1	Jordan Weiner (SBN 356297) jordan@lrcl.org	
2	La Raza Centro Legal 474 Valencia St., Ste. 295	
3	San Francisco, CA 94103 Telephone: (415) 553-3435	
4	Attorney for Petitioner	
5	UNITED STATES DI	STRICT COURT
6	NORTHERN DISTRIC' SAN FRANCISC	T OF CALIFORNIA O DIVISION
7		
8	Jorge Willy VALERA CHUQUILLANQUI,	CASE NO.
9	Petitioner,	PETITION FOR W
10	v.	CORPUS
11 12	POLLY KAISER, Acting Field Office Director of the San Francisco Immigration and Customs	
13	Enforcement Office; TODD LYONS, Acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM,	
1415	Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security, PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the United States, acting in	
16	their official capacities,	
17	Respondents.	
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

CASE NO.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS **CORPUS**

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CASE NO.

26

27

INTRODUCTION

CASE NO.

- 1. Petitioner Jorge Willy Valera Chuquillanqu is an asylum seeker who fled Peru. After Petitioner arrived in the United States in December 2022, federal agents briefly detained him, determined that he was not a flight risk or danger to the community, and released him on his own recognizance with a notice to appear for removal proceedings in immigration court. Since then, Petitioner has done everything the government asked him to do: he has diligently attended every immigration court hearing and filed an application for asylum. He has no criminal history anywhere in the world.
- 2. On July 25, 2025, Petitioner again did what the government told him to do: He went to San Francisco Immigration Court for a routine hearing before Immigration Judge Joseph Park, where the government orally moved to dismiss his case. On information and belief, the government did so for the purpose of placing him in so-called "expedited removal" proceedings. IJ Park did not grant the motion to dismiss. Instead, the judge gave Petitioner time to respond and set a further hearing on October 17, 2025.
- 3. Minutes after Petitioner exited the courtroom, Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") agents arrested him before he could leave the courthouse. After he was taken into custody, Petitioner started experiencing pain in the left half of his body that was paralyzed from a medical incident the year before. As his symptoms grew worse, ICE Officers called an ambulance to take him to a hospital in San Francisco, only to return him to custody the following morning.
- 4. Petitioner's arrest is part of a new, nationwide DHS strategy of sweeping up people who attend their immigration court hearings, detaining them, and seeking to re-route them to fast-track deportations. Since mid-May, DHS has implemented a coordinated practice of leveraging immigration detention to strip people like Petitioner of their substantive and procedural rights and pressure them into deportation. Immigration detention is civil, and thus is permissible for only two reasons: to ensure a noncitizen's appearance at immigration hearings and to prevent danger to the community. But DHS did not arrest and detain Petitioner—who demonstrably poses no risk of absconding from immigration proceedings or danger to the community—for either of these reasons. Instead, as part of its broader enforcement campaign, DHS detained Petitioner to strip him PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

3

6

10

11

13

14

15

17

18 19

21 22

24

23

25 26

27

of his procedural rights, force him to forfeit his applications for relief, and pressure him into fasttrack removal.

- In immigration court, noncitizens have the right to pursue claims for relief from 5. removal (including asylum), be represented by counsel, gather and present evidence, and pursue appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). By dismissing an ongoing case, DHS—in its view—can transfer a noncitizen's case from removal proceedings in immigration court, governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, to cursory proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) called "expedited removal," where the procedural protections and opportunities to pursue relief from removal built into regular immigration-court proceedings do not apply.
- Petitioner's arrest and detention are causing him tremendous and ongoing harm. He 6. has been torn away from his family and his community. The conditions of his confinement are also egregious. The detainees are only given two cereal bars and a bottle of water for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. He sleeps on a metal slab in a room with about five other men and must use an open toilet with no privacy.
- The Constitution protects Petitioner—and every other person present in this 7. country-from arbitrary deprivations of his liberty, and guarantees him due process of law. The government's power over immigration is broad, but as the Supreme Court has declared, it "is subject to important constitutional limitations." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001). "Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action." Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
- Petitioner respectfully seeks a writ of habeas corpus ordering the government to 8. immediately release him from his ongoing, unlawful detention, and prohibiting his re-arrest without a hearing to contest that re-arrest before a neutral decisionmaker. In addition, to preserve this Court's jurisdiction, Petitioner also requests that this Court order the government not to transfer him outside of the District or deport him for the duration of this proceeding.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal 9. 28 | question), 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (Declaratory Judgment Act), 2 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CASE NO.

28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution (the Suspension Clause), the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (Administrative Procedure Act).

10. Venue is proper in this district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and (e)(1) because Petitioner is physically detained within this district.

PARTIES

- 11. Petitioner is a 47-year-old man from Peru. He has no criminal history anywhere in the world. He has a pending application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. He is presently in civil immigration detention at 630 Sansome Street in San Franciso.
- 12. Respondent Polly Kaiser is the Acting Field Office Director of the San Francisco ICE Field Office. In this capacity, she is responsible for the administration of immigration laws and the execution of immigration enforcement and detention policy within ICE's San Francisco Area of Responsibility, including the detention of Petitioner. Respondent Kaiser maintains an office and regularly conducts business in this district. Respondent Kaiser is sued in her official capacity.
- 13. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is the Acting Director of ICE. As the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of ICE, he is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States; routinely transacts business in this District; and is legally responsible for pursuing any effort to detain and remove the Petitioner. Respondent Lyons is sued in his official capacity.
- 14. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of Homeland Security and has ultimate authority over DHS. In that capacity and through her agents, Respondent Noem has broad authority over and responsibility for the operation and enforcement of the immigration laws; routinely transacts business in this District; and is legally responsible for pursuing any effort to detain and remove the Petitioner. Respondent Noem is sued in her official capacity.
- 15. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States and the most senior official at the Department of Justice. In that capacity and through her agents, she is PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

 CASE NO.

responsible for overseeing the implementation and enforcement of the federal immigration laws. The Attorney General delegates this responsibility to the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which administers the immigration courts and the BIA. Respondent Bondi is sued in her official capacity.

EXHAUSTION

16. There is no requirement to exhaust because no other forum exists in which Petitioner can raise the claims herein. There is no statutory exhaustion requirement prior to challenging the constitutionality of an arrest or detention, or challenging a policy under the Administrative Procedure Act. Prudential exhaustion is not required here because it would be futile, and Petitioner will "suffer irreparable harm if unable to secure immediate judicial consideration of [their] claim." *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 147 (1992). Any further exhaustion requirements would be unreasonable.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

- A. The Constitution Protects Noncitizens Like Petitioner from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention.
- 17. The Constitution establishes due process rights for "all 'persons' within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 693). These due process rights are both substantive and procedural.
- 18. First, "[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government," Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974), including "the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate government objective," Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
- 19. These protections extend to noncitizens facing detention, as "[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). Accordingly, "[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.

Substantive due process thus requires that all forms of civil detention—including

20.

- immigration detention—bear a "reasonable relation" to a non-punitive purpose. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). The Supreme Court has recognized only two permissible non-punitive purposes for immigration detention: ensuring a noncitizen's appearance at immigration proceedings and preventing danger to the community. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–92; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 at 519–20, 527–28, 31 (2003).
- 21. Second, the procedural component of the Due Process Clause prohibits the government from imposing even permissible physical restraints without adequate procedural safeguards.
- 22. Generally, "the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). This is so even in cases where that freedom is lawfully revocable. See Hurd v. D.C., Gov't, 864 F.3d at 683 (citing Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 152 (1997) (re-detention after pre-parole conditional supervision requires pre-deprivation hearing)); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (same, in probation context); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (same, in parole context).
- 23. After an initial release from custody on conditions, even a person paroled following a conviction for a criminal offense for which they may lawfully have remained incarcerated has a protected liberty interest in that conditional release. *Morrissey* at 408 U.S. at 482. As the Supreme Court recognized, "[t]he parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions." *Id.* "By whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen within the protection of the [Constitution]." *Id.*
- This reasoning applies with equal if not greater force to people released from civil immigration detention at the border, like Petitioner. After all, noncitizens living in the United States like Petitioner have a protected liberty interest in their ongoing freedom from confinement. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. And, "[g]iven the civil context [of immigration detention], [the] liberty interest [of noncitizens released from custody] is arguably greater than the interest of parolees." Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. DHS Dramatically Expands the Scope of Expedited Removal.

- 25. For decades, DHS applied expedited removal exclusively in the border enforcement context, with only narrow exceptions to that general rule. From 1997 until 2002, expedited removal applied only to inadmissible noncitizens arriving at ports of entry. *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures; Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312 (Mar. 6, 1997).
- 26. In 2002, the government for the first time invoked its authority to apply expedited removal to persons already inside the country, but only for a narrow group of people who arrived by sea, were not admitted or paroled, and were apprehended within two years of entry. *See* Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68924 (Nov. 13, 2002).
- 27. In 2004, the government authorized the application of expedited removal to individuals who entered by means other than sea, but only if they were apprehended within 100 miles of a land border and were unable to demonstrate that they had been continuously physically present in the United States for 14 days. *See* Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877 (Aug. 11, 2004).
- 28. In 2019, at the direction of President Trump, DHS published a Federal Register Notice authorizing the application of expedited removal to certain noncitizens arrested anywhere in the country who could not affirmatively show that they had been continuously present for two years. See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 35409 (July 23, 2019). The District Court for the District of Columbia entered a preliminary injunction preventing the rule from taking effect, which the D.C. Circuit later vacated. Make the Rd. New York v. McAleenan, 405 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2019), vacated sub nom. Make the Rd. New York v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 618 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
- 29. In 2021, President Biden directed the DHS Secretary to review the rule expanding expedited removal and consider whether it comported with legal and constitutional requirements, including due process. In 2022, DHS rescinded the rule. *See* Rescission of the Notice of July 23, PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

 6
 CASE NO.

2019, Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 87 Fed. Reg. 16022 (Mar. 21, 2022).

CASE NO.

- 30. While the 2019 expansion was in effect, the government applied expedited removal to persons inside the country in an exceedingly small number of cases. Thus, from 1997 to 2025, with limited exceptions, immigration authorities generally did not apply expedited removal to noncitizens apprehended far from the border, or individuals anywhere in the United States (including near the border) who had been residing in the country for more than fourteen days.
- Trump took office for his second term. That day, President Trump signed Executive Order 14159, "Protecting the American People Against Invasion," the purpose of which was "to faithfully execute the immigration laws against all inadmissible and removable aliens, particularly those aliens who threaten the safety or security of the American people." Exec. Order No. 14,159, 90 C.F.R. § 8443 (Jan. 20, 2025). The order directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to take various actions "to ensure the efficient and expedited removal of aliens from the United States." *Id*.
- 32. To implement this Executive Order, DHS issued a notice immediately authorizing application of expedited removal to certain noncitizens arrested anywhere in the country who cannot show "to the satisfaction of an immigration officer" that they have been continuously present in the United States for at least two years. 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (published Jan. 24, 2025).
- 33. On January 23, 2025, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum "provid[ing] guidance regarding how to exercise enforcement discretion in implementing" the new expedited-removal rule. The guidance directed federal immigration officers to "consider . . . whether to apply expedited removal" to "any alien DHS is aware of who is amenable to expedited removal but to whom expedited removal has not been applied." As part of that process, the guidance encourages officers to "take steps to terminate any ongoing removal proceeding and/or any active parole status."

¹ Benjamine C. Huffman, *Guidance Regarding How to Exercise Enforcement Discretion*, Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Jan. 23, 2025), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/25_0123_erand-parole-guidance.pdf.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

34. Under the administration's expanded approach to expedited removal, hundreds of thousands of noncitizens who have lived in the country for less than two years are at imminent risk of summary removal without any hearing, meaningful process, access to counsel, or judicial review—regardless of the strength of their ties to the United States.

B. To Place More People in Expedited Removal, DHS Undertakes New Campaign of Courthouse Arrests and Detention.

- 35. Since mid-May 2025, DHS has initiated an aggressive new enforcement campaign targeting people who are in regular removal proceedings in immigration court, many of whom have pending applications for asylum or other relief. This "coordinated operation" is "aimed at dramatically accelerating deportations" by arresting people at the courthouse and placing them into expedited removal.²
- 36. The first step of this enforcement operation typically takes place inside the immigration court. When people arrive in court for their master calendar hearings, DHS attorneys orally file a motion to dismiss the proceedings—without any notice to the affected individual. Although DHS regulations do not permit such motions to dismiss absent a showing that the "[c]ircumstances of the case have changed," 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a)(7), (c), DHS attorneys do not conduct any case-specific analysis of changed circumstances before filing these motions to dismiss.
- 37. Even though individuals are supposed to have ten days to respond to a motion to dismiss, some IJs have granted the government's oral motion on the spot and immediately dismissed the case. This is consistent with recent instructions from the Department of Justice to immigration judges stating that they may allow the government to move to dismiss cases orally, in court, without a written motion, and to decide that motion without allowing the noncitizen an opportunity to file a response.

² Arelis R. Hernández & Maria Sacchetti, *Immigrant Arrests at Courthouses Signal New Tactic in Trump's Deportation Push*, Wash. Post, May 23, 2025,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2025/05/23/immigration-court-arrests-ice-trump/; see also Hamed Aleaziz, Luis Ferré-Sadurní, & Miriam Jordan, How ICE is Seeking to Ramp Up Deportations Through Courthouse Arrests, N.Y. Times, May 30, 2025,

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/30/us/politics/ice-courthouse-arrests.html.

- 38. Despite these instructions, some IJs have still asked DHS to re-file the motion as a written motion and continued proceedings to allow individuals to file their response. A smaller group of IJs have expressly denied the motion to dismiss on the record or in a written order.
- 39. The next step of DHS's new campaign takes place outside the courtroom. ICE officers, in consultation with DHS attorneys and officials, station themselves in courthouse waiting rooms, hallways, and elevator banks. When an individual exits their immigration hearings, ICE officers—typically masked and in plainclothes—immediately arrest the person and detain them. ICE officers execute these arrests regardless of how the IJ rules on the government's motion to dismiss. On information and belief, they typically do not have an arrest warrant.
- 40. Once the person has been transferred to a detention facility, the government places the individual in expedited removal. In cases in which the IJ did not dismiss the person's removal proceedings, DHS attorneys unilaterally transfer venue of the case to a "detained" immigration court, where they renew their motions to dismiss—again with the goal of putting the person in expedited removal.
- 41. DHS is aggressively pursuing this arrest and detention campaign at courthouses throughout the country. In New York City, for example, "ICE agents have apprehended so many people showing up for routine appointments this month that the facilities" are "overcrowded," with "[h]undreds of migrants . . . sle[eping] on the floor or sitting upright, sometimes for days." 3
- 42. The same is true at the San Francisco Immigration Court, where Petitioner was arrested. Over the last month, dozens of people have been arrested and detained after attending their routine immigration hearings.⁴

³ Luis Ferré-Sadurní, *Inside a Courthouse, Chaos and Tears as Trump Accelerates Deportations*, N.Y. Times, June 12, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/12/nyregion/immigration-courthouse-arrests-trump-deportation.html.

⁴ Sarah Ravani, *ICE Arrests Two More at S.F. Immigration Court, Advocates Say*, S.F. Chron., June 12, 2025, https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/sf-immigration-court-arrests-20374755.php; Margaret Kadifa & Gustavo Hernandez, *Immigrants fearful as ICE Nabs at least 15 in S.F.*, *Including Toddler*, Mission Local, June 5, 2025, https://missionlocal.org/2025/06/ice-arrest-san-francisco-toddler/; Tomoki Chien, *Undercover ICE Agents Begin Making Arrests at SF Immigration Court*, S.F. Standard, May 27, 2025, https://sfstandard.com/2025/05/27/undercover-ice-agents-make-arrests-san-francisco-court/.

12

13

11

14

1617

18 19

20

22

23

24 25

26

27

- 43. DHS's aggressive tactics at immigration courts appear to be motivated by the Administration's imposition of a new daily quota of 3,000 ICE arrests.⁵ In part as a result of this campaign, ICE's arrests of noncitizens with no criminal record have increased more than 800% since before January.⁶
- 44. The new courthouse arrest and detention campaign is a sharp break from DHS's previous practices, when immigration officers avoided arrests at courthouses given the concern that such enforcement actions would deter people from appearing for their proceedings and complying with court orders.⁷
- 45. In fact, DHS officials previously permitted ICE officers to conduct "civil immigration enforcement action . . . in or near a courthouse" only in highly limited circumstances, such as when "it involves a national security threat," or "there is an imminent risk of death, violence, or physical harm." These limitations were necessary, DHS explained, because "[e]xecuting civil immigration enforcement actions in or near a courthouse may chill individuals' access to courthouses, and, as a result, impair the fair administration of justice." The new policy includes no such limiting language. 9
 - 46. The government's new campaign is also a significant shift from previous DHS

⁵ Ted Hesson & Kristina Cooke, *ICE's Tactics Draw Criticism as it Triples Daily Arrest Targets*, Reuters, June 10, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/ices-tactics-draw-criticism-it-triples-daily-arrest-targets-2025-06-10/; Alayna Alvarez & Brittany Gibson, *ICE Ramps Up Immigration Arrests in Courthouses Across the U.S.*, Axios, June 12, 2025, https://www.axios.com/2025/06/12/ice-courthouse-arrests-trump.

⁶ José Olivares & Will Craft, *ICE Arrests of Migrants with No Criminal History Surging under Trump*, The Guardian, June 14, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jun/14/ice-arrests-migrants-trump-figures.

⁷ Hamed Aleaziz, Luis Ferré-Sadurní, & Miriam Jordan, *How ICE Is Seeking to Ramp Up Deportations Through Courthouse Arrests*, N.Y. Times, May 30, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/30/us/politics/ice-courthouse-arrests.html.

⁸ A true and correct copy of DHS' April 27, 2021 *Civil Immigration Enforcement Actions in or Near Courthouses* memorandum from Tae Johnson and Troy Miller is attached hereto as Exhibit

⁹ A true and correct copy of ICE's January 21, 2025 *Interim Guidance: Civil Immigration Enforcement Actions in or near Courthouses* memorandum from Caleb Vitello is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. A true and correct copy of ICE's May 27, 2025 *Civil Immigration Enforcement Actions In or Near Courthouses* memorandum from Todd M. Lyons is attached hereto as Exhibit 3

practice of re-detaining noncitizens only after a material change in circumstances. *See Saravia v. Sessions*, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2017), *aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions*, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018) (describing prior practice).

C. Petitioner is Unlawfully Arrested and Detained Pursuant to DHS's New Policy.

- 47. Petitioner fled Peru in 2022 after members of an organized criminal group threatened him and his family.
- 48. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in December 2022. Immigration officials detained him for about three days and then released him into the United States. In granting him release without requiring that he pay bond or wear an ankle monitor, DHS determined that he posed little if any risk of flight or danger to the community.
- 49. Petitioner thereafter moved to Daly City, California. He attended multiple required check-ins at the San Francisco ICE office and appeared for regular phone check-ins.
- 50. In 2024, Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. He received employment authorization. He worked as a cleaner.
- 51. Petitioner was scheduled for a master calendar hearing on July 25, 2025. Prior to the hearing, he submitted a motion to appear by video to the Immigration Judge. He did not want to appear at his hearing in-person in part because he was undergoing medical issues as a result of a medical incident he endured last year, which he believes was a stroke. The Immigration Judge denied the motion.
- 52. On July 25, 2025, Petitioner appeared in-person at San Francisco Immigration Court for a master calendar hearing before Immigration Judge Park. The government made a motion to dismiss. IJ Park did not rule on the motion at that hearing. He reset the hearing for October 17, 2025 at 8:30 AM.
- 53. Immediately after the hearing, ICE agents arrested Petitioner and took him into custody.
- 54. On July 25, 2025, a dispatcher with the San Mateo County Rapid Response Network (SMC RRN) network was notified about Petitioner's arrest. An on-call responding attorney went to meet with him. Another SMC RR attorney joined her later.

- 55. DHS officials brought out Petitioner to meet with one of the SMC RRN attorneys in a visitation room on the sixth floor. They were separated by plexiglass and spoke through telephone handsets. The attorney could see Petitioner was in obvious pain. Petitioner was struggling to breathe and experiencing swelling in his neck, hands, and feet.
- 56. The attorney escalated Petitioner's medical condition to ICE. ICE Officer Johnson came out and spoke to them. He kept asking if Petitioner needed to be screened medically, and Petitioner kept responding "yes" in Spanish, but ICE Officer Johnson feigned that he couldn't understand. It wasn't until Petitioner said "yes" in English that ICE finally called an ambulance.
- 57. The attorney submitted a release request to ICE and request to keep Petitioner in the local AOR based on the severity of his health shortly afterward. She attached medical records provided by his sister. She never received a response.
- 58. Later that evening, another attorney with the SMC RRN e-mailed ICE ERO, ICE San Francisco Outreach, and the two contacts she had listed as AFODs. She wrote she was worried about Petitioner's health and asked what hospital he was at. She also asked for his location if he was not in a hospital because she urgently needed to meet with him for legal reasons. She attached a G-28, which is the form that authorizes ICE to provide information to an attorney acting on behalf of a noncitizen. She also submitted a G-28 through ERO eFile, an online system developed to electronically file G-28s with ICE ERO. As of the date of this filing, ICE has not responded to her e-mail.
- 59. Petitioner was taken to Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital and Trauma Center. He spent the night there, and a blood test was taken the next day. He was also given an injection of what may have been a sedative. ICE agents returned Petitioner to 630 Sansome Street later that morning. ICE agents were in possession of Petitioner's medical documents but would not give them to Petitioner.
- 60. On July 28, 2025, an intern working with an attorney from the SMC RRN visited Petitioner at 630 Sansome. Petitioner was still in severe pain. He felt like he had been hit on the side of his body that was paralyzed. The back of his head hurt. He had poor balance on his right foot for the last few days. He thinks he may have had a stroke.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CASE NO.

- 61. He also explained that the conditions at 630 Sansome are horrendous. The detainees are only given two cereal bars and a bottle of water for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. He shares a room with about five men. He sleeps on a metal slab and everything is metal. There is no place to shower. There is an open toilet and no privacy. It feels like a high security prison. He hasn't been able to communicate with his family.
- 62. The intern asked ICE Officer Caldwell for Petitioner's medical records. Officer Caldwell responded that she would have to do a Freedom of Information Act request or ask the hospital for the records. She asked him if Petitioner was staying at the building, and he said he didn't know if he could tell her and that they were "doing things."
- 63. As the intern was leaving, she heard women in a room banging on a door, saying someone inside was overheating and it was a medical emergency. They let her come out, and the intern saw an indigenous-appearing women who seemed in distress.
- 64. Because Petitioner has never been determined to be a flight risk or danger to the community, his ongoing detention is not related to either of the permissible justifications for civil immigration litigation. His detention does not further any legitimate government interest.
- D. As a Result of His Arrest and Detention, Petitioner is Suffering Ongoing and Irreparable Harm.
- 65. Petitioner is being deprived of his liberty without any permissible justification. The government previously released him on his own recognizance because he did not pose sufficient risk of flight or danger to the community to warrant detention.
- 66. None of that has changed. Petitioner has no criminal record, and there is no basis to believe that he poses any public-safety risk. Nor is Petitioner, who was arrested *while appearing* in court for his immigration case, conceivably a flight risk. To the contrary, Petitioner appeared for every immigration court hearing and supervision check-in, and he has consistently informed the court about any change in his address or other circumstances.
- 67. Petitioner is currently experiencing severe pain as a result of a serious medical incident he endured in mid-2024. He was also diagnosed with Bell's Palsy in September 2024. He has been held for several days in inhumane conditions.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

(Substantive Due Process—Detention)

- Petitioner repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the preceding 68. paragraphs of this Petition as if fully set forth herein.
- The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects all "person[s]" from 69. deprivation of liberty "without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
- 70. Immigration detention is constitutionally permissible only when it furthers the government's legitimate goals of ensuring the noncitizen's appearance during removal proceedings and preventing danger to the community. See id.
- Petitioner is not a flight risk or danger to the community. Respondents' detention 71. of Petitioner is therefore unjustified and unlawful. Accordingly, Petitioner is being detained in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
- Moreover, Petitioner's detention is punitive as it bears no "reasonable relation" to 72. any legitimate government purpose. Id. (finding immigration detention is civil and thus ostensibly "nonpunitive in purpose and effect"). Here, the purpose of Petitioner's detention appears to be "not to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons"-namely, to meet newly-imposed DHS quotas and transfer immigration court venue away from an IJ who refused to facilitate DHS's new expedited removal scheme. Demore, 538 U.S. at 532–33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

(Procedural Due Process—Detention)

Petitioner repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the preceding 73. 14 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CASE NO.

1

2 3

4

5

6

7

8

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

23

24

25

26 27

11

17

23

20

24 25

CASE NO.

paragraphs of this Petition as if fully set forth herein.

- As part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, Petitioner has a weighty liberty interest in avoiding re-incarceration after his release. See Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1997); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1972); see also Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 969-70 (holding that a noncitizen has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody following an IJ's bond determination).
- Accordingly, "[i]n the context of immigration detention, it is well-settled that due 75. process requires adequate procedural protections to ensure that the government's asserted justification for physical confinement outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 990 (cleaned up); Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127 (Generally, "the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property."). In the immigration context, for such hearings to comply with due process, the government must bear the burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the noncitizen poses a flight risk or danger to the community. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785, 786 (9th Cir. 2024).
- Petitioner's re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing violated due process. 76. Nearly two years after deciding to release Petitioner from custody on his own recognizance, Respondents re-detained Petitioner with no notice, no explanation of the justification of his redetention, and no opportunity to contest his re-detention before a neutral adjudicator before being taken into custody.
- Petitioner has a profound personal interest in his liberty. Because he received no 77. procedural protections, the risk of erroneous deprivation is high. And the government has no legitimate interest in detaining Petitioner without a hearing; bond hearings are conducted as a matter of course in immigration proceedings, and nothing in Petitioner's record suggested that he would abscond or endanger the community before a bond hearing could be carried out. See, e.g., Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021); Vargas v. 28 | Jennings, 2020 WL 5074312, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020) ("the government's concern that 15 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

delay in scheduling a hearing could exacerbate flight risk or danger is unsubstantiated in light of petitioner's strong family ties and his continued employment during the pandemic as an essential agricultural worker").

4

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

5

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

6 7

Assume jurisdiction over this matter; 1.

or danger to the community;

8

Issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to immediately release 2. Petitioner from custody;

9

Declare that Petitioner's arrest and detention violate the Due Process Clause of the 3.

10

Fifth Amendment.

11

Enjoin Respondents from transferring Petitioner outside this District or deporting 4.

12

Petitioner pending these proceedings;

13 14

Enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner unless his re-detention is ordered 5. at a custody hearing before a neutral arbiter in which the government bears the

15

burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner is a flight risk

16

17

Award Petitioner his costs and reasonable attorneys' fees in this action as provided 6.

for by the Equal Access to Justice Act and 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and

18

19

7. Grant such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

20

Date: July 28, 2025

Respectfully Submitted,

22

21

23

24

25 26

27

28

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CASE NO.

/s/ Jordan Weiner

La Raza Centro Legal 474 Valencia St., Ste. 295 San Francisco, CA 94103

Telephone: (415) 553-3435 E-mail: jordan@lrcl.org

Attorney for Petitioner