will refer the alien for a credible fear interview. *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). An individual “with a credible fear of persecution” is “detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the individual does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” he is detained until removed. *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)(B)(iii)(IV).

Section 1225(b)(2) is “broader” and “serves as a catchall provision.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. It “applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” *Id.* Under § 1225(b)(2), an individual “who is an applicant for admission” shall be detained for a removal proceeding “if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 68 (BIA 2025) (“for aliens arriving in and seeking admission into the United States who are placed directly in full removal proceedings, section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), mandates detention ‘until removal proceedings have concluded.’”) (citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 299). Still, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has the sole discretionary authority

to temporarily release on parole “any alien applying for admission to the United States” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); *see Biden v. Texas*, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022).

b. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

Section 1226 “generally governs the process of arresting and detaining . . . aliens pending their removal.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018). Section 1226(a) provides that “an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The Attorney General and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) thus have broad discretionary authority to detain a noncitizen during removal proceedings.¹ *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1) (DHS “may continue to detain the arrested alien” during the pendency of removal proceedings); *Nielsen v. Preap*, 139 S. Ct. 954, 966 (2019) (highlighting that “subsection (a) creates authority for *anyone*’s arrest or release under § 1226—and it gives the Secretary broad discretion as to both actions”).

When a noncitizen is apprehended, a DHS officer makes an initial custody determination. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). DHS “may continue to detain the arrested alien.”

¹ Although the relevant statutory sections refer to the Attorney General, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), transferred all immigration enforcement and administration functions vested in the Attorney General, with few exceptions, to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Attorney General’s authority—delegated to immigration judges, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d)—to detain, or authorize bond for noncitizens under section 1226(a) is “one of the authorities he retains . . . although this authority is shared with [DHS] because officials of that department make the initial determination whether an alien will remain in custody during removal proceedings.” *Matter of D-J-*, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 574 n.3 (A.G. 2003).

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1). “To secure release, the alien must show that he does not pose a danger to the community and that he is likely to appear for future proceedings.” *Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2280–81 (2021) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8); *Matter of Adeniji*, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1113 (BIA 1999)).

If DHS decides to release the noncitizen, it may set a bond or place other conditions on release. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). If DHS determines that a noncitizen should remain detained during the pendency of his removal proceedings, the noncitizen may request a bond hearing before an immigration judge. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1003.19, 1236.1(d). The immigration judge then conducts a bond hearing and decides whether to release the noncitizen, based on a variety of factors that account for the noncitizen’s ties to the United States and evaluate whether the noncitizen poses a flight risk or danger to the community. *See Guerra*, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006);² *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (“The determination of the Immigration Judge as to custody status or bond may be based upon any information that is available to the Immigration Judge or that is presented to him or her by the alien or [DHS].”).

Section 1226(a) does not provide a noncitizen with a right to release on bond. *See*

² The BIA has identified the following non-exhaustive list of factors the immigration judge may consider: “(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States; (2) the alien’s length of residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s family ties in the United States, and whether they may entitle the alien to reside permanently in the United States in the future; (4) the alien’s employment history; (5) the alien’s record of appearance in court; (6) the alien’s criminal record, including the extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency of such activity, and the seriousness of the offenses; (7) the alien’s history of immigration violations; (8) any attempts by the alien to flee prosecution or otherwise escape from authorities; and (9) the alien’s manner of entry to the United States.” *Guerra*, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40.

Matter of D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 575 (citing *Carlson*, 342 U.S. at 534). Nor does Section 1226(a) explicitly address the burden of proof that should apply or any particular factor that must be considered in bond hearings. Rather, it grants DHS and the Attorney General broad discretionary authority to determine whether to detain or release a noncitizen during his removal proceedings. *Id.* If, after the bond hearing, either party disagrees with the decision of the immigration judge, that party may appeal that decision to the BIA. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(3), 1003.19(f), 1003.38, 1236.1(d)(3).

Included within the Attorney General and DHS's discretionary authority are limitations on the delegation to the immigration court. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B), the immigration judge does not have authority to redetermine the conditions of custody imposed by DHS for any arriving alien. While not applicable in this case, the regulations also allow DHS to invoke an automatic stay of any decision by an immigration judge to release an individual on bond when DHS files an appeal of the custody redetermination. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) (“The decision whether or not to file [an automatic stay] is subject to the discretion of the Secretary.”).

c. Review of custody determinations at the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

The BIA is an appellate body within the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”). *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). Members of the BIA possess delegated authority from the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1). The BIA is “charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the [INA] that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it,” including IJ custody determinations. 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1003.1(d)(1), 236.1; 1236.1. The BIA not only resolves particular disputes before it, but also “through precedent decisions, [it] shall provide clear and uniform guidance to DHS, the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the [INA] and its implementing regulations.” *Id.* § 1003.1(d)(1). “The decision of the [BIA] shall be final except in those cases reviewed by the Attorney General.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7).

ARGUMENT

A. Applicable Legal Standards

“The district courts of the United States . . . are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute[.]” *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.*, 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005) (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he scope of habeas has been tightly regulated by statute, from the Judiciary Act of 1789 to the present day[.]” *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 125 n.20. To warrant a grant of habeas corpus, a petitioner must demonstrate that his custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

B. Petitioner Is Properly Detained Under Section 1225.

Petitioner is properly in removal proceedings. As described above and summarized below, ICE obtained a dismissal of the original removal proceedings and then immediately initiated expedited removal proceedings. Kamara appealed the dismissal of the original removal proceeding. ICE initiated the expedited removal properly and has processed the credible fear claim as far as it can pending the resolution of the BIA appeal.

As to the original removal, USBP served Kamara with a Notice to Appear (NTA)

alleging he is an alien present without admission or parole and inadmissible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted is known as an “applicant for admission.” Per Section 1225(a)(3), all applicants for admission are subject to inspection by immigration officers to determine if they are admissible to the United States. The term “admission” is defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) to mean “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1235.1 (setting forth inspection procedures). A person who has not been inspected, admitted, or paroled into the United States is subject to removal. *Id.* In this case, Kamara entered into the country without inspection in 2024 and has remained in the country since then. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶¶ 4-7; ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 21-34.

Section 1225(b) provides for the inspection of aliens in the United States for admission. Section 1225(b)(1) pertains to inspection of “arriving aliens,” contains the “expedited removal” provision for such aliens, and is the provision applicable in this case. Significantly, a person in expedited removal proceedings that has expressed credible fear, like Kamara, is subject to mandatory detention and “**shall be detained** pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such fear, until removed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(iii)(IV)(emphasis added).

The catch-all provision, Section § 1225(b)(2)(A), provides for the inspection of all “other” applicants for admission and states that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking

admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien *shall be detained* for a proceeding under section 240.”³ 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

Here, Kamara had never been inspected by immigration officials before her apprehension on May 28, 2025. After her apprehension on May 28, 2025, ICE officials determined she was in the United States without inspection and without being admitted or paroled after inspection and they charged her appropriately. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶¶ 4-5, 10, and Ex. E. Kamara does not claim this removal charge was inappropriate and indeed she has asserted a fear of persecution to avoid removal.

The Immigration Court held a Master Calendar hearing on May 28, 2025. At that time, DHS orally moved to dismiss the original removal proceedings on the basis of changed circumstances. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1239.2(c), 239.2(a)(7), 239.2(c). The Immigration Court agreed and dismissed the original removal proceeding without prejudice. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 9, and Ex. D.

That same day, ICE officials arrested Kamara and served her a Form I-860, Notice and Order of Expedited Removal. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 10, and Ex. E. Kamara indicated a fear of return to her country of origin. ICE officials then placed her in mandatory detention INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 11. ICE referred the matter to USCIS to conduct the credible fear interview.

³ Section 240 of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, refers to full removal proceedings before the Immigration Court.

Unfortunately, the credible fear interview has not occurred yet. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶¶ 13-15.

The credible fear interview and subsequent proceeding have not occurred yet because Kamara appealed the dismissal order to the BIA and that appeal remains pending. Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶¶ 12, 16, and Ex. F. Thus, while the Immigration Court dismissed the original removal proceedings, DHS cannot proceed with the next step in the expedited removal process (the credible fear interview) because of Kamara's pending appeal to the BIA.

Kamara has made this issue the heart and basis of her habeas petition. She argues that, since her original removal proceedings are not yet administratively final pending her appeal to the BIA, she remains in that removal proceeding under section 1229a and is entitled to immediate release or at least a bond hearing under section 1226. Relatedly, she argues she has not yet been placed in expedited removal under 1225(b)(1) because she has not been served with the notice and has not been afforded a credible fear interview; accordingly, she argues she should not be in mandatory detention under 1225(b)(1).

This Court should reject these related arguments while exercising its jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings. First, the Immigration Court correctly dismissed the original removal proceeding. It dismissed the original removal proceeding under 8 C.F.R. 1239.2(c) on the government's motion made properly under 8 C.F.R. §§ 239.2(a)(7) and 239.2(c). See *Matter of Jaso and Ayala*, 27 I & N. Dec. 557 (BIA 2019); *In Re G-N-C-*, 22 I & N Dec. 281, 1998 WL 646918 (BIA 1998). The Immigration Court noted the motion was opposed, provided Kamara the opportunity to respond, and dismissed the case, without

prejudice to either party, in the best interests of the government and because “Respondent does not have the right to be placed into removal proceedings or remain in removal proceedings.” Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 9, and Ex. D. The dismissal was without prejudice and the Immigration Judge preserved Kamara’s right to appeal. The dismissal occurred at the initial Master Calendar hearing following period of 13 months when Kamara not detained under section 1226 or any other provision and was free on her own recognizance. Kamara alleges she appeared *pro se* at the hearing, but that was her choice and she had 15 months to obtain counsel to appear on her behalf. Ordinarily such a dismissal of a removal proceeding without prejudice would favor the Respondent, here Kamara, and she does not claim any substantive error with the dismissal in her habeas petition. While Kamara exercised her right to appeal to the BIA, it is clear from the appeal itself that it was taken not on its intrinsic merit but to undermine expedited removal proceedings and advance an argument to support her habeas petition. The Immigration Judge’s decision to dismiss the original removal proceeding was correct. In short, the dismissal order does not form a basis for habeas relief, as it comports with the facts, the INA, and due process.

Relatedly, Kamara argues that she is not in expedited removal proceedings because she was not served with proper notice and has not been afforded a credible fear interview. But, she identified in her appeal that she was “detained” so she must in fact be in expedited removal proceedings. *See* Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶ 12, and Ex. F. She has been afforded a credible fear interview but that has not occurred because of Kamara’s appeal to the BIA. *See* Van Der Vaart Declaration, ¶¶ 13-15 and Ex. F. Thus, ICE has complied with

all the procedures for expedited removal and is detaining Kamara properly under those procedures and that detention is mandatory pending the outcome of her credible fear/asylum proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). Neither Section 1225(b)(1) nor Section 1225(b)(2) says anything about bond hearings. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297. Moreover, applicants for admission may be released temporarily on parole for urgent humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons, but Kamara has not requested or argued for parole. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288.

Because Kamara is detained properly under Section 1225(b)(1), the Court should dismiss the habeas petition.

C. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

As noted, Petitioner's habeas petition proceeds upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the basis for her proposed removal from the United States and her concomitant detention pending that removal. Petitioner is properly in removal proceedings and is detained properly under Section 1225. The court should dismiss the habeas petition on the merits. The Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction to delve any further into this detention issue raised by the habeas petition for the following reasons.

1. Lack of Exhaustion.

Petitioner has not raised claims that constitute routine matters of statutory interpretation. Rather, she claims she remains in 1229a proceedings (because of her appeal) and therefore claims entitlement to immediate release or a bond hearing under section 1226. After being placed in expedited removal and detained under 1225, she filed an appeal of the Immigration Court's dismissal of the original removal proceeding and then

filed her habeas petition. Yet, through this petition he seeks to bypass the administrative review process. The Court would likely benefit from the BIA decision on the appeal. *See Puga v. Chertoff*, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007); *see also Reiter v. Cooper*, 507 U.S. 258, 269 (1993) (“Where relief is available from an administrative agency, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to pursue that avenue of redress before proceeding to the courts; and until that recourse is exhausted, suit is premature and must be dismissed.”); *Mathena v. United States*, 577 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 2009); *Arroyo v. Fikes*, No. 21-CV-2489 (KMM/BRT), 2022 WL 2820405, at *2 (D. Minn. May 5, 2022). While “[t]here is no statutory requirement that a habeas petitioner exhaust his administrative remedies before challenging his immigration detention [in federal court],” *Araujo-Cortes v. Shanahan*, 35 F. Supp. 3d 533, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), exhaustion should be required as a prudential matter, *accord Paz Nativi v. Shanahan*, No. 16 Civ. 8496 (JPO), 2017 WL 281751, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017) (“[B]efore immigration detention may be challenged in federal court. . . exhaustion is generally required as a prudential matter.” (collecting cases)).

Further, Petitioner’s assertion in her Petition that an administrative appeal is “futile” because it “will take several months to complete” rings hollow for several reasons. First, the BIA is well-positioned to assess how agency expertise affects the interplay between 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226. *See Delgado v. Sessions*, No. C17-1031-RSL-JPD, 2017 WL 4776340, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 2017) (finding denial of bond to an immigration detainee was “a question well suited for agency expertise”); *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 68 (BIA 2025) (addressing the interplay of §§ 1225(b)(1) and 1226); *Matter of M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. 509, 515-18 (2019). Second, waiving exhaustion will “encourage other

detainees to bypass the BIA and directly appeal their no-bond determinations from the IJ to federal district court.” *Aden v. Nielsen*, No. C18-1441RSL, 2019 WL 5802013, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2019). Put another way, judicial intervention may stop the flow from immigration courts to the BIA and redirect it—prematurely, as here—to the federal courts. *See id.* The Court should deny the habeas petition for lack of exhaustion.

2. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

Section 1252(g) specifically deprives courts of jurisdiction, including habeas corpus jurisdiction, to review “any cause or claim by or on behalf of an alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to [1] *commence proceedings*, [2] *adjudicate cases*, or [3] *execute removal orders* against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added). Section 1252(g) eliminates jurisdiction “[e]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title.”⁴ Except as provided in § 1252, courts “cannot entertain challenges to the enumerated executive branch decisions or actions.” *E.F.L. v. Prim*, 986 F.3d 959, 964–65 (7th Cir. 2021).

Section 1252(g) also bars district courts from hearing challenges to the *method* by which the Secretary of Homeland Security chooses to commence removal proceedings, including the decision to detain an alien pending removal. *See Alvarez v. ICE*, 818 F.3d

⁴ Congress initially passed § 1252(g) in the IIRIRA, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. In 2005, Congress amended § 1252(g) by adding “(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title” after “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 231, 311.

1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016) (“By its plain terms, [§ 1252(g)] bars us from questioning ICE’s discretionary decisions to commence removal” and also to review “ICE’s decision to take [plaintiff] into custody and to detain him during removal proceedings”).

Petitioner’s claim stems from her detention during removal proceedings. That detention arises from the decision to commence such proceedings against her. *See, e.g., Valencia-Mejia v. United States*, No. CV 08–2943 CAS (PJWx), 2008 WL 4286979, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2008) (“The decision to detain plaintiff until his hearing before the Immigration Judge arose from this decision to commence proceedings[.]”); *Wang v. United States*, No. CV 10-0389 SVW (RCx), 2010 WL 11463156, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2010); *Tazu v. Att’y Gen. U.S.*, 975 F.3d 292, 298–99 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and (b)(9) deprive district court of jurisdiction to review action to execute removal order).

As other courts have held, “[f]or the purposes of § 1252, the Attorney General commences proceedings against an alien when the alien is issued a Notice to Appear before an immigration court.” *Herrera-Correra v. United States*, No. CV 08-2941 DSF (JCx), 2008 WL 11336833, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008). “The Attorney General may arrest the alien against whom proceedings are commenced and detain that individual until the conclusion of those proceedings.” *Id.* at *3. “Thus, an alien’s detention throughout this process arises from the Attorney General’s decision to commence proceedings” and review of claims arising from such detention is barred under § 1252(g). *Id.* (citing *Sissoko v. Rocha*, 509 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2007)); *Wang*, 2010 WL 11463156, at *6; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

ICE placed Kamara in expedited removal proceedings under section 1225(b)(1) and has started the credible fear process. As such, judicial review of the claim that she is entitled immediate release or a bond hearing to bond is barred by § 1252(g). This habeas action is a blatant attempt to circumvent the use of Congressionally approved expedited removal. The Court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

3. § 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9).

Under § 1252(b)(9), “judicial review of all questions of law . . . including interpretation and application of statutory provisions . . . arising from any action taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States” is only proper before the appropriate federal court of appeals in the form of a petition for review of a final removal order. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). Section 1252(b)(9) is an “unmistakable ‘zipper’ clause” that “channels judicial review of all [claims arising from deportation proceedings]” to a court of appeals in the first instance. *Id.*; *see Lopez v. Barr*, No. CV 20-1330 (JRT/BRT), 2021 WL 195523, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 2021) (citing *Nasrallah v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 573, 579–80 (2020)).

Moreover, § 1252(a)(5) provides that a petition for review is the exclusive means for judicial review of immigration proceedings:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), . . . a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (e) [concerning aliens not admitted to the United States].

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). “Taken together, § 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9) mean that *any* issue—whether legal or factual—arising from *any* removal-related activity can be

reviewed *only* through the [petition-for-review] process.” *J.E.F.M. v. Lynch*, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original); *see id.* at 1035 (“§§ 1252(a)(5) and [(b)(9)] channel review of all claims, including policies-and-practices challenges . . . whenever they ‘arise from’ removal proceedings”); *accord Ruiz v. Mukasey*, 552 F.3d 269, 274 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009) (only when the action is “unrelated to any removal action or proceeding” is it within the district court’s jurisdiction); *cf. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice*, 434 F.3d 144, 151 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (a “primary effect” of the REAL ID Act is to “limit all aliens to one bite of the apple” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Critically, “[§] 1252(b)(9) is a judicial channeling provision, not a claim-barring one.” *Aguilar v. ICE*, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007). Indeed, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that “[n]othing . . . in any other provision of this chapter . . . shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.” *See also Ajlani v. Chertoff*, 545 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[J]urisdiction to review such claims is vested exclusively in the courts of appeals[.]”). The petition-for-review process before the court of appeals ensures that aliens have a proper forum for claims arising from their immigration proceedings and “receive their day in court.” *J.E.F.M.*, 837 F.3d at 1031–32 (internal quotations omitted); *see also Rosario v. Holder*, 627 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the [INA] to obviate . . . Suspension Clause concerns” by permitting judicial review of “nondiscretionary” BIA determinations and “all constitutional claims or questions of law.”).

In evaluating the reach of subsections (a)(5) and (b)(9), the Second Circuit explained that jurisdiction turns on the substance of the relief sought. *Delgado v. Quarantillo*, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011). Those provisions divest district courts of jurisdiction to review both direct and indirect challenges to removal orders, including decisions to detain for purposes of removal or for proceedings. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294–95 (section 1252(b)(9) includes challenges to the “decision to detain [an alien] in the first place or to seek removal[.]”). Here, Petitioner challenges the government’s decision and action to detain her, which arises from DHS’s decision to commence expedited removal proceedings against her as an arriving alien and is thus an “action taken . . . to remove [them] from the United States.” *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); *see also, e.g., Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294–95; *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) did not bar review in that case because the petitioner did not challenge “his initial detention”); *Saadulloev v. Garland*, No. 3:23-CV-00106, 2024 WL 1076106, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2024) (recognizing that there is no judicial review of the threshold detention decision, which flows from the government’s decision to “commence proceedings”). As such, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action.

The reasoning in *Jennings* outlines why Petitioner’s claims are unreviewable here. While holding that it was unnecessary to comprehensively address the scope of § 1252(b)(9), the Supreme Court in *Jennings* also provided guidance on the types of challenges that may fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 293–94. The Court found that “§1252(b)(9) [did] not present a jurisdictional bar” in situations where “respondents . . . [were] not challenging the decision to detain them in the first

place.” *Id.* at 294–95. In this case, Petitioner *does* challenge the government’s decision to detain her in the first place. Though Petitioner may attempt to frame her challenge as one relating to detention authority, rather than a challenge to DHS’s decision to detain her pending her expedited removal proceedings in the first instance, such creative framing does not evade the preclusive effect of § 1252(b)(9).

Indeed, the fact that Petitioner is challenging the basis upon which he is detained is enough to trigger § 1252(b)(9) because “detention *is* an ‘action taken . . . to remove’ an alien.” *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. 318, 319 (Thomas, J., concurring); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The Court should dismiss Petition for lack of jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9). Petitioner must present her claims before the appropriate federal court of appeals because they challenge the government’s decision or action to detain her, which must be raised before a court of appeals, not this Court. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

D. The habeas petition should be denied on the merits.

As argued above, the court should dismiss the habeas petition on the merits, because under the plain text of Section 1225, Kamara must be detained pending the outcome of her credible fear and removal proceedings.

1. The plain reading of Section 1225 and basic statutory construction.

The Court should reject Petitioner’s argument that § 1226(a) governs her detention instead of § 1225. When there is “an irreconcilable conflict in two legal provisions,” then “the specific governs over the general.” *Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley LLC*, 862 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017); *Hickman v. Cliff Peck Chevrolet, Inc.*, 566 F.2d 44, 48 (8th Cir. 1977); *In re Bender*, 338 B.R. 62, 69 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006). Section 1226(a)

“applies to aliens “arrested and detained pending a decision” on removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). In contrast, § 1225 is narrower. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225. It applies only to “applicants for admission”; that is, as relevant here, aliens present in the United States who have not been admitted. *See id.*; *see also Florida v. United States*, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2023). Because Petitioner falls within that category, the specific detention authority under § 1225 governs over the general authority found at § 1226(a).

Applying this reasoning, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently confirmed in a habeas action that an unlawfully present alien, who had been unlawfully present in the country for approximately 20 years, was nonetheless an “applicant for admission” upon the straightforward application of the statute. *See Weibert Alvarenga Pena, Petitioner, v. Patricia Hyde, et al., Respondents.*, No. CV 25-11983-NMG, 2025 WL 2108913 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025). The court explained this resulted in the “continued detention” of an alien during removal proceedings as commanded by statute. *Id.*

Petitioner’s argument that 1226(a) applies rests on a factual error. Petitioner states in her petition that ICE must put her in proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, and she argues that her detention is unlawful because the “discretionary detention framework at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)” applies regardless because 8 U.S.C. § 1229 governs. That is incorrect.

After the dismissal of the original removal proceedings, ICE placed Kamara in expedited removal proceedings and initiated the credible fear process. ICE has referred the case to USCIS for the credible fear interview. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). Congress provided that detention was mandatory pending “final determination of credible fear of

persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.” 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), an “applicant for admission” is defined as an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” Applicants for admission “fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. And § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) mandates detention during the credible fear process. *see also Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I & N. Dec. at 69 (“[A]n applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).”). Section 1225(b)(1) applies because Petitioner is present in the United States without being admitted. Indeed, Kamara does not dispute that she was not inspected and that she was not admitted.

Any argument that Kamara should be treated differently because she has been in the interior of the United States is unpersuasive. The BIA has long recognized that “many people who are not *actually* requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless deemed to be ‘seeking admission’ under the immigration laws.” *Matter of Lemus-Losa*, 25 I. & N. Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012). Statutory language “is known by the company it keeps.” *Marquez-Reyes v. Garland*, 36 F.4th 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting *McDonnell v. United States*, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016)). The phrase “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A) must be read in the context of the definition of “applicant

for admission” in § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission are both those individuals present without admission and those who arrive in the United States. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Both are understood to be “seeking admission” under §1225(a)(1). *See Lemus-Losa*, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 743. Congress made that clear in § 1225(a)(3), which requires all aliens “who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission” to be inspected by immigration officers. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). The word “or” here “introduce[s] an appositive—a word or phrase that is synonymous with what precedes it (‘Vienna or Wien,’ ‘Batman or the Caped Crusader’).” *United States v. Woods*, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013).

Petitioner’s interpretation also reads “applicant for admission” out of § 1225(b)(2)(A). One of the most basic interpretative canons instructs that a “statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” *See Corley v. United States*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (cleaned up). Petitioner’s interpretation fails that test. It renders the phrase “applicant for admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A) “inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” *See id.* If Congress did not want § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply to “applicants for admission,” then it would not have included that phrase in the subsection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see also Corley*, 556 U.S. at 314.

The court’s decision in *Florida v. United States*, 660 F.Supp.3d 1239 (N.D. Fla. 2023) is instructive here. The district court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) mandates detention of applicants for admission throughout removal proceedings, rejecting the assertion that DHS has discretion to choose to detain an applicant for admission under either section 1225(b) or 1226(a). 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275. The court held that such discretion “would render mandatory detention under § 1225(b) meaningless. Indeed, the 1996 expansion of

§ 1225(b) to include illegal border crossers would make little sense if DHS retained discretion to apply § 1225(a) and release illegal border crossers whenever the agency saw fit.” *Id.* The court pointed to *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003), in which the Supreme Court explained that “wholesale failure” by the federal government motivated the 1996 amendments to the INA. *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275. The court also relied on, *Matter of M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. 509, 516 (A.G. 2019), in which the Attorney General explained “section [1225] (under which detention is mandatory) and section [1226(a)] (under which detention is permissive) can be reconciled only if they apply to different classes of aliens.” *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275.

2. Congress did not intend to treat individuals who enter unlawfully better than those who appear at a port of entry.

When the plain text of a statute is clear, that meaning is controlling and courts “need not examine legislative history.” *Doe v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs. of U.S.*, 519 F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir. 2008). But to the extent legislative history is relevant here, nothing “refutes the plain language” of § 1225. *Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 671 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2011). Congress passed IIRIRA to correct “an anomaly whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the United States were in a worse position than persons who had crossed the border unlawfully.” *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), *declined to extend by*, *United States v. Gambino-Ruiz*, 91 F.4th 981 (9th Cir. 2024). It “intended to replace certain aspects of the [then] current ‘entry doctrine,’ under which illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry.” *Id.* (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225).

The Court should reject any interpretation because it would put aliens who “crossed the border unlawfully” in a better position than those “who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry.” *Id.* Aliens who presented at port of entry would be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, but those who crossed illegally would be eligible for a bond under § 1226(a).

Nothing in the Laken Riley Act (“LRA”) changes the analysis.⁵ Redundancies in statutory drafting are “common . . . sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure.” *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020). The LRA arose after an inadmissible alien “was paroled into this country through a shocking abuse of that power.” 171 Cong. Rec. H278 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2025) (statement of Rep. McClintock). Congress passed it out of concern that the executive branch “ignore[d] its fundamental duty under the Constitution to defend its citizens.” *Id.* at H269 (statement of Rep. Roy). One member even expressed frustration that “every illegal alien is currently required to be detained by current law throughout the pendency of their asylum claims.” *Id.* at H278 (statement of Rep. McClintock). The LRA reflects a “congressional effort to be doubly sure” that such unlawful aliens are detained. *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 239.

3. Prior agency practices are not entitled to deference under *Loper Bright*.

Kamara also asserts this Court should not follow *Matter of Q. Li* as it contravenes the INA and therefore the Court is under no obligation to follow it under *Loper Bright*. Prior agency practice carries little, if any, weight under *Loper Bright*. The weight given to

⁵ The cases Petitioner cites make this argument. *See Rodriguez v. Bostock*, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 1193850, at *13–14 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2025).

agency interpretations “must always ‘depend upon their thoroughness, the validity of their reasoning, the consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give them power to persuade.’” *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 432–33 (2024) (quoting *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (cleaned up)). To be sure, “when the best reading of the statute is that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency,” the Court must “independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress.” *Loper Bright*, 603 U.S. at 395 (cleaned up). But “read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention for applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297 (cleaned up). Here, under section 1225(b)(1), detention is mandatory pending the outcome of the credible fear process. The court should dismiss the habeas petition.

4. Petitioner’s detention is for the purpose of conducting her removal proceedings.

Petitioner claims that her current temporary detention pending removal is unlawful and violates prior precedent. Congress, the Eighth Circuit, and the Supreme Court disagree.

As mentioned above, Congress broadly crafted “applicants for admission” to include undocumented aliens present within the United States like Petitioner. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). And, Congress directed aliens like the Petitioner to be detained during the credible fear process. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297 (“Read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) thus mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.”). In so doing, Congress made a legislative judgment to detain undocumented aliens during removal proceedings, as they—by definition—have

crossed borders and traveled in violation of United States law. As explained above, that is the prerogative of the legislative branch serving the interest of the government and the United States.

The Supreme Court has recognized this profound interest. See *Shaughnessy v. United States*, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (“Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control.”). With this power to remove aliens, the Supreme Court has recognized the United States’s longtime Constitutional ability to detain those in removal proceedings. *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure.”); *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (“Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character, and while arrangements were being made for their deportation.”); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (“Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 286 (2018) (“Congress has authorized immigration officials to detain some classes of aliens during the course of certain immigration proceedings. Detention during those proceedings gives immigration officials time to determine an alien's status without running the risk of the alien's either absconding or engaging in criminal activity before a final decision can be made.”).

In light of Congress’s interest in dealing with illegal immigration by keeping specified aliens in detention pending the removal period, the Supreme Court dispensed of

any Due Process concerns without engaging in the *Mathews v. Eldridge* test. *See generally Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690-91.

5. Any claim related to Petitioner's arrest should be dismissed.

Petitioner has not asserted her apprehension and booking under section 1225(b)(1) were invalid; however, in the event he were to make such a claim, the Court should reject it as not cognizable in habeas. “The ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest . . . occurred.” *I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza*, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984). One court recently addressing this in a similar context explained, “Thus, even if Petitioner's initial arrest was unlawful, her detention pending removal may stand.” *Rodrigues De Oliveira v. Joyce*, No. 2:25-CV-00291-LEW, 2025 WL 1826118, at *5 (D. Me. July 2, 2025). Should Petitioner raise this issue, the Court should reject it.

E. The due process claim lacks merit.

Kamara claims that her current detention is “without cause” and “in violation of her constitutional rights to due process of law.” This argument fails. The cause of her detention is that the Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), as set forth above.

To the extent Petitioner intends to argue that she expects to remain released on her own recognizance during the pendency of her removal proceedings, this argument is unavailing. An “expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” *Olim v. Wakinekona*, 461 U.S. 238, 250 n. 12 (1983). And the Supreme Court has held that applicants for admission such as Petitioner

are only entitled to the protections set forth by statute and that “the Due Process Clause provides nothing more.” *Department of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020).

The Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress exercises “plenary power to make rules for the admission of foreign nationals and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.” *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). Pursuant to that longstanding doctrine, “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.” *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). The broad scope of the political branches’ authority over immigration is “at its zenith at the international border.” *United States v. Flores-Montano*, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004). Accordingly, “certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographical borders.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

The Supreme Court has explained that applicants for admission lack any constitutional due process rights with respect to admission aside from the rights provided by statute: “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned,” *Mezei*, 345 U.S. at 212, and “it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review [that] determination”. *United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950). The Supreme Court reaffirmed “[its] century-old rule regarding the due process rights of an alien seeking initial entry” in *Thuraissigiam*, explaining that an individual who illegally crosses the border—

like Petitioner—is an applicant for admission and “has only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” 591 U.S. at 139-40.

As explained by the Supreme Court, “[w]hen an alien arrives at a port of entry—for example, an international airport—the alien is on U.S. soil, but the alien is not considered to have entered the country ...”. *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 139. Stated further, “aliens who arrive at ports of entry—even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal—are ‘treated’ for due process purposes ‘as if stopped at the border.’” *Id.* (quoting *Mezei*, 345 U.S. at 215). The Court held that this same “threshold” rule applies to individuals, like Petitioner, who are apprehended after trying “to enter the country illegally” since by statute, such individuals are also defined as applicants for admission. *Id.* at 139-40. Treating such an individual in a more favorable manner than an individual arriving at a port of entry would “create a perverse incentive to enter at an unlawful rather than a lawful location” and therefore the Supreme Court rejected the argument that an individual who “succeeded in making it 25 yards into U.S. territory before he was caught” should be entitled to additional constitutional protections. *Id.* at 140.

Instead, applying the “century-old rule regarding the due process rights of an alien seeking initial entry[,]” the Court explained that aliens arrested after crossing the border illegally, such as Petitioner, have “only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” *Id.* at 140. The Court was clear: “the Due Process Clause provides nothing more” than the procedural protections set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225 that allow an individual to seek protection from removal if he fears return to his home country and also seek parole from the agency. *Id.* The Supreme Court’s decision in *Thuraissigiam* is

instructive. In relevant part, *Thuraissigiam* concerned a due process challenge raised by an alien apprehended 25 yards from the border, which he crossed illegally. 591 U.S. at 139. DHS detained and processed him for expedited removal because he lacked valid entry documents. *Id.* at 114. An asylum officer then determined that Mr. Thuraissigiam lacked a credible fear of persecution. *Id.* Mr. Thuraissigiam petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting a fear of persecution and requesting another opportunity to apply for asylum. *Id.*

In its decision, the Supreme Court delineated the boundaries of due process claims that can be made by applicants for admission. Specifically, the Court held that for such aliens stopped at the border, “the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.” *Id.* at 131 (citing *Nishimura Ekiu v. United States*, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892)); *see also Guerrier v. Garland*, 18 F.4th 304, 313 (9th Cir. 2021) (“In concluding that Thuraissigiam’s due process rights were not violated, the Supreme Court emphasized that the due process rights of noncitizens who have not ‘effected an entry’ into the country are coextensive with the statutory rights Congress provides.”).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also held that detention of an alien seeking admission to the United States does not violate due process in *Amanullah v. Nelson*, 811 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1987). In that case, the Court explained that “the detention of the appellants is entirely incident to their attempted entry into the United States and their apparent failure to meet the criteria for admission—and so, entirely within the powers expressly conferred by Congress.” *Id.* The appellants were detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b) and the Court found no due process violation in the denial of their parole applications “pending the ultimate (seasonable) resolution of the exclusion/asylum proceedings” as there was “no suggestion of unwarranted governmental footdragging in these cases” and because “prompt attention appears to have been paid to the administrative aspects of exclusion and asylum.” *Id.*

This Court should apply the “century-old rule” reaffirmed in *Thuraissigiam* and conclude that Petitioner’s due process rights are coextensive with the rights provided under statute. Here, the law provides that “[a]ny alien subject to the [credible fear process] shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). For the reasons set forth above, the Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under this statute.

Moreover, mandatory detention is warranted under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a as the Petitioner is being processed for expedited removal. *See Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66, 67. ICE’s decision to place an alien arriving in the United States in either expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or full removal proceedings 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, is discretionary. However, ICE’s decision to detain or release aliens deemed applicants for admission is not. “For those placed in expedited removal proceedings who are referred to an Immigration Judge for consideration of their asylum application. . . 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), requires detention until the final adjudication of the asylum application.” *Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. at 68 (citing *Matter of M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. 509, 516 (A.G. 2019)). “Likewise, for aliens arriving in and seeking admission into the United States who are placed directly in full removal proceedings, section . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A),

mandates detention ‘until removal proceedings have concluded.’” *Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. at 68 (quoting *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 299). Thus, even if the Court were not barred from reviewing Petitioner’s claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), her claim that her current detention is “without cause” and “in violation of his constitutional rights to due process of law” is without merit and should be dismissed.

For all these reasons, Petitioner’s due process claim should be denied.

F. The Rehabilitation Act Claim lacks merit.

In her Second Claim Kamara asserts that Respondents violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and must make reasonable accommodations. The Court should reject this claim for many reasons. First, the claim is wholly unsubstantiated and even if it were, such a claim has no place in a habeas matter. If Petitioner has such a claim, it must be raised in a complaint filed in a civil action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Moreover, it does not appear the Court would have subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim. Kamara makes no claim to have exhausted her administrative remedies available for her claims. *See Jones v. Black*, 549 U.S. 199, 022-23 (2007); *Porter v. Nussle*, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); *Booth v. Churner*, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001); *Chelette v. Harris*, 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000); *O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Center*, 502 F.3d 1056, 1061(9th Cir. 2007). The Court should reject the alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act as a basis for habeas relief.

G. The Eight Amendment Claim lacks merit.

Kamara also attempts to make out claims under the Eighth Amendment. She alleges without any factual support that her custodians breached their affirmative duty to provide adequate medical care to Kamara. She asserts that her detention both the objective and

subjective prongs of a deliberate indifference claim, citing *Butler v. Fletcher*, 465 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 2006); *Saylor v. Nebraska*, 812 F. 3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 2016); *Angelica C.*, 2020 WL 3441461 *14. The Court should dismiss this claim.

First, the claim is wholly unsubstantiated and even if it were, such a claim has no place in a habeas matter. If Petitioner has such a claim, it must be raised in a complaint filed in a civil action and properly served and filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Moreover, it does not appear the Court would have subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim. Kamara makes no claim to have exhausted her administrative remedies available for her claims. Additionally, Kamara does not allege or identify a statute that waives sovereign immunity for violations of the Eighth Amendment by the United States for claims that its officials or employees violated the Eighth Amendment. See *FDIC v. Meyer*, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994); *Phelps v. United States Federal Gov't*, 15 F.3d 735, 739 (8th Cir. 1994).

Second, Kamara's Eighth Amendment claim is not cognizable in a habeas matter. Petitioner asserts she has been denied medical care. Leaving aside the substance of such allegations, these allegations present a challenge to the conditions of her detention. Conditions of confinement claims like these are not cognizable in a habeas Petition, which much challenge the fact or duration of confinement, not its conditions. See *Spencer*, 774 F.3d at 470 ("Spencer's constitutional claim relates to the conditions of his confinement. . . . Consequently, a habeas petition is not the proper claim to remedy his alleged injury."); *Kruger*, 77 F.3d 1071, 1073 (noting "fundamental differences between a civil rights action . . . where a prisoner might seek money damages or injunctive relief from unlawful

treatment, and a habeas action”). Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claims do not support a habeas claim. The Court should dismiss the habeas petition.

Finally, under *Demore*, mandatory detention under during removal proceedings is constitutional where it continues to “serve its purported immigration purpose.” 538 U.S. at 527 (citing *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690); *see also id.* at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring); *Flores*, 507 U.S. at 306; *Carlson*, 342 U.S. at 540; *Wong Wing*, 163 U.S. at 235-36. Here, Petitioner’s Eight Amendment claims amount to little mor than attempts to characterize her detention as “punitive” and do not undermine the removal related purpose of her detention.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), a writ of habeas corpus “shall not extend to a prisoner” unless he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” The only issue before the Court is the legality of Petitioner’s current detention, and the only relief she could obtain would be release. *See Foy v. Bilderbergers*, 16-cv-0454 (JNE/LIB), 2016 WL 11486912, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 17, 2016) (“a litigant cannot combine civil-rights claims (such as conditions-of-confinement claims) and habeas claims in the same action.”), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2016 WL 2621952 (D. Minn. May 6, 2016); *Mendez v. Kallis*, No. 20-cv-924 (ECT/ECW), 2020 WL 2572524, at *1 (D. Minn. May 21, 2020) (“Mendez’s claims relate to the conditions of his confinement, and consequently, a habeas petition is not the proper claim to remedy his alleged injury.”); *see also Banyee*, 115 F.4th at 931, 934 (distinguishing district court tests that factored in resemblance to criminal incarceration; “Nor is it a problem that the jail the government

used also housed criminals. It takes more to turn otherwise legal detention into unconstitutional punishment.”) (citation omitted).

Thus, the circumstances of this case do not demonstrate that Petitioner’s continued detention under § 1225 violates due process. As in *Demore*, Petitioner’s detention continues to “serve its purported immigration purpose,” 538 U.S. at 527, *i.e.*, ensuring her appearance at her ongoing credible fear and removal proceedings.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that the Court dismiss or deny Petitioner’s habeas petition.

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