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Case \$:25-cv-01937-MEMF-DFM

- Artka Ovsepian (Petitioner), by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby
 files this petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the unlawful
 revocation of his release on an order of supervision (OSUP) and his
 continued detention without belief that his removal from the United States is
 reasonably foreseeable.
- Petitioner entered the United States on or about September 12, 1995, at the
 age of fourteen years old, and was granted asylum on December 9, 1995.
 Petitioner was subsequently accorded lawful permanent residence status.
- 3. Petitioner is married to Marion Manukian, and they have two children: Mark Ovsepian (14 years old) and Tiffany Ovsepian (age 19). Petitioner's sister, Liliana Ovsepian, is a lawful permanent resident. His other sister, Izabella Hovsepyan, is a U.S. citizen. His father, Arshak Ovsepian, is a lawful permanent resident, and his mother, Tsovinar Ovsepian, is a U.S. citizen.
- 4. On June 5, 2017, Petitioner was convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, 1347 (conspiracy to commit health care fraud) and related crimes. An amended judgment and commitment order was issued on February 13, 2024. He was ordered to pay more than \$9,000,000 in restitution and to serve a total of 156 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release.
- Petitioner was subsequently detained by ICE and ordered removed on June 18, 2024.

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- 7. On August 2, 2024, the Consulate General of Armenia responded to correspondence from ICE, informing them that Petitioner is not a citizen of Armenia. On information and belief, around the same time (August 2024), Russia and Turkey also rejected requests to issue a travel document to Petitioner.
- 8. On October 29, 2024, Petitioner was released from ICE custody on an OSUP. Petitioner complied with the requirements of his OSUP and incurred no additional criminal violations.
- 9. On June 9, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained by ICE officials. ICE officials called Petitioner to their office to replace or repair an allegedly faulty GPS tracking device. On information and belief, there was no malfunction of Petitioner's GPS device, and the alleged malfunction was a pretext to rearrest Petitioner.
- 10.On information and belief, ICE officials did not provide Petitioner with any notice for the reasons they were revoking his release, nor did they provide him with the opportunity to present evidence as to why he should remain at liberty. Rather, the officers simply informed him that he was being arrested because of a "new administration, new rules."

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- 11. Petitioner suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) since 2014 and has been prescribed Zyprexa and Trazodone. He also suffers from high cholesterol, peripheral neuropathy resulting from a gunshot wound, nerve pain, hearing loss, high blood pressure, and gastro-esophageal reflux disease (GERD).
- 12. During his first ICE custody in 2024, he was prescribed an albuterol inhaler, amlodipine (a medication for high blood pressure), gabapentin (a medication for nerve pain), and rosuvastatin (a medication to treat high cholesterol).
- 13. Since being re-detained by ICE, Petitioner has been without his required medication. He has seen a doctor twice and has been provided with seven "cough and cold" pills only. Prior to his detention, he was taking daily medication for high blood pressure, as well as Trazadone and Zyprexa as needed to manage his PTSD symptoms. Petitioner's re-detention has triggered increased symptoms of his PTSD, and Petitioner's ability to participate in the removal process has been adversely impacted by ICE's failure to provide him with the appropriate medication.
- 14. Since being re-detained, Petitioner has sent letters to the consulates of the United Kingdom, Italy, and France, requesting the issuance of a travel document. To date, he has received no response to any of this correspondence.
- 15. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Petitioner has been stateless.

- 16.On information and belief, DHS has no particularized evidence that Petitioner can be removed to any country.
- 17. On information and belief, Petitioner has not received an individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to assess whether his recent redetention is warranted due to danger or flight risk.

PARTIES

- 18. Petitioner Artak Ovsepian is a stateless individual born in the former Soviet Union, and a former lawful permanent resident of the United States, who is currently in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security,

 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS or ICE) at the Adelanto

 Detention Center in Adelanto, California.
- 19. Respondent Pamela Bondi, the Attorney General, is the highest-ranking official within the Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondent Bondi has responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103. As the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) has not been amended to reflect the designation of the Secretary of the DHS as the administrator and enforcer of immigration laws, Respondent Bondi is sued in her official capacity to the extent that 8 U.S.C. § 1102 gives her authority over immigration law.
- 20. Respondent Kristi Noem, the Secretary of the DHS, is the highest-ranking

 official within the DHS. Respondent Noem, by and through her agency for the DHS, is responsible for the implementation of the INA, and for ensuring compliance with applicable federal law. She is also responsible for the detention of non-citizens by ICE. Respondent Noem is sued in her official capacity as an agent of the government of the United States.

- 21. The DHS is the agency responsible for detaining non-citizens, including Petitioner.
- 22. Respondent F. Semaia is the warden at Adelanto Detention Facility. He oversees Petitioner's place of custody.
- 23. Respondent Ernesto Santacruz, Jr. is the Acting Field Office Director of the Los Angeles office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He oversees the custody of all Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainees at the Adelanto Detention Facility. Respondent Santacruz is sued in his official capacity as an agent of the government of the United States.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

24. This Court has jurisdiction over the present action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, general federal question jurisdiction; 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); habeas jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.; Art I., § 9, Cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause); and the common law. This action arises under the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the INA. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et. seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq., and the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

- 25. Federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of DHS conduct. Federal courts are not stripped of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
- 26. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are agencies of the United States or officers or employees thereof acting in their official capacity or under color of legal authority; Petitioner is in the custody of the Los Angeles Field Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the warden of the Adelanto Detention Center, both of which are in the jurisdiction of the Central District of California; and there is no real property involved in this action.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

27. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) governs the detention of individuals who have been ordered removed. The statute directs ICE to detain such individuals for 90 days while carrying out a removal order. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). This 90-day removal period begins when the removal order becomes final.

Absent an applicable exception, if ICE cannot remove a person within the 90-day removal period, they are released from custody subject to supervision. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).

- 28.8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) permits detention beyond the normal 90-day removal period, but even these exceptions do not authorize indefinite detention. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (limiting ICE's detention authority to a period "reasonably necessary" to carry out removal and deeming detention impermissible when removal is not "reasonably foreseeable").
- 29. The regulations permit release of a non-citizen subject to a removal order after the 90-day removal period has elapsed if ICE determines that the non-citizen "would not pose a danger to the public or a risk of flight, without regard to the likelihood of the [non-citizen's] removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(b)(1). These released individuals are typically subject to an OSUP, as Petitioner was prior to being re-detained. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(j); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h).
- 30. ICE may withdraw its approval for the release of a non-citizen if it can effectual the individual's removal from the United States "in the reasonably foreseeable future" or if the individual fails to comply with the conditions of release. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(4). ICE may only revoke a non-citizen's release if "there is a significant likelihood that the [non-citizen] may be

removed in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Id.* at § 241.13(i)(2). "Upon revocation, the [non-citizen] will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his [] release." *Id.* at § 241.13(i)(3).

- 31. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that no "qualified individual with a disability" be "excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also 6 C.F.R. § 15.30 (prohibiting discrimination by DHS).
- 32. "To state a *prima facie* case under Section 504, [Petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) they are qualified individuals with a disability, as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act [], (2) they are otherwise qualified for the benefit or services sought; (3) that they were denied the benefit or services solely by reason of their handicap; and (4) the program providing the benefit or services receives federal financial assistance." *Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder*, 767 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1051-52 (C.D. Ca. 2010).
- 33. A "disability" is defined as either: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual,
 (B) a record of such an impairment, or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).

34. Respondents may remove a non-citizen to a third country (i.e., a country in which the non-citizen does not hold citizenship) if removal to their country of citizenship is impractical, inadvisable or impossible. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E)(ii). However, DHS is barred from removing a non-citizen to a country where the non-citizen's life or freedom would be threatened because of five protected grounds. *Id.* at § 1231(b)(3)(A). In addition, DHS is barred from deporting a non-citizen to a country where they face a threat of torture. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-208.18.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

UNLAWFUL REVOCATION OF RELEASE

- 35. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates each allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34.
- 36. Petitioner was previously detained by ICE and released because his removal could not be effectuated. If he complies with the conditions of this OSUP, Respondents have the authority to revoke his release only if there is a significant likelihood that they can remove him in the reasonably foreseeable future. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2).
- 37. Respondents revoked Petitioner's release without evidence that he can be repatriated deported to any other country. Indeed, at the time of his detention, ICE had not even decided which country it would attempt to

deport Petitioner to, let alone whether such deportation could be effectuated in the reasonably foreseeable future.

38. Respondents' actions are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(2)(A). Petitioner is entitled to immediate release on an OSUP.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF PROCEDURES FOR REVOCATION OF RELEASE

- 39. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates each allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34.
- 40. The governing regulations require Respondents to notify Petitioner of the reason for his re-detention. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Respondents have not complied with this obligation, nor have they yet provided him with an initial interview at which he can respond to the purported reasons from revocation.

 Cf. id. As such, Petitioner is entitled to immediate release on OSUP until ICE can provide the minimal process required by the regulation.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

UNLAWFUL DETENTION WHERE REMOVAL IS NOT REASONABLY FORESEEABLE

- 41. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates each allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34.
- 42. Post-removal order detention violated 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) where removal is not significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. *See also Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
- 43. Detention where removal is not reasonably foreseeable also violates due process.
- 44.Petitioner was already detained during the 90-day removal period, until ICE determined it could not effectuate removal and released him on an OSUP.

 Given that Petitioner is stateless and multiple countries have already rejected his request for travel documents, he has made an initial showing under Zadvydas that his removal is not significantly likely. Id. at 701.

 Respondents cannot rebut this showing, as they do not have any individualized evidence to believe that Petitioner's removal is reasonably foreseeable, as demonstrated by the statements of the arresting officer confirming that ICE had not yet even determined to which country it will try to deport Petitioner.

45. Petitioner's re-detention under these circumstances violates Section 1231 and the Due Process Clause under the U.S. Constitution.

46. Petitioner is entitled to immediate release on an OSUP.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

UNLAWFUL DETENTION WITHOUT INDIVIDUALIZED DETERMINATIONS OF DANGER OR FLIGHT RISK

- 47. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates each allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34.
- 48. Detention violates Section 1231 and the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
 Constitution unless it is reasonably related to the government's purpose of preventing flight and protecting the community. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690-91.
- 49. Before being re-detained, Petitioner lived in the community for eight months, in compliance with the terms of his OSUP. He returned to his family and incurred no new criminal violations. Petitioner has received no process to determine if his re-detention is warranted.
- 50.Petitioner is entitled to an individualized determination by impartial adjudicators as to whether detention is justified based on danger or flight risk.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT

51. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates each allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34.

- 52. The Rehabilitation Act prevents the federal government from discriminating against individuals with disabilities in a manner that prevents the individuals from meaningfully participating in any activity conducted by an executive agency.
- 53. Petitioner's PTSD qualifies as a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.

 Respondents' failure to provide him with the necessary medication to treat his PTSD has affected his ability to participate in the removal process.
- 54. Petitioner is entitled to release from custody, in order to obtain proper treatment for his disability, and to facilitate his meaningful participation in the removal process.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

UNLAWFUL REMOVAL TO A THIRD COUNTRY

55. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates each allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34.

- 56. Notwithstanding the statutory and regulatory prohibitions on removing noncitizens to countries where they face potential persecution or torture, on
 March 30, 2025, Respondent Noemi issued a memo entitled, "Guidance
 Regarding Third Country Removals." This memo states that if the United
 States has received "diplomatic assurances" from a third country that noncitizens removed to that country will not be persecuted or tortured, DHS may
 remove that non-citizen "without the need for further procedures." Exhibit
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- 57. The procedure laid out in this memo violates the statutory and regulatory provisions requiring Respondents to provide a non-citizen with a forum to demonstrate an individualized risk of torture or persecution in a specific country. The memo purports to rely on blanket assurances from third countries that non-citizens generally will not be tortured or persecuted to circumvent the obligation to determine if an individual non-citizen faces a risk of torture or persecution.
- 58. To the extent that Respondents are detaining Petitioner with the intent to remove him to a third country without notice or the opportunity to demonstrate that he is at a particularized risk of torture or persecution in that third country, the detention is unlawful.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant the following relief:

- 1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 2. Declare that Respondents have violated Petitioner's rights;
- Order Respondents to notify Petitioner of the reasons for the revocation of his release and provide Petitioner with a prompt interview as required by regulation;
- Order Respondents to Release Petitioner from detention because they lack any individualized evidence that removal of Petitioner will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future;
- 5. Order Respondents to release Petitioner from detention absent an individualized determination by an impartial adjudicator that his detention is justified based on danger or flight risk, which cannot be sufficiently addressed by alternative conditions of release and/or supervision;
- Order Respondents to release Petitioner from detention so that he may obtain appropriate medical care for his disability and accordingly participate in a meaningful way in the removal process;
- Enjoin Respondents from revoking Petitioner's release unless they have individualized evidence that his removal is reasonably foreseeable;

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- 8. Enjoin Respondents from revoking Petitioner's release without providing him a determination by an impartial adjudicator that his detention is justified based on danger or flight risk, which cannot be sufficiently addressed by alternative conditions of release and/or supervision, at which hearing Respondents will bear the burden of proof of demonstrating that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community;
- Enjoin Respondents from removing Petitioner to a third country without sufficient notice and opportunity to demonstrate that he faces a specific risk of torture or persecution in that third country;
- 10.Award Petitioner his costs and reasonable attorneys' fees in this action as provided for by the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any further basis justified under law;
- 11. Grant such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of July, 2025

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